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The inclusion of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) as an official diagnosis in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) in 1980 triggered a resurgence 
of interest in trauma research, stimulating the production of a huge amount of empirical data 
and a range of theoretical innovations over the past three decades. Interestingly, these 
intensive research efforts stem from a variety of scientific disciplines, which, according to 
Vincenzo Di Nicola (2012a), can be roughly divided into two large traditions. On the one 
hand, psychological trauma has, of course, been extensively studied from an explicitly 
clinical perspective. This research pole encompasses disciplines such as the neurosciences, 
cognitive and behavioral psychology, clinical psychiatry, psychoanalysis and so on. On the 
other hand, and rather atypically for a psychiatric disorder, trauma has increasingly become a 
topic of interest for cultural fields of enquiry such as literature research, holocaust studies, 
women’s studies, and postcolonial research. Needless to say, these various disciplines and, on 
a larger scale, the clinical and cultural poles of trauma research, are characterized by radically 
divergent values, epistemological assumptions, methodologies, beliefs and aims – to a degree 
that it would be justified to speak of two separate ‘trauma communities’, each with a 
distinctive and irreducible understanding of trauma, despite their commonalities and 
interrelations (Di Nicola, 2012b). Whereas the clinical research pole is largely associated with 
a positivist and empiricist approach to trauma rooted in a biomedical model, the cultural pole 
is more influenced by social constructionist and postmodern scientific paradigms.   
The combined research efforts of the last three decades can therefore be said to have given 
birth to a body of knowledge that, with a wink to Jacques Lacan’s (1949) mirror stage theory, 
is best described as a corps morcelé: an amorphous, split or divided corpus that cannot be 
identified as a whole when viewed from the vantage point of whichever of its constituent 
parts. In other words, the sprawling knowledge of trauma that is produced in these various 
fields of inquiry cannot be integrated into a single, unified discourse, due to the lack of a point 
of reference from where such an operation could occur. As Dominick LaCapra (2001) 
observed: ‘no genre or discipline “owns” trauma as a problem or can provide definitive 
boundaries for it’ (p.96).  
xii    PREFACE 
 
My own research starts from the observed tension between cultural and clinical accounts of 
trauma. Because of the distinct perspectives on the same phenomenon, their juxtaposition 
offers somewhat of a ‘parallax view’; the shift between both vantage points apparently puts 
the scrutinized object in motion. When we consider the points at which these traditions 
diverge in their understanding of trauma, then the underlying presuppositions of both, which 
often remain implicit, suddenly light up with great clarity. Moreover, it has been argued that 
the gap that separates both approaches discloses something about the studied phenomenon 
itself: from this point of view, the observed lack of integration in the corpus of trauma 
knowledge is not merely the result of the different perspectives from which trauma is studied, 
but rather indicative of a split or gap in the concept of trauma itself (Di Nicola, 2012a). Every 
attempt to describe and localize this gap, for instance by means of the introduction of a 
dichotomy (for example, cultural versus clinical; moral versus theoretical (Fassin & 
Rechtman, 2009); mimetic versus antimetic (Leys, 2000)) brings a degree of order to the 
confusing multitude of trauma studies and theories, without however exhausting the tensions 
internal to trauma. As Di Nicola shows, each posited dichotomy is ‘shifting, porous and 
unstable’ (2012a, p. 103): it will always give rise to cases that cannot be allocated to either of 
the proposed poles of the dichotomy. Psychoanalytic theory is a good case in point: although 
it is first and foremost a clinical theory, its insights are often adopted in cultural work on 
trauma.  
It follows that in the confrontation with this gap, my goal is not to attempt an impossible 
Hegelian-style Aufhebung of the tension between the thesis and its antithesis. Nor is it even to 
aid in the construction of a ‘common ground’ or bridge between them. The idea is rather that 
the inter-implication of both traditions disrupts their respective independent flows; it lays bare 
a number of aporias that are otherwise easily missed. The goal is ultimately to subvert a 
number of distinctions and divergences that separate both traditions, for example the 
purported discrepancy between clinical-therapeutic and sociopolitical goals in clinical and 
cultural accounts of trauma respectively. In line with the general rationale of this project, I 
believe that the disruption caused by juxtaposing both outlooks is a motor force for theoretical 
innovation. 
Part I of this dissertation focuses on the etiology of trauma, with special attention given to two 
intertwined problems: Criterion A of the PTSD diagnosis and delayed traumatic reactions. An 





Parts II and III focus on trauma in its relation to politics and ethics. It is my contention that 
recent philosophical analyses of the dynamics of rupture in sociopolitical change can be put to 
use to incorporate the political dimension in our understanding of trauma. Whereas trauma is 
ordinarily understood as a rupture on a psychological, intra-individual level, these 
philosophical theories make use of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory to comprehend how 
rupture appears on a trans-individual, collective or societal level – and how this constitutes a 
possibility and a prerequisite for the creative invention of new political or economical 
structures. Whereas current psychological trauma approaches have been criticized for 
obscuring and neglecting the sociopolitical aspects of trauma recovery, philosophical theories 
of rupture and cultural trauma theories are at risk of downplaying the suffering of those 
caught up in movements of radical social change – in favor of an emphasis on the creative 
possibilities of such disruptive moments. I believe the choice between a psychological and a 
sociological level of analysis and intervention to be a false one. Through a discussion of 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, I hope to show where this dichotomy becomes unstable, and how 
this can broaden our understanding of trauma recovery as an ethical endeavor with political 







The concept of trauma has become ubiquitous in contemporary society. Whenever a sudden, 
unexpected and horrific event disrupts the normal run of things, the language of trauma is 
deployed by professionals and lay-persons alike in an attempt to make sense of the 
unthinkable. More generally, it has been argued that in our postmodern times, the scientific 
disciplines of medicine and psychology have increasingly taken over religion’s primary role 
of providing meaning and coherence for a world continuously shaken up by the 
unforeseeable. This is evidenced, for instance, by the observation that ‘therapeutic forms 
rather than religious ceremonies are becoming the predominant cultural rites that accompany 
public and private events’ (Pupavac, 2004, p. 495).  
The old, biblical proverb that ‘God works in mysterious ways’ still echoes the ways in which 
religion used to assure people that the senseless would be revealed to be meaningful after all, 
once our human restraints were transcended in the hereafter. If God is dead, then he can no 
longer perform this pivotal task of holding the world together, of being the universal 
hypokeimenon or subjectum of everything that is – or at least of providing the semblance of 
possibility of such a harmonious unity in which everything has purpose and makes sense, by 
grace of the bestowment of some sort of divine Order that allocates everything its rightful 
place. In the vacuum left behind in the West by God’s demise, then, science can be said to be 
the prime candidate to take upon itself this abandoned function of providing meaning and 
guaranteeing order. Understand that this is not necessarily science per se, as it is practiced by 
scientists themselves, but rather the way in which this form of human activity is recuperated 
and put to work in popular discourse (that is, scientism). The chorus of pre-modern religiosity 
with its returning theme of a unifying One continues to stir up deep-rooted desires for a 
universe that closes in upon itself, one that, in the final analysis, will be shown to make a 
whole. Deep down we still believe that everything happens for a reason, and science has now 
become the instrument on which we rely to unearth the obscured links in a supposedly 
complete causal chain. God’s proclaimed death, then, did not prevent the suffusion of 
theological images and sensibilities in the sciences of modernity, as can be seen for instance 
in the fantasy of Nature as a cosmic One-All ruled by unbreakable, timeless laws (Johnston, 




ultimate cohesion of reality. Science, then, is identified as our means to access these securing 
eternal laws of nature. We put our faith in it to guide us through our existential predicaments. 
As we will see, the psy-sciences occupy a central position in this dynamic, with trauma as the 
central concept to think the effects of a confrontation with a point of radical 
incomprehensibility.  
The word trauma is, confusingly, often used in two distinct ways. In lay terminology, it often 
denotes a type of event that is considered both out of the ordinary and inherently destructive. 
Originally, however, psychological trauma referred to a type of pathological reaction towards 
such a devastating event. Trauma is what happens to a person’s psychological functioning 
when he or she is confronted with something that defies his or her ability to grasp. In 
cognitive psychology this is seen as a failure to ‘process’ a certain type of data related to the 
traumatic event. Subsequently, this unprocessed material is thought to incessantly haunt the 
psychic system, disrupting its normal functioning and inciting a cascade of maladaptive 
sequelae, in a repeatedly thwarted attempt to finally conclude this obstructed mental 
processing. In other words: the psyche is understood as, ideally, an integrated or unified 
system that smoothly combines external data with internal objectives to guide behavior. 
Trauma describes what happens when an incommensurable element enters and disturbs the 
psychic space. When we are confronted with the boundaries of our capacity to process 
something, simply because it literally concerns the impossible that nevertheless took place, 
trauma describes the potential psychic consequences of this encounter: the shattering 
experience of a profound sense of meaninglessness and dislocation. Ideas of integrative unity 
and its disruption are thus central to these phenomena.  
When today disaster strikes and cracks suddenly appear on the purportedly smooth surface of 
life, it astonishes no-one that the representatives of the disciplines of (trauma) psychiatry and 
psychology are called upon to enter the field. Today, no-one is surprised to find that 
thousands of psychosocial workers are dispatched to far-away, non-Western countries in the 
aftermath of natural disasters or violent conflicts, in an attempt to attend to the local 
population’s psychological needs (Fassin & Rechtman, 2009). As Derek Summerfield (1998, 
p. 1580) duly noted, the rise of trauma work in humanitarian operations is rooted in the 
aforementioned way that ‘medicine and psychology have displaced religion in Western 
culture as the source of descriptions and explanations of human experiences’. The disciplines 





to the impossible questions of life’s contingencies. Science takes the place of religion in the 
precise sense that it is called upon to provide sensible answers at times when there are none. 
But more importantly, the scientific apparatus serves as a guarantee for the validity of these 
answers: it offers us authoritative answers in which we can trust. 
As part of the shared belief system of Western societies, the idea of trauma is experienced as 
both self-evident and natural. This means that we expect the human response to adversity to 
be universal across times and cultures. Consequently, the inclusion of trauma psychiatry in 
humanitarian aid campaigns, which started only at the end of the 1980s, appears to be both 
logically and morally justifiable. This innovation was premised on the assumption of a 
distinct ‘psychological fallout’ of war and catastrophes for whole populations (Summerfield, 
1997). Moreover, what was known about trauma suggested that this type of wound does not 
heal simply with the passing of chronological time, but needs to be addressed in its own right.  
It came as a great surprise when researchers found that the application of interventions based 
upon this supposedly universally valid trauma framework resulted in paradoxical (that is, 
harmful) effects when applied in both Western and non-Western settings (for example, 
Bisson, Jenkins, Alexander, & Bannister, 1997; Bracken, 2002; Herbert, et al., 2001; 
McNally, 2009; McNally, Bryant, & Ehlers, 2003; Raphael & Wilson, 2000; Rose, Bisson, 
Churchill, & Wessely, 2002; van Emmerik, Kamphuis, Hulsbosch, & Emmelkamp, 2002). 
Such findings, among others, prompted a series of critical analyses of the assumptions behind 
the contemporary dominant conceptualization of traumatic pathology, the diagnosis of Post-
Traumatic Stress Syndrome or PTSD. As a result, a great number of conceptual and practical 
deficiencies that haunt this biomedical trauma model have been identified by trauma scholars 
from a variety of academic backgrounds. The current project is built around a selection of a 
number of interrelated core problems associated with the PTSD approach to trauma.  
First, the construct of PTSD is closely tied to a specific conception of the etiological 
mechanism behind traumatic pathology. Basically, the raison d’être of PTSD as a distinct 
diagnostic entity is the idea that this type of suffering is the effect of exposure to a particular 
sort of stressor/event, which produces the condition in a rather straightforward, quasi-
automatic or mechanical fashion. However, this basic assumption, which is at the core of our 
contemporary understanding of trauma, has become untenable in the light of a series of 
empirical findings gathered in the decades following PTSD’s introduction as a separate 




traumatic pathology cannot be explained by the extraordinary nature of the event in itself: 
such encounters are far more frequent than expected, even in Western societies, and only a 
minority of those exposed go on to continue long-term traumatic pathology. ‘Something else’ 
must be taken into account to make sense of this unexpected yet consistently reproduced 
observation. Presumably, the resultant reaction (pathology or resilience) derives from the 
specificity of the encounter between a singular subject and a particular event.  
A second core issue with PTSD is that it effectuates a problematic decontextualization that 
determines the manners in which we understand and respond to these phenomena. At the level 
of the definition of PTSD itself, for instance, there is the conceptual annulment of the 
peculiarities of any given etiological stressor, in favor of an emphasis on  the commonalities 
between traumatic responses at the level of pathological mechanism and symptom 
manifestation. The idea that different types of events can cause the same symptoms through a 
similar etiological pathway – one of the core ideas defining the PTSD construct, which ties 
back to its historical background – can lead to negligence of the manners in which the 
specificities of the social, cultural, political or economical context of the stressor play a part in 
both the origin and outcome of trauma, as well as in processes of recovery.  
Third, the emphasis on the individual as the locus of scrutiny and intervention in Western 
psychotherapeutic approaches has been argued to be unfit to address the problems that surface 
in the wake of a collectively suffered event, as is the case with political violence, large-scale 
disasters, and so on. Furthermore, the emphasis on individual psychology is antithetical to 
responses that aim to alter the social conditions associated with various forms of distress. An 
increasing number of trauma scholars have argued that traumatic pathology does not occur in 
a vacuum, and that successful recovery from trauma requires the recognition of the 
importance of an individual’s relations to the Other (a Lacanian concept that refers to other 
people as well as to the socio-symbolic order in which we are immersed).  
Fourth, these decontextualizing and individualizing operations have been argued to have a 
political effect in themselves, as they produce a focus on immaterial recovery (that is, a 
change in someone’s individual psychological functioning) over material recovery (the 
modification of a trauma-generating context). Trauma psychiatry therefore risks becoming a 
depoliticizing instrument in service of the status quo.  





(1) to develop additional or alternative etiological models for traumatic pathology, so 
that the subjective dimensions of trauma can be conceptualized and taken into account; 
(2) to acknowledge and incorporate the influence of culture and context in trauma 
definitions and interventions; 
(3) to depart from a limited focus on the individual in trauma theory;  
(4) to reintroduce the dimension of the political in trauma interventions. 
What is needed, then, is conceptual work on trauma that takes into account subject, context 
and culture, and that helps to envision how sociopolitical change on a collective level is 
related to (individual) processes of recovery. It is my contention that the Lacanian 
psychoanalytic framework proves very powerful to deal with these issues, primarily because 
of its unique conception of both the subject and the Other as the locus of the symbolic order in 
which the subject is constituted.   
The identified needs in the field of trauma studies translate into the following research 
questions: 
(1) What are the shortcomings of a trauma model that excludes the subject? How can  
we reintroduce the subject in our understanding of (the etiology of) trauma?  
(2) How can we acknowledge and take into account the role of context in the etiology 
and recovery from trauma?  
(3) Is it possible to think trauma recovery in a way that transcends the exclusive focus 
on the individual?  
(4) In relation to this: how can we take the political dimension of trauma into account?   
These questions will be addressed by means of a series of conceptual studies. First, I will 
work out the discussed criticisms in more detail. To this end, I will take my cue from various 
sources, amongst which the most recent empirical findings with regard to psychological 
trauma. The fact that these findings contradict most, if not all, of the core assumptions on 
which the PTSD-model of trauma is based, highlights the urgency and relevance of this 
research project. This is compounded by the central place the PTSD-model takes in, for 




empirical findings, I use philosophical analyses to clarify the foundations of the PTSD-
approach, and historical studies of the developments in trauma research to place the current 
impasses in a broader context. Second, I take recourse to an alternative theoretical point of 
reference to throw new light on the discussed issues with the PTSD-approach. Freudian and 
Lacanian psychoanalysis are the privileged partners in this endeavor. The choice for these 
frameworks is motivated in the text when they are introduced.  
In order to grasp the delicate and central nature of the first issue (the quasi-mechanical 
etiological model that stresses the external event as the ‘uniformly most potent causal factor’ 
in trauma), we start off in Chapter 1 with a brief historical sketch of how trauma theory 
evolved, hand in hand with developments in the moral climate of the societies in which the 
question of trauma surfaced. This historical introduction will clear the ground for what 
follows, as it enables the contemporary reader to question the reification of the current PTSD 
framework. We tend to take our current understanding of trauma as something neutral and 
evident, something that can be readily and objectively extracted from the phenomena in 
question – a strictly scientific truth. However, a brief glance at the history of trauma studies, 
with all the difficulties and heated debates that characterize its protracted and laborious 
coming to be, quickly destabilizes this intellectually debilitating idea. Traumatic pathology 
has been conceptualized in many different ways over the last century, whereby the 
temporarily prevailing outlook is often in sync with a determining socio-cultural, political or 
economic context. Moreover, a major point of contention throughout these historical 
meanders has always been the relative import of person-specific/internal and 
contextual/external factors in the causation of traumatic conditions.  
This, at the most basic level, already underscores that many different readings of these 
phenomena are possible, and that our current understanding of trauma is the product of a 
lengthy process of construction rather than being an unproblematic ‘discovery’ or inference. 
The question then remains if, through this historical development, we have asymptotically 
reached the “objective” truth of traumatic phenomena, in the sense of a gradual 
rapprochement between representation (theory) and a reality that exists in independence of 
theory. Although this outlook is often adopted, other researchers suggest that the success of 
PTSD is less related to its incremental specular truth-value (adequatio rei et intellectus) than 
to its ability to capture and materialize a series of unspoken assumptions permeating our so-





carried out in Chapter 1, thus puts into perspective the current etiological model of trauma, 
and shows how it is enmeshed in a delicate debate concerning the role of the affected person 
and the external event in the causation of this type of distress. This will be my point of entry 
to discuss a series of difficulties associated with the linear etiological model underpinning 
PTSD. Going against the historically determined major premise of PTSD (the external event 
as the uniformly most potent etiological agent), trauma scholars should somehow reintroduce 
subjective dimensions if we are to make sense of the counterintuitive empirical findings 
regarding the dynamics of traumatic etiology. However, the question as to how these 
‘subjective dimensions’ should be envisioned was left largely unanswered heretofore – partly 
because of the (unwarranted) dread that asking questions about the ‘subject in trauma’ could 
revive the old tendencies of ‘blaming the victim’ for his or her own suffering. Through a 
discussion of Sigmund Freud’s concept of Nachträglichkeit, which was taken up and 
elaborated by Jacques Lacan in his work on the après-coup and the point de capiton, I aim to 
show in the second chapter that an external event must always acquire some sort of ‘psychic 
traction’ in order to wreak havoc in someone’s psychological functioning. This claim does not 
deny the importance or validity of trauma models that emphasize the peritraumatic sensorial 
overload as an important causal factor for trauma; it is rather an addition to these models as it 
draws attention to something which is often-times neglected, or perhaps hidden behind the 
brutality of the external event in question. In sum, my discussion of trauma and the 
psychoanalytical conception of logical time aims to provide a few coordinates to locate the 
subject in trauma, and to show that the recognition and identification of a subjective 
dimension in trauma does not simply deny the impact or responsibility of the external 
intrusion. In a nutshell, Part I of this dissertation targets the etiological assumptions of the 
PTSD model and proposes the utility of a Lacanian conception of logical time to reintroduce 
the subject in our comprehension of traumatic phenomena.  
In Part II of this book, I elaborate on the remaining core criticisms directed at the hegemonic 
trauma model of PTSD (see above). To recapitulate: the construct of PTSD, in its biomedical 
approach to trauma, effectuates a problematic individualization, decontextualization and 
depoliticization that determines the manners in which we understand and react to these 
phenomena.  
I start off in Chapter 3 by unearthing the factors that contribute to the decontextualizing and 




approach to mental illness, which was adopted for the creation of the third edition of the DSM 
(the edition in which PTSD made its first appearance in 1980). I describe how this biomedical 
approach, in the context of trauma, leads to types of interventions that neglect and obscure the 
political dimensions involved in both the genesis of and recovery from trauma. This analysis 
aims to show that far from being neutral and value-free, PTSD-informed interventions have 
very real political consequences, as they reinforce the political and economical status quo and 
foreclose alternative modes of responding to these situations. It is precisely because PTSD 
purportedly describes a reality that transcends particular contexts and cultural determinations, 
that is, because of its avowed universality and neutrality, that it is able to serve as a 
disempowering political instrument – in the sense that to claim ‘that one is beyond ideology’ 
is itself the ultimate ideological gesture. It follows that the application of the knowledge 
associated with PTSD, for instance in humanitarian aid campaigns, must be handled with 
great care. The discussion in Chapter 3 renders the link between trauma and its often 
neglected political dimension more palpable, suggesting the need for a conceptualization of 
trauma that includes it.  
In Chapter 4, French philosopher Alain Badiou’s (2001) work allows me to tie the discussed 
problems of PTSD’s decontextualization and depoliticization to a more general crisis of ethics 
in the West. I thereby agree with Fassin and Rechtman’s (2009) compelling thesis that 
evolutions in trauma theory should always be read against the background of an equally 
developing societal moral climate (see Chapter 1 as well). I offer a reading of the current 
success and omnipresence of trauma discourse as reflective of the prevalence of the ethics of 
human rights as the dominant moral compass for our times. Although this ethical doctrine 
seems self-evident to a contemporary eye, given its emphasis on the prevention of suffering 
and death, Badiou’s controversial analysis suggests that it ultimately amounts to a nihilistic 
resignation that must be resisted. The success of this doctrine is tied to the catastrophic 
consequences of the utopian projects of the 20th century. Badiou laments that the resultant fear 
of collective action in the name of a shared cause has left us with a type of ethics that is 
essentially negative, defensive and conservative. This ethical doctrine, then, is founded on a 
number of basic assumptions and related to a series of undesirable consequences that bear a 
striking resemblance to those discussed with regards to PTSD. It turns out that a well-defined 
ethical position is at the heart of several problems affecting PTSD, which presents us with the 





– a project to be carried out in Part III of this dissertation.  
The objective of the third and final, psychoanalytically inspired part is not so much to develop 
a ‘better’ alternative to existent practices, but to provide a conceptual framework that clarifies 
the manners in which these the fields of trauma, ethics and politics are related. This will 
require an elaboration of how the psychiatric level (of the particular, the individual) can be 
articulated with the sociological level (the universal, the collective). The main hypothesis 
driving this work is that Lacan’s concept of the real is at the intersection of trauma, ethics and 
politics. The analysis of this concept will throw new light on the issues laid out in Part II. 
In Chapter 5, I discuss Lacan’s evolving views of the real, while introducing a number of 
other key Lacanian concepts that will be of use in what follows. I discuss the two major 
conceptions of the real: ‘presymbolic’ and ‘postsymbolic’. It becomes clear that the real 
should not be taken as the ultimate referent of external reality, but rather as a productive 
negativity that dislocates the representation of external (symbolic-imaginary) reality. 
Subsequently, I go on to show how this notion of the real generates an interesting take on 
trauma that diverges from the more familiar, biomedical trauma discourse. As will become 
clear, the Lacanian approach to trauma breaks with the familiar inside/outside, self/other and 
individual/collective dichotomies. Furthermore, as described in Chapter 2, it introduces a non-
linear conception of time to make sense of the counterintuitive dynamics of trauma.  
In Chapter 6, I scrutinize the paradoxical notion of an ‘ethics of the real’, which refers to 
Alenka Zupančič’s (2000) denomination of the particular form of ethics that derives from 
Lacan’s elaboration of the subject. Already here, we see an intriguing connection appear: the 
real is defined simultaneously as traumatic on the one hand, and as the condition of possibility 
for the subject, and thus of ethics as such, on the other. This chapter aims to elucidate this 
estranging logic, which leads to the identification of the Lacanian real as characterized by the 
dual function of ‘productive destruction’.  
In Chapter 7, I aim to show the centrality of this same concept in the movements of politics. 
According to Yannis Stavrakakis (1999; 2007) and others, it is a disruptive encounter with the 
real that initiates time and again a process of symbolization – along with the ensuing 
hegemonic struggle between alternative symbolizations of this real. Rupture, in this way, is 
connected with sociopolitical innovation. However, the traumatic impact of such large-scale, 




juxtaposition of Lacanian trauma theory and philosophical contributions on rupture-
predicated societal change allows us to think the ‘moment of the political’ in its relation to 
trauma recovery.   
The category of the real, then, is at the centre of the interconnections that proved so difficult 
to account for in the PTSD-model of trauma. In Chapter 8, I describe some of the 
consequences of this interrelatedness centered around the real. First, I argue that many 
psychological theories of trauma commit a logical fallacy in their description of the process of 
trauma recovery, claiming that the psychological buildup needs to be remodeled so that it can 
accommodate the ‘new trauma information’. In this move, they take as a given that which 
must first be constituted by the subject: the content or ‘meaning’ of the traumatic episode. 
Second, I argue that Lacan’s notion of the act can be put to work to conceptualize this 
neglected but primordial aspect of trauma recovery. Furthermore, I demonstrate that it is this 
moment of the act that opens up the path towards collective action and social change. The 
incorporation of the dimension in the act in trauma recovery, moreover, requires us to take up 




























Between Railway Spine and PTSD 
 
Abstract: A hundred years ago the world witnessed the start of an armed conflict 
unlike anything that preceded it. A series of initiatives to commemorate the human 
suffering involved typically used the framework of psychic trauma to understand what 
had transpired. Although such a move seems obvious to the contemporary eye, the 
author argues that it was by no means straightforward at the time of the conflict itself. 
In this chapter, a brief account of the history of trauma studies is provided, with a 
focus on two crucial moments: (1) the railroad accidents in the 19th century, which 
gave rise to the idea of Railway Spine, and (2) the controversy regarding Shell Shock 
in World War I. This historical review allows the author to formulate four conclusions 
that call into question the tendency to reify our current understanding of traumatic 
phenomena. 
 
In 2014, the world commemorated the start of World War I (WWI), an armed conflict that in 
no way resembled anything that went before. The level of technological development at the 
start of the 20th century had made possible military interventions with an unseen destructive 
impact. These new technologies of destruction produced vast numbers of casualties amongst 
both civil and military populations, on a scale that was previously unimaginable. The 
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confrontation between the power of modern machinery and the fragility of the human 
organism thereby led to what we can call ‘the discovery of the psychological’. The 
omnipresence of death, the pieces of human bodies scattered throughout the land after another 
violent encounter, the accumulation of dead bodies that could not be ‘processed’ fast enough, 
the inertia of a trench war and the everlasting anxious anticipation of those caught up in it, the 
numerous amputations and the mutilated faces that needed care, and so on: all of this 
constituted the dark soil in which a type of pathology, which was at the heart of a heated 
debate even before the war, flourished like never before.  
When today we look back on this conflict, and try to imagine the human suffering involved, it 
is almost natural to apply the framework of ‘psychological trauma’ to make sense of things. 
To a contemporary eye, it is hardly surprising that the horrors of WWI left psychological 
scars in those exposed. It is evident that soldiers suffered from their war experiences. 
Moreover, it is also quite straightforward that these psychological problems derive from the 
nature of the suffered events as such. At the time of the conflict itself, however, there existed 
no consensus as to how these phenomena should be understood and treated. What we think 
we know about the phenomenon of psychological trauma, a hundred years after this conflict, 
has been developed in a very cumbersome manner – often under impulse of such large-scale, 
tragic events. This already indicates that the way in which we understand traumatic 
phenomena today in no way flows from the nature of the investigated object in an obvious or 
unmediated fashion. In this first chapter, I will briefly discuss a few structuring moments in 
the history of trauma studies. It will become clear that academic and societal debates on 




From 1830 onwards, travelling by train in Great-Britain became increasingly popular. In this 
time frame, steam power was used for the first time on a large scale in both industry and 
transport. In liberal Great-Britain, the railway sector was allowed to develop according to the 
‘laisser-faire’ principle, unhindered by outside regulation. Safety measures were not imposed 





costs were cut in both maintenance and personnel (Siemerink-Hermans, 1998). All of this 
made travelling by train a perilous enterprise at that time: unsuspecting travelers could find 
themselves in an inferno in the blink of an eye, when their trains collided or derailed. Given 
that the train wagons consisted of little more than shaky wooden structures that offered no 
protection to those inside, damage to the passengers was enormous. The first railroad 
accidents were major, catastrophic events that caused dismay and outrage all over Europe: 
accidents of this magnitude were an unseen, new phenomenon (Luckhurst, 2008). The 
upcoming popular press magnified and utilized the dramatic quality of these accidents, which 
stirred up strong emotional reactions with the public (Siemerink-Hermans, 1998).  
From 1846, railway companies were legally obligated to reimburse travelers for the injuries 
inflicted by the accidents. In this context, medical doctors were confronted with a large group 
of people who claimed to have been seriously injured in a train crash, but for whom no clear 
physical cause for their quasi-neurological ailments could be found. Hence, the railroad 
companies rejected their claims as unfounded. This was often followed by a lawsuit, in which 
a shocked and sympathetic jury usually allocated the entire requested financial sum to the 
claimant. As such, the nature of these symptoms became the centre of a heated debate at the 
end of the 19th century. 
John Erichsen, a British professor in Surgery, was responsible for diagnosing the injuries and 
symptoms that were ascribed to railway accidents. He divided the patients in three categories: 
1. those cases in which the neurological tissue was visibly damaged by the physical 
impact of the accident; 
2. cases he supposed to be caused by the jars and shocks of the accident, but in which no 
neurological damage could be found, even post mortem; 
3. cases in which people simulated their symptoms to receive financial compensation. 
Erichsen (1875) reported that the observable symptoms in all groups were identical. Whereas 
the first group clearly suffered physical injuries because of the impact of the accident, and 
thus were entitled to financial compensation, the third group was not genuinely affected and 
could not lay claim to any form of compensation. The second group is the mysterious one: 
there is enough doubt to acknowledge their suffering as ‘real’, as ‘not simulated’, yet no 
organic cause could be detected. How, then, should their symptoms be comprehended? First 
of all, the presented complaints were highly diverse: paralysis, spasms, anesthesias, 
melancholy, sudden blindness or deafness, and so on. It is this diversity of the clinical tableau 
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that necessitated to find an explanation within the nervous system. Erichsen (1875, p. 156) 
was confronted with ‘nervous’ symptoms without any detectable neurological cause, which 
developed after a train crash. What was the mechanism behind these clinical phenomena, 
taking into account that in a large subset of individuals symptoms only developed many 
weeks after the actual disaster (so-called ‘belated onset’ (p. 157))? It is not sufficient to say 
that symptoms were caused by the accident; such a statement is meaningless unless it is 
framed within a theoretical network that stipulates the mechanism according to which the 
outer world affects the inner world of the patient. Moreover, the theoretical model must be 
able to explain why these symptoms only developed in some survivors of the railway 
accident, whilst others remained unaffected.  
The most straightforward explanation was offered by Erichsen himself. He suggested the 
existence of organic lesions that could not be detected with the technological means of the 
time (Erichsen, 1875). This explanation is logical and aligned itself with the emergent and 
increasingly authoritative scientific disciplines of anatomy and physiology. Erichsen ascribed 
the symptomatic attacks to microscopic lesion of the spinal cord, caused by the physical 
impact of the accident. Hence, the name Railway Spine or Railway Brain, which captures in 
one term both the cause and the substrate of the injury. In other words: Erichsen’s explanation 
de facto suspended the distinction between the first and second category: in both groups, 
injuries were organically determined, and people from either group had a right to financial 
compensation. He was convinced that future technological innovations would confirm his 
hypotheses (Siemerink-Hermans, 1998). 
Nevertheless, it is important to take into account the third group suggested by Erichsen: those 
who fabricated their pathology for personal financial gain, the frauds, the malingerers – 
whose nervous system could in no way be distinguished from the cases in the second group. 
The first large-scale encounter with the series of phenomena that gave rise to the idea of 
psychological trauma was in a context in which the distinction between real patients and 
cynical malingerers was to be made. As a result, everyone who sought out the help of a 
medical doctor in the aftermath of a railway accident was met with a fair dose of skepticism 
and suspicion. Moreover, the necessity to differentiate between frauds and authentic victims 
was interwoven with the question of financial compensation: who or what was responsible for 
these symptoms? Financial compensation was only warranted if the claimant was genuinely 





Medical science, which was called upon to explain these phenomena, determined whether or 
not financial compensation was provided. Any specification of the involved 
pathophysiological mechanism cannot but identify the ‘final cause’ of this form of suffering. 
Erichsen’s proposal was simple, elegant and convincing. Symptoms followed the accident in a 
mechanical fashion: from the impact on the body and, more specifically, the nervous system, 
to the subjective experience of debilitating symptoms. Only those whose nervous system was 
affected, developed the syndrome. Despite the appeal and increasing popularity of this model, 
other voices quickly entered the debate. 
Herbert Page, a surgeon as well, suggested that so-called Railway Spine had psychological 
causes rather than anatomical. He stressed the role of fear at the time of the accident, as well 
as the desire for financial gain as the determining factors in this sort of pathology (Page, 
1883). Bear in mind that the theoretical network of psychology was far from developed at the 
end of the 19th century. Roger Luckhurst (2008, p. 23) underscores that even though Page’s 
ideas might appear closer to modern conceptions, ‘his insistence that the psychical traumas of 
railway accidents were forms of hysteria came from transparently pecuniary motives’, as Page 
had been the surgeon for the London and North Western Railway Company for nine years 
when he wrote his book.  
German psychiatrist Hermann Oppenheim claimed that the changes in the nervous system 
were ‘functional’ rather than structural, and thus related to a disturbed functioning of the 
nervous system, an idea that opened up perspectives for treatment and even complete 
recovery. It was Oppenheim who proposed and succeeded in changing the name for this kind 
of pathology to ‘traumatic neurosis’ (Luckhurst, 2008). The famous French doctor Jean-
Martin Charcot was very interested in the reports on the effects of railway accidents, written 
by his British colleagues. However, he did not endorse the creation of a new diagnostic 
category to account for these cases. In Charcot’s eyes, all of the described symptoms were 
identical to those he had longtime discovered and described in the context of hysteria. In the 
victims of the railway accidents, he saw confirmation of his controversial hypothesis that 
hysteria could affect men as well as women. The fact that all of these cases arose in the wake 
of a specific external event did not warrant the inference of a new nosological category for 
Charcot. His conclusion was the opposite: all cases of hysteria presumably developed after 
such an inciting, ‘traumatic’ incident. This incident was merely the agent provocateur that 
kick-started the always-already present yet latent hysterical predisposition in these patients.  
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In other words: a variety of psychological theories associated Railway Spine with hysteria, 
which was in itself already a highly suspicious disorder often classified as a form of 
malingering or ‘neuromimesis’. Moreover, traumatic pathology was associated with such 
notions as bad faith, simulation with the goal of personal gain, and so on. Some of these early 
psychological theories went as far as to say that the prospect of financial gain was the sole 
cause of the development and persistence of the medical complaints. This was referred to as 
claim neurosis or sinistrosis (a sort of condition of the will) (Fassin & Rechtman, 2009). This 
same condition was suggested to be even more frequent in the context of factory accidents, 
where the encounter between man and machine often led to atrocious scenes.  
The associations with hysteria and claim neurosis de facto lifted the opposition between 
Erichson’s second and third suggested category: both groups were considered to be simulating 
their complaints. Psychological theories accounted for the fact that only some of the survivors 
reacted in a shameful, hysterical manner to the railway accident, while others appeared 
unaffected, by use of the stopgap of heredity and ‘degeneration’ – a rather common move at 
the turn of the 19th century. The consequences of this position were vast: according to 
psychological theories, the railway accidents were no longer seen as the direct cause of the 
suffering, but reduced to a proximate, inciting factor that activated an individual vulnerability 
regarded as the real cause of the pathology (see Charcot’s notion of the agent provocateur). 
Hence, the railway companies, in the final analysis, could not be held accountable for these 
problems – and were no longer legally obliged to pay damages. 
 
World War I and Shell Shock 
In the previous section, I established that in the years before WWI, presumptions of 
simulation, bad will and financial motivations were widespread in the field of traumatic 
neurosis. The term Shell Shock stems from the second major founding moment in the history 
of psychological trauma. Military doctors were confronted with large numbers of soldiers 
who presented with injuries surmised to be related to their being in the proximity of 
explosions of heavy artillery shells (Young, 1995). Although they presented the same 
symptoms as soldiers with head and brain injuries, for instance, no such head wound could be 





observed effects to a specific cause. Doctors suggested that the observed pathological 
phenomena were caused by shockwaves that caused undetectable cerebral lesions (Leese, 
2002). Symptoms ranged from blurry and limited vision, episodes of uncontrollable crying, 
involuntary tremor, loss of smell and taste, to retrograde and anterograde amnesia, and many 
more (Luckhurst, 2008). The physical explanation model for Shell Shock was gladly accepted 
and defended by those affected: in a horrible trench war, where death was inevitable, 
evacuation on medical grounds was often the only way to make it out of their predicament 
alive and without the stigma of mental weakness.   
Although this condition was named after an external, violent and physical cause, the manner 
in which it was treated once again evidences the link with hysteria, which is an internally 
caused, psychological condition. The enormous and ever-increasing amount of Shell Shock 
cases, sometimes even observed in soldiers in training who were nowhere near the battlefield 
or heavy explosions, put the biological, straightforward explanation under a lot of pressure 
(Leese, 2002). Psychological theories quickly took over, and the idea that psychopathology 
could only develop in those that have a pre-existent ‘neuropathic soil’ once again took root. 
Consequently, it was the soldiers’ hereditary predisposition which was considered the 
ultimate cause for their affliction, rather than the war experiences in themselves. War was 
only the window through which the weakness of these men became visible. Further support 
for a psychological mechanism and the hypothesis of mental weakness was found in the 
observation that this condition could spread through an entire battalion in no time, through 
some sort of ‘neuromimesis’ or simulation (Fassin & Rechtman, 2009). The question that 
occupied military doctors was thus never what sort of experiences could lead to long-term 
psychopathological effects, but rather what type of soldier would display such an unmanly, 
shameful reaction in response to fulfilling his patriotic duties.  
The military authorities were, of course, concerned by the idea that these men, who, after all, 
were not visibly injured, were trying to evade their duty by feigning their illness. Evacuation 
on medical ground was often the only way to avert certain death. The primary role of medical 
personnel in the army consisted in sorting out those who were genuinely wounded from those 
trying to evade their duties by feigning mental conditions or even by mutilating themselves. 
Just as in the context of Railway Spine, doctors were primarily concerned with detecting 
frauds.  
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Importantly, organic explanations resulted in the removal of the Shell Shocked soldiers from 
the frontline, in analogy with the physically injured. As a result, fighting forces quickly 
threatened to be depleted. War psychiatry, which adapted itself to the patriotic ideal, was 
forced to change its theories in order to be compatible with the expectations of the military 
regime (Luckhurst, 2008; Young, 1995). Psychological theories of Shell Shock interpreted the 
symptoms as an affliction of the will or (later, under influence of Sigmund Freud’s 
psychoanalytical theory) as an unconscious desire to forsake duty and flee into illness. Once 
again, this type of explanation focuses on the characteristics of those who present with this 
condition: they are seen as people of bad moral fiber who try to evade battle. An illness of the 
will could be overcome by strengthening the will, most often by means of brutal ‘persuasive 
therapies’ such as faradism, which involved the administration of electric shocks onto the 
affected, dysfunctional body parts of the soldier. If this did not work, the voltage would be 
gradually increased. The same technique was utilized as a disciplinary measure when the 
soldier showed too little motivation to heal, or when he simply did not recover quick enough. 
A bonus of these therapeutic practices was its disencouraging potential (Fassin & Rechtman, 
2009). The criterion for recovery entailed the soldier’s confession of his weakness, and his 
willingness to return to the battlefield. A successful treatment is a treatment that satisfies the 
desires of the military government, that is, getting the soldier ready to go fight. Refusal of 
treatment equaled an act of desertion, and was thus punishable by execution.  
 
Towards PTSD 
I will only discuss the rest of the history of trauma theory very succinctly. The success of 
psychoanalysis in the interbellum rendered the idea that Shell Shocked soldiers were driven 
by conscious motives to avoid their duties untenable (Leys, 2000). Hence, it made no sense to 
make them confess their ill intentions and to give up their simulation with brutal methods. 
The driving force behind their affliction was not their conscious motivation, nor the events in 
themselves, but a power beyond their control. The roots of Shell Shock, in popularized 
versions of psychoanalysis, lay in the soldiers’ childhood. Their violent war experiences only 
rendered their condition manifest, yet they were not the true ‘cause’ of their difficulties (Leys, 
2000). The idea was that something in the unconscious of these soldiers made it impossible to 





soldier from his more able counterpart, and this supposedly had something to do with his 
repressed desires, wishes and anxieties (Fassin & Rechtman, 2009). Trauma was still an 
individual reaction of an abnormal human being confronted with an moral duty that he could 
not carry out. Although traumatic neurosis was recognized to be a genuine mental disorder, it 
was something that followed in the wake of horrible experiences, but was not ultimately 
caused by them. Possible recovery from this condition required the slow and difficult process 
of psychoanalytical treatment. Undoubtedly an improvement to the intimidating techniques of 
before, but nevertheless a stigmatization to those subjected to it. 
In the context of World War II, psychoanalysis was hardly a suitable form of treatment. The 
old, tried ‘treatments’ soon became fashionable again (Luckhurst, 2008). During this time, the 
term combat fatigue surfaces in war psychiatry, which suggests that a couple of days of rest 
and a good warm meal would suffice to enable the soldier to resume his duties.  
It was the encounter with the survivors of the concentration camps that would radically alter 
the societal perception of trauma patients (Luckhurst, 2008; Young, 1995). Secondary gain, 
overdeveloped narcissism, financial motivation and so on: none of the stigmas of traumatic 
neuroses were applicable to these broken people who emerged from the worst of places. A 
new paradigm was required to make sense of their suffering. It could no longer be ignored 
that the nature of the experiences that these people suffered were, in themselves, sufficient to 
cause mental problems. This revolutionized the way trauma was comprehended: the emphasis 
shifted from the affected person to the event as the primary etiological agent (Fassin & 
Rechtman, 2009). Importantly, the societal attitude of respect, of willingness to hear, did not 
generalize to those who were afflicted by other tragic or violent events. The affliction of those 
who emerged from the Holocaust was considered to be uniquely tied to the Holocaust; hence 
the name given to this syndrome, Concentration Camp Syndrome.  
 
PTSD 
Before the inception of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, each type of ‘traumatic stressor’ was 
tied to its own, specific syndrome. A few already came up in the preceding sections: Railway 
Spine, Shell Shock and Concentration Camp Syndrome. Other examples are Rape Trauma 
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Syndrome or the Battered Wife Syndrome (Herman, 1997). Each stressor was considered 
unique and distinctive. 
At the time of the development of the third version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM), the Vietnam Veteran movement and the feminist movement 
advocated for the inclusion of traumatic psychopathology in the manual. However, there was 
not enough time nor money to acquire the necessitated empirical evidence to ground the 
proposed condition. The strategy to more or less meet the required scientific standards set 
forth by the DSM-III’s task force consisted of collecting evidence to argue the equivalence 
between the experiences of veterans on the one hand, and the survivors of the concentration 
camps (and other groups) on the other (Young, 1995). In other words, the idea started to take 
shape that the problems encountered by Vietnam veterans could be a manifestation of the 
same condition that afflicted the survivors of other violent incidents. In this way, the 
advocates of the new diagnosis could make use of already developed empirical evidence 
concerning other disorders to argue their case and to provide the new diagnosis with a 
minimal scientific foundation (Kutchins & Kirk, 1997).  
Hence, the basic yet revolutionary idea of PTSD is the following: that all these different 
external influences operate according to the same etiological mechanism to produce a similar 
effect. The diversity in etiological events is conceptually annulled to stress the uniformity in 
both the pathophysiological mechanism and in the symptomatology (Herman, 1997). As such, 
PTSD became a diagnosis for an ever-expanding range of problems that were all united by 
one single characteristic: that the cause of these problems was external. PTSD is a condition 
that almost automatically flows from the nature of the traumatic event itself. This train of 
thought is reflected in the name, which drops the latter part of the former ‘traumatic neurosis’ 
diagnosis; neurosis always implies a subjective element in the development of 
psychopathology. 
The discussed fragments from the history of trauma studies illustrate that it was by no means 
straightforward to cancel out the differences between an array of different etiological events 
and to treat them as uniform in their capacity to cause mental problems. The violence of war, 
the horror of concentration camps and torture,  domestic abuse, rape, sexual abuse, natural 
catastrophes, traffic accidents, being mugged in the street, a difficult child labor, verbal sexual 
intimidation and even the shock of receiving bad news from a doctor: all of these events are 





is that the social, economical and political contexts that gave rise to the abuse are thereby 
obscured, in favor of a biomedical, technical approach to the problems at hand (Craps, 2013).  
The DSM-III task force, of which Robert Spitzer was the chairman, came to the conclusion 
that the external stressor was the only, or at least the most decisive, etiological factor for 
PTSD. The former ‘abnormal reaction’ soon became the normal, expected response to an 
abnormal situation – in analogy with the attitude towards the victims of the Holocaust. The 
stress on the abnormality of the situation simultaneously stresses the normality of those 
affected. This is the great accomplishment and merit of the PTSD-model of trauma: it ascribes 
victimhood and incites patience and respect in the other, as opposed to suspicion, 
stigmatization and rejection.  
The price to be paid for this is the infamous ‘Criterion A’ of the PTSD diagnosis, which limits 
the type of events that are deemed ‘inherently traumatic’ and thus potentially give rise to 
genuine ‘traumatic pathology’. This will be my starting point in the next chapter, where I will 
go into the problems related to this particular criterion.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter provided a brief account of the history of trauma studies, from which a number 
of observations can be made. First, this history learns that theories of trauma have always 
been affected by the dominant societal outlooks of the time. As Didier Fassin and Richard 
Rechtman (2009) worked out, the history of trauma should always be studied ‘double’: 
parallel to the scientific development of trauma theory runs the development in the societal 
attitude towards those who present with these phenomena. The acceptance of ideas and 
theories concerning trauma hinges on how these people are viewed: as malingerers and 
frauds, as passive victims, or even as privileged witnesses to a side of human existence which 
is ordinarily hidden from sight.  
Symmetrically, theoretical frameworks influence the manner in which these patients are 
perceived. Trauma theory is therefore never a merely academic matter: it determines to a large 
extent how those who present with this type of pathology are approached in a medical 
context. In addition, trauma theory has had large-scale societal effects, for instance in the 
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enormous impact that the PTSD construct has had on forensic psychiatry and legal issues in 
the United States (Pitman, Sparr, Saunders, & McFarlane, 2007). 
Second, history learns that political, social and economical factors consistently played a part 
in our understanding of trauma. These circumstances generate a context in which some ideas 
thrive better than others. As discussed, our contemporary understanding of trauma in no way 
flows directly from the phenomena under scrutiny. A number of different and competing 
explanatory models are possible, and the choice between distinct alternatives cannot always 
be made on the basis of scientific arguments. In the context of the railroad accidents, it 
became clear that economical motives played a part in the acceptance and popularity of some 
models at the expense of others. In World War I, it was a political and military need that 
influenced the way in which trauma was dealt with, both at the level of theory and practice.  
Third, the meanders of the history of trauma studies show how hard it is to pin down this 
particular research object in a single theory. If trauma must indeed always be studied in a 
double manner, as Fassin and Rechtman argue, then we cannot but affirm that in our times, 
there is a large degree of consensus between the dominant trauma model of PTSD on the one 
hand, and the societal perception of those who suffer it on the other. To a contemporary eye, 
the PTSD-model feels correct and self-evident. This is why it is always surprising and 
unnerving when its fundamental assumptions are contradicted in empirical studies, or when 
interventions based on these models do not produce the positive effects that were expected 
(see Chapters 2 and 3). Every discussion of the validity of the PTSD-model has become very 
delicate, and never fails to arouse intense emotions – most likely because of the fear that 
questioning our contemporary understanding of trauma might once again revive the ghosts of 
the past, the old stigmas of personal weakness and so on.  
In this light, let me conclude by stating that the current findings regarding trauma seem to 
deliver a piece for a puzzle that already appears complete. Perhaps when we scrutinize 
trauma, we are not driven by what is missing from our knowledge, but rather with a repeated 
confrontation with something that offers a discomforting surplus. It is this extra piece of the 
puzzle, this enigmatic ‘too much’ that we cannot accommodate into our contemporary 
















Logical Time and Delayed Traumatic Reactions 
 
Abstract: The Freudian concept of Nachträglichkeit is central to the psychoanalytical 
understanding of trauma. However, it has not received much attention within the 
contemporary field of trauma studies. This paper attempts to reconstruct the logic 
inherent to this concept by examining Freud’s remarks on the case of Emma. 
Furthermore, it is argued that Nachträglichkeit offers an interesting perspective on 
both (1) the well-established yet controversial finding that traumatic reactions 
sometimes follow in the wake of non-Criterion A events (so-called minor stressors or 
life events) and (2) the often-neglected phenomenon of delayed-onset PTSD. These two 
phenomena will appear to be related in some instances. Nachträglichkeit clarifies one 
way in which traumatic encounters are mediated by subjective dimensions above and 
beyond the objective particularities of both the event and the person. It demonstrates 
that the subjective impact of an event is not given once and for all but is malleable by 
subsequent experiences. 
 
In 1980, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) was included as a new diagnostic category in 
the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III; 




that a diverse yet limited set of traumatic events (defined in Criterion A: the ‘stressor 
criterion’) is causally linked to a distinct clinical syndrome (Criteria B through D: the 
‘symptom criteria’). The DSM explicitly adopts a restrictive approach to the stressor by 
defining a set of requirements that an event must meet in order to be acknowledged as 
‘traumatic’i. In other words, the fact that an experience directly precedes the emergence of 
traumatic symptoms does not suffice for it to qualify as a traumatic event. Although the exact 
definition of Criterion A has changed considerably throughout subsequent editions of the 
DSM, this particular assumption has always been retained (APA, 1987, 1994, 2000, 2013). 
Consequently, according to the DSM, cases where the full clinical picture of PTSD develops 
in the aftermath of an event that does not meet Criterion A (referred to as non-Criterion A 
events, life events, or minor stressors) ought to be classified as Adjustment Disorder (AD) 
rather than PTSD (APA, 1987, p. 249) – since there can only be a post-traumatic syndrome in 
the aftermath of a ‘truly’ traumatic event. The DSM thus implies that the traumatogenic 
potential of an event can be deduced a priori by charting the objective particularities of the 
situation.  
More specifically, an event is considered to be (potentially) traumatic only if it involves a 
confrontation with actual or threatened death or (sexual) violence (APA, 2013). The rationale 
for this approach rests on the belief that Criterion A events have a unique etiological effect in 
comparison to less dramatic life events, ‘and that there is a quantitatively and qualitatively 
different relationship between these two types of events and consequent psychopathology’ 
(Van Hooff, McFarlane, Baur, Abraham, & Barnes, 2009, p. 77). More precisely, the central 
claim is that individual vulnerability plays a less important role in precipitating PTSD than in 
bringing about other psychiatric disorders (McFarlane & de Girolamo, 2007, p. 137). Put 
simply, PTSD is caused by the objective particularities of the event as such, while in AD a 
subjective vulnerability factor plays a more prominent role. 
Such a view is partly supported by the finding that the probability of developing PTSD is 
dependent on the type of event involved: some events (such as torture) produce the disorder 
more frequently than others (for example, car accidents), suggesting that there is something 
traumatogenic inherent to these events (without any reference to the affected person). The 
observed differences in conditional probability for developing PTSD represent one possible 
measure for ‘trauma severity’. Significantly, sexual assault has been consistently found to be 





Troost, Bohnert, & Luo, 2013). However, it should be noted that conceptually ‘there is no true 
objective assessment of severity that is totally divorced from response, because a rough 
assessment of the modal response to any particular event is typically understood to be a rough 
index of its severity’ (Ozer, Best, Lipsey, & Weiss, 2003, p. 69)ii. The idea of trauma severity 
is tied to the conception of a dose-response relationship between traumatic event and 
subsequent pathology, which underpins the central claim of the PTSD construct. 
The study of the history of the concept of psychological trauma in Chapter 1 revealed that the 
introduction of PTSD in DSM-III put a provisional end to the long-lasting debate concerning 
the relative contribution of the event and the characteristics of the person as etiological factors 
in favor of the event (Fassin & Rechtman, 2009, pp. 77–97; Luckhurst, 2008, pp. 59–76). The 
text of DSM-IV-TR clarifies that the nature of the exposure to the traumatic event provides 
the most important factor to account for the likelihood of developing the disorder (APA, 
2000, p. 466), an idea that has become generally accepted in Western society (Fassin & 
Rechtman, 2009, p. 4). As a direct result of this claim, the PTSD diagnosis wields a political 
and juridical power. It has often been remarked that it is rare to find a psychiatric diagnosis 
that anyone would like to have, but that PTSD is one of them (Andreasen, 1995). For many 
people, the diagnosis of PTSD serves as an important tool for acknowledging their distress 
and determining liability, and the construct has had a dramatic impact on forensic psychiatry 
and law (Pitman, Sparr, Saunders, & McFarlane, 2007). Because it is suggested that 
subjective vulnerability plays a negligible role in developing PTSD, the responsibility for the 
distress can be attributed to an external agent that will then be required to provide some form 
of restitution. Should less severe stressors be acknowledged to cause PTSD, then the causal 
emphasis risks being shifted away from the stressor towards personal predispositions and 
frailties. This would ‘undermine the very rationale for having a diagnosis of PTSD in the first 
place’ (McNally, 2009, p. 598). Hence, a restrictive stressor criterion has been retained in the 
recently released fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM-5; APA, 2013), despite many criticisms. It is feared that adopting a non-restrictive 
approach to the stressor would ‘trivialize the PTSD diagnosis and defeat the purpose of the 
original DSM-III construct by permitting people exposed to less stressful events to meet the A 
Criterion’ (Friedman, Resick, Bryant, & Brewin, 2011, p. 753). 
However, empirical research does not corroborate the idea that traumatic pathology is limited 




long-term psychological distress in the majority of cases (McFarlane & de Girolamo, 2007; 
Rosen & Lilienfeld, 2008; Shalev, 2007). Conversely, a variety of non-Criterion A events 
have been consistently reported to potentially produce the full clinical picture of PTSD 
(Rosen & Lilienfeld, 2008). Van Hooff et al. (2009) found that the majority of studies 
‘reported similar or greater mean PTSD scores and/or PTSD prevalence in individuals 
reporting non-traumatic life events compared to those who report Criterion A1-events’ (p. 
78)iii. Criterion A is thus neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for developing the 
clinical syndrome of PTSD. Consequently, considerable debate exists about whether or not 
non-Criterion A events should be accepted as traumatic stressors (Van Hooff et al., 2009). As 
empirical evidence showed that traumatic pathology cannot be accurately predicted on the 
basis of event characteristics alone, researchers attempted to identify resilience and 
vulnerability factors of the affected person that influence clinical outcome. However, in a 
comprehensive review Ozer et al. (2003) concluded that less than 20% of the total variance in 
clinical outcome after experiencing a traumatic event can be explained by the combination of 
all hitherto-known predictors (particularities of both the event and the person). The other 80% 
is unaccounted for, which basically means that it is impossible to predict who will develop 
traumatic pathology after which event. Ozer et al. (2003) conclude that this is consistent with 
the possibility that ‘factors unique to the combination of the person exposed and the nature of 
the exposure are the determining factors in understanding who becomes symptomatic and 
who does not’ (p. 66). In other words, traumatic pathology is the result of a highly personal, 
subjective encounter that cannot be reduced to a calculus of objective parameters. This is 
corroborated by the finding that it is not the nature of the event per se but rather the 
individual’s emotional response that is associated with PTSD symptoms (Boals & Schuettler, 
2009; Maercker, Beauducel, & Schutzwohl, 2000). Accumulating empirical evidence points 
in this direction as it suggests that subjective interpretation plays an important part in 
precipitating PTSD (Boals & Schuettler, 2009; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; van der Kolk, 
McFarlane, & Weisaeth, 2007). These findings call into question the centrality of the nature 
of the external event and of a simple dose/response relationship to account for traumatic 
pathology, while pointing to the importance of psychological factors. Conceptual analysis is 
needed in order to interpret the results of these empirical studies. In this chapter, Freud’s 
notion of Nachträglichkeit is deployed precisely to allow us to envisage one possible manner 





A second and related controversy concerns the phenomenon of delayed-onset PTSD. This 
refers to individuals with persistent PTSD who reported no or few symptoms in the first 
weeks, months, or even years following the event. DSM-IV defines delayed-onset PTSD as 
the development of the clinical syndrome 6 months or more after the traumatic event, 
although the evidence base for this particular cut-off was negligible (Carty, O’Donnell, & 
Creamer, 2006). The phenomenon of a ‘delayed reaction’ to trauma has been described as a 
core feature of traumatic pathology throughout its entire history (Fassin & Rechtman, 2009; 
Luckhurst, 2008; Young, 1995), and contemporary empirical studies have also confirmed the 
importance of this phenomenon (Andrews, Brewin, Philpott, & Stewart, 2007; Berninger et 
al., 2010; Carty et al., 2006; Yehuda et al., 2009). A systematic review concluded that, on 
average, 38.2% and 15% of PTSD cases are delayed in military and civilian samples 
respectively (Andrews et al., 2007). Despite the historical and clinical relevance of this 
phenomenon, few studies have taken delayed-onset PTSD as their primary focus, and little is 
known about what distinguishes the delayed- and immediate onset forms of the disorder 
(Andrews et al., 2007). Ehlers and Clark (2000) have proposed an influential cognitive theory 
on the development of PTSD which also addresses delayed reactions. They suggest that 
delayed-onset PTSD may develop in some people due to a subsequent event which gives the 
original trauma a more threatening meaning. The temporal dynamic involved in Freud’s 
concept of Nachträglichkeit dovetails with this cognitive re-appraisal model of delayed 
traumatic reactions, while adding important nuances and subtleties to it. 
The central claim of this chapter is that Nachträglichkeit provides interesting perspectives on 
both traumatic reactions following non-Criterion A events and delayed-onset PTSD – two 
phenomena that will appear to be related in some instances. In both cases, the concept 
introduces one possible mechanism by which subjective interpretation intervenes in the 
etiology of trauma, above and beyond the objective characteristics of the event and the 
person. Nachträglichkeit was chosen because it is central to the psychoanalytical 
understanding of trauma. Despite the overall acknowledgment of the impact of 
psychoanalysis on the history of trauma studies, Nachträglichkeit itself has not received much 
attention within this field. This might be due to the inconsistent and more or less problematic 
translations of the term (a neologism coined by Freud), which include ‘deferred action’, 
‘après-coup’, ‘afterwardsness’, ‘retroactive temporality’, ‘belatedness’, ‘latency’, and 




aspect of the far-reaching implications of this construct, thereby obscuring other relevant 
dimensions. Therefore, in what follows, we opt to retain the original term. The notion of 
Nachträglichkeit was primarily elaborated through Freud’s work on psychological trauma, 
which in turn is deeply intertwined with his study of hysteria. This work will be the starting 
point for our reconstruction of the logic of the construct. Subsequently, we briefly turn to 
Jacques Lacan’s logic of signification (Lacan, 1957a, 1957b, 1957–58, 1960) in order to 
further clarify the manner in which subjective interpretation plays a part in certain instances 
of traumatic pathology. 
 
Nachträglichkeit: The Case of Emma 
Freud developed his theories of both psychological trauma and hysteria simultaneously, 
mainly in two articles on the ‘Neuro-Psychoses of Defence’ (Freud, 1894; 1896a) and also in 
his co-publications with Josef Breuer (Freud & Breuer, 1893). For Freud, every case of 
hysteria ‘can be looked upon as traumatic hysteria in the sense of implying a psychical 
trauma’ (1893, p. 34). In making this assumption, he was strongly influenced by the ideas of 
French neuropathologist Jean-Martin Charcot on traumatic hysteria (Libbrecht & 
Quackelbeen, 1995). Freud was convinced that patients with hysteria suffered from 
psychological traumata that had not been sufficiently abreacted (Freud, 1893, p. 38). 
Interestingly, he found that each hysterical symptom was due to a psychic trauma reviving an 
earlier traumatic event. At this point, he introduced the notion of Nachträglichkeit to explain 
the mechanism of the symptom formation in these patients. Essential to this notion is that an 
initial event only becomes traumatic, in the sense of exerting its full pathogenic power, at a 
later stage in psychical development, when the initial event to which the subject was unable to 
react adequately is revived by a subsequent encounter. Nachträglichkeit thus refers to the 
process by which pathology develops following a trauma that is constituted through two 
etiological moments instead of one (Mather & Marsden, 2004). Importantly, not the real 
nature of the original event is of major importance, but the way in which the experience 
affects the psychical being. It is not ‘what had happened’ but the way in which the subject 






In the Project for a Scientific Psychology (Freud, 1895a) we find a description of the case of 
Emma on which we wish to elaborate in order to clarify this notion. Emma Eckstein was a 
Viennese woman from a well-known bourgeois family who sought out Freud’s help when she 
was 27 years old. Her treatment spanned approximately three years, from 1892 to 1895 
(Appignanesi & Forrester, 2005, p. 138). At the time of her therapy with Freud, Emma was 
subject to a ‘compulsion of not being able to go into shops alone’ (Freud, 1895a, p. 353). She 
explained this symptom by producing a memory from the time when she was 12 years old – 
shortly after the onset of puberty, Freud remarks. The relevant passage reads as follows:  
She went into a shop to buy something, saw the two shop-assistants (one of whom she 
can remember) laughing together, and ran away in some kind of affect of fright. In 
connection with this, she was led to recall that the two of them were laughing at her 
clothes and that one of them had pleased her sexually. (Freud, 1895/1975a, p. 353) 
Given as a first explanation for her pathology, this scene raises a few questions. Freud 
concludes that this memory explains neither the compulsion nor the determination of the 
symptom. However, further investigation revealed a second memory that was chronologically 
prior to the first: 
On two occasions when she was a child of eight she had gone into a small shop to buy 
some sweets, and the shopkeeper had grabbed at her genitals through her clothes. In 
spite of the first experience she had gone there a second time; after the second time she 
stopped away. (Freud, 1895a, p. 354) 
The production of the second memory is anticipated by the first through various associations, 
which Freud discusses extensively. He concludes that the laughing of the shop-assistants had 
unconsciously activated the older scene through the evocation of the grin with which the 
shopkeeper had accompanied his assault. Importantly, this reviving of the older scene 
‘aroused what it was certainly not able at the time, a sexual release, which was transformed 
into anxiety’ (Freud, 1895a, p. 354). Curiously, the only element of the older scene that 
reached Emma’s consciousness was the least significant one: her clothing. The one that 
actually mattered (that is, the assault), in the sense of  potentially producing an adverse effect 
on the girl, was thus replaced by a symbol. Freud saw as the cause of this pathological process 
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T1 and T2 denote two distinct moments in time, separated by a chronological gap 
(symbolized by →). T2 is the moment of the traumatic event as classically understood, that is, 
the scene that directly precedes the onset of traumatic symptoms (designated by Σ in Figure 
1). This particular event can only be identified retroactively since there is no way of 
predicting which experience will be traumatogenic to whom. In the case of Emma, T2 refers 
to the ‘laughing of the shop-assistants’, an experience that is directly followed by the 
emergence of her ‘compulsion’. Freud’s capital discovery here is that the pathological power 
of the second scene at T2 is derived from an earlier experience at T1. However, this first event 
remained without consequence for many years, indicating that it did not become ‘traumatic’ 
until after its revival at T2. Freud emphasized that it was the memory that became traumatic, 
whereas the experience originally was not, and it did so precisely at the moment of T2. 
Nachträglichkeit thus refers to a mechanism that literally alters the subjective interpretation of 
the past, in such a way that this altered memory causes new and unexpected effects in the 
present. This is precisely the point that is missed when Nachträglichkeit is translated as 
‘deferred action’, since the latter suggests a commonsense, chronological, and deterministic 
view of subjective time. Deferred action suggests that something is deposited in the individual 
at T1 that suddenly detonates, like a time bomb, at T2. This is how we ordinarily understand 
the notion of time, in terms of duration with only one dimension, that of succession or 
diachrony (Chatel, 1995). With its conception of logical time, Nachträglichkeit opposes this 
intuitive notion of linear time. Freud’s concept dictates that what is deposited at T1 only 
becomes ‘explosive’ through a retroactive investment at T2. We suggest that this mechanism 
can be logically related to both delayed traumatic pathology and traumatic reactions following 
non-Criterion A events. 
 
Nachträglichkeit, Delayed-Onset PTSD, and Non-Criterion A Events 
Nachträglichkeit presupposes that the effects of a potentially traumatic experience can be 
delayed by several years and require a second constituent moment in order to arise. Ergo, the 
belated onset of traumatic pathology does not occur at a random moment in time but is 
logically determined. Recent studies point in the same direction as they emphasize the 




2011). In particular, life events that are reminiscent of an original stressful experience might 
‘activate and unmask latent psychopathology’ (Horesh et al., 2011, p. 864): 
Some trauma casualties experience a long latency period during which they preserve 
good functioning and present little or no PTSD symptoms. However, following this 
period they may encounter an event (e.g. accident, death of a loved one, terror attack) 
that is actually or symbolically reminiscent of their traumatic event, and therefore 
bring it to the forefront again. (Ibid., p. 864) 
Likewise, Friedman et al. (2011) suggest that traumatic reactions occurring after non- 
Criterion A events might be due to a reviving or triggering of an earlier traumatic event. A 
common yet distressing life event, such as breaking up with one’s best friend (Solomon & 
Canino, 1990), might then result in full-blown PTSD only because of its associations with a 
former trauma that is revived and brought to the fore again. Although the principle of 
Nachträglichkeit indeed posits that trauma is constituted in two events, in our view it is not 
entirely correct to say that the non-Criterion A event at T2 triggers or revives an earlier 
(latent) trauma that has already been suffered. The event at T2 does not revive dormant old 
wounds. Rather, it is essential to Nachträglichkeit that the wound is only afflicted at T2 and 
not at T1. That is to say, the wounding has not already occurred and somehow been isolated 
from the rest of the psychic life, as the notion of ‘latent psychopathology’ would suggest. It is 
only at T2 that the original event is rendered traumatic, wounding the subject for the very first 
time. Thus, we agree that in some instances traumatic reactions following non-Criterion A 
events are due to an association with an older event. However, the notion of Nachträglichkeit 
suggests that in these cases the non-Criterion A event elicits the formation of a traumatic 
memory, rather than the reviving of an old wound that was already constituted. 
Acknowledging that delayed onset is precipitated by a second event that is reminiscent of the 
prior one is important, but it leaves a most intriguing question unanswered: why is it that the 
reviving of the memory of the original scene causes traumatic pathology, whereas the 
experience itself did not? How can the surfacing memory produce such massive effects, while 
the experience itself could not? As Freud phrased it with respect to Emma: ‘Here we have the 
case of a memory arousing an affect which it did not arouse as an experience, because in the 
meantime the change [brought about] by puberty had made possible a different 





Thus, Freud provides us with two pointers to make sense of the retroactive reworking inherent 
to Nachträglichkeit: (a) that the first experience was somehow ‘missed’ by the subjectvi  and 
(b) that it is experienced belatedly by a subject that has undergone significant alterations since 
the time of the initial scene. Cathy Caruth (1995, 1996) strongly argues the case that an event 
can only evoke traumatic after-effects due to this particular characteristic: that it ‘is not 
assimilated or experienced fully at the time, but only belatedly’ (Caruth, 1995, p. 4). She 
contends that the traumatogenic potential cannot be situated in either the first or the second 
event, but is to be located precisely in the gap that separates them. More generally, trauma is 
understood as ‘the violent intrusion of something radically unexpected, something the subject 
was absolutely not ready for, something the subject cannot integrate in any way’ (Žižek, 
2008, p. 10). Ergo, the impossibility to fully grasp or signify the distressing experience at the 
time of its occurrence is associated with trauma. What typifies delayed traumatic reactions – 
and this contradicts current views of traumatic etiology – is that this initial absence of 
signification does not directly lead to pathology. Rather, it is the belated understanding that 
initiates traumatic symptomatology. In the next section, we turn to Lacanian theory to shed 
more light on this peculiar mechanism.  
At this point, it is important to remark that although one instance of the ‘missed encounter’ 
can indeed be the ‘precocious sexual experience’ (Freud, 1896b, p. 154) – that is, a sexual 
experience that occurs when the individual does not yet have the means to understand it – it is 
not the only one. For example, Freud himself for some time supported the idea that hysterical 
traumata could be caused by experiences that impinged on the person while in a ‘hypnoid 
state’. This state is characterized by the fact that the ideas which emerge in it are very intense 
but are cut off from associative communication with the rest of consciousness (Freud & 
Breuer, 1893, pp. 12–17). The idea of a ‘missed encounter’ is also corroborated by the finding 
that dissociation during the traumatic event (so-called peri-traumatic dissociation) is one of 
the most powerful predictors of clinical outcome (Brewin & Holmes, 2003). In sum, 
Nachträglichkeit presupposes that at the time of its occurrence, certain aspects of the initial 
event could not be grasped by the person and were missed, for various reasons  
(precociousness, being overwhelmed, dissociation, and so on). As a result, the person cannot 






A Lacanian Perspective on the Precocious Sexual Experience 
Let us now proceed by sketching the structure of the process of Nachträglichkeit as deducted 
from the example of Emma. First, there is a distressing event at T1 that cannot be fully 
understood at the time of its occurrence because the subject lacks the necessary symbolic 
means for it. Despite the fact that the subject cannot make sense of what is happening and 
becomes overwhelmed, the event leaves behind some sort of a ‘mnemic trace’. From within a 
Lacanian framework, this first episode is engraved in memory by the promotion of a single 
signifier or representation that comes to signal and cover up the original lack of understanding 
(Verhaeghe, 2008). This single signifier, which is metonymically chosen by the subject, hems 
in or borders the hole of the nonsensical experience. In Emma’s case, this could be the 
linguistic element ‘clothing’ or the visual trace of the shopkeeper’s grin, something that 
simultaneously points to and obscures the original mystifying scenevii. It is crucial to grasp 
that this single signifier or representation remains ‘mute’, as it does not become associated 
with other elements that would confer meaning upon it. Lacanian theory teaches that by itself, 
any element of the psychic system is senseless (Fink, 1995; Vanheule, 2011a). Only in the 
concatenation of a signifying chain can an element receive a temporarily fixed signification 
(Lacan, 1957–58, 1959). Thus, the first experience is retained in a very specific way: as a 
single signifier that borders the nonsensical event and that is unable to articulate itself with 
the rest of the psychic material. It is not accessible for conscious recollection, as it cannot be 
brought into articulation with the group of signifiers (or representations) that constitutes the 
Ego. Importantly, the effect of a signifier being unable to associate itself with other elements 
is not restricted to the impossibility of understanding the scene it designates. In Lacan’s logic 
of signification, the subject as such is an effect of the concatenation of signifiers (Lacan, 
1957–58; 1960). Hence, as long as the scene at T1 cannot be signified through association 
with subsequent elements, it cannot be ‘lived’ or experienced, subjectively speaking; it 
remains asubjective. 
Due to the failure to bestow meaning on the event, to understand it, to realize what has 
happened, the subject (as an effect of the concatenation of signifiers) is excluded from it. 
Ultimately, the event can be said not to be subjectively experienced at the time of its 
occurrence. It is a missed encounter, or an ‘unclaimed experience’, as Caruth (1996) calls it. 
Hence, the experience initially remains without long-term consequence. Nevertheless, the 





reaction of distress and fright and by the fact that the scene leaves a mnemic trace. The initial 
experience opens up an enigma; it raises a question. This question is pending and awaits an 
answer – sometimes for years. All of this is reminiscent of Jean Laplanche’s (1999) notion of 
the ‘enigmatic signifier’.  
As time passes, the affected person acquires the keys to unlock the mystery of the original 
scene. In the example of Emma, it is a coincidence, a contingent meeting, which results in the 
realization of the first scene – realization, in the sense that the new experience gives birth to 
an understanding of what the subject had missed in the first experience. But more essentially: 
through this understanding, it is as if the potentially traumatic aspects of the scene that were 
not experienced at T1 are now fully experienced at T2. The subject, through T2, receives 
access to the traumatic truth of the T1 event for the very first time. The T1 experience starts to 
be lived as a new subjective event. Therefore, at T2, both T1 and T2 happen simultaneously. 
Only through the association with a second event at T2 can the subject draw a conclusion as 
to the signification-value of the first scene, and only then can this scene produce a traumatic 
impact. Precisely at that moment, the moment of realization, the memory of T1 becomes 
traumatic. Up to that point, the memory of T1 was opaque and subjectively inaccessible. 
Therefore, T2 is the moment where the past, which had been anticipated, is finally signified – 
albeit in a very peculiar manner, as we will see.  
Thus considered, it becomes clear that the person does not carry a dormant old wound after 
the experience at T1. He or she is only psychically wounded at the moment of realization, 
where the wound is materialized through signification. The traumatic past, although spoken of 
by analytic discourse in a suggestive manner as ‘repressed’, ‘doesn’t have any substantial 
existence outside of the immanence of the present in which it achieves actualization’ 
(Johnston, 2005, p. 54). The first event does not lie dormant in the preconscious, waiting like 
a time bomb to pathologically detonate. What matters in delayed traumatic reactions is not the 
past ‘as such’, in its factual purity, but the way past events are included in the present, 
synchronous field of meaning: ‘Something which was at first perceived as a meaningless, 
neutral event changes retroactively, after the advent of a new symbolic network…. into a 
trauma that cannot be integrated' (Žižek, 1991a, pp. 221-2, emphasis added). Consequently, it 
can be said that the former event does determine the present (and therefore can be called 




the very mode of this determining is overdetermined by the present synchronous 
symbolic network. If the trace of an old encounter all of a sudden begins to exert an 
impact, it is because the present symbolic universe of the subject is structured in a way 
that is susceptible to it. (Žižek, 1991a, p. 202) 
In contrast with current theories, we therefore conclude that the initial absence of meaning, 
the event as not-fully-understood, is distressing but not traumatic in itself. It is only when it is 
comprehended at T2 that it becomes so. This distinction is of capital importance. The 
experiences at T1 set the stage for a subjective event that has not yet come to pass. Only at T2 
does this subjective event commence – and trauma may then indeed be conceptualized as a 
failure to ‘close’ or to finish this event. Hence, the traumatic event is both belated and 
unfinished. In the moment of realization a traumatic truth is revealed which threatens to 
shatter the subjective feeling of consistency.  
The default manner in which trauma is comprehended in contemporary psychological theories 
stresses the incompatibility between the ‘new trauma-information’ (which, in the above 
framework, is constituted at T2) and the views of the self and the world that preceded this 
realization (see, for example, Brewin & Holmes (2003), Ehlers & Clark (2000) or Janoff-
Bulman (1992)). In other words: the traumatic rupture is understood as a conflict between two 
irreconcilable discursive formations. And indeed, the described linkage between a moment of 
‘realization’ on the one hand, and the emergence of traumatic pathology on the other, seems 
to point in the direction of a trauma determined by a massive and unbearable surplus of 
meaning, rather than the more familiar view of trauma as the site of an impossibility of 
meaning. Charles Shepherdson (2008) offers an interesting reading of this mechanism in his 
book Lacan and the Limits of Language. In the light of his line of reasoning, the traumatic 
moment at T2 is a moment in which ‘two chains of signifiers, previously kept apart, are 
suddenly made to intersect’ (p. 35). Yet what is produced in this moment of realization? 
Whereas ordinarily, the linking-up of two (chains of) signifiers produces an effect of 
meaning, Shepherdson argues that the traumatic realization produces a hole in the place of 
meaning:  
Instead of a metaphor, a spark of meaning, something impossible suddenly emerges 
from this intersection of signifiers, a hole or cut in the universe of meaning, a cut that 
is linked to an obscure knowledge […], a forbidden knowledge that remains excluded 





This is the manner in which we are to understand Lacan’s notion of the traumatic real: not as 
a ‘presymbolic’ (unmentalized) field of raw experience before it is psychically processed, but 
as something that immanently arises out of the symbolic itself as a strange sort of surplus (see 
Chapter 5). The defining characteristic of this real as an internally produced excess is that it 
cannot be recuperated or accommodated in the pre-existent symbolic-imaginary framework 
from which it arose. This is precisely what makes it traumatic: the encounter with the real 
requires a restructuring of the subject. Although the real is not without a link to this meaning-
generating system, insofar as it can even be considered its effect, it is simultaneously 
something that escapes or transcends this field of meaning – in a movement that we could call 
‘transcendence-in-immanence’viii. In other words: from the current symbolic network, an 
unbearable surplus is generated that cannot be accommodated in that same symbolic structure.  
The entire issue of recovery from trauma then boils down to how to deal with this estranging 
surplus – a matter that will be taken up in part III of this dissertation. 
Suffice to say that what opens up in the moment of traumatic realization at T2 is an 
‘unbearable truth’, something that cannot be supported. This unbearable real launches the 
subject in a prolonged ‘time of comprehension’ (Lacan, 1945), awaiting a conclusion. The 
real that is opened up in the traumatic truth demands a subjective response, which, as Žižek 
points out, ultimately boils down to the birth of a new subject (Žižek, 2008). 
 
Limiting example 
In one of their papers Bessel van der Kolk and Alexander McFarlane (2007, pp. 6–7) briefly 
discuss the case of a woman who had been raped (a Criterion A event at T1) but who did not 
develop long-term psychological distress in the immediate aftermath of the ordeal. Yet, many 
months later, she received news that the same violator had made another casualty; only this 
time, he had not only raped but subsequently also murdered his victim. It was not until after 
this second constituent moment (T2) that the woman developed the full clinical syndrome of 
PTSD, several months after the actual assault. Whereas the horrible experience at T1 was 
initially not traumatic when judged by its clinical consequences, the memory of the experience 
became traumatic but only at T2 as it was re-signified. The subjective past was literally 




reaction was thus not the direct result of her experience at T1, but rather of the subjective 
rewriting of this experience at T2. Importantly, this case suggests that it is not always the 
physical impact or the particularities of the situation that somehow ‘cause’ the traumatic 
consequences in an unmediated fashion. Rather, it is the manner in which this situation affects 
the person that is of prime importance. And this subjective impact can be modified as the 
memory of the event itself is subject to influences from the present. 
When we compare this example of delayed-onset PTSD with the mechanism we sketched in 
relation to Emma’s case, some discrepancies catch the eye. Emma’s original scene happened 
under very specific circumstances: it was what Freud called a ‘precocious sexual experience’, 
which means that at that particular age she did not have the symbolic tools at her disposal to 
comprehend what was happening. During the second encounter, with the shop assistants, she 
did possess these tools, which made a belated understanding possible. According to Freud, the 
delayed traumatic effect is contingent on the crossing over of a mythical point in the 
structuring of the subject: pre- and post-puberty (Freud, 1896b, p. 152). This clearly cannot be 
extrapolated to van der Kolk and McFarlane’s example. Here, the T1 incident occurs when 
the person is mature, and still a ‘missed encounter’ or a belated understanding is possible – as 
her delayed traumatic reaction shows. It seems plausible that, in contrast with Emma’s case, 
the woman initially succeeded in signifying and coping with the incident at T1. However, the 
additional information at T2 called into question her initial appraisal of the situation and 
revealed that she too had ‘missed’ certain horrific aspects of the situation as it occurred. The 
realization of this unclaimed side of her experience altered its entire significance, rendering it 
traumatic in the sense described above (the absolute incommensurability between an 
excessive, real element and the pre-existent symbolic-imaginary framework). Thus, the main 
differences between Emma and van der Kolk and McFarlane’s example are that in the latter 
case (a) the T1 event happened after the so-called definite Oedipal structuring of the subject 
and (b) a subjective memory had already been formed, whereas with Emma the experience 
had only been rudimentarily held onto by a single, un-subjectifiable signifier. That a memory 
had already been formed does not prevent the victim from developing delayed-onset PTSD 
through a re-signification of the event. Signifiers can always be added to the signifying chain, 
and the latest elements will retroactively determine the impact of the formerly produced 







Our analysis of the Freudian concept of Nachträglichkeit led to the conclusion that in some 
instances delayed-onset PTSD and traumatic reactions following non-Criterion A events are 
logically related to each other. The case of Emma illustrates that the pathological weight of an 
apparently trivial situation can derive from an association with an earlier distressing 
experience that remained without consequence for many years. In such instances, the non-
Criterion A event causes traumatic pathology by instigating the formation of a traumatic 
memory of a formerly distressing event. When the diagnostician only focuses on the incident 
that immediately precedes the emergence of the symptoms, this can result in the ‘agent 
provocateur’ erroneously being taken for the sole etiological event. And if this immediately 
preceding event has no ‘traumatic face validity’ (i.e., satisfying Criterion A), then the distress 
might go unrecognized as being an instance of traumatic pathology. 
Secondly, a focus on the surface manifestation of the symptoms can exacerbate 
underdetection of psychological trauma even further. For example, Emma’s ‘compulsion’ 
would hardly appear as an instance of traumatic pathology to a contemporary eye. Perhaps 
she would be diagnosed with ‘Specific Social Phobia (Anxiety Disorder)’. This illustrates that 
the clinical picture that develops after a traumatic experience can be very diverse. Van der 
Kolk and McFarlane (2007) make a similar point as they consider the rather marked 
differences in symptomatic expressions among Vietnam combat soldiers belonging to 
different ethnic groups. More generally, the impact of cultural differences on trauma and 
recovery has been firmly established by a vast body of research (for an overview, see Stamm 
& Friedman, 2000). Taking these two remarks together, it appears safe to assume that many 
cases of delayed traumatic reactions go undetected and are rather classified as Adjustment 
Disorder, depression, other anxiety disorders, or conduct and developmental disorders in 
children and adolescents. Therefore, the clinician is required to invest in highly individual 
case formulation in order to recognize and make sense of the traumatic impact of various 
experiences – beyond a restricted focus on the immediately preceding event and the surface 
manifestation of the symptoms. 
As discussed, charting the objective particularities of the event and/or the person cannot 
predict clinical outcome. Subjective dimensions surface as paramount in understanding who 




impact of a situation on a person cannot be predicted by a priori parameters and is highly 
particular to their unique combination. Moreover, it clarifies that the subjective impact of an 
event is not given once and for all, but is always open to subsequent alterations through the 
ascription of a new signification-value.  
Next, Freud inferred Nachträglichkeit in the very specific context of the precocious sexual 
experience. By emphasizing the reality of the traumatic scene in early infancy, before the 
structuring of the subject in the Oedipal phase, he sought to ground the difference between 
normality and psychopathology in whether or not such an infantile trauma had occurred. This 
is known as Freud’s ‘seduction theory’ of psychoneuroses. In it, the primordial trauma 
functions as the point of origin for all subsequent pathology – phobia, obsessive neurosis, 
hysteria, etc. (Freud, 1896b, pp. 151–6). At that time, Freud suggested that the potentially 
traumatogenic nature of such an experience was primarily due to its precociousness, 
suggesting that sexuality is only traumatic when it is encountered too soon. In other words, 
the missed encounter that caused subsequent pathology was the effect of an unpreparedness of 
the subject due to its prematurity at the time of the occurrence. As psychoanalytical theory 
developed, the structural nature of psychological trauma became emphasized, blurring the 
boundaries between normality and pathology. Lacan theorized that the sexual is always 
potentially traumatic – not only for the infant who lacks the necessary symbolic means to deal 
with it (Lacan, 1972–73). Rather, it is the symbolic system in its entirety that structurally 
lacks the elements to adequately deal with certain aspects of our existential predicament, more 
specifically: sexual identity, the sexual relation, and death (Lacan, 1959, pp. 459–61). As 
such, the possibility of an ‘unclaimed experience’ or missed encounter is not limited to a 
specific time frame in the life of a person: the symbolic means to protect the speaking being 
against all intrusions of the real simply do not exist and thus cannot be acquired through 
development. It follows that the mechanism described in Emma’s case functions beyond the 
Oedipal point of discontinuity. 
Surprisingly, then, Lacan’s identification of the points at which the symbolic is structurally 
lacking dovetails with the restrictions on the traumatic stressor specified in the Criterion A 
definition: both suggest that psychological trauma is always tied to the registers of sexuality 
and/or death. Consequently, it can be surmised that non-Criterion A events that result in 
traumatic pathology are (unconsciously) associated with these fields of existence, even when 





whether the aforementioned association should be limited to ‘real’ events in the past that have 
left a mnemic trace (as was the case with Emma), or whether another type of mechanism is 
possible. More specifically: can a non-Criterion A event (such as losing your job or getting 
divorced) be traumatic simply because of its place in the logic of the affected person’s drive 
economy or fantasy life, without referring to a ‘real’ incident? This is precisely what Freud 
suggested after the abandonment of his seduction theory, and it constitutes the exact mirror-
image of the contemporary view of trauma. Put aphoristically: trauma without an event on the 
one hand, trauma without a subject on the other. In any case, the possibility that a non-
Criterion A event is traumatic without reference to a ‘real’ prior event cannot be excluded. 
The traumatic capacity of such a life event must then derive from the fact that it suddenly and 
unexpectedly traverses the strict determination inherent to the unconscious. Lacan argued that 
while the contingent experiences of the real seem perfectly arbitrary at the phenomenal level 
of the conscious ego, the timeless unconscious cannot but assign significance to them. As 
soon as chance encounters are taken up in the psychic system and brought into connection 
with other unconscious materials, an order is bestowed on them – in that the logic of the 
unconscious prescribes what elements can follow in light of what went beforeix. In a similar 
vein, the prescriptive determination of the unconscious can be envisaged through the 
conceptualization of the fundamental fantasy, which is understood as a window through 
which we perceive reality. This framework is a highly particular construction that protects the 
subject from a confrontation with the traumatic real (Fink, 1995; Jonckheere, 2003). As such, 
the specificities of the phantasm strictly determine the possibilities of what can and cannot 
arise in the subjectively constituted field of reality. The fundamental fantasy stipulates what 
cannot be grasped and made sense of. Trauma, in this case, can be understood as the 
emergence of an element that shatters the framework that allows us to make sense of the 
world and to position ourselves and the other within it. It is the confrontation with the 
‘impossible’ that disrupts the logic of the unconscious and that resists any form of 
reintegration into this system. The traumatic can thus be seen as an ethical injunction to 
subjectivize the chance phenomena that have proven to be incommensurable with the former 
structuring of the subject (that is, the automatic logic of the primary processes at work in the 
unconscious): it is that which requires the precipitation of a new subject(ive structuring). 
Given the specificity of each person’s psychic build-up (fundamental fantasy and signifying 





On the other hand, the finding that some experiences are more frequently related to the 
development of PTSD than others (i.e., severity) is not incompatible with analytical theory. 
However, the latter provides an explanation for this finding by linking it with the propensities 
of the symbolic system. This move emphasizes that what is pathological in these types of 
events can be defined only in relation to the psychic system that encounters them. In a time 
when the causal emphasis of traumatic pathology rests heavily on the nature of the event, 
Nachträglichkeit underlines that a traumatic encounter is always constituted by two parties: 
the event but also the subject. No event is traumatic in and of itself; it is only traumatic in 
relation to a subject. This might seem trivial, but it is of prime importance. It implies that 
traumatic pathology cannot be accounted for by an a priori knowledge of the objective 
characteristics of any situation. Comprehending traumatic reactions necessitates the study of 
the place of the traumatic event in the course of a person’s life, the manner in which it affects 
the whole of that person’s knowledge about the self and the world. Since this is of a highly 
individual nature, it cannot be generalized in order to predict how a certain situation will 
impact on the next person. However, the mistaken idea that we can predict and limit what 
types of events are traumatic by charting their particularities – as evidenced by the existence 
of a Criterion A definition – has now become a self-evident truth (Fassin & Rechtman, 2009), 
with far-reaching implications. For instance, it justifies the massive efforts in humanitarian 
missions of psychologists and other mental health workers in the aftermath of natural 
disasters (Bracken, Giller, & Summerfield, 1995; Bracken & Petty, 1998; Summerfield, 1999, 
2001; Watters, 2010). 
Trauma confronts us with the unimaginable and the uncontrollable. Trying to predict 
traumatic pathology tends to go in the same direction: it opens up a register that is not 
accessible and even resists the logic of calculation. The real is never where it is expected, and 




















The Biomedical Approach to Trauma and the Ethics 












Beyond the Biomedical Trauma Approach 
 
Abstract: The hegemonic biomedical approach to trauma, encapsulated in the 
psychiatric category of PTSD, is argued to individualize, decontextualize and 
depoliticize the effects of distressing experiences. The view of PTSD as a scientifically 
backed construct supports its claims to universality and neutrality and thereby allows 
it to function as a disempowering political instrument in servitude of the status quo. 
However, the empirical base to infer PTSD as a distinct psychiatric category is 
lacking, and the cultural-historical determination of the construct contradicts its 
supposed universality and neutrality. Humanitarian help based on this model neglects 
a focus on ‘material recovery’, in the sense of the the transformation of the wounding 
social, political or economic system that gave rise to the suffering. 
 
The feminist trauma theorist Judith Herman was amongst the first to insist, in Trauma and 
Recovery: The Aftermath of Violence – from Domestic Abuse to Political Terror (1997), on 
the necessity of a political movement alongside the practices of studying and treating 
psychological trauma. She argues that ‘advances in the field occur only when they are 
supported by a political movement powerful enough to legitimate an alliance between 




denial’ (p. 9). In this sense, Trauma and Recovery is itself a political book: it starts from the 
controversial thesis that mechanisms on the social and individual level work together to deny 
or repress the truth of trauma, which is rendered literally unspeakable. The intriguing thesis 
put forward in Trauma and Recovery is that the process of healing from trauma is essentially 
embedded in a wider sociopolitical framework that must always be taken into account.  
However, psychological trauma research in general has not picked up the claim that recovery 
from trauma necessarily entails a political dimension. The eclipse of the politics of trauma 
recovery is reflected in the ubiquitous use of various treatment programs that focus on the 
intrapsychic processing of the traumatic experience without taking the sociopolitical context 
into consideration. Indeed, it has been argued in recent years that the dominant Western 
framework for thinking trauma recovery, epitomized in the psychiatric construct of Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), risks robbing the traumatized of their political agency 
rather than securing a place for it (Craps, 2013). This claim is related to a more general 
critique targeting the tendency in the disciplines of clinical psychology and psychiatry to 
render invisible the ‘true’ external/social causes of human suffering. Western notions of 
psychopathology, heavily influenced by and embedded in a long-standing biomedical 
tradition, identify the individual as the locus for therapeutic intervention, rather than the social 
conditions associated with various forms of distress (McKinney, 2007; Pupavac, 2004; 
Summerfield, 1997). Additionally, the basic psychotherapeutic stance, in the wake of 
Sigmund Freud’s discovery of the talking cure, is to be wary of patients’ attempts to 
externalize the causes of their suffering, as this enables them to avoid confronting the manner 
in which they are subjectively implicated in the problems they experience. As such, the 
individualizing, internalizing and decontextualizing trend captured in the notions of 
‘medicalization’ and ‘psychologization’ forms an antonymic pair with the called-for 
(re)politicization of various forms of human misery. When applied to PTSD, this tension-
generating dichotomy becomes ever more pressing, since this particular type of 
psychopathology is regarded as primarily externally determined on the one hand (Rosen & 
Lilienfeld, 2008), while simultaneously treated as an intrapsychic disorder on the other 
(Young, 1995). Although it is acknowledged that in some cases the sociopolitical 
environment causes the subjective distress, ‘contextual considerations seldom fit into formal 
trauma-and-recovery paradigms’ (Montiel, 2000, p. 96). In what follows, I intend to show that 





and a general disinterest in engaging with the social conditions that caused distress) derive 
from the biomedical approach that dominates the way we think about trauma. 
The political dimension of trauma recovery is most salient in contexts of collective disruptive 
events that cause pain, loss and suffering, such as natural disasters, armed conflicts, state-
organized terror, civil war, and so on. Note that the attention given to trauma in these contexts 
is a rather recent phenomenon within the humanitarian sector. There was no mention of it in 
manuals of refugee health as recently as the early 1980s; the psychotherapeutic turn in 
humanitarian aid is often situated only in the early 1990s. For instance, Doctors without 
Borders first deployed psychiatrists and psychologists in December 1988, in the aftermath of 
the earthquake in Armenia (De Vos, 2012, p. 102). After this first intervention, mental health 
became one of the organization’s primary goals. However, throughout part II of this 
dissertation, it will become clear that even in contexts of individual trauma, the use of medical 
technologies to address this type of suffering imposes a framework that obscures the political 
and ethical sides of trauma, which, in line with Herman’s (1997) main assertion, are 
nevertheless always present. 
How, then, was trauma ‘discovered’ as an international humanitarian issue? This is not a 
gratuitous question, as it entails  a declarative act that not only recognizes but establishes the 
fact that war-affected populations are at risk of being traumatized en masse. Evident as it may 
seem, how do we know that war and natural catastrophes cause traumatic pathology that 
needs to be addressed with Western psychological technologies? The importation of trauma 
programs in the 1990s did not follow the affected populations’ expressed demand for this kind 
of help. Vanessa Pupavac (2004) argues that the imperative for international psychosocial 
programs lay in sociocultural ‘developments within donor countries and debates in their 
humanitarian sectors over the efficacy of traditional aid responses’ (p. 491). She points out 
that it was the benefactor who identified the need for trauma projects in these settings, based 
on our supposedly universally applicable, scientific understanding of trauma itself, which 
obviously raises moral questions about who has the power to define the problem: whose 
norms, knowledge and priorities guide the offers of assistance? As Jan De Vos (2012, p. 104) 
remarks, it did not take long for critics to suggest that trauma psychiatry was a covert form of 
neocolonialism, due to its tacit imposition of Western cultural norms. Those who defended 
the idea of trauma responded to this accusation by claiming that they were simply busying 




based research concerning PTSD was claimed to transcend cultural and anthropological 
differences (for example, de Vries, 1998). The scientific status of PTSD thus serves to 
safeguard the purported neutrality of the interventions predicated on this model; the question 
regarding PTSD’s empirical status, along with its claims to universality, therefore has a 
political side to it. The biomedical approach to illness and distress cannot be uncoupled from 
the debates concerning the political dimension of trauma interventions.  
The third edition of the DSM, which appeared in 1980, was developed in line with the central 
tenets of the biomedical framework. Significantly, this was the edition in which PTSD was 
first included as a distinct psychiatric diagnosis. The so-called ‘biomedical turn’ in psychiatric 
diagnostics was part of a strategy to enhance the scientific image of psychiatry, which had 
been heavily discredited in the 1960s and 1970s by a series of ‘anti-psychiatric’ experiments 
(Kirk & Kutchins, 1992; Vanheule, 2014). In the next section, I will discuss some of the core 
beliefs on which this model is predicated.  
 
The Biomedical Model 
In The Rise of Causal Concepts of Disease (2003), K. Codell Carter describes how in the 
nineteenth century the idea took root that diseases are best understood by means of causes that 
are ‘natural (they depend on forces of nature as opposed to the willful transgression of moral 
or social norms), universal (the same cause is common to every instance of a given disease), 
and necessary (the disease does not occur in absence of its cause)’ (p. 1). In the early 
nineteenth century, individual diseases were defined by a pattern of prominent signs and 
symptoms, and every disease was believed to have a range of remote and proximate causes: 
each instance of a disease was claimed to be caused by a series of conditions particular to the 
case in question. The question was ‘why does this person get the mumps?’, as opposed to 
‘what causes the mumps?’ The idea that there would be one universal, necessary and 
sufficient cause that explains every episode of a single disease was simply unthinkable. The 
only way this could be conceived was by defining diseases in terms of their causes rather than 
in terms of symptoms. This powerful evolution in medical thinking, which put etiology centre 
stage, constitutes an attempt to transform medicine in order to fit scientific requirements. In 
medicine, this goal could be accomplished because the etiological agents (bacteria, viruses, 





other. The greatest advantage of such an approach is that it makes possible consistent and 
uniform strategies of intervention that target these specific causes (in both prevention and 
treatment).  
Within the field of psychopathology, the attempt to define disorders as nosological entities 
will always be associated with the name of Emil Kraepelin (1856-1926). In analogy with the 
medical model, this German psychiatrist thought of mental disorders as natural disease 
entities with an independent existence. Mary Boyle (2002) rightly identifies the Platonic roots 
of such a stance: reality is considered to be universal and unchanging, while perceptions are 
always relative and imperfect. This position leads to ‘ontological theories of disease’ that pose 
‘the existence of natural and unvarying disease entities, separable from the person, and whose 
presentation [is] uniform across sufferers’ (Boyle, 2002, p. 9). Each disease entity is thought 
of as a discrete and separate unit, defined by its own distinctive cause, symptoms, course and 
outcome. Kraepelin sought to find the essence of every mental disorder, a defining trait that is 
both necessary and sufficient to make the diagnosis, an intrinsic or underlying quality that 
causes an entirety of other, more superficial characteristics (Ellis, 2001).  
However, whereas Kraepelin initially believed that every distinct mental disorder would 
eventually be explained by a specific genetic mutation or a specific neurobiological marker, in 
line with the etiological standpoint described by Carter (2003), over a hundred years of 
research has failed to identify such an unequivocal sign for a single psychiatric diagnostic 
category (Dehue, 2008; Kupfer, First, & Regier, 2002; Vanheule, 2014). Etiology in the field 
of mental problems has been found to be complex and multidimensional: research indicates a 
variety of risk factors on different levels, such as genetic, molecular, neuronal, psychological, 
social and cultural factors (Lemaire, 2014). The absence of two-way pathognomic signs or 
symptoms, that is, of indicators that are both necessary and sufficient to diagnose a specific 
disorder, poses great difficulties for psychiatry’s scientific status.  
In absence of such findings regarding etiology or pathophysiology, mental disorders have 
been defined by a number of nonspecific signs and symptoms that appear to correlate on more 
than chance level. The (forced) choice to remain agnostic with regard to etiology, in favor of a 
description of the readily observable surface phenomena, was the major intervention that 
marked the much-discussed break of DSM-III with its predecessorsx. The explicit goal of this 
move was to augment the reliability of psychiatric diagnostics (Kirk & Kutchins, 1992). The 




symptom constellations, which, by themselves, offer little information as to the validity of the 
proposed categories (Boyle, 2002). Despite these limitations, there is a tendency to reify the 
mental disorders in the DSM: the labels are often used as if they refer to underlying natural 
disease entities that cause the clinical tableau in a straightforward fashion, whereas in fact 
they simply represent the name given to a particular cluster of symptoms (Hyman, 2010).  
 
Mental Disorders as Natural Kinds 
Ontological psychiatric theories assume that the forms of mental disorder found in the West 
are basically the same as those found elsewhere: their nature is not significantly modified by 
social and cultural influences stemming from either the patient’s or the researcher’s context. 
Theory is believed to be external to the facts under observation, in the sense that the basic 
data of psychiatric research (that is, symptoms and syndromes) ‘exist prior to and independent 
of psychiatric theory’ (Bracken, Giller & Summerfield, 1995, p. 1075). Western psychiatric 
diagnoses are frequently taken to be ‘natural kinds’ that exist independently of any cultural 
determination. This is nicely illustrated by the inclusion of a ‘Glossary of culture-bound 
syndromes’ in appendix I of the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 
2000, pp. 897-905xi). The explicit reference to a limited set of culturally determined 
afflictions retroactively confers the status of ‘cultural independency’ on everything that went 
before. Psychiatry and clinical psychology assume that the deductive-nomological scientific 
method makes possible the delineation of the universal aspects of mental illnesses, in 
independence from subjective values, ethnic or social bias and so on (Bracken, 2002).  
Knowledge about these data, generated through the implementation of established scientific 
methodologies, is regarded as neutral, value-free, and universal.  
Do the mental disorders described in the DSM capture a reality that exists independently of 
the classification system itself? Is the order imposed by the DSM upon the multiform variety 
of clinical symptoms something artificial and culturally dependent, or does it reflect an order 
which was always-already there, inscribed in nature? The preoccupation with establishing a 
classification that describes natural kinds in part derives from practical considerations: if the 
ideal of ‘carving nature at its joints’ were achieved, clinical intervention would become a lot 
easier. In analogy with physical medicine, psychological problems could then be approached 





would allow predictions as to the (generic) cause of the disorder and the most efficient course 
of treatment. In other words: the idea of natural kinds allows for a generalization of the 
produced knowledge concerning etiology and treatment.  
When applied specifically to trauma, the described assumptions suggest that PTSD has a 
universal and timeless character, which translates into claims such as: it has been around from 
the earliest times; people in the stone age suffered from PTSD just as people from the 21st 
century do; people across the globe react with more or less the same symptoms when faced 
with adversity, generated through a quasi-identical pathophysiological mechanism; and so on. 
The assertion that PTSD reflects a universal human response to distress suggests that it is 
possible to predict the impact of war, violence and disaster on Western and non-Western 
people alike. Moreover, it supports the idea that there exist universally applicable medical 
technologies to address this form of suffering. It is important to emphasize that the 
cornerstone of these presuppositions is the scientific method through which psychiatric 
knowledge is gathered: this method is believed to guarantee the latter’s accuracy and validity. 
Before we delve into a discussion of whether or not PTSD meets the scientific standards that 
warrant its inference as a medical syndrome, I will briefly discuss two more assumptions of 
the psychiatric trauma approach that lead to a few undesirable consequences: its assumption 
of a universal srubject and its cognitive framework. 
 
The Universal Subject and its Vulnerability 
At its core, psychiatry is very much determined by Cartesian dualism, the idea that the inner 
and outer world are ontologically separated from each other (Bracken, 2002). The res 
cogitans, the substance of our minds with the capacity for thought, is believed to exist in 
isolation from the external world, although it is not without a relationship to this world. 
Trauma psychiatry presupposes the existence of  some kind of inborn universal human 
subject that is affected by distressing experiences in more or less the same way across 
different times and places. This human subject is not considered an effect of the social, 
political or cultural context in which it is embedded: it is fundamentally a priori, isolated and 
autonomous. As such, the similarity between people from different cultures is emphasized, 
whilst difference and diversity are downplayed. Furthermore, it is immediately clear that the 




violent crises are seen as fundamentally at risk of traumatization, and part of the impetus for 
psychosocial humanitarian work is the desire to prevent or attenuate the impact of horrific 
events on the fragile human mind. This will prove important for the discussion of the ethical 
stance associated with PTSD in the next chapter. 
 
Cognitive Theory 
Contemporary understandings of psychopathology are highly influenced by cognitive 
psychology, which views mental problems as the result of dysfunctional beliefs or faulty 
information processing (Bracken, 2002; Brewin & Holmes, 2003). Cognitive theory 
approaches the human mind as an information processing system. It uses the computer as the 
privileged metaphor to illuminate our mental processes. Within this theoretical framework, 
mental ‘schemata’, ‘cognitive scripts’ or ‘unconscious schemas’ (that is, the software running 
on the computers) are believed to organize our sensory experience in a ‘theory-driven’ way, a 
process that generates a meaningful and orderly world (Janoff-Bulman, 1992). In other words, 
according to this view, meaning is produced within individual minds, it is dependent on the 
person-specific schemas and their interaction with the outer world. In these schemata, our 
deepest convictions and most fundamental assumptions about the world are condensed 
(Janoff-Bulman, 1992). Through these structures, raw experience is ordered into coherent 
meaning. Mental schemata help the person to understand the world and to orientate him or 
herself in it.  
It is through this cognitive lens that traumatic experience is generally understood within 
contemporary (psychological) theories: trauma occurs when something happens that 
contradicts our most fundamental assumptions about the world (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). For 
instance, that the world is just and good; that the world is meaningful; that we have a degree 
of control over what happens to us in an ‘action-outcome contingency’; that good things 
happen to good people; and so on (Janoff-Bulman, 1992). The central idea is that a traumatic 
event offers ‘information’ that cannot be reconciled with the pre-existent schemata: the 
conflict between the inner beliefs and the reality of the trauma generates tension and distress. 
In other words, the traumatic event cannot be assimilated into the existent schemata; its 
processing is blocked. The iconic symptoms of re-experiencing the event (in nightmares and 





processing of the event. This ‘completion tendency’, which is reminiscent of Sigmund 
Freud’s (1920) concept of repetition compulsion, will continue with its work until ‘the 
situation or the models change and the reality and the schema of that reality reach accord’ 
(Bracken, 2002, p. 55).  
In line with these theoretical premises, cognitive therapy for trauma attempts to facilitate the 
obstructed processing of the traumatic event (Foa & Rothbaum, 1998). Where trauma is 
defined by the fact that the meaning of the etiological event cannot be grasped, because it 
cannot be assimilated within the existent intra-individual schemata, what ideally must be 
achieved is the re-evaluation and modification of these schemata so that they can 
accommodate the new trauma information (Christopher, 2004; Joseph & Linley, 2006; Linley 
& Joseph, 2004). Meaning must be allowed to emerge where it has failed to do so, and this 
process is conceived to take place intra-individually: the affected person’s private mental 
schemata must be changed to enable recovery. To achieve this, cognitive therapy usually 
involves some sort of psycho-education and training: the therapist helps the patient to 
understand the way his/her own psyche functions, and how it sometimes works against him or 
her. The patient is given homework and exercises to be carried out between sessions, with the 
goal of stimulating an objective and systematic examination of his or her own thoughts. 
During this process, cognitive distortions are laid bare and new, more functional ways of 
viewing the world are learned. One major consequence of the adoption of a cognitive 
framework in the context of trauma treatment is therefore the focus on the individual as the 
primary locus of intervention: it is in the individual’s mind/brain that violence is 
problematically inscribed, and it is there that it must be treated. This framework can therefore 
be said to individualize and psychologize the effects of horrid experiences on people (for 
example, Bracken, 2002; Summerfield, 1999).  
In the following sections, I will turn towards a series of problems related to the core 
assumptions on which the PTSD construct is predicated. First, the universality and neutrality 
of the diagnosis have been called into question. Second, the individualistic focus has been 
argued to be counterproductive to deal with (collective) trauma and issues of meaning: 
context appears to have a central place in both etiology and recovery from trauma. Third, the 
use of a technical framework to counter the effects of distressing experiences has been 





Problems with Universality 
The claim that PTSD captures a universal reality is linked with the idea that it is a 
scientifically established clinical syndrome. Remember that it is this claim that justifies the 
export of this trauma model into non-Western cultures. The arguments against this are 
multiple. First, when measured against the requirements of the scientific paradigm from 
which it stems, PTSD lacks empirical support. Rather surprisingly, the predictions made on 
the basis of this model were not borne out by scientific research. The empirical base to infer 
the construct of PTSD, in other words, is simply not there. Second, historical analyses show 
the variety in symptom expression after exposure to intense and violent events, and also 
indicate that political, economical and social factors consistently play a part in the manners in 
which we understand traumatic pathology and organize its treatment (see Chapter 1). In other 
words: trauma theory has always been heavily influenced by the moral and cultural climate of 
the society in which it was developed, and this equally applies to PTSD. Taken together, this 
suggests that PTSD is a cultural construction rather than a ‘natural kind’.  
 
The Validity of PTSD 
The biomedical paradigm suggests that the knowledge produced and validated through the 
scientific apparatus is objective and neutral. Hence, it is warranted to ask whether or not the 
claim that PTSD captures a ‘universal reality’ is backed up by empirical findings? In an 
impressive and comprehensive review study, Gerald Rosen and Scott Lilienfeld (2008, p. 
838) ‘ask the critical question of whether PTSD, as a hypothetical construct, is the best means 
of “carving nature at its joints”’. Note that in phrasing matters in these terms, they accept the 
general tenets of the scientific tradition in which the construct is embedded: their aim is to 
provide an internal critique of PTSD’s validity. They answer their opening question by means 
of a thorough examination of the nomological network surrounding PTSD, that is, the entire 
range of external validating criteria that have been proposed in the scientific literature to 
distinguish PTSD as a separate diagnostic entity. This includes 
(a) the specificity of precipitating events, (b) relations between precipitating events 





from other conditions, (d) psychophysiological reactivity, (e) neuroendocrine and 
brain imaging findings, and (f) distinctive features of traumatic memory. (p.838) 
These six characteristics constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions to infer a PTSD 
diagnosis: each one of them could advance the claim that PTSD is distinct from other 
conditions such as other anxiety disorders. Whereas PTSD is essentially defined as a specific 
set of symptoms that emerge after the confrontation with a specific type of precipitating 
event, the nodes (d) to (f) show attempts to tie the PTSD construct to other, more reliable and 
independent observations (signs as opposed to symptoms). A comprehensive review of 
research on each of the nodes in the theoretical network of PTSD thus accumulates in a 
systematic review of the construct validity of the diagnosis itself. Note that to assess the 
validity of PTDS is not to question the reality of the pain and suffering of those who are 
diagnosed with it, or who could be. The idea is rather to show that the claims that underpin 
PTSD’s many usages (its scientific status, its objectivity and neutrality) are not defendable 
from a scientific point of view. Furthermore, the difficulties encountered in the process of 
validating this construct are very instructive; they show us where our intuitive understanding 
of trauma is disconfirmed. As such, the fact that empirical evidence diverges from what we 
expect challenges us to question anew our theories of trauma.  
To be brief: according to Rosen and Lilienfeld (2008), contemporary research indicates that 
most every core assumption underlying the diagnostic construct of PTSD has met with 
questionable support, if not falsification. It seems that one major merit of the construct is that 
it has stimulated intensive research efforts – which, ironically, call into question every 
assumption on which the concept was based:  
PTSD was originally believed to follow only specific types of traumatic events, but 
this assumption has been disconfirmed. Traumatic events were generally believed to 
be the largest contributor to clinical outcome, but this is not the case. Evidence for a 
dose-response relation between stressors and symptoms has been inconsistent and 
equivocal. PTSD is defined by symptom criteria that overlap substantially with extant 
conditions, such as depression and better established anxiety disorders (for example, 
specific phobia). Concerted efforts to identify distinct pathogenic processes that 
underlie PTSD, including research on neuroanatomy, psychophysiological markers 
and memory processes have met with mixed results, if not outright failure. In short, 




nodes within the nomological network surrounding PTSD. (Rosen & Lilienfeld, 2008, 
p. 853) 
From a scientific standpoint, PTSD has little appeals to the status of hypothetical construct, 
syndrome or disease entity. PTSD does not simply reflect scientifically gathered, objective 
knowledge. This conclusion by no means denies the fact that horrible experiences cause pain 
and suffering and may produce long-term psychological problems; it only shows that (1) the 
creation and success of PTSD is not merely the result of scientific evolutions in our 
understanding of trauma, and (2) that this framework, despite its merits, cannot explain a 
number of empirical findings. An empirical investigation of the construct validity of PTSD 
thus undermines the claims of universality and neutrality that underpin its many usages.  
 
The History of Trauma Studies 
Historical accounts of the pathological effects of people’s exposure to the horrors of war 
seldom make reference of the re-experiencing symptoms that are nowadays viewed as most 
uniquely related to traumatic pathology (Bracken, 2002). In contradiction with the idea that 
the clinical picture associated with horrible events is universal and thus timeless, historical 
accounts of the aftereffects of war and violence show a series of psychological and physical 
reactions that digress substantially from those enlisted in PTSD. Take, for instance, the 
medical literature on Soldier’s Heart (also known as Da Costa’s syndrome) produced during 
the American Civil War: the symptoms of this syndrome, which are now regarded as physical 
manifestations of an anxiety disorder, included shortness of breath, palpitations, sweating and, 
most characteristically, chest pains (Mackenzie, 1916). In addition, recall that trauma was 
considered to be at the root of an entire range of symptoms under the flag of conversion 
hysteria, which included paralyses, contractures, muscle weakness, blindness, mutism, 
seizures, spasms and so on (Luckhurst, 2008). These symptoms, which arose in the aftermath 
of large-scale railway accidents, for instance, or in the context of Shell Shock during the First 
World War, are far removed from what we consider to be the ‘typical’ traumatic symptoms 
nowadays (see Chapter 1). It appears that somatic symptoms are described much more 
frequently in both medical and non-medical historical literature about these issues. At a 
minimum, this points to a variation across history with regard to how people are affected and 





level of symptom manifestation has been confirmed by more recent empirical studies, which 
found that culture has an impact on symptom expression in trauma (Stamm & Friedman, 
2000). Kulka and colleagues (1990), for instance, found clear differences in symptom 
expression (and vulnerability) among Vietnam veterans from different ethnic groups.  
A historical account of the events that led up to PTSD’s first inclusion as an official diagnosis 
in DSM-III reveals that this latest trauma construct does not escape a substantive degree of 
contextual determination (Fassin & Rechtman, 2009; Kutchins & Kirk, 1997; Luckhurst, 
2008; Young, 1995). Young (1995), for instance, argues that PTSD was created at a particular 
time, in a particular place and according to a particular moral and political agenda. As 
Summerfield (1999) puts it: ‘PTSD was as much a sociopolitical as a medical response to the 
problems of a particular group at a particular point in time, yet the mental health field rapidly 
accorded it the status of scientific truth, supposedly representing a universal and essentially 
context-independent entity.’ (p. 1450) The unearthed influence of the sociocultural context on 
the particular definition of PTSD further undermines its status as a natural disease entity that 
exists independently of any contingent historical context (see Chapter 1). It contradicts the 
positivist idea that the psychiatric knowledge inscribed in the DSM is the exclusive result of 
objective scientific evidence.  
A historical perspective on trauma thus learns that (1) there is no universal trauma response 
and that (2) PTSD is not merely the result of scientific inquiry, but equally the product of a 
specific social and political context. This ‘background agenda’ is at odds with the DSM’s 
position that disorders are enlisted on the basis of scientific argumentation (Bracken, 2002, p. 
47). In addition, the previous section learned that (3) the construct validity of PTSD leaves a 
lot to be desired for. When taken together, these findings contradict the picture of PTSD as a 
‘natural disease entity’. Western psychiatric knowledge about trauma cannot simply be 
regarded as neutral, objective or universally valid. As such, its application in non-Western 
contexts risks a form of neo-colonialism, in which local knowledge systems are measured 





Individualization versus Contextualization 
It is well-known that the location of the individual ‘at the centre of Western morality and 
cosmology’ is not something universally shared across cultures (Bracken, Giller, & 
Summerfield, 1995, p. 1074). Many non-Western systems of thought embrace a notion of the 
self and of its relationships to others and to the outside world that is incommensurable with 
the particular conception of individuality that has become so self-evident in the West. This 
further undermines the proposed universality of PTSD.  
As the cognitive framework suggest that meaning is something ‘”conferred” on it [reality] by 
the schemas, or programs, running in individual minds’, trauma is viewed as acting on 
individual minds and therapy is oriented towards ‘restoring or renewing the schemas in 
discrete individuals’ (Bracken, 2002, p. 209). As a result, the consequences of major social 
upheavals are individualized and psychologized: the emphasis is not on the modification of a 
problematic social, political or economical system, but on psychological adaptation to the 
demands imposed by distressing events.  
Furthermore, the therapeutic arsenal of psychiatry and clinical psychology (exposure, 
cognitive reappraisal, reduction of emotional arousal, and so on) risks increasing the isolation 
of those who suffer ‘by encouraging a narrow focus on their own memories, thoughts and 
beliefs’ (Bracken, 2002, p. 210). The further disruption of social networks, brought about by 
the individualizing framework of PTSD, has been put forward as a convincing explanation for 
the paradoxical (negative) effects of PTSD-based interventions in humanitarian missions 
(Bracken, 2002; Summerfield, 1999; Watters, 2010).  
The emphasis on the individual in trauma derives from the idea that meaning is generated 
through the interaction of a person’s mental schemata with the external environment. The idea 
that meaning arises in the isolation of one’s private mind is opposed by accounts that 
emphasize the importance of context in the constitution of sensible human reality. Bracken 
(2002), for instance, uses Heideggerian philosophy to argue that meaning is created socially, 
through our immersion in language, culture and our social roles. Despite the merits of the 
cognitive approach to trauma, then, the danger is that it neglects the social and communal 
dynamics influencing both the development of and recovery from traumatic pathology. 
Summerfield (1999) equally asserts that the individualist focus of PTSD eclipses the cultural 





to disruptive events is shaped to a large degree by their culture: ‘people do not passively 
register the impact of external forces (unlike, say, a leg hit by a bullet) but engage with them 
in an active and problem-solving way’ (Summerfield, 1999, p. 1454). If we take seriously the 
claim that meaning is something generated through our practical engagement with the world, 
and not in the isolation of one’s mind, what does this imply for the manners in which we 
comprehend trauma, and the manners in which we attempt to address it?   
If we follow Bracken’s thesis, then the loss of meaning entailed in trauma is caused by a 
disruption and disintegration of our social networks. In this sense, any intervention that 
furthers individualization and separation should be avoided; trauma rather requires the re-
establishment of social bonds, of a community, of new ways of life. Western therapeutic 
techniques, which encourage the individual person to turn ‘inwards’ and focus on his or her 
private loss and suffering, run counter to the protective and regenerative powers of these 
social and moral networks. What is needed more than anything else, then, in contexts of loss 
of meaning and trauma, is the ‘rebuilding [of] a practical way of life’ (Bracken, 2002, p. 218). 
Bracken argues that recovery from violence and trauma happens all the time as communities 
rebuild their lives after war: ‘It is in the regaining of an economy, a culture and a sense of 
community that individuals find a way of living in the wake of terrible suffering’ (2002, p. 
219).  If meaning is generated through our interaction with the social context, and not in the 
solitude of our own minds, then the emphasis on the individual in trauma psychiatry may very 
well make things worse. Furthermore, it necessarily obfuscates action on a more collective, 
political level. 
The conceptual erasure of differences related to the traumatic stressor, which is implied in the 
very definition of PTSD, reinforces the disorder’s already-present decontextualizing potential. 
The core idea of PTSD is that a set of highly diverse external influences equally produce a 
typical traumatic symptomatology, through a similar etiological mechanism. As such, the 
diversity in etiological events is downplayed to stress the uniformity of the condition at the 
level of symptom manifestation and the pathological mechanism involved (see Chapter 1). 
Within this model, a range of dissimilar types of events are treated as uniform in their 
capacity to cause a specific form of psychological distress, including the violence of war, the 
horror of concentration camps and genocide, torture, domestic violence, rape and sexual 
abuse, natural disasters, traffic accidents, being mugged, a difficult labor (with a healthy 




doctor (Rosen & Lilienfeld, 2008). The context and particularities of the etiological events 
themselves are considered of secondary relevance. The PTSD model, in other words, fails to 
take into account ‘how distress is mediated by political or religious convictions, cultural 
beliefs, social circumstances and previous experience of adversity, and not simply by the 
distressing events themselves’ (Shepherd, 2000 in Pupavac, 2004, p. 494). The lack of 
cultural and contextual sensitivity has been argued to be a general shortcoming of the DSM’s 
approach to psychological problems (Vanheule, 2014), and it becomes specifically 
problematic in the context of collectively suffered disruptive events and their sequelae.   
 
Technological Interventions 
Positivism aims at the formulation of universal laws that allow us to understand, predict and 
control the phenomena of interest. As such, it translates the world into a technical idiom. 
Psychiatry’s positivist background suggests that each mental disorder is characterized by its 
own symptoms, etiology, prognosis and treatment. The goal is to develop interventions that 
target the specific pathological mechanism involved: protocols that can be applied in all cases 
of a given disorder. In other words, the goal is the development of specific interventions for 
well-defined problems that will reliably lead to the desired outcome. In this view, the subject 
is radically separated from his or her own psychological problems. Recovery becomes a 
matter of administrating the correct therapeutic agent in the right dose.  
The effort to develop and administer a form of ‘psychological first aid’ in humanitarian 
missions is predicated on the belief that certain experiences, due to their shear intensity, 
overwhelm the processing capacities of the individual mind. If not properly attended to, these 
unprocessed experiences are thought not to spontaneously resolve, and to potentially lead to 
new cycles of violence and trauma. Psychological first aid, such as a variety of debriefing 
methods, attempts to prevent the development of PTSD and similar phenomena, and to 
attenuate the impact of what transpired (McNally, Bryant, & Ehlers, 2003). At this point, we 
should ask ourselves the simple question what this form of intervention is in its essence. Not: 
what are its principles, but, on a more basic level, what do psy-professionals actually do when 





What immediately catches the eye is that psychosocial interventions often involve some sort 
of ‘education’ and/or ‘training’. The victims of an external event are brought to formulate 
their problems in the uniform medico-technical language of PTSD. They learn to ‘recognize’ 
and ‘measure’ the symptoms of trauma, and are handed ways to deal with them. Jan De Vos 
states that in most cases, this amounts to little more than ‘getting people to talk’ (2012, p. 
106). By means of a philosophical analysis he concludes that psychological first aid is a 
logical impossibility. The classical way to ignore and circumvent this impossibility is to seek 
refuge in some form of psycho-education. In the case of posttraumatic reactions, this means 
that ‘the treatment of the wounded has to pass through knowledge-distribution and education’ 
(De Vos, 2012, p. 107). Most trauma programs first seek to reach the target audience, in order 
to educate them, to spread information, to develop in them an understanding of their own 
condition, to learn how to deal with it, to help to understand the thoughts and feelings that are 
propounded to surface, to normalize and validate these feelings and reactions, to find practical 
ways to deal with them, to observe behavior, to control anger, to let go of fear and 
aggression,… De Vos holds that when faced with the impossibility of psychological first aid, 
the target audience is instead educated in psychological theories. This requires the 
beneficiaries of psychosocial aid to assume the dual position of being both the object and the 
subject of psychology; they are compelled to adopt the gaze of academic psychology and 
scrutinize their inner life worlds in the terms provided by the benefactor. The survivor is 
expected to develop a theoretical understanding of his or her situation, and the internalization 
of psychological theories is assumed to be healing in itself. The problems faced are thereby 
translated in a technical jargon: when you become knowledgeable of what is happening to 
you, it becomes possible to rationally intervene in the maladaptive chain of events to which 
you are otherwise blindly subjected. The idea is that people should be helped to transcend 
their own psychology through the adoption of the observational position of the psychological 
gaze. This analysis leads De Vos to conclude that in the end, psychological first aid boils 
down to ‘the administration of psychology’ (2012, p. 107). Note that in this model, the 
confrontation with the traumatic ‘gap’ in meaning, with the impossibility of meaning, is 
believed to be remediated by the administration of normative psychiatric knowledge.  
The best-known psychological first aid program is called debriefing, which relies on three 
therapeutic components and an array of different techniques: ‘ventilation in a context of group 




The technique consists of reviewing the traumatic experience, encouraging emotional 
expression, and promoting cognitive processing of the experience’ (Kaplan, Iancu, & Bodner, 
2001, p. 825). This brief description contains all the elements discussed by De Vos: 
ventilation, dispersal of knowledge through psycho-education, normalization, and so on. 
Despite the increased utilization of models such as Critical Incident Stress Debriefing and 
Critical Incident Stress Management in ever-expanding contexts, scientific evidence for these 
types of interventions is equivocal at best, even in contexts where the background 
assumptions of the dispersed knowledge are shared (for example, Bisson, Jenkins, Alexander, 
& Bannister, 1997; Bracken, 2002; Herbert, et al., 2001; McNally, Bryant, & Ehlers, 2003; 
Raphael & Wilson, 2000; Rose, Bisson, Churchill, & Wessely, 2002; Rose, Brewin, Andrews, 
& Kirk, 1999; van Emmerik, Kamphuis, Hulsbosch, & Emmelkamp, 2002). Moreover, such 
interventions have been argued to interfere with natural recovery processes (Bisson, Jenkins, 
Alexander, & Bannister, 1997; Mayou, Ehlers, & Hobbs, 2000), which suggests that they are 
liable to further traumatize those on the receiving end. 
In physical medicine, the patient has no need to be knowledgeable about anatomy, surgery, 
and so on. In psychology, the entire technique and praxis is based upon bringing the subject in 
contact with the background knowledge. As such, psychological assistance offers a 
normalizing and normative model, reflected in well-known and well-intended assertions like 
‘It is normal to feel like…’, ‘you need to understand that…’, and so on. Psychosocial aid thus 
prescribes the appropriate emotions and how to deal with them: it communicates what the 
academic perspective deems the norm. De Vos (2012) holds that the political meaning of 
psychosocial help rests in the fact that (1) it imposes a number of limited, normative signifiers 
in which the other is alienated, and (2) it places the recipients of aid in the specific role of the 
student. In other words, the mere form of this type of aid allocates the respective actors a 
predefined position in a power relation, in which the recipients are rendered passive and 
silent. In the end, De Vos concludes that ‘the psychosocial turn in humanitarian help is the 
fundament of a thoroughly politicized humanitarian help, while it simultaneously 
depoliticizes the terrain itself’ (2012, p. 163-4, own translation). 
If the technology of psychological first aid, in the final analysis, amounts to the 
‘administration of psychology’, then this leads to a series of difficult moral questions. First of 
all, the imposition of a foreign knowledge to frame the problems of a person or a given 





This simply flows from the form of the intervention. It is the product of a discourse in which 
the other is reduced to the object of a supreme knowledge that precedes him or her, in which 
he or she is alienated. Second, given its focus on the individual, the content of the dispersed 
knowledge risks furthering the disintegration of the already destabilized and dislocated social 
networks (see above). Third, the well-intended administration of psychological/psychiatric 
knowledge once again raises the specter of neocolonialism: in international humanitarian 
contexts, it is the Western benefactor who holds the power to define the problem and to 
provide a solution. Psychiatry lays claim to the truth of the involved suffering and pain and 
thereby silences other, less powerful voices. Finally, even in Western settings, the technical 
approach to trauma recovery is questionable. According to Bracken (2002), this is so because 
our reliance on technology is itself implicated in the specific vulnerability of the Western 
individual to succumb to problems of meaning; therefore, we should be wary of turning to it 
for solutions. Throughout this book, I will argue that the technical paradigm negates the 
paramount ethical dimension involved in trauma recovery.  
 
Psychologization Means Depoliticization 
In the context of major societal upheavals such as war and violent conflict, the 
psychiatric/cognitive framework psychologizes not only the consequences of and responses to 
these events. In recent years, the causes of such conflicts have been psychologized as well, to 
the degree that war and violence are sometimes comprehended as a potential manifestation of 
‘psychosocial dysfunctionalism’ and treated as ‘mental health emergencies’. Pupavac (2004, 
p. 498) summarizes the logic behind these claims as follows: ‘trauma is regarded as 
significant for not only impairing the development and mental well-being of the individual, 
but the future development and well-being of the society as a whole’. The sense of urgency 
permeating this discourse points to the idea that ‘rapid intervention can prevent the 
development of serious mental problems, as well as subsequent violence and wars’ 
(Summerfield, 1999, p. 1457). The claim that ‘unresolved traumatic experiences are likely to 
ignite new hatred and new wars’ is, according to Summerfield, an extreme consequence of 
approaching war with a gaze borrowed from the psychiatric clinic. He draws attention to the 
fact that there exist no empirical data ‘to demonstrate increased rates of psychiatric morbidity 




whether talk therapies are preventive’ (1999, p. 1457). The idea that war represents a mental 
health emergency derives from our understanding of trauma rather than from empirical 
observation.  
The view of war as a mental health emergency entails a psychologizing move that has become 
commonplace in Western thought. Mihalis Mentinis (2013), for example, shows with great 
clarity how the so-called ‘Greek crisis’ is commonly couched in a rhetoric that identifies the 
‘deficient psychology of the Greeks’ (p. 4) as the root of the country’s problems. Mainstream 
media continuously repeat the message that what is required for Greece to surmount its sordid 
economic situation is a modification of the psychological make-up of its inhabitants: ‘in the 
bourgeois psy-discourse the ‘Greek’ is constituted as a deficient being that needs to be 
radically re-educated, re-trained and radically changed if he/she is to survive in the new global 
conditions’ (p. 5). Obviously, this psychologizing discourse is inherently depoliticizing, as it 
forecloses as a potential solution any form of action on a collective, societal level. The desire 
for social experimentation and societal reconfiguration, according to this discourse, betrays a 
political immaturity and an unproductive unwillingness to psychologically adapt to the 
economic spirit of the times. In sum: what needs to change is not the neoliberal, capitalist 
system but rather the ‘national selfhood’ of the Greek, so that he or she can fit the 
entrepreneurial requirements of modern-day society. This is but one example of how 
sociocultural and sociopolitical phenomena are reframed as psychopathology on European 
terms (Summerfield, 1999). As De Vos (2012) aptly remarks, in the psy-sciences the political 
and socioeconomic reality is reduced to the individual; material conditions and power 
relations are replaced by intrapsychic processes. 
The question arises whether the present referral to war-affected populations as traumatized is 
helpful in formulating appropriate responses. Higginbotham and Marsella (1988, p. 553) state 
that ‘investing authority in biomedical reasoning about human problems eliminates 
explanations of disorder at levels of psychologic, political and economic functioning. 
Consequently, problems with origins in poverty, discrimination, role conflict and so forth are 
treated medically’. Humanitarian psychiatry relocates phenomena from the social to the 
biopsychomedical realm. The imposed psychiatric framework of trauma closes down 
alternative avenues of intervention as it opens up a medical one. The narrow focus on 
individual psychology ‘ignores and leaves unquestioned the conditions that enabled the 





‘immaterial recovery’, that is, some form of cognitive restructuring that consists in having the 
sufferers confront their painful memory and integrate it into their life stories so that 
‘psychological healing’ becomes possible, over ‘material recovery’. The latter refers to   
reparation or restitution and, more broadly, the transformation of a wounding political, 
social, and economic system. Insofar as it negates the need for taking collective action 
towards systemic change, the current trauma discourse can be seen to serve as a 
political palliative for the downtrodden. Survivors are pathologized as victims without 
political agency, sufferers from an ‘illness’ that can be ‘cured’ within existing 
structures of institutionalized psychiatry. (Craps, 2010, pp. 55-6) 
Thus, although the infusion of trauma theory in humanitarian aid can be argued to have a 
depoliticizing effect on the situations in which it is deployed, it is paradoxically the exact 
same feature that turns it into a potential instrument of ideology and power – in servitude of 
the status quo. The idea that psychiatry concerns itself with ‘universal realities’, that it is 
‘beyond ideology’, is the ultimate gesture of ideology itself (Žižek, 1989). Such a claim 
carves out an impossible, transcendental position for itself from where it is possible to speak 
with an unquestionable authority. Questions of values are thereby transposed to the plane of 
scientific investigation and truth, which makes them harder to debate. De Vos (2012) claims 
that the humanitarian worker attempts to adopt a position of being the mere servant of a 
knowledge that covers the whole field of being itself. As such, he or she is caught up in the 
production of what Agamben (1998) calls ‘bare life’:. In De Vos’ (2012, p. 114) words: 
the refusal of any higher Causes in the so-called post-ideological era is the biopolitical 
move at its sharpest. As we consider the ultimate goal of our lives as life itself, this 
stance cannot but become caught up in the production of homo sacer […]. The psy-
worker, convinced he is merely tapping into scientifically proven universals, reduces 
the other to bare life, to homo sacer. 
This ties the psychologizing and depoliticizing operations of the PTSD-framework to a more 
general ethical crisis in the West, related to the ‘refusal of higher Causes’. This will be the 






Although trauma has become somewhat of a commonplace or a ‘shared truth’ in the West, it 
has proven difficult to substantiate this truth with empirical evidence. Whereas we expected 
the response to radically disruptive events to be universal, it turns out to be highly diverse. 
Where we believed that ‘almost anyone’ would develop long-term pathology in the 
confrontation with a series of well-defined, horrific events, it turns out that it is impossible to 
predict the outcome of such confrontations (see Chapter 2). Where we suspected that only a 
limited range of experiences could give rise to trauma, it turns out that other life events can 
equally produce the entire clinical tableau associated with trauma. And finally, when we 
intervene on the basis of what we believe is a universal truth, it turns out that the effects of 
these interventions are not as beneficial as expected and might even impede processes of 
recovery.  
The biomedical approach in which PTSD is embedded attempts to gain objective knowledge 
about the phenomena that it studies. The production of this sort of knowledge requires the 
acceptance of a series of assumptions that are not universally shared. Furthermore, as soon as 
the acquired knowledge is implemented in concrete situations, it imposes a medico-technical 
framework that renders some aspects visible while it inevitably obscures others. As such, the 
choice for a particular scientific paradigm can never be neutral, because it concerns the power 
to define the problem and its solutions. In the case of PTSD, the underlying presuppositions 
stimulate an emphasis on the individual; a preoccupation with immaterial recovery; an 
inability to take the context into account; a technical approach that misses the ethical 
dimensions of trauma recovery; and a depoliticization that serves the status quo of a given 
political and/or economical reality. It is precisely because PTSD purportedly describes a 
reality that transcends particular contexts and cultural determinations, that is, because of its 
avowed universality and neutrality, that it is able to serve as a disempowering political 
instrument. Academic knowledge thereby legitimates a series of interventions which, despite 
claims to the contrary, can never be politically neutral. 
These points of criticism, and the desire to address them, serve as the driving force for the 
current project. Can we reinstate the often neglected dimension of the political in trauma 





III of this dissertation, I argue that Lacan’s concept of the real can be utilized to think through 
these difficult matters in a novel and productive fashion.  
In the next chapter, I will scrutinize the moral and ethical dimensions involved in this 
practice. Taking my cue from French philosopher Alain Badiou’s (2001) critique of 
contemporary liberal-humanist ethics, I will argue that the spectacular rise of trauma over the 
last 35 years – to such an extent that ours is an ‘age of trauma’, trauma being the ultimate 
emblem for our times (Di Nicola, 2012a) – is concomitant with the dominance of the human 
rights discourse as the sole moral compass for our times. In other words, it is no coincidence 
that trauma psychiatry emerges, at this moment in time, as an important partner in the 
management of conflicts and in attempts at peace-building. In fact, from within a certain 
‘ethical ideology’, as Badiou would call it, trauma treatment has become the logical answer 
when faced with questions of instability and rupture. As will become clear, the remarkable 
contemporary preoccupation with psychological trauma in its ever-increasing number of 
guises and the omnipresence and supposed universality of the human rights doctrine are two 
sides of the same coin. Many of Badiou’s points of criticism targeting contemporary ethics 











Abstract: French philosopher Alain Badiou’s (2001) work allows me to tie the 
problems of PTSD’s decontextualization and depoliticization to a more general crisis 
of ethics in the West. The ethics predicated on the doctrine of human rights is shown to 
be inherently negative, defensive and debilitating. The similarities between this ethical 
position and the practices associated with PTSD are drawn out, and the current 
success and omnipresence of trauma discourse is argued to be reflective of the 
prevalence of the ethics of human rights as the dominant moral compass for our times. 
It turns out that a well-defined ethical position is at the heart of several problems 
affecting PTSD, which presents us with the injunction to think anew the 
interrelatedness between the fields of trauma, ethics and politics. 
 
Alain Badiou’s Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil (2001) remains to date one of 
his more successful and bestselling books. It starts off with a polemical charge against 
contemporary ethics in its relation to the discourse on human rights (pp. 1-39). Badiou 
observes that ethics, today, has become a matter of busying ourselves with these rights, of 
making sure that they are respected. Despite the seductive power of this doctrine, rooted in its 




because, in his analysis, it operates as an id eological support for the current political situation 
by presenting as potentially evil any organized political collectivity that seeks to challenge the 
prevailing way of the world (that is, parliamentary democracy and neoliberal economics) and 
its absolute injustice. Similar concerns regarding this discourse of the rights of manxii have 
been formulated by, among others, Dominic Lecourt (2001) and, as Jacques Rancière (2004) 
remarks, Hannah Arendt (1951), who devoted a chapter of her book The Origins of 
Totalitarianism to the ‘Perplexities of the Rights of Man’. In what follows, we will first 
describe Badiou’s characterization of this form of ethics and the purported reasons for its 
dominance in our times. Next, we aim to show that the discourse of trauma is one of the most 
powerful representatives of this orientation, its avatar on the ground, one of the prime 
manners in which the ethical ideology of today is practically translated or applied in situ.  
 
Contemporary Ethics: Characterization and Situation 
The term ‘ethics’ traditionally denotes a branch of philosophy that investigates the best way 
for human beings to live and how to judge what kinds of actions are right or wrong in 
particular situations. According to Badiou (2001, p. 2), ethics designates today a principle 
that, in a vague and fuzzy way, governs how we relate to and comment on a variety of 
historical, techno-scientific, social and other situations. He detects two major strains at the 
root of this principle. The first is related to the discourse of human rights and is founded on 
the work of Immanuel Kant. The second can be referred to as the ‘ethics of the other’ and has 
its origin in the theses of Emmanuel Lévinas. These two strains most easily meet in their 
agreement to organize ethics around the prevention of suffering and death. Although the 
merits of such a stance seem self-evident, Badiou asserts that it ultimately amounts to a 
nihilistic resignation that must be resisted. In what follows, I will summarize Badiou’s 
analysis of this type of ethics. 
At the core of this doctrine lies the presupposition that human beings possess a universal, a 
priori ability to discern Evil. The assumed consensus regarding what is evil then provides the 
basis from which to develop an - inherently defensive - ethics: good is what intervenes visibly 
against these forms of evil. The good, here, only has a secondary status: it is derived from evil 





this discourse spells out what must not be done; it indicates what is forbidden. At the same 
time, however, it struggles to formulate a positive alternative. This emphasis on the 
prevention of suffering and death thus produces a strictly negative conception of ethics, and, 
ultimately, of the human being itself (Hallward, 2003, p. 256). 
Indeed, one of the major philosophical problems with this position is that it necessitates the 
presupposition of a universal human subject, the identification of which is subordinated to the 
recognition of the evil that is done to him or her. As such, this ethics defines man as a victim, 
or as ‘the being who is capable of recognizing himself as a victim’ (Badiou, 2001, p. 10). For 
Badiou, this is unacceptable, because ‘the status of victim, of suffering beast, of emaciated, 
dying individual equates man with his animal substructure, […] reduces him to the level of a 
living organism pure and simple’ (Badiou, 2001, p. 11). We could say, with Arendt, that 
human beings have not one but two lives: first, we have bare, physiological life (zoe), but, 
additionally, we are characterized by a life that surpasses this bare existence, the political life 
of speech and action (bios). The Aristotelian distinction between zoe and bios was placed in 
the spotlight more recently by Georgio Agamben (1998), whose work on biopolitics allocates 
a central role to the concept of ‘bare life’ (homo sacer). The point is that the rights of man 
confuse these two lives, which ultimately means the reduction (or denial) of bios to sheer zoe 
(Rancière, 2004). In relation to this, Alenka Zupančič (2000) remarks that the pre-modern 
ethical maxim par excellence was that of ‘the master’: sadder than to lose one’s (biological) 
life is to lose one’s reason for living (that is, bios as a particular way of life as an individual or 
a group). In other words: according to the pre-modern ethical maxim, when one has to choose 
between honor and life, one should never choose life and lose, for the sake of living, all that 
makes life worth living. Modernity, then, offered no alternative to the discourse of the master 
besides the feeble maxim ‘the worst thing one can lose is one's own life’. The latter maxim, 
which identifies the preservation of ‘bare life’ as the highest value, ‘lacks both conceptual 
force and the power to “mobilize”’ according to Zupančič (2000, p. 5).  
Badiou ties the return to the doctrine of the natural rights of man to the collapse of 
revolutionary Marxism and all the forms of progressive engagement that it inspired. If the 
ethical consensus is founded on the recognition of evil,  
it follows that every effort to unite people around a positive idea of the Good, let alone 
to identify man with projects of this kind, becomes in fact the real source of evil itself. 




project stigmatized as ‘utopian’ turns, we are told, into totalitarian nightmare. Every 
will to inscribe an idea of justice or equality turns bad. Every collective will to the 
Good creates Evil. (Badiou, 2001, p. 13) 
In other words: evil is what happens when we collectively try to bring about, in reality, the 
Good. To make ourselves the bearer of a ‘positive idea’ (what Badiou calls a ‘truth’) and to 
try to change our worldly reality to fit this notion: was this not the recipe for the horrors of 
20th-century totalitarianism? The Holocaust and the Gulag linger in our collective memory, 
amongst other atrocities, as a traumatic reminder of what the will to the good has produced in 
the past. Evil is proclaimed to be tied up exactly with the ‘life of great actions and noble 
words’, that dimension of life which exceeds our bare existence as living beings. In this 
manner, contemporary ethics, as the struggle against an a priori recognizable Evil which, in 
its turn, is linked to collective projects around a positive notion of the Good, makes it very 
hard to envisage any transformation of the way things are now. The price paid by the ethics of 
the rights of man, Badiou (2001, p. 14) concludes, is ‘a stodgy conservatism’: ‘the ethical 
conception of man […] prohibits every broad, positive vision of possibilities. What is vaunted 
here, what ethics legitimates, is in fact the conservation by the so-called West of what it 
possesses.’ In other words, Badiou recognizes the political impact of the ethics of human 
rights, its potential to undercut any form of militant engagement with a shared cause. 
It follows that any genuine ethics, for Badiou (2001, pp. 11-12), is ‘antihumanistic’, in that it 
necessitates the affirmation of a superhuman or ‘immortal’ aspect of the human. In fact, it is 
this ‘immortal’ aspect, which in Badiou’s philosophy only comes to the fore when man is 
sustained by a truth that surpasses him yet passes through him, that defines the human being 
as human, as something more than just an animal: ‘To forbid him to imagine the Good, to 
devote his collective powers to it, to work towards the realization of unknown possibilities, to 
think what might be in terms that break radically with what is, is quite simply to forbid him 
humanity as such.’ (2001, p. 14) Here, we witness a remarkable inversion of the starting 
positions: the human rights discourse is claimed to violently reduce man to his animal 
substructure, a being for whom basic comfort and the continuance of life are deemed the 
highest value. Conversely, an antihumanist position affirms man in the potential of becoming 
something more than just an animal, and situates his humanity exactly in the realm that 





It should be remarked that it is not only the contemporary equation of man with his status as 
victim that bothers Badiou; on a more fundamental philosophical level, he questions 
altogether the existence of a universally recognizable human subject, possessing rights that 
are somehow ‘natural’. Thinkers such as Louis Althusser, Michel Foucault and Jacques 
Lacan, who have all influenced Badiou’s own strand of antihumanism in some way, have 
repeatedly debunked this idea of a natural or spiritual identity of Man, and, as such, the very 
foundation that underlies the assertion of the existence of ‘natural rights’ and the notion of 
universal ethics. Their analysis led to the conclusion that ‘the humanism of human rights and 
ethics in the abstract sense were merely imaginary constructions – ideologies’ (Badiou, 2001, 
p. 5). Nevertheless, and perhaps somewhat surprisingly, these authors’ critical, antihumanist 
position did not lead them to embrace a kind of cynicism, an attitude of resignation or 
indifference to the suffering of people. As Badiou (2001, p. 6) aptly remarks, all three of them 
were ‘militants of a cause’. Paradoxically, then, the dismissal of the existence of man and his 
natural rights ‘is not incompatible with rebellion, with dissatisfaction with the established 
order, or with a committed engagement in real situations’ (p. 6).  
Additionally, and not without an echo of the criticisms directed at the PTSD construct in the 
previous chapter, Badiou takes issue with another Kantian aspect of the human rights 
discourse , namely its universal underpinnings. This point of departure renders contemporary 
ethics unable to address the singularity of situations as such, ‘which is the obligatory starting 
point of all properly human action’ (Badiou, 2001, p. 14). When the barbarity of a situation is 
considered only in terms of human rights, we lose sight of the fact that we are always dealing 
‘with a political situation, one that calls for a political thought-practice, one that is peopled by 
its own authentic actors’ (Ibid., p. 13). Universality appears to push towards 
decontextualization in its emphasis on similarities rather than discrepancies. Moreover, the 
effacement of the political nature of the situations involved is often accompanied by the 
production of a derogatory judgment concerning the people caught up in it:  
it is perceived, from the heights of our apparent civil peace, as the uncivilized that 
demand of the civilized a civilizing intervention. Every intervention in the name of a 
civilization requires an initial contempt for the situation as a whole, including its 
victims. And this is why the reign of ‘ethics’ coincides, after decades of courageous 
critiques of colonialism and imperialism, with today’s sordid self-satisfaction in the 




is the result of its own incompetence, its own inanity – in short, of its subhumanity. 
(Badiou, 2001, p. 13) 
Contrary to this stance, Badiou proclaims that ‘there is no ethics in general’ (Ibid., p. 16). 
There is only ethics related to singular situations. The ethical question is how we treat the 
possibilities of a given situation.  
I will not go into the details of Badiou’s critique of the second strand constitutive of present-
day ethics, that is, the Levinian ethics of the Other. Badiou analyzes the generalized emphasis 
on the ‘recognition of the other’, the ‘respect for differences’ and ‘multiculturalism’, along 
with the pervasive demand for ‘tolerance’, to be philosophically untenable – primarily due to 
its religious underpinnings. Furthermore, the attempt to veil or suppress the religious 
character of an ethics based on the primacy of the Other over the Same leads to a series of 
suspicious consequences. Badiou observes that, for example, the right to difference is 
accompanied by a genuine horror in the face of any sustained manifestation of difference: 
‘African customs are barbaric, Muslims are dreadful, the Chinese are totalitarian, and so on’ 
(2001, p. 24). The celebrated other is acceptable only insofar as he is a ‘good’ other, ‘which is 
to say, what, exactly, if not the same as us?’ (Ibid., p. 24). More fundamentally, then, the 
problem is that the respect for differences defines an identity, and that the respect for 
differences only applies to those differences that are reasonably consistent with this identity. 
Because of this and similar problems, Badiou comes to the characteristically uncompromising 
conclusion that ‘the whole ethical  predication based upon recognition of the other should be 
purely and simply abandoned’ (Ibid., p. 25), in favor of the more difficult endeavor to think 
an ethics that recognizes the same. 
Ethics thus designates today, either as the consensual representation of Evil or as the concern 
for the other, ‘the incapacity, so typical of our contemporary world, to name and strive for a 
Good’ (Ibid, p. 30). Badiou identifies three interrelated features of this discourse that render it 
nihilistic: (1) the failure to provide a positive account of the good beyond the abstract notions 
of security and order, (2) its complacency about ‘necessity’ and resigned acceptance of the 
status quo, and (3) its dependence on the notions of happiness and the absence of death. 
Against this, he affirms that ‘it is only by declaring that we want what conservatism decrees 
to be impossible, and by affirming truths against the desire for nothingness, that we tear 





the development of an antihumanist, positive ethics in line with the postulates of his own 
philosophical system (as developed mainly in Badiou, 1999; 2005; 2009a; 2009b).  
 
PTSD and Human Rights 
There are a great deal of similarities between the criticisms raised against PTSD on one hand, 
and Badiou’s charge against contemporary ethics and the discourse of human rights on the 
other. First, both discourses presuppose the universal human ability to a priori recognize 
instances of evil/trauma, independent of the social, cultural, economic and political contexts 
involved. In the case of PTSD, this is reflected in the idea that it is possible to determine a 
series of inherently traumatic events (due to their objective characteristics) while excluding 
others (see Chapter 2). As discussed above, the human rights discourse symmetrically claims 
that human beings possess a universal, a priori ability to discern evil. Second, this reliance on 
readily observable instances of evil/trauma in both cases leads to interventions that focus on 
salient markers of evil/pathology, in disregard of the contexts that caused them. In the absence 
of a collective, positive project, both the discourse of human rights and the PTSD-model of 
trauma tend to focus on the treatment of symptoms rather than causes. Third, the emphasis on 
vulnerability in both cases define a hypothesized universal human subject in its capacity for 
suffering. Both discourses rely on the notion of an inborn, isolated and a-contextual 
psychological subject characterized by its fragility. This once again neglects the influence of 
context in the determination of subjectivity, and it risks reducing the other to his or her status 
of victim. Both discourses, then, are involved in the biopolitical production of the homo sacer. 
These similarities open up the possibility to question the ethical dimensions involved in 
trauma psychiatry.  
 
The a priori of Trauma and Human Rights 
In Chapter 2, I discussed the restrictive approach taken with regard to the traumatic stressor in 
the DSM definition of PTSD. Criterion A, which serves as a ‘gatekeeper’ for the diagnosis, 
delineates a limited series of events believed to cause traumatic pathology in and of 




intuitively and reliably identify the sort of situations that give rise to traumatic 
psychopathology a priori. At the heart of the humanitarian enterprise lies the certainty about 
the Western benefactor’s ability to justly detect traumatic situations from an objective, outside 
position; to gauge the resultant psychological effects of exposure to these situations; and, 
finally, to successfully treat these persistent pathologies through the use of medical and 
psychological technologies developed in the West. Indeed, a traumatic event was first defined 
rather succinctly as something ‘generally outside the range of usual human experience’ that 
would ‘evoke significant symptoms of distress in almost everyone’ (APA, 1980, p. 236, p. 
238). However, subsequent research rather counterintuitively learned that (1) exposure to 
Criterion A events was quite common, even in Western societies and that (2) only a small 
portion of people exposed to such events developed long-term traumatic pathology. In the 
DSM-IV field trials, for example, 93 per cent of a community sample reported experiencing a 
Criterion A event, whereas only 10.3 per cent met criteria for lifetime PTSD (Kilpatrick, et 
al., 1998). Exposure to a Criterion A event does not lead to the development of the symptom 
cluster in the majority of cases: it is not a sufficient condition (see Chapter 2). Additionally, 
studies have shown that is not a necessary condition either: the whole clinical picture 
associated with PTSD has been observed to develop in the wake of an entire series of non-
criterion A events, such as marital disruption, affairs, divorce; collapse of adoption 
arrangements; employment related stressors and money problems; bereavement; childbirth; 
frightening Halloween television programs; and so on (Rosen & Lilienfeld, 2008). This 
suggests that, against our expectations, what constitutes a traumatic event for a specific 
person cannot be decided on the basis of a pre-existent list of objective event characteristics. 
Despite the fact that the idea that we can recognize traumatic events a priori has not been 
corroborated by empirical research, it continues to have strong appeal. Its truth somehow 
seems to transcend the facts, as we continue to operate on this basis. This evokes the 
exemplary caricature of a well-intending mental health worker who arrives at the scene in the 
aftermath of a massive natural disaster and expects the local population to be traumatized by 
the destructive event. However, he or she finds that – strangely – none of them reports any 
psychological complaints. From the surprising absence of an expected response, he or she 
concludes that the target audience must be ‘denying’ or ‘suppressing’ their inevitable 
psychological wounds. This line of reasoning is actually rather straightforward and derives 





the appropriate responses for those assisted (in the context of the death of a loved one, the 
same bias has been identified with regards to the ‘suspicious’ absence of grief (Bonanno, 
2008)). It is my hypothesis that the stubborn insistence of this idea, in the absence of genuine 
scientific arguments, is caused by moral factors. The reason why it is so difficult to accept or 
incorporate these counterintuitive findings is that the PTSD-framework mirrors the moral 
climate of our times, which is founded on a belief in the a priori of evil.  
 
Symptom versus Cause 
In the previous chapter, the cultural determination of PTSD was brought to the fore. The 
emphasis on the individual and the notion of an a-contextual, universal subject were argued to 
be inherited from a Cartesian understanding of the world, rather than simply part of human 
nature. The use of ‘trauma lenses’ to make sense of reality was thereby criticized: to view the 
world from the perspective of traumatic stress arguably leads to a decontextualized, a-
historical, and individualizing approach to problems interwoven with political and economic 
realities. The same now applies to the more general ethical principle of our age: the ‘human 
rights lens’ makes us focus on the decontextualized symptoms of war, violent conflict, natural 
disasters and so on. Bereft of a shared positive project, the only course of ethical action for 
post-traditional societies appears to be defensive and negative, with a focus on local, visible 
instances of Evil without taking the context into account. In humanitarian psychiatry, the 
absence of an emancipatory project puts the focus on erasing on an individual level the 
(psychological) manifestations of violence and conflict.  
This is not without a parallel to the generalized strategic move made by the DSM task force in 
preparation of the third edition of their diagnostic manual. As discussed, in order to restore 
the scientific image of psychiatry by improving the reliability of diagnoses, the DSM Task 
Force decided that diagnostics should no longer be based on etiological reasoning, but rather 
on the reported complaints and the readily observable surface symptoms (Kirk & Kutchins, 
1992). This diagnostic practice tends to promote a form of therapeutics that aims primarily at 
symptom reduction, without adequately taking into account the underlying factors that caused 
these pathological manifestations in the first place (Vanheule, 2014). In the absence of an 
elaborated conceptual theory that allows for an analysis of the singular dynamics of the case 




patient’s suffering. In privation of a more ‘positive project’ to define and guide therapeutic 
actions, then, the only criterion for therapeutic success becomes the elimination of a series of 
salient markers of distress.  
The universalist assumptions of both the human rights discourse and Western psychiatry, and 
the emphasis on purportedly readily observable indicators of distress/evil, effectively perform 
a decontextualizing and depoliticizing operation of severance, which simultaneously serves as 
an ideological instrument in servitude of the status quo. The framework of PTSD severs the 
cause from the consequences, as it suggests that the former’s specificities have no real impact 
on how the treatment of the latter should be conducted (see Chapter 1). In the human rights 
discourse, the emphasis on a series of a priori discernible markers of Evil potentially leads to 
forms of intervention restricted to treating isolated problems at a surface level, and such an 
approach fails to take into account both the context and the subjectivity of those involved. 
This has both political and ethical consequences, in that it proscribes a course of action that 
eclipses alternative routes of intervention. Therefore, it becomes increasingly important to 
conceptualize (collective) trauma in a manner that safeguards a contextual understanding of 
the problems at its root and acknowledges those involved as political actors. Trauma theory 
must enable interventions in the sociopolitical contexts themselves, which in turn implies a 
different form of ethics.  
The recourse to an a-contextualized understanding of suffering/evil has been constructed as an 
answer to a ‘crisis of humanitarianism’ in the early 1980s, which arose from the realization 
that humanitarian aid was ‘de facto entangled with biopolitics’ (De Vos, 2012, p. 102). In 
other words: it was no longer tenable that humanitarian aid, as it was conceived before the 
psychosocial turn, was a neutral business. The focus on purportedly universal aspects of 
being, reflected in both the human rights discourse and the academic knowledge of PTSD, 
served to counter these attacks and to reaffirm the status of humanitarian aid as something 
which merely neutrally and objectively tends to the ‘real’ needs of people. However, for 
reasons discussed, the psychosocial turn did not succeed in its aim to resolve the crisis of 
humanitarianism. Mark Duffield ( 2004, p. 13) contends that ‘the insistence that 
humanitarianism is “neutral” and separate from politics, means that humanitarianism can only 
grasp human life as bare life. By excluding the political, humanitarianism reproduces the 





Is there a way in which we can think the consequences of violent conflict and war in a way 
that allows for contextualization and thus political action? Or is this antithetical to the manner 
in which psychiatry and psychology function in situ? In other words: is 
psychological/psychiatric trauma intervention necessarily depoliticizing, or can we find ways 
to re-establish the political dimension in recovery processes from trauma? These questions 
will be picked up in Part III of this dissertation. 
 
The Universal Subject/Victim in the Post-Traditional Vacuum of Meaning 
Didier Fassin and Richard Rechtman (2009), in The Empire of Trauma, trace a dual 
genealogy in the history of the invention of post-traumatic stress. The first strand is well-
known and consists of the scientific and theoretical evolution in trauma research. Fassin and 
Rechtman convincingly argue that, for a correct understanding, this genealogical line needs to 
be supplemented with a second strand that continuously interacted with it. This second strand 
concerns evolving social and moral conceptions, such as changes in the attitudes to 
misfortune and to (the authenticity of) those who suffer it (see Chapter 1). With PTSD, then, 
both strands are integrated in what has become ‘an established commonplace of the 
contemporary world, a shared truth’ (Fassin & Rechtman, 2009, p. 2). In their reading, the 
definition of PTSD perfectly mirrors the moral and sociocultural climate of Western societies 
around the turn of the 21st century. On a theoretical level, it is assumed that the external event 
is the most important etiological factor to account for this pathology in a quasi-direct, 
mechanical fashion (see above). This stance is mirrored in the societal attitude towards those 
subjected to such events: they are seen as innocent victims and treated with patience and 
respect. The trauma theory encapsulated in the construct of PTSD and the moral attitude 
towards the people who present with these symptoms thus appear to be perfectly in tune at the 
beginning of the 21st century.  
Throughout this and the previous chapter, I have discussed several problems with this model, 
both empirical and practical in nature. The victim status, which does allow for a limited, well-
defined type of political and judicial power (see Green (2006) for a description and a 
polemical, liberalist critique of this particular status), comes at a cost: although it sometimes 
allows for forms of compensation to redress the grievances of victims (Pitman, Sparr, 




claims for instance first necessitates the acceptance of the medical framework, of being 
labeled mentally disordered, along with the implicit acknowledgment that what needs to 
change to allow for recovery is the individual’s victim psychology. In short, if someone is 
reduced to his or her status as a victim, this reduction cuts away the possibility of alternative 
forms of political agency. As Edkins puts it: ‘In contemporary culture victimhood offers 
sympathy and pity for the surrender of any political voice’ (2003, p. 9).  
In line with Fassin and Rechtman’s dual genealogy of trauma and Badiou’s analysis of the 
human rights discourse, I claim that what was ‘discovered’ via the detour of PTSD was the 
very ‘truth’ of postmodern existence: bereft of any great collective project, the West is left in 
a perilous vacuum of meaning without any clear answers and an inability to act. This 
dovetails with Bracken’s suggestion that trauma, which is essentially a ‘crisis of meaning’, is 
the prototypical existential condition of Western, post-traditional societies (Bracken, 2002; 
see also Pupavac, 2004). Bracken holds that cultures differ with regard to their degree of 
‘ontological security’: the presence of a shared religious, political or cultural orientation 
towards life purportedly offers a protective sense of coherence, whereas the absence of such 
orientations leaves cultures under the permanent threat of pervasive and disheartening crises 
of meaning. In other words, the bankruptcy of the ‘great stories’ in the West (the fall of what 
Lacan would call the ‘paternal function’ (see, for example, Lacan, 1956a, p. 230; 1959, p. 
483; 1960, p. 688)) may have left us particularly vulnerable for traumatic ruptures  (Nolan, 
1998; Verhaeghe, 2015). Bracken surmises this to be the inheritance of postmodernism, 
which systematically calls into question the meaningfulness of our world and the grounds of 
our knowledge. In traditional societies, by contrast, the presence of collective, overarching 
cultural frameworks is said to produce a protective armor of meaning and purpose that 
promotes resilience of character (Verhaeghe, 2008). PTSD, in this light, becomes the 
archetypal syndrome of the Westerner’s condition, stripped bare of the unraveling symbolical 
swathes that used to envelop him or her. Ergo, the hegemony of trauma, or the observed 
omnipresence of crises of meaning, may very well be an effect of the Western gaze which 
perceives its own condition everywhere it looks. The spectacular rise of trauma discourse then 
derives from the fact that it captures and plays out the repressed ‘truth’ of postmodern reality 
– rather than being the effect of advances in our scientific understanding of these phenomena, 
an idea that is untenable in the light of the arguments advanced in the Chapters 1 and 3. This 





Furthermore, when viewed from this angle, the so-called ‘universal’ subject behind the 
doctrine of human rights, which is also at the heart of the construct of PTSD, is revealed to be 
a culturally determined type of subjectivity. This subject’s supposed vulnerability, isolation, 
and characteristic capacity for suffering constitutes a telling reflection of contemporary 
Western culture more than anything else. In this sense, the dispatching of psychologists and 
psychiatrists to far-away countries, based on a purportedly universal vulnerability to 
traumatization, is an enterprise that always-already incorporates the culturally determined 
vision and verdict of (Western) experts. It is an intervention that contains and plays out the 
benefactor’s analysis of the needs of the local population – which are rather the needs of so-
called post-traditional societies more than anything else. In other words, the intervention is 
the enactment of an unacknowledged truth, an acting-out  in the psychoanalytical sense of the 
term: something that ordinarily escapes consciousness and can only be grasped indirectly, 
precisely by staging it and then critically returning to it. The enactment constitutes or realizes 
its truth: ‘the ritual is the collective performance of the analysis’ (De Vos, 2012, p. 98), albeit 
an analysis that was necessarily incomplete at the time of its performance. Only in retroaction 
can the truth which drove this process be discerned in the misrecognition that founded it (a 
logic that will be worked out fully in Chapter 8). The exportation of the PTSD-model of 
trauma aids in the construction of a particular type of subject (the victim) and a culturally 
determined view of reality as something always on the verge of plunging into 
meaninglessness. The success of PTSD-informed interventions in humanitarian aid campaigns 
reflects the West’s inability to come up with a ‘positive’ project beyond a focus on the salient 
symptoms of distress caused by an apparently inescapable political and economical system.  
The problems with the PTSD-model of trauma, described in Chapter 1, thus appear to be 
intimately connected with a well-defined ethical position. Hence, the development of a trauma 
model that incorporates context, subject and political agency requires us to think anew the 







Badiou advocates a type of ethics which is inherently ‘positive’, in the sense that it privileges 
a notion of the Good, from which evil is then derived, instead of the other way around. He 
defines the ethical subject as a subject of militant engagement in servitude of a supposedly 
‘universal truth’ which, nevertheless, is always instantiated locally, in singular situations or 
worlds. In any case, the difficulties discussed in Part II of this dissertation point out the need 
to think through trauma recovery in a way that incorporates contextual determination and 
political agency. It is my contention that this can only come about when we adopt a different 
ethical position, one that makes up on the ‘motivational deficit in morality’, as Simon 
Critchley (2007, p. 49) calls it (the inability to motivate subjects to engage themselves for a 
‘cause’ within the boundaries of secular liberal democracy). Trauma recovery, in my view, 
requires the occurrence of and fidelity to an ethical act that breaks with the pre-existent 
meaning-generating framework by introducing something new and incommensurable. The 
necessity of this type of break derives from the fact that the pre-existent framework was 
rendered invalid by the traumatic experience of rupture. In other words: a traumatic rupture 
entails an ethical injunction to which the subject cannot but respond. Trauma, just like the 
Badiouian event, entails a ‘demand that is received from the situation, for example a situation 
of political injustice’ (Critchley, 2007, p. 42). However,  although such a demand arises in a 
singular situation, it is not reducible to that situation; the demand is addressed to everyone and 
thus universal. This is the ethical and political force inherent to situations of (traumatic) 
rupture.  
The linkage of trauma with theories of the act and the event is sustained by their relation to 
the Lacanian concept of the real, and it permits the ethics involved in trauma recovery to be 
approached as a ‘process of the formation of ethical subjectivity, where a self commits itself 
with fidelity to a concrete situation, a singular occurrence that places a demand on the self’ 
(Critchley, 2007, p. 49). 
I will work out this idea in Part III of this dissertation, through a conceptual analysis of 
Lacan’s notion of the real in its relation to trauma, ethics and politics respectively. Although 
this enterprise is inevitably conceptual or theoretical by nature, it is my hope and belief that 
the Lacan-inspired understanding of trauma has practical implications for both individual and 






In recent years, a number of innovations have been proposed and implemented in trauma 
programs precisely to address some of the aforementioned shortcomings of the hegemonic 
PTSD-model. Since it is beyond the scope of this book to discuss these varied theoretical and 
practical contributions in sufficient detail to do them justice, I will only briefly mention some 
of them. Amongst them are an array of approaches that leave the strict framework of PTSD 
behind in favor of a more flexible understanding of trauma, tailored to the specificities of the 
affected culture (for example, Brown, 2008; Kirmayer, 1996; Kirmayer, Lemelson, & Barad, 
2007; Nader, Dubrow, & Stamm, 1999; Rhoades & Sar, 2006). These approaches generally 
devote a lot of effort to descriptions of the historical and philosophical backgrounds of the 
people who are identified as in need of help. An understanding of the beliefs and practices of 
the community in question is regarded as important to all phases of effective intervention: ‘It 
is essential to the accuracy of assessment and to the effectiveness of initial and ongoing 
interventions’ (Dubrow & Nader, 1999, p. 3). Moreover, cultural awareness is deemed 
necessary to prevent additional harm in the process of assessing and treating trauma itself 
(that is, secondary traumatization). Practices that work in one culture may lead to failure or 
even adverse effects in another.  
Culture is sometimes regarded as throwing up barriers against the smooth functioning of 
ready-made treatment modalities that usually ‘work’ with a Western target audience. 
Alternatively, it is seen as a vast reservoir of resources that can be utilized within the 
framework of treatment, either by combining traditional healing approaches with Western 
psychological methods or by utilizing them as therapeutic tools in themselves. Local rituals 
are here comprehended through a psychotherapeutic frame: they are recuperated as culturally-
tailored techniques to bring about a desired effect. In other words: traditional cultural 
practices are incorporated in the framework of psychology and traumatology and given 
meaning against this conceptual background. Local people are educated about their own 
rituals and traditions; they learn to comprehend these activities by means of the psychological 
gaze and knowledge. Within this perspective, it is still up to the practitioner to learn, in time, 
‘what is of value and what is not’ so that he or she ‘will be able to discard, keep, and 
embellish the household resources and their funds of knowledge for the benefit of the client’ 
(Velez-Ibanez & Garcia Parra, 2014, p. 93). Part of the impetus for relying on these resources 




direct effects on mental well being’ (p. 80). In this description, the sophisticated, Western 
health worker is placed in a superior position as the expert who, from an ultimate meta-
perspective, is able to judge the relevance and pragmatic value of traditional healing methods 
and rituals for the process of recovery from trauma.  
I will not go deeper into these matters here. It is clear that a greater sensitivity for the cultural 
background of the target audience avoids a series of pitfalls that derive from a universalist 
understanding of trauma. Moreover, cultural sensitivity promotes alternative modes of 
intervention that are more in line with the belief system of those affected. If trauma is a 
breach in meaning, and if this meaning is collectively constituted and culturally determined, 
then it makes more sense to address crises of meaning within these frameworks themselves – 
and not through the imposition of a foreign knowledge system in its stead. Nevertheless, I 
think it is wise to remain vigilant in face of the very real threat of sliding back into an 
alienating praxis.  
Efforts have been made to construct holistic approaches that integrate psychological 
dimensions with economic development and political change. A variety of psychosocial 
programs start from the idea of a close, ongoing circular interaction between an individual's 
psychological state and his or her social environment (Agger, 2001). Positive changes in the 
social context are surmised to have ameliorating effects on the psyche and vice versa. 
Notably, in contemporary literature on peace-building, treatment of post-traumatic stress is 
viewed as paramount in any attempt to construct a stable, social equilibrium  (see above). The 
creation of a number of truth commissions explicitly abandons the focus on the individual in 
favor of forms of healing on a communal/national level. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized 
that if we want to break with the technological approach described above, this cannot be 
accomplished merely by trading in a psychotherapeutical framework for a sociotherapeutical 
one. In both cases, it is outside knowledge that identifies the locus of the rupture and hence 
the appropriate therapy (inside versus outside). The question is if we can somehow subvert 
this dichotomy.  
The political struggle over memory, which takes place after the traumatic events themselves, 
is another related field of investigation that has flourished in recent years (see, for example, 
the work of Ron Eyerman, Jane Goodall and Jenny Edkins). Literature on testimony and 
critical witnessing unearth the political dimension of (collectively) coming to terms with 





Kilby, Elizabeth Dutro and Veena Das). Furthermore, the political charge of trauma work has 
been reflected in the call for trauma workers and psychotherapists to leave their position of 
neutrality in favor of an engagement with the injustices that constitute the soil of the distress 
encountered in the consulting room. This is usually referred to with the term advocacy: the 
clinician or consultant becomes an advocate for trauma survivors, giving a voice to those who 
otherwise go shrouded in silence. Fassin argues that the infusion of trauma language in 
international politics is not so much an addition of a ‘psychological and cultural 
representation to the moral and political representation of the facts’ (2008, p. 532), but rather 
a new modality for moral and political action in itself. His point is that the language of 
psychiatry in general and the concept of trauma in particular serve as key instruments for 
strategically giving form to the experiences of victims of war, disaster and famine – the goal 
being the construction and effective promotion of a cause, primarily through the solicitation 
of affects in the target audience. Thus, in Fassin’s analysis, mental health specialists are 
mobilized in humanitarian missions in part because their presence is regarded as essential in 
exposing the consequences of violent crises, and to condemn what they are witnessing. 
All of these different strategies attempt to incorporate context and political agency in our 
understanding of and engagement with trauma. In what follows, I will present the reader with 
a Lacanian psychoanalytical framework to think through the interrelatedness of trauma with 
ethics and politics. Although some of the aforementioned approaches sometimes utilize 
certain aspects of Lacanian theory, the novelty of my proposal lies in the emphasis on the 
centrality of the act in recovery from trauma. This notion allows me to combine trauma theory 
with philosophical inquiries into the dynamics of rupture and political transformation. At the 
























In Part II, I established the necessity to thoroughly think through the intersections between 
three apparently distinct fields: trauma, ethics and politics. For someone who is familiar with 
psychoanalysis, the intertwinement between psychopathology, ethics and the larger socio-
cultural framework does not appear out of the ordinary. Psychopathology, according to 
Lacanian theory,  is always situated in the relation of the subject to the Other, where the latter 
refers simultaneously to the symbolic system of language and to the significant others with 
whom we engage. Although psychoanalysis obviously works primarily with the individual, its 
particular conception of how this individuality is constituted opens onto the cultural and 
political contexts that determined it. When one is immersed in the specificity of Lacan’s 
thought, a range of generally accepted dichotomies are difficult to retain. His notion of the 
subject, for instance, turns the intuitive understanding of inside and outside upside down. The 
topological models Lacan presented in his final seminars can be seen as attempts to transcend 
such all-too-familiar and problematic dualities. The main thesis that I wish to develop in what 
follows can be formulated rather succinctly: at the heart of the intersections between trauma, 
ethics and politics is the category of the real. 
 
  
Figure 5.1: The fields of trauma, ethics and politics meet in their shared determination 
by the real. 
This hypothesis derives from the observation that the real has been brought into relation with 
each of these domains, either by Lacan, at separate instances in his teachings, or by those who 
further elaborated his concepts. Some of the relevant ideas are rather familiar, for instance the 
central claim that trauma is caused by a confrontation with the real. Others are more difficult 
to grasp, such as the idea that the subject’s condition of possibility is an encounter with the 
traumatic real. Despite the fact that each of these fields has been brought in articulation with 




not been drawn. This will be the main goal of the rest of the  current project. In order to 
accomplish this, it will first be necessary to define the category of the real itself. In the 
following chapter, we will trace Lacan’s progress in mapping out this elusive concept, with 
special attention as to why he considers it to be traumatic. In Chapter 4, I will describe the 
logic that led him to develop an ‘ethics of the real’. Lastly, the determinative role of the real 
in politics will be discussed . After we have discussed the real’s relation to each of these 
domains separately, it will become possible to establish the manners in which they mutually 
implicate each other and to address some of the difficulties laid out in the previous chapters.  
The choice to emphasize the dimension of the real in this work is made for conceptual 
reasons. It can be argued that other concepts, most notably the subject and the Lacanian act, 
can equally be placed in the intersection of trauma, ethics and politics. This is due to the fact 
that both are closely related to the real, and I will inevitably touch upon them as I progress. 
However, I have opted to put the emphasis on the latter concept because of its central place in 















The Traumatic Real 
 
Abstract: In this chapter, French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan’s evolving views of the 
real are discussed, while a number of other key Lacanian concepts such as the barred 
subject and the Other are introduced. The two major conceptions of the real, a 
‘presymbolic’ and ‘postsymbolic’ version, are discussed in depth. Through this 
discussion, it becomes clear that the real should not be taken as the ultimate referent 
of external reality, but rather as a productive negativity that dislocates the 
representation of external (symbolic-imaginary) reality. This notion of the real 
generates an interesting take on trauma that diverges from the more familiar, 
biomedical trauma discourse. The Lacanian approach to trauma breaks with the 
familiar inside/outside, self/other and individual/collective dichotomies. Furthermore, 
the psychoanalytic elaboration of the real in relation to trauma introduces a non-
linear conception of time to make sense of the counterintuitive dynamics of trauma.  
 
In Le Désir Foudroyé, French psychoanalyst Sonia Chiriaco (2012) clarifies the specificities 
of the Lacanian psychoanalytical approach to trauma by means of a series of clinical case 
studies. She argues that the strength of this framework lies in its unique emphasis on the 




trauma theory, Lacanian psychoanalysis does not exclusively focus on the traumatic event in 
itself, but rather on what the (unconscious) subject has done with it or made of it. During the 
analysis, the subject must attempt to articulate the real that was encountered in all its brutality 
and senselessness. In the diversity of case studies discussed, Chiriaco makes visible that the 
subjective experience of what constitutes a trauma is always singular, and that the 
psychoanalytical endeavor aims at the invention of a unique solution to exit the traumatic 
impasse. Psychoanalysis holds that even in trauma, there is a certain implication of the subject 
in its suffering. Acknowledging this gives back a minimal form of responsibility and agency 
to the subject, the road to revive the desire which was ‘struck down as if by lightning’ 
(foudroyé) by the trauma.  
Chiriaco’s book opens with a short vignette about Lea, who suffered from traumatic 
symptoms after her house burned down completely. Lea appears to be frozen in the moment 
where she witnessed this spectacle, lost for words and thoughts. The same memory repeats 
itself in all its crudity time and time again: she came home with her family after a night out, 
and did not understand at first that it was her house caught on fire. From far away, she had 
perceived the fire and heard the sirens. She arrived at her house too late, only to see the roof 
coming down and the remains burn out. There was nothing left to do but watch the disaster 
take its course. In the aftermath of the event, Lea was supported by many family members and 
friends. She was advised to take comfort from the fact that there were no casualties. It was a 
fortunate coincidence that no-one was home that night! But in the nightmares that followed, 
Lea always arrived too late to save her house.  
When she sought out the help of an analyst, Lea knew perfectly well what had happened that 
night. She knew why she was anxious and could not sleep. She knew that the fire was caused 
by an electric short-circuit. Yet something opaque persisted, despite the fact that she had 
produced a verbal account of what happened many times over. Everything was reconstructed, 
yet her sorrow and anxiety did not subside because of it. In the presence of the analyst, Lea 
once again recounted the events of that night. She said she had lost everything. The analyst 
refrained from any commentary, and simply asked: ‘Everything?’ An utterly small detail then 
surfaced: behind the grotesque brutality of the fire and the ashes was hidden an old 
photograph from when she was only a child. In the picture, she radiantly smiled at the 
photographer – her father. The precious object that was lost in the fire is what this photo 





many years ago. The trauma of her burning house reduced itself to the trauma of the loss of 
her father’s gaze, which was kept alive in the seemingly insignificant photograph. Lea is 
surprised, because when her father died, she did not nearly suffer as much as now.  
In the analysis that followed, Lea reconstructed the twists and turns of her ‘Oedipal drama’. 
She realized how much she had always been suspended on this childhood smile, offered to her 
father. The picture assured her of her father’s love, on which she kept relying long after his 
demise: ‘Her very being reduced itself to that smile, the real negative of the absent father’s 
gaze.’ (Chiriaco, 2012, p. 13, my translation) What is at stake here is not merely the violent 
destruction of Lea’s house. Her suffering did not stop through the repeated reconstruction and 
narration of the events that factually took place that night. The impact of the loss of that 
photograph can only be understood when it is taken as a second logical moment that re-
actualizes her father’s disappearance, which she never actually grieved. The second moment 
acquires its force through the associations with a prior loss that was never symbolized (see 
Chapter 2).  
This short vignette introduces a number of key Lacanian ideas for the study of trauma. For 
example, it shows that trauma is always related to the unexpected, the surprising. Trauma 
entails an encounter that suddenly disrupts the continuity of life. It concerns an event that 
cannot be recuperated in the symbolical chain that makes up a person’s history, but manifests 
itself as a meaningless hole in that chain. Additionally, it shows that trauma is not simply the 
direct effect of a horrible external event on the individual. Every external event must acquire 
some sort of psychical traction in order to wreak its havoc; it must always necessarily be 
inscribed in the singularity of a person’s psychological and libidinal functioning. Lacan 
approached trauma as an encounter with the real, and although this real always has relation to 
the fields of sexuality and death, it is impossible to predict the impact of an event on the basis 
of a set of  a priori event characteristics. The traumatic real, in other words, must be thought 
in an intricate relation to the symbolic and imaginary registers that it traverses. In addition, 
Chiriaco’s vignette also highlights the importance of so-called logical time in the 
psychoanalytical approach of trauma, as something different from linear, chronological time. 
Retroactivity plays an important part in understanding both genesis and treatment of trauma 
from a psychoanalytical perspective. Taken together, this culminates in the acknowledgment 




subject has a very precise meaning in Lacan’s work, one that diverges from its common usage 
(see below).   
In this chapter, I will discuss the category of the real, the key Lacanian concept to think 
trauma. For those who are not acquainted with Lacan, I will briefly situate his work first, 
along with a few other concepts that will prove useful in what follows (for example, the 
subject, the Other, and so on). The bulk of this chapter, however, will be devoted to the two 
predominant readings of the real encountered in Lacan’s work. The real is first and foremost 
described as a realm of immediate experience, a state of being before the intervention of 
language or representation. Here, the real becomes something that is gradually lost as the 
developing child becomes more and more ensnared in symbolic-imaginary reality. Such an 
understanding of the real as something ‘presymbolic’ is rather intuitive and certainly has a 
didactical value, primarily because it adheres to a linear ontogenetic perspective. Despite its 
merits, there are a number of difficulties associated with it, which I will highlight throughout 
the text. The second reading of the real, as something ‘postsymbolic’, abandons a linear, 
diachronic perspective to understand the relations between the real, the symbolic and the 
imaginary, in favor of an emphasis on their interdependence. The starting point of this 
approach is that, as human beings, we are always-already caught within language. As such, 
the real only ever makes its presence known through its reverberations in the symbolic and 
imaginary orders.  
Introducing Lacan 
The name of Jacques Lacan will forever be connected with his retour à Freud, in which he 
attempted to retrieve the essence of psychoanalysis’ discovery through a (post)structuralist 
reading of Freud’s original texts. During this enterprise, he gradually developed his notions of 
the symbolic order, the imaginary order, and the real. The real is arguably one of the central, 
determining concepts in Lacan’s work. However, as will become clear in what follows, due to 
its very nature we can only ever accurately describe it by tracing the multiple ways in which it 
is conceived through the articulation with a series of other (psychoanalytical) concepts. The 
introduction of the central notion of this study will therefore require a few detours through the 





Within Anglo-Saxon academia, Lacan is perhaps best-known as a thinker of the symbolic 
order. It is through the uncovering of the workings of structure at the heart of our most 
intimate self-experience, that the French psychiatrist and psychoanalyst came in touch with 
those aspects of human existence that are irreducible to structure or language (Shepherdson, 
2008). Lacan followed the path of symbolic determination as far as he could, which enabled 
him to see where structure leaves off and something else enters the scene – precisely as that 
which resists and disrupts structure. This is, incidentally, not without parallel to what happens 
in the process of an analysis itself: it is insofar as this practice of speech mobilizes the 
imaginary and the symbolic, that is, the field of semblants, that the real of a particular 
analysand is brought into question (Soler, 2014).  
When discussing Lacan’s work, one must keep in mind two different points of view adopted 
by Lacan scholars. The canonical reading, inspired by the teachings of Jacques-Alain Miller 
(for instance, 2007), schematically divides his work in distinct periods or stages. This 
periodization emphasizes the drastic changes made during the course of his theoretical 
elaborations. Traditionally, the ‘early Lacan’ is identified with an emphasis on the symbolic, 
whereby the unconscious is approached as a linguistic system governed by strict laws. The 
shift to the ‘later Lacan’ is located in his eleventh seminar on The Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psychoanalysis (1964), where the real and the drive become the main focus of his 
attention. The ‘last Lacan’ is associated with a recourse to knot theory and topology to 
account for the interrelations between the real, the symbolic and the imaginary (Lacan, 1974-
75, 1975-76). Here, the three registers are taken as mutually constitutive and interdependent. 
In opposition with Miller’s division, however, it can be argued that all the developments in 
Lacan’s latest work were there in an anticipated form right from the start, and that the 
evolution in his theory is nothing but the arduous elaboration of what was already contained 
in the beginning (Verhaeghe, 2001). This outlook is defended, for example, by Tom Eyers 
(2012), who refutes the traditional historical narrative to make sense of Lacan’s work and 
endeavors to show that every stage of his theoretical development can be understood as a 
continuous attempt to delineate more accurately the real as the object of psychoanalytic 
inquiry.  
Both outlooks have their merits and disadvantages. Despite their differences, they share 
common ground in their acknowledgement that (1) the real has been conceived in multiple 




direct conceptualization or definition for it without relying on other concepts or notions. 
These points are related: the register of the real is difficult to discuss precisely because it is 
conceived as the register which cannot be expressed in language or captured in an image. It 
only ever reveals itself as a surplus or an excess, thus, in relation to something else. As 
Stavrakakis (1999, p. 73) says: ‘although the real is per definition irreducible to the field of 
construction and representation, it nevertheless shows itself in the first instance – and 
indirectly – through the kinks and inconsistencies of the latter’s functioning’. Or, in the words 
of Richard Boothby (2001, p. 295): ‘As essentially unthinkable and unrepresentable, the real 
can only be conceived negatively, in terms of disturbances of the imaginary and the 
symbolic.’ The real makes its presence known through its episodic interruptions into the 
imaginary and symbolic fields of representation (Andreescu, 2013). Throughout his teachings, 
Lacan attempted to identify this real dimension of human existence from multiple angles and 
in relation to a series of different concepts, always unsatisfied with his previous attempts to 
get a hold on it. 
Every development in Lacan’s theory, whether it constitutes a qualitative break or a gradual 
progression, always derives from an impasse encountered in his prior work. This, in itself, is 
already an example of how the real continuously resurfaces and dislocates each and every 
attempt to describe and think through a field of experience by means of a representational 
system. Lacan’s ongoing work in progress culminated in a theoretical corpus with 
significance for a number of domains, exceeding the framework of psychoanalysis pure and 
simple. For instance: in order to account for the difference between his approach and the Ego-
analytical methods of his time, Lacan (for example, 1957a; 1959) elaborated a theory of the 
divided subject which can and has been put to use in various fields of inquiry. Likewise, his 
particular conception of how social reality is constructed at the level of meaning and 
discourse digresses from other theories of social constructionism, as it emphasizes that not 
everything is reducible to language: there is always a remainder, something that escapes the 
level of socio-symbolic representation (Stavrakakis, 1999).This account of reality as 
linguistically constructed yet always necessarily incomplete (a feature captured in the notion 
of the ‘barred Other’ (Lacan, 1958-59, 1962-63, p. 136)) has inspired theoretical innovations 
in an array of disciplines distinct from psychoanalysis. Amongst them are discourse studies 
(for example, Parker, 2005) and cultural studies (for example, Barker and Galasinski, 2001), 





(for example, the work of Elisabeth Grosz, Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva); political theory 
(for example, Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Žižek, 1989), and so on.  Due to the particularities of 
Lacan’s conception of the subject and the Other (the field of the symbolic where the 
signifying chain originates and the subject is constituted), the levels of individual and 
collective analysis become inseparable. His subject is no longer an inborn, autonomous entity 
that exists prior to and in independence of the social order in which it abides. The subject is 
rather an effect of this social order: it is formed through its interaction with the Other. As 
such, Lacan’s notion of the subject is both contextual and historical – an important digression 
from the problematic, purportedly universal subject of psychology that underpins both PTSD 
and the doctrine of human rights. Both the divided subject and the barred Other will prove to 
be powerful concepts to think through trauma in an innovative manner in what follows.  
The substantiated hypothesis driving the current project is thus that Lacan’s concepts (such as 
the real) not only provide us with a productive outlook on the dynamics of psychopathology 
and its treatment (such as trauma), but that they open up towards other fields of interest (such 
as politics and ethics) and enable us to think through their interrelations.  Although Lacanian 
theory is first and foremost a clinical theory, to be worked on and put to use by 
psychoanalysts, it is undoubtedly so that many of its insights are relevant for other disciplines 
as well – encompassing those that do not primarily focus on or intervene at the level of the 
individual. It is my contention that Lacanian theory can contribute to a better understanding of 
how trauma responses on both individual and collective levels are sometimes interwoven.  
Clearly, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to reconstruct the different turning points in 
Lacan’s work in general and/or concerning the real specifically, along with their many 
implications. I gladly redirect the interested reader to a number of high-quality works that 
have done just that, in particular the monograph Lacan and the Concept of the Real by Tom 
Eyers (2012)xiii. Instead, I will limit myself in what follows to a discussion of two primary 
forms in which the real appears within Lacan’s oeuvre: presymbolic and postsymbolic. Both 
are important to illuminate why, in Lacanian psychoanalysis, trauma is understood in relation 
to the real. As we will see, the hypothesis of the real as inherently traumatic is intimately 
connected to the thesis that both the subject and reality must come into being by means of the 
signifier, that is, in reliance on the Otherxiv. Neither subject nor reality exists independently of 
or prior to the symbolic order of language. Moreover, Lacan holds that because of their 




reality are inherently instable structures, marked by an irreducible lack (Laclau, 1990). The 
general strategy for dealing with this incompleteness and insecurity involves the imaginary 
order, which covers over this structural lack through fantasies that offer a promise of 
wholeness and closure. A traumatic event, then, suddenly pulls away the imaginary cover that 
grants a degree of stability to the self and the social order. Moreover, the place where this 
traumatic element is encountered is determined by the symbolic order itself: the real manifests 
itself where the symbolic bumps up against its own internal limit. Elaboration of these 
opening thoughts requires a discussion of how the subject and the social order come into 
being from a Lacanian perspective, and how trauma disrupts these structures underlying 
comprehensible experience.  
I will now go on to further introduce a few useful concepts and themes, which were first 
encountered and theorized within the context of psychoanalysis. Next, I turn towards a 
discussion of the two most salient readings of this real and the view of trauma that derives 
from each.  
 
Lacan the Psychoanalyst 
It is important to always bear in mind that Lacan’s theoretical edifice was developed against 
the background of his work as a psychoanalyst. Psychoanalysis is a praxis of speech wherein 
the person seeking help is charged with the task of saying whatever comes to mind during the 
session. This technique of free association quite rapidly reveals that what arises in the field of 
consciousness is affected by ‘another scene’, which Freud (1900, p. 535) designated as the 
unconscious. What the person on the sofa intends to say is continuously disrupted by elements 
that appear to be out of place, nonsensical, foreign. The wager of psychoanalysis is that these 
seemingly senseless elements do not appear out of the blue: laws and principles that can be 
uncovered and systematized strictly determine their emergence. Through the practice of 
psychoanalysis, Freud (1917a, p. 143) discovered that the human being, this strange animal 
that speaks, is not ‘master in its own house’: he is not even free to say what he wants, as his 
conscious discourse is constantly affected by an unconscious to which he ordinarily has no 
access whatsoever. The conscious ego, then, is not all that we are, as speaking beings. Even in 
the intimacy of our ‘own’ minds, we do not coincide with ourselves. As subjects of language, 





The material on which the analyst operates is language, or, more precisely, speech (language 
in action). Lacan uses the term signifier to denote the material substrate that carries the 
meanings we wish to communicate. Referring to the work of structuralist linguists such as 
Ferdinand de Saussure and Roman Jakobson, Lacan (for example, 1957b) insists that a 
signifier, by itself, does not mean anything. The link between the particular sound pattern of a 
word (the material signifier) and a specific concept or idea (the signified) is strictly arbitrary 
and contingent on the specificities of its enunciation. It is only when placed in a network of 
differential relations with other elements that any signifier acquires a temporarily fixed 
signification. Speech, for Lacan, can be taken as a chain of signifiers, and it is the chain itself 
that interprets each of its elements. For instance: an element that surfaces in a dream (a 
signifier or representation, Vorstellung in Freud’s terminology) does not simply refer to an 
object in waking reality, nor does it point to some sort of predetermined, universal referent or 
meaning. Its significance is strictly dependent on the always shifting relations with other 
elements in the dreamer’s discourse, as produced during the analysis. This is elaborated in 
Lacan’s (1957-58, 1960) ‘logic of signification’: it is the unraveling chain of associations that, 
in a retroactive movement, produces the meaning of what went before (Figure 5.2).  
    
   Figure 5.2: the logic of signification 
The retroactive meaning-effect emerges only at the point where the chain (S-S’) is 
punctuated. Moreover, through this generation of meaning, subjectivity ($) is produced. The 
subject is thus an effect of the chain: the subject does not produce speech, but speech 
produces the subject. In this way, Lacan’s subject is correlative to the symbolic order (the 
chain of signifiers), whereas the ego, as we will see, is tied to the imaginary order (given its 
function of misrecognition and its reliance upon the image). It bears repeating that this 




the functioning of language. As Vanheule (2011a, p. 47) remarks, subjectivity according to 
Lacan is therefore ‘not a constancy or permanency. It needs to be created time and time again 
by using the signifier’. Subjectivity has an event-like status.  
Lacan thus breaks with referential theories of language that focus on the relationship between 
words and the things in the world that they designate. In line with structuralist linguistics, he 
claims that meaning is not generated by the things in themselves: language does not simply 
name things that are already there in the world. Instead, language divides the world up in 
particular ways to produce for every social group what it calls reality. Each particular 
language, or broader, each particular symbolic or social order, has its own way of 
accomplishing this (Edkins, 2003). What is crucial, however, is that none of these symbolic 
systems are ever complete. Reality itself is always ‘lacking’; something is always necessarily 
excluded from its scope. This limitation is structural: it is not a contingent failure that could 
be remediated. Lacan stresses that the symbolic system of language cannot close in upon 
itself: the Other is ‘barred’ just like the subject. An element is always missing from its 
structure, and it is precisely this feature that allows the system to function (Miller, 2012a). 
What cannot be represented, what falls between the cracks of the symbolic system, is what 
Lacan designated as the real. It concerns something ‘impossible’ that disrupts every attempt to 
construct both reality and a stable identity through representation (Stavrakakis, 1999).  
The real, then, must be distinguished from what is commonly called reality. Reality is 
considered the effect of symbolical action upon the real, which is said to cut into the latter’s 
smooth surface, generating divisions, separate zones, distinguishable entities and distinct 
features (Fink, 1995, p. 24). Reality must come into being, it must be created by language. 
What cannot be said, in other words, is not part of reality. Given that the real is per definition 
antonymic to the symbolic, it cannot be part of this linguistically constructed reality. Strictly 
speaking, the real for Lacan doesn’t exist, since he defines existence as a function of language 
(Fink, 1995). By contrast, Lacan (1975-76, p. 26, 34) will say that the real ‘ex-sists’, which 
means that it is outside of or apart from our realityxv. Whereas the symbolic order and the 
concomitant reality are structured, as language introduces differences and creates order, 
Lacan’s real is ‘without zones, subdivisions, localized highs and lows, or gaps and plenitudes: 
the real is a sort of unrent, undifferentiated fabric, woven in such a way as to be full 





When starting to speak in psychoanalysis, the new analysand is faced with his own 
submission to a symbolic system that exceeds him or her. Where we believe ourselves to be 
free, autonomous beings, the speech in analysis reveals that what we say is determined by a 
series of influences from the past which are no longer in our control at times of deliberation. 
In addition, the experience of psychoanalysis learns that as human beings, we are irresistibly 
and repeatedly drawn to certain activities that are against our own interests and that make us 
suffer (this is what Freud (1920) called the death drive, elaborated by Lacan (for example, 
1970) as jouissance and related to both the real and to trauma). It is by grace of the 
transference to the analyst, which Lacan (1964, p. 232) redefined as the analysand’s 
supposition that the analyst knows the opaque meaning and source of the former’s symptoms 
and difficulties (a supposition that elicits the analysand’s love for the analyst), that the 
analysand continues to produce speech in order to form a belated understanding of these 
estranging phenomena. As such, the analytic process reconstructs the paradoxical logic 
behind the unconscious formations.  
Lacan re-examined Freud’s original texts and suggested that primary unconscious processes 
such as displacement and condensation are equivalent with linguistic operations such as 
metonymy and metaphor. It compelled him to famously conclude that ‘the unconscious is 
structured like a language’, and to systematize the laws that govern this symbolic mode of 
thinking. The structuralist thesis that orients this endeavor holds that the individual, as it is 
usually understood (that is, the conscious subject of psychology), is merely ‘a derivative 
effect of structuring forces operating on a level beyond its grasp’ (Hallward, 2012, p. 13). The 
signifier and the symbolic order, according to Lacan, cannot be conceived of as constituted by 
man. It is rather the other way around: man is constituted by the symbolic. In this way, the 
conscious ego is considered a merely ‘structured’ and not a ‘structuring’ configuration. The 
same applies to the realm of meaning in which we consciously dwell: for Lacan (1957b), the 
symbolic level of the signifier has primacy over the signified, which only arises as an effect of 
the former’s action.  
 Lacan’s project necessitated him to make explicit his ideas regarding what it is that drives the 
human being; how desire is constituted and oriented during human development; how fantasy 
organizes a person’s mode of enjoyment; how reality must necessarily be constituted for 
every individual; and so on. The conceptualization of how psychoanalysis works requires the 




she asks when he comes to see a psychoanalyst; what it is that occurs in a psychoanalysis and 
how the analyst operates; what a psychoanalysis potentially has to offer in the end; and so on. 
I only briefly mention these many questions – and there are a great deal more – to show how 
an attempt to rigorously think through the psychoanalytical experience leads to a panoply of 
issues regarding human nature, reality and so on, issues with relevance exceeding the 
framework of psychoanalysis per se. 
Lacan developed answers to these and other questions in opposition with the psychoanalytic 
establishment of his time, which he suspected to be moving in a direction at odds with the 
crucial insights garnered by Freud. He vehemently argued that Anglo-Saxon psychoanalysis 
had adapted itself to the ideals of bourgeois capitalism, promoting the development of a 
strong and mature Ego able to deal with reality in an ‘adequate’ or normalized fashion (Van 
Haute, 2002). A first period of Lacan’s work , if we follow Miller’s (2007) historical division, 
was arguably dedicated to describing the opposition between those supposedly imaginary 
forms of intervention whereby a person is alienated to some sort of outside norm, and the 
symbolic process by which the relation between the (unconscious) subject and the order 
determining it (the Other) comes to the fore. For Lacan (1957b), the set-up of psychoanalysis 
is designed to produce the conditions of possibility for the latter to occur. An emphasis on 
meaning (which is considered only a derivative effect that belongs to the imaginary register) 
and so-called objective reality during the analysis can easily obstruct the exposition of the 
symbolic matrix in which the subject is entangled, and therefore should be rejected. Lacan’s 
advice is to pay attention to the specific signifiers that are used and to observe the manners in 
which they regularly resurface in the analysand’s discourse, without jumping to conclusions 
as to the underlying meaning (hence his technical guideline ‘Gardez-vous de comprendre!’, 
‘don’t try to understand!’ (Lacan, 1956b, p. 394).  
Nevertheless, Lacan soon learned that this focus on symbolic structure, notwithstanding its 
merits, cannot be the entire story of psychoanalysis. In order to avoid the pitfall of 
‘interminable analysis’, which refers to Freud’s (1937) observation that the analysand’s 
speech has the propensity to go on forever without reaching a satisfactory resolution, every 
analysis should lead to a confrontation with the limit of symbolic determination, a point 
where an encounter with the real of jouissance is orchestrated. The subject of psychoanalysis, 
then, is not simply ‘structural man’; it is an embodied being marked by language and 





enjoyment (jouissance) tied up with it (Soler, 2014, p. 5). It was only by acknowledging the 
dimension of the real that Lacan was able, au delà de Freud, to define a possible endpoint for 
the psychoanalytic cure, one that differed from any form of adaptation or alienation to an 
outside norm. Importantly, the manner in which Lacan conceived the end of the analytic 
experience is linked to trauma: he surmised that the cure should be oriented towards a 
confrontation with both the lack in the Other and the subject’s estranging jouissance. Both are 
instances of the real, which means that this confrontation verges on the unbearable and the 
traumatic. Strange as it may sound, Lacanian psychoanalysis pushes toward this 
confrontation, which entails the so-called destitution of the subject (Lacan, 1967-68), because 
it is only at this point that a break with the subject’s prior modes of functioning becomes 
possible. These ideas will be picked up and worked out in the final chapter of this book. 
Without further ado, I will now turn to a discussion of the presymbolic real in its relation to 
the mirror stage theory of the subject. This will allow for a first understanding of how Lacan 
thinks trauma as the resurfacing of something which is ordinarily hidden from sight. The 
reading of the real as some sort of prediscursive or presymbolic field is quite widely spread in 
secondary literature on Lacan. Here, the real is conceived as something with an independent 
existence, which can be gradually drawn into socio-symbolical reality. However, parts of it 
always ‘stay behind’ and ‘remain real’ as they cannot make the transition to the symbolic. The 
contingent confrontation with these unprocessable elements is considered to be potentially 
traumatic. 
 
The Presymbolic Real 
The presymbolic real is construed as a domain of immediate experience, ‘a level of brute 
reality that never reaches consciousness without being filtered through representation – by 
memory, by the ego, or by various internal neurological pathways that mediate and organize 
our sensory experience’ (Shepherdson, 2008, p. 29). For the human being, this primordial real 
is said to be organized and structured through the symbolic and imaginary registers that 
represent and distort it. As such, we never simply have unmediated access to the world. The 
prism of language and our past experiences always fractures the manner in which we 




without this form of mediation, can only be construed and projected back from within the 
confines of our current symbolic-imaginary framework. In this reading, the real comes very 
close to Kant’s notion of das Ding: it is what lies beyond our representations, the thing-in-
itself before it is transformed by our faculties for understanding. In fact, Lacan himself, in a 
reference to Freud’s Project (1895a), designated the real with the term das Ding in his 
Seminar on the ethics of psychoanalysis (1959-60). It is important to keep in mind, however, 
that he appropriates das Ding not as something essential that provides a solid ontological 
ground for our representations, but to denote an excess produced by the action of the signifier.  
 
The Symbol is the Murder of the Thing 
The purportedly smooth surface of the presymbolic real is divided into ‘separate zones, 
distinct features, and contrasting structures’ through the action of the signifier (Fink, 1995, p. 
24). This applies equally to the internal realm of the body as to external reality: their 
undifferentiated, chaotic quality is organized and regulated through the Other. The symbols of 
language cancel out the real and thereby create reality: by using symbols, we negate the thing 
and substitute for it with a representation. Thus, following Bruce Fink, we could define the 
real in a preliminary way as ‘that which has not yet been symbolized’ (1995, p. 25). By 
drawing the real into symbols, we annihilate it. Nevertheless, this ‘murder of the Thing’, the 
transition from the real to the symbolic, is necessary to allow us to make sense of our life-
world (Lacan, 1953-54, 1964-65). For Lacan, meaning is strictly dependent on language, as it 
is considered an imaginary effect of the symbolic concatenation of signifiers.  
The real in this account is something that can be progressively ‘realized’ over the course of a 
person’s life, in the aforementioned sense that reality is the effect of symbolic and imaginary 
action. Importantly, however, this process never reaches completion. A remainder always 
persists alongside the symbolic, because certain aspects of being formally resist this 
transition: they remain ‘real’, fixated outside of symbolic-imaginary reality. Paul Verhaeghe 
(2001, p. 59) argues that because the symbolic order is predicated on the phallus as the 
primary symbol or signifier, everything therein must be expressed and represented in phallic 
terms. Consequently, there are no adequate signifiers for femininity, for fatherhood, and for 
the sexual relation. These matters remain ‘real’ because the symbolic order, in its reliance on 





have to produce its own tentative answers to these aspects of life in the imaginary order: ‘the 
fantasy is a defensive attempt to give meaning to a part of the real that resists to the Symbolic’ 
(Verhaeghe, 2001, p. 53). Fantasy occupies a central place in Lacan’s theory, as it determines 
how someone constructs his or her intersubjective world (for example, Lacan, 1957-58, 1964-
65). Hence the strange entanglement of fantasy and reality in psychoanalysis: whereas fantasy 
is ordinarily understood in opposition with reality, psychoanalysis emphasizes that it is only 
through fantasy that reality acquires a degree of consistency. Fantasy attempts to close the gap 
that is produced at specific points by the incompatibility between the symbolic and the real. It 
is a defensive construction that veils the lack at the heart of human experience, in order to 
prevent a potentially traumatic confrontation with it. Already at this point, it is worth pointing 
out that the same dynamic can be found on a larger scale as well: every culture is marked by 
specific collective fantasies that attempt to give form to the impossible elements of the real. 
This will prove important when we discuss the real in its political dimension in Chapter 7.  
 
The Presymbolic Real of the Body 
One particularly fruitful understanding of the presymbolic real derives from the 
psychoanalytical account of the subject-formation. A central psychoanalytical claim with 
regards to human development is that there is no such thing as an inborn identity, no ready-
made relation to one’s own body and drives, and no direct or unmediated access to what is 
commonly called reality. Instead, both identity and reality must be idiosyncratically 
constructed through the relationships with the caregivers. They are both essentially verbal: 
‘each human being is a story and lives in a narrative reality’ (Verhaeghe, 2008, p. 174). 
Importantly, the construction of reality and identity occurs in tandem with the intervention of 
the symbolic order on the body. Indeed, before the body comes under the sway of the 
signifier, it is viewed as the prime example of the presymbolic real. In the course of 
socialization, the real body is overwritten with the Other’s signifiers, whereby the chaotic 
‘polymorphous perversity’ (Freud, 1905) that characterizes it is organized and pleasure 
becomes localized in specific zones (Fink, 1994).  
The starting point of psychological development, according to Freud (1895a), is an original 
experience of displeasure produced by an array of insistent internal needs such as hunger or 




multitude of bodily urges and sensations that produce an unpleasurable rise in somatic 
tension. These ‘turbulent movements with which the subject feels he is animated’, as Lacan 
(1949, p.95) calls them, concern a ‘real tension, a component of the drive by which the 
primitive subject is characterized’ (Vanheule, 2011b, p. 4). Furthermore, the human infant is 
marked by a lack of motor coordination that renders him or her completely helpless and 
dependent. The state of being before the intervention of the Other is thus characterized by a 
fragmented and chaotic experience of bodily irruptions in combination with the lack of proper 
means to deal with the somatic tension they produce (for example, Lacan, 1954-55).  
The child’s response to the rise in bodily tension is prototypical: he or she cries out. It falls to 
the other (the caregiver) to interpret the cry and to produce a ‘specific action’ (for example, 
feeding) that will more or less relieve the inner tension (Freud, 1895a, pp. 317-321; 1926, pp. 
169-172). Verhaeghe (2008) underlines that in this way, the somatic drive is taken up in an 
intersubjective relation right from the start. The Other of language is called upon to formulate 
an answer to the movements of the unstructured drives. However, any answer produced 
always necessarily falls short of relinquishing the tension of the drive in full.  
Freud’s theory of anxiety neurosis stipulates that the somatic tension of the drives transforms 
into anxiety when it cannot be dealt with through psychical (symbolical) representation 
(Freud, 1895b; 1926). This production of traumatic anxiety is described as automatic, 
purposeless and meaningless. Since the infant necessarily lacks the symbolical tools to deal 
with somatic sexual tension, as these are only acquired to a greater or lesser degree during 
ontogenetic development, every human being is subjected to this experience of being flooded 
by a senseless anxiety in his or her early life. Verhaeghe (2001) recognizes in this universal 
condition a ‘structural trauma’ that forms the driving force behind the development as a 
speaking being. The idea is that our own drive is traumatic if it cannot be dealt with through 
psychological elaboration, as is the case with the newborn. Indeed, Freud’s descriptions of 
trauma and the drive respectively share an emphasis on the sudden, overwhelming rise of 
excitation and pressure that has to be released somehow (Freud, 1905, p. 168; 1917b, p. 275). 
The difference is that whereas trauma is commonly associated with an external agency, the 
rise in somatic tension of the drive is produced internally. When this increase in stimulus 
cannot be discharged through psychological elaboration, this may result ‘in permanent 
disturbances of the manner in which the energy operates’ (Freud, 1917b, p. 275). The time 





Even before the arrival of the signifier, being is already split: ‘it’s not as if the natural world 
were in a state of equilibrium before humans began to speak and disrupted it’ (Eisenstein & 
McGowan, 2012, p. 11). The illusion of a prior harmony is itself already an effect of the 
emergence of the signifier.  
The Mirror Stage 
The presymbolic, traumatic real of the infant’s body is thus intimately connected with the 
arousal stemming from the partial drives before they are regulated by the Other. The pre-
verbal child does not possess an organized experience of his or her body. Lacan’s mirror stage 
theory (1949, 1953-54, 1961a) stipulates that the drives only become regulated through the 
process of identification with a specular image found in the outside world. This identification 
simultaneously constitutes the ego and, as such, provides the basis for an integrated bodily 
awareness and its accompanying sense of identity. Lacan draws on the research of his 
contemporaries in developmental psychology to claim that this pivotal moment, in which a 
child’s developing cognitive capacities allow for the recognition of one’s own self-image in 
the mirror, occurs between the age of six and eighteen months (1949). Whereas the infant 
experiences its body as a fragmented kaleidoscope of unpleasurable tensions at first, the 
reflected image in the mirror contrastingly shows the body as a Gestalt, a unity. Through the 
recognition that this image is ‘oneself’, and by identifying with it, the ‘proto-ego’ is 
constituted (Eyers, 2012). Lacan (1961a) stresses that this kind of self-recognition and 
identification is only possible when a minimal form of symbolic mapping is already in 
placexvi. The Other thus plays an integral part in the constitution of the ego via the image.  
The infant’s paramount discovery of his or her own mirror image is accompanied by a sense 
of triumph and satisfaction: through identification, the child transforms its fragmented 
experience of inner chaos in the experience of the body as a whole. Ergo, identification serves 
as a defense through misrecognition: by focusing on the coherent and stable image, the human 
infant actively denies or misrecognizes his own incapacity and internal chaos in favor of a 
(false) sense of mastery. Importantly, this installs an enduring tendency for misrecognition 
and a ‘generalized search for unity in the world, which actually distorts the experience of 
reality’ (Vanheule, 2011b, p. 2). The idealized image of the self is the precipitation of the I or 
the Ego in a primordial form, to paraphrase Lacan (1949, p. 76). It is important to note that 




core of what constitutes the human being as such is something ‘foreign’. This is one instance 
of psychoanalysis’ notorious decentration of our innermost selves. Our very being as a 
separate ego is founded on an external ‘alter-ego’. As such, inside and outside become two 
intertwined dimensions, which is captured in the newly coined term extimacy (Lacan, 1959-
60, p. 139): the supposed intimate kernel of our being is revealed to be something external 
and alien. This will be compounded by the fact that the subject, as distinct from the ego, 
equally depends on the signifier (that is, the Other) for its emergence (for example, Lacan 
1957-58).  
 
The Subject of the Signifier 
The formative series of identifications, which attempt to secure a sense of identity and 
continuity, are never entirely successful. A distance continually resurfaces between the ideal 
image of the self (unified and in control) and the actual lived experience of the fragmented 
and uncoordinated, real body (Shepherdson, 2008). Because a stable identity cannot be 
guaranteed by alienation in the image, the only recourse for the child is to turn to the symbolic 
level of language in the hope of achieving an adequate representation in the world of words. 
The search for a stable identity thus continues in the realm of the signifier, which determines 
and structures the subject (in contrast with the ego, which was associated with the image). 
However, this escape route ultimately leads to a new impasse: the subject’s identity is 
connoted, but never denoted exactly by language (Vanheule, 2011a). The subject as 
constituted in language never achieves a state of fullness, in part because the condition of 
possibility for its appearance is an act of subordination to the laws of the signifier. Moreover, 
the subject is dispersed over the signifiers that constitute its chain.   
The human being’s entrance into the field of language implies a certain loss. Stavrakakis 
(1999) argues that what is sacrificed is ultimately the signified as such: the possibility of 
being fully represented in the symbolic order, of finding in it the signified that univocally 
captures the singularity of the subject, granting a stable platform for one’s identity. Likewise, 
the signified of the signifier ‘reality’ is sacrificed as well: as speaking beings, we only have 
access to a linguistically constructed reality, with no direct access to what lies beyond it. As 
such, both the subject and reality are structurally marked by lack. The crux is that symbolic 





the imaginary, ultimately (re)produces lack-of-being instead of ‘filling’ it with some decisive 
content. At a bare minimum, what is lost is the unmediated access to the things in themselves, 
to a hypothesized real that exists beyond our representations. 
The mirror stage theory, then, elucidates our repeated claim that the individual, just as social 
reality itself, is not simply ‘given’. Both are the product of social construction. However, the 
process of identification, either through the image or through the signifier, does not lead to the 
consolidation of a stable identity, but rather continuously makes the lack-of-being re-emerge 
in each attempt (Stavrakakis, 1999). Moreover, the impossibility of identification to result in a 
final identity is precisely what drives the process forward in an endless cycle. Lacan argues 
that insofar as human beings rely on language to ground their identities and to construct their 
realities, they are continuously confronted with lack: to be a human subject is essentially to be 
a subject of lack. However, this implies that this same subject is constantly trying to 
compensate for this lack at the core of his or her being, through a series of identification acts 
that, nevertheless, always necessarily fail (Stavrakakis, 1999). Eventually, this structural lack 
of being, which persists in ‘the division of the subject and the conflicting representations it is 
made up by’ (Vanheule,  2011a, p. 4), will be misrecognized and covered up by the formation 
of a series of fantasies that promise unity, coherence and stability (Lacan, 1957-58, 1964-65).  
 
The Return of the Real 
The dual conception of the body, divided between a represented, accessible body on the one 
hand and a ‘real’ body affected by an obscure jouissance on the other, allows us to 
circumscribe, at this level, the nature of trauma as an intrusion of the real. As stated, the 
traumatic is what cannot be taken up in the image or the signifier and thus persists as real. Or, 
symmetrically, trauma is the result of a failure of the symbolic-imaginary system of 
representation to deal with an aspect of the real. The latter formulation emphasizes that what 
constitutes a traumatic event is dependent on the specificities of this system. This dovetails 
with the empirical and clinical finding that the ‘same’ event, at the level of external 
characteristics, may be traumatic for one person but not for another (see Chapter 2).  
As discussed, the experience of the body as a unified totality is not something natural, yet 




background against which a discordant element can be identified. That is to say: once the 
seemingly harmonious bodily system is in place, every experience that traverses this unity in 
a radical way is a potentially traumatic intrusion of the real. Indeed, Freud, in discussing 
trauma, referred to the notion of a stimulus barrier or a psychologically ‘protective shield’ that 
prevents disturbing stimuli to reach consciousness. Trauma is then defined as ‘any excitations 
from outside which are powerful enough to break through the protective shield. [...] The 
concept of trauma necessarily implies a connection of this kind with a breach in an otherwise 
efficacious barrier against stimuli’ (Freud, 1920, p. 29). An event is traumatic when it 
overloads the psychic system with vast amounts of excitation, to the point where normal 
processing becomes impossible and the protective barrier is pierced. Just as in the preverbal 
infantile state, the excitation that cannot be psychically bound elicits the affect of 
automatic/traumatic anxiety. This anxiety is so intense that it is experienced as life-
threatening: the subject is at risk of disappearing or dissolving in its toxicity. In analogy with 
this quasi-neurological Freudian definition, Lacan (1949) holds that the body image itself 
functions as a barrier against the real of the body. When this defensive function suddenly 
fails, the body is no longer experienced as a whole: the symbolic-imaginary veil is suddenly 
lifted, revealing the body as something fractured, foreign and disintegrated. Given the fact 
that a person’s sense of being a consistent and stable entity is founded in part on the integrity 
of the body image, it follows that the breaching of this structure potentially undercuts the 
ordinary mode of experience built around the self as its centre (Lacan, 1949, 1961a).  
Such descriptions of trauma are well-known. Their most salient feature is that there must 
always be something in relation to which a trauma is defined, some kind of barrier to be 
penetrated. This obviously complicates every reading of the real as traumatic ‘in itself’: the 
real is only ever traumatic in relation to something else, for instance the psychical structures 
that constitute the continuity of the body image and the ego. In this regard, the intrusion of the 
real is something on the cusp between the somatic and the psychic, it concerns an 
unacknowledged dimension of the body that suddenly breaks through and reaches 
consciousness. The real is thus not absolutely lost; it asserts itself and ‘disrupts the systems of 
representation set up to encode and process it’ (Shepherdson, 2008, p. 30).  
Importantly, the confrontation with this so-called presymbolic real does not manifest itself as 
the fullness of an ultimate referent or meaning: since it is beyond any possible signification or 





signifiers that supports the emergence of the subject (Lacan, 1964). As such, the subject of the 
unconscious is suspended, because its supporting chain breaks. Symmetrically, the ego, which 
is considered an imaginary formation and associated with the realm of meaning, can be 
disrupted by the opaque senselessness of a return of the real. The purported stability and 
coherence of the ego is thereby shown to be nothing but an illusion. Taken together, this 
implies that trauma has everything to do with the symbolic and the imaginary registers: the 
real is encountered specifically at the points where something is lacking. Consequently, the 
real and trauma should be studied starting from the limits and impasses of these registers. 
 
The Impasse of the Real-in-itself 
The link between the presymbolic real and the infant’s experience before the intervention of 
the Other poses a few problems for Lacanian theory. To be brief, Lacan argues that both the 
subject and the ego, and, more generally speaking, organized consciousness as such, only 
come into being as effects of the signifier. The implications of this claim are vast: in order to 
become a person, to become an individual, to reach the level of human existence properly 
speaking, one must necessarily be constituted in and through language. In fact, this ultimately 
boils down to the idea that a person not only has to die two times, as Lacan (1963) worked out 
in his writings on the Marquis de Sade, but also has to be ‘born’ at least twice. First, the 
human being is obviously born in the biological sense, as an organism (what we called zoe in 
Chapter 4) . Yet besides that, we are born a second time, when we are drawn into the 
symbolic order and the flame of an organized consciousness is lit (bios). For Lacan (1961a), 
reflexivity and consciousness are strictly dependent on the second type of birth, on the 
constitution of the ego and the unconscious subject during ontogenesis. Naturally, this begs 
the question as to ‘who’ is performing the acts of identification that purportedly lead to the 
precipitation of the ego and the subject (Frank, 1989). In this way, Lacan’s theory is in danger 
of reintroducing through the backdoor precisely the type of ‘inborn subject’ that it tried so 
hard to circumvent in its emphasis on the primacy of the Other. 
Given that the world we consciously inhabit is the signified world of meaning, there is no 
possibility of knowing or saying anything about what preceded the advent of language, since 
‘we’ were simply never there. Whenever we reflect, think or speak, we always do so from 




preverbal real as a time before the word, we cannot but fall back on ‘the categories and filters’ 
provided by the symbolic (Fink, 1995, p. 24). When trying to imagine a state before the word, 
we inevitably take our current selves with us: ‘Once the signifier emerges, what came before 
begins to exist in the terms that the signifier introduces’ (Eisenstein & McGowan, 2012, p. 
11). Thus, the thesis of a presymbolic real can never be more than an afterward construction, 
derived from our experience as beings of language. It is our existence in language, which is 
necessarily marked by lack, that produces the mirage of a presymbolic real unaffected by 
lack.  
If we agree that our experience is always-already dependent on language, then the only way in 
which we are ever confronted with the real is through its reverberations in the systems of 
representations that are already in place and that support our existence. Like I argued in the 
previous section, it is against the background of a unified system that the real ‘returns’ as a 
disruptive, traumatic element. As such, the real ceases to be equated with a simple notion of 
prelinguistic reality. If the real is defined as the impossible to represent and therefore 
traumatic, then its status is not simply independent of the symbolic-imaginary order. The real 
cannot be thought in independence of the symbolic and the imaginary: the Lacanian trio must 
be conceived as mutually constitutive. This is what the term ‘postsymbolic’ refers to: the real 
only exists as a result of symbolization, as the detritus that this operation leaves behind in the 
form of an excess, a remainder or a surplus-effect. At the same time, however, it can only be 
encountered as a lack, from the standpoint of socio-symbolic reality.  
The difference between the two versions of the real, in their relation to trauma, can be 
illuminated by Slavoj Žižek’s (2006) reference to Einstein’s transition from the special to the 
general theory of relativity. In the former, the curvature of space is explained as the effect of 
matter: the presence of matter ‘curves’ space (in the sense that only an empty space would be 
‘non-curved’). In the general theory of relativity, however, the causality is reversed: matter is 
no longer the cause but rather the effect of the curvature of space. When applied to trauma 
this means that the symbolical system is not incoherent because of the disruptions of a 
foreign, outside element, as a reading of the presymbolic real (cf. the special theory of 
relativity) might suggest. The turn towards the postsymbolic real (cf. the general theory of 
relativity) implies that the traumatic impact of a scene is rather the effect of an already 
existent curvature of the singular subjective space, that is, an effect of the structure of the 





I am well aware of the difficulty of this turn-around. Whereas the account of the presymbolic 
real has a degree of familiarity to it, the idea of a postsymbolic real is rather counterintuitive. I 
will introduce it by returning for a moment to the context of psychoanalysis and the technique 
of free association. This will allow me to indicate how the real is located vis-à-vis the 
symbolic chain; how the determination inherent to the symbolic chain circumscribes an 
impossibility to be identified with the (postsymbolic) real. To conclude, I will describe the 
view of trauma that derives from this articulation. 
 
The Postsymbolic Real 
Someone who enters psychoanalysis often does so because he or she suffers from a symptom 
that is barely understood. The symptom presents itself as a ‘hole in meaning’, a piece of 
nonsense that one cannot get rid of. Likewise, other productions of the unconscious such as 
parapraxes, bungled actions or dreams equally constitute ‘units outside meaning’ (Soler, 
2014, p. 36). They pop up on their own accord in an anomalous fashion, seemingly out of 
nowhere. The analytic work of free association consists in connecting this unit with others 
that confer meaning upon it (Lacan, 1953-54). Soler (2014) convincingly argues that ‘every 
time a parasitic element surfaces in intentionality, it will summon the associative work that 
produces meaning by revealing the phantasy’ (p. 69-70). Prior to the analytical work, a 
senseless unit appears as a One in isolation, an opaque monolith. Only by recuperating it into 
a chain of associations does the analysand recover (a morsel of) its unknown meaning.  
When the analysand is confronted with something unthinkable or unmasterable (for instance, 
a symptom), the transference implies a supposition of knowledge and the expectation that this 
knowledge can remediate the ‘hole in what he thinks he knows about himself’ (Soler, 2014, p. 
41). This knowledge concerning the analysand’s intimacy is transferred onto the person of the 
psychoanalyst. Conversely, the analyst supposes this knowledge to free association: it is the 
unraveling chain of the analysand’s discourse itself that somehow ‘knows’, that somehow 
produces this knowledge (Lacan, 1964). The latter supposition refers back to the fact that so-
called ‘free’ association is not free at all. In the chain unfolding during free association, 
particular jouissance-laden signifiers systematically and automatically return. This 




by an unconscious knowledge and wanting-to-say (vouloir-dire) (Lacan, 1953-54, p. 242). 
According to Lacan, the determination in free association is orchestrated by the signifier, and 
the seemingly senseless elements traversing conscious discourse in fact express unconscious 
desire. The signifiers that return time and again owe this promotion to the specificities of the 
life of the particular subject in question. They are the signifiers of the Other in which the 
subject is alienated, the signifiers that structured the drives of the subject (Declercq, 2000). In 
his later work, Lacan (1972-73) arrived at the idea that signifiers are laden with the drive 
(jouissance), apart from the meaning they entail. Each signifier thus ‘carries both structure 
and drive’ (Vanheule, 2011a, p. 152). However, jouissance is not distributed equitably across 
the signifying chain: some signifiers are charged with jouissance more than others, and  this 
quality is what drives their incessant recurrence throughout the productions of the 
unconscious. The surprising elements that surface during free association are thus not without 
a logic: in the symbolic process of concatenating signifiers, what can and cannot appear is 
bound to certain laws or rules. There is some sort of determination at work in the 
unconscious, some kind of ‘action of the structure’ as Miller (2012b) calls it. Nevertheless, 
the real driving force behind these movements is something ‘beyond’ the chain itself. In this 
way, determination is distinguished from causality. 
 
Tuche and automaton 
The crucial distinction between symbolic determination on the one hand, and real cause on 
the other, can be approached through the Aristotelian notions of tuche and automaton, which 
Lacan discusses in Seminar XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (1964, 
pp. 53-64). The articulation of tuche with automaton is helpful to imagine the real as 
something ‘internally excluded’ from the symbolic order.  
The automaton, for Lacan, is the network or chain of signifiers in which the symbolic order 
(the Other) is incarnated. Here, signifiers are combined incessantly according to certain rules 
or laws that determine the possibilities of circulation and production. Through the elaboration 
of a series of graphs, Lacan (1954-55, 1957b) showed that when a series of chance events (for 
example, the pluses and minuses as results of a coin toss) are encoded (by grouping them in 





group. Take, for instance, the following arbitrary series (the results of a number of coin 
tosses, whereby ‘+’ stands for heads and ‘-’ for tails): 
Series X: + +  +  -  +  + -  -  +  -  
 
The result of a coin flip is uncontrollable, since it is determined by ‘so many variables that no 
feasible, finite list of conditions can be singled out as the cause’ (Dennett, 2003, p. 85). 
Hence, it is a randomizing device, used in Lacan’s graph to simulate the pure contingency of 
the real. A second series Y is created by grouping the chance outcomes in overlapping pairs, 
assigning to the pair ++ the value 1, to +-  or -+ the value 2, and to -- the value 3 xvii. If we 
write these codes underneath the heads/tails chain, we get the following series, in which each 
number refers to the plus or minus sign directly above it, in conjunction with the plus or 
minus immediately to that sign’s left: 
 
Series X: + +  +  -  +  +  -  -  +   -        
 Series Y:     1  1  2  2  1  2 3  2  2  
 
From this small example, it becomes clear that a category 1 set of tosses (++) cannot be 
immediately followed by a category 3 set (- -). Likewise, whereas a category 2 can be 
followed by either a 1, 2 or 3 category, a category 3 cannot be followed by a category 1. Thus, 
within the series Y, an order emerges that prohibits certain possibilities while allowing for 
others. Although series Y is constructed over a strictly coincidental series, and furthermore, 
although the series Y has no impact on the results of the associated coin toss, it nevertheless 
introduces a set of rules and laws. One more example: if we start the series of tosses off with a 
1 (++) followed by a 2 (+-), we can only find a 1 again in the chain after an even number of 2s 
(See Fink (1995, p. 18)). In this way, we could say that the series Y keeps track of, 
remembers or even counts its previous components. Arguably, the emergent order thus signals 
the function of some sort of (cybernetic) memory that remembers what can and cannot follow 
a specific combination (Verhaeghe, 1989). Lacan’s (1960) subject of the unconscious is the 
afterwards effect of this march of the signifiers.  
 
Thus, although the first, encoded series of pluses and minuses is established contingently, the 




limitations that is not inherent to the ‘pre-existing reality’. As such, within the second, coded 
series Y (the symbolic level of representation), a deterministic effect is produced that 
apparently transcends the original coincidence. The chain itself ‘spontaneously’ produces its 
own determination: the possibilities and impossibilities derive from ‘the way in which the 
symbolic matrix is constructed, that is, the way it ciphers the event in question’ (Fink, 1995, 
p. 19). Hence, the term automaton: that which moves out of itself (Lacan, 1964, pp. 53-4). 
When applied to free association in the psychoanalytic cure, the automaton model indicates 
that it rather concerns a type of ‘automatic association’ (Verhaeghe, 1989).  
One clinically significant consequence of this model is that once a form of symbolic 
knowledge is introduced into the real (by means of a ciphering or counting), pure coincidence 
ceases to exist (Lacan, 1964, pp. 54-5). An unexpected encounter, determined solely by 
external factors that seem accidental from the perspective of the victim of circumstance, is 
immediately caught within the pre-established symbolical determination of the subject in 
question, the ‘matrix of unconscious significance’ as Adrian Johnston calls it (2005, p. 26). 
The valence and potential effects of such a contingent encounter derive from this symbolical 
background. Obviously, this has important repercussions for the way in which we think 
traumatic etiology: the impact of an external event similarly depends on the manners in which 
it interacts with this pre-existing matrix. Ergo, it is impossible to predict beforehand whether 
or not a particular event will cause traumatic effects or not, based on a set of a priori event 
characteristics (see Part I).  
The model of the automaton is located within Lacan’s structuralist project, in which he 
attributes unilateral causal power to the signifier. Signification or meaning, which we 
experience at the level of consciousness, is not primary for Lacan. The question is not what 
the productions of the unconscious (symptom, lapsus, dream, and so on) mean in themselves, 
nor what their nature or essence is. Lacan aims to show that their meaning is a derivative 
effect of the structure imposed by the signifier, of the ciphering of the unconscious (for 
instance, Lacan, 1953-54; 1956a), . Psychoanalysis attempts to reveal the primacy and causal 
power of the signifier in its stupidity; to reveal the subject’s submission to that which lies 
beyond meaning. What distinguishes Lacan’s project from others that focus on the structuring 
forces of the symbolic is his sustained attention to those aspects of experience that remain un- 
or understructured, to ‘absence, lack, displacement, exception, indetermination, and so on’ 





Seminar XI, this underdetermined aspect is called tuche. With reference to the determination 
of the automaton, the tuche denotes what is excluded from appearance, what cannot be said, 
the impossible. In its movement, the automaton produces this impossible that lies beyond the 
chain. In a sense, the chain behaves as if what is excluded were the ‘truth of everything that 
the chain produces as it beats around the bush’ (Fink, 1995, p. 27). What remains outside the 
chain can therefore be said to cause what is on the inside. Structurally speaking, something 
must always be pushed outside for there to even be an inside.  
Tuche is thus associated with the notion of causality. Lacan’s account of tuche and automaton 
sharpens a dichotomy, and the question is how both poles are connected with each other. On 
the one hand, we have structure: the automatic functioning of the signifying chain. On the 
other, we have something that causes the automaton while at the same time interrupting its 
smooth functioning: tuche. The symbolic chain automatically leads to an encounter with the 
tuche, albeit one that is always missed. The chain leads to a place where it does not bump up 
against something substantial, but against a point where the expected final signifier, the point 
de capiton that would reveal the full truth of the subject, is lacking. The automaton describes 
a circular path that always arives at this destination, the point of rendez-vous with the real. 
However, the nature of this encounter is such that ‘nobody ever shows up’, so to speak. The 
final signifier is lacking, and this lack is ordinarily covered over through the workings of 
fantasy. The return of the signifier, determined as it is by the machinations of the symbolic, 
thus denotes a kind of repetition that simultaneously serves as an avoidance of and an appeal 
to an encounter with the real. The signifying chain of the automaton both eludes and 
designates the central place of the real. The crux is that this real beyond the chain is what 
drives the process forward. The cause, in Lacan’s (1964, p. 22) account, always concerns 
something indeterminate, something anticonceptual or indefinite. Instead of finding the 
solidity of a determinate cause at the endpoint of the chain, some sort of substantial prime 
mover, we only find a hole or a gap.  
 
The Incalculability of the Real 
The discussion of tuche and automaton is vital for the current project, as it shows that the 
traumatic real is something outside of, but not without a relation to language. Moreover, it 




subjects are constituted through language (that is, a postsymbolic real). The productive tension 
between structure and something ‘internally excluded’ that disrupts and propels the former 
can be approached in a multitude of ways, but the central idea always remains the same. 
Whereas structure allows for a degree of predictability, of calculability, the real of tuche is per 
definition incalculable.  
 In trauma, we deal with an event that overthrows the pre-existing order in which it emerges – 
and this applies equally to the individual and the collective level. What was valid in the 
symbolically constructed reality is suddenly and brutally contradicted, because the traumatic 
encounter is per definition an encounter with what was deemed ‘impossible‘ from the 
perspective prior to its onset (see Lacan (1964, p. 280): ‘the real is the impossible’). 
Nevertheless, the impossible did happen. This means, for one, that the invalidated laws or 
rules that governed the pre-existing order of things cannot be relied upon to guide a way out 
of the traumatic predicament. When action can be decided upon the principles of a certain 
symbolical order, we are safely within the realm of calculation, where things follow one 
another in a more or less predictable, comprehensible and overseeable fashion. As Calum 
Neill (2011, p. 118) puts it: ‘Calculation relies on the pre-given, it is internal to the logic of 
the system’. A traumatic encounter is defined by the fact that the pre-existent ‘logic of the 
system’ was proven insufficient to deal with what has occurred: it is because the traumatic 
event cannot be assimilated or recuperated in this system that all sorts of psychopathological 
reactions emerge (for example, re-experiencing of the event, hyperarousal, emotional 
numbing)xviii. Hence, a way out of the trauma cannot be predicated upon this pre-existent 
logic, but must necessarily be based on a decision, which is defined negatively as ‘not of the 
order of the calculable’. A decision is ‘that which must necessarily be taken at the limit of the 
system’ (Neill, 2011, p. 118). Whereas calculation is ‘the enactment of or on the basis of 
formulae or prescription’, that ‘which would follow from a rule or law‘, a decision (to 
calculate, for instance) is itself not of the order of the calculable, but is indicative of 
something outside the law, beyond the symbolic order, of the real (Neill, 2011, p. 118). When 
a decision is at stake, there is no solid ground to launch from, simply because this ground was 
gobbled away in the rupture of the pre-existing order. Hence, the foundation  for such a 
decision can be no other than the subject itselfxix. These claims will be further substantiated 





In terms of the opposition automaton/tuche, we can say that the process of concatenating 
signifiers is calculable: signifiers surface and resurface, insist and permutate, and their 
procession is not coincidental but structurally determined. The tuche, by contrast, is a gap that 
obeys no law. It is a real without rational principle or order, an encounter that takes place as 
chance, coincidence, contingency. It is the impossible to symbolize, reduce or digest, and it 
‘always returns to the same place’ (Lacan, 1964, p. 280). It can be located where meaning 
falls, in uncertainty. The tuche manifests itself when something disrupts the working of the 
automaton, something unforeseen that cannot be traced back to or explained in terms of the 
symbolic laws of the automaton. Nevertheless, it is precisely this ‘hitch’ or ‘obstacle’ that 
provides the impetus for the activity of the chain (Lacan, 1964, p. 54). This led Lacan to 
conclude that ‘there is cause only in something that doesn’t work’ [Il n’y a de cause que de ce 
qui cloche] (Lacan, 1964, p. 22) from the perspective of the automaton. Cause, then, should 
be distinguished from that which is already determined in a system. Properly understood, it is 
something exterior to the system itself. Imagine a line of domino tiles standing upright next to 
each other: the organization of the system is such that when one tile is toppled, a linear and 
predictable chain reaction is set in motion which results in all the tiles falling in succession. 
For Lacan, cause is no longer present once the system is ‘put to work’ and every falling tile 
inevitably contacts with the adjacent one. The ‘real’ cause of the entire domino process is 
something which put the determined sequence in motion. Or, alternatively, something that 
interrupts the entirely calculable chain of events once it has started. This primum movens can 
be said to function as cause, but only insofar as it could also not have happened.  
When discussing this domino example, we obviously find ourselves on the outside of the 
automatically functioning symbolic system that is represented by the line of standing domino 
tiles. We are not part of the chain and from that perspective, we can indeed identify and name 
that ‘something’ which is foreign to the system (a child, for example) but which caused it into 
existence and set it in motion for the sake of its own pleasure. As subjects of language, 
however, there is no vantage point outside the symbolic realm that we can occupy in order to 
capture what it is that lies beyond. We can only attest to the fact that the symbolic register is 
not sufficient in itself and that it is sometimes disturbed or dislocated, which testifies to an 





The description of the presymbolic real enabled an understanding of trauma as the resurfacing 
of an unbearable jouissance located at the level of corporeality, something that suddenly 
disrupts the smooth surface and coherence of the arduously constructed body image. The 
dynamic between an experience of continuity (as provided by the ego and the body image) 
and something real that suddenly disrupts this experience can be extrapolated to other 
dimensions. The main idea here is that both the experience of oneself as a solid entity and the 
coherence of reality, as prime examples of apparently continuous entities, can be interrupted 
in an unforeseen way. What underpins this idea is the claim that being itself is marked by an 
irreducible lack, and that the constitution of both reality and identity as something substantive 
requires the installation of a fantasmatic screen to cover up the instability that lies underneath. 
This screen can, however, be ripped apart. Such ruptures are encountered in many different 
forms, on many different planes. When such a rupture occurs, trauma is one possible 
outcome.  
The postsymbolic real thus signals the constitutive incompleteness of any symbolic structure. 
In Lacan’s ontology, being itself is marked by a gap, which is repeated by the emergence of 
the signifier. Lack is thus doubled: the lack of being cannot be remediated by the Other, 
which is itself barred or incomplete. The imaginary register obscures this doubled lack 
through the content of signification. It establishes a ‘signified world of meaning’ that we 
‘consciously inhabit’ (Eisenstein & McGowan, 2012, p. 13). The primary characteristic of the 
imaginary is its ability to erect an experience of the world as coherent and stable: a world 
without gaps or rents. As Lacan puts it: ‘It’s in the Imaginary that I locate the support of what 
is consistency’ (Lacan, 1975-76, p. 50). The imaginary allows us to approach the world ‘in 
pursuit of recurrent patterns of meaning’ (Vanheule, 2011a, p. 158). This inclination towards 
images, appearances and unity is purportedly rooted in the experience of the body image (see 
above). The disturbance of the harmony provided by the imaginary provokes unease (Ibid.). 
 Traumatic rupture occurs when the natural flow of things is suddenly interrupted by the 
impossible. As such, the real is not reducible simply to ‘something out of the ordinary’ that 
traverses our expectations. The definition of a traumatic event, through the concept of the real, 
as the impossible which nevertheless occurs has many and far-reaching consequences (Lacan, 





make possible a reading of what happened. Because the magnitude of the rupture in trauma is 
so vast, it implies a change in the coordinates of what is possible and what is not. In turn, this 
necessitates a particular form of subjective activity that, because of its very nature, has 
political ramifications. In Chapter 8, these ideas will be taken up and worked out. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter provided an outlook on Lacan’s difficult notion of the real in its many facets. 
The real can be thought of in terms of something that ex-sists outside of language and 
continuously disrupts representation. Moreover, it is this very disruption, this failure to 
represent, that continuously stimulates a series of never-ending attempts at representation. 
The real is defined as the impossible, and it manifests itself in a strictly senseless fashion: its 
occurrence is entirely unpredictable in that it cannot be derived from the laws that govern the 
situation in which it arises. Its traumatic force lies in its formal radicality: a traumatic 
encounter changes the coordinates of what was deemed possible. It prevents the pre-existent 
symbolic-imaginary system to perform its function of ‘ignorant misrecognition’ 
(méconnaissance) (Lacan, 1953-54, p. 53). The lack at the core of being is suddenly laid bare 
and the smooth surface of meaning is disrupted. The field of experience becomes affected by 
something that testifies to non-meaning, by an opaque and senseless disturbance. Moreover, 
lack can no longer be covered up by the traversed pre-existent logic. From this, I propose to 
define trauma as that which demands a restructuration of the subject in its relation to the 
Other.  
In the next two chapters, I will discuss the real in its ethical and political aspects respectively. 








Lacan’s Ethics of the Real 
 
Abstract: In this chapter, I investigate the paradoxical notion of an ‘ethics of the real’, 
which refers to Alenka Zupančič’s (2000) denomination of the particular form of 
ethics that derives from Lacan’s elaboration of the subject. In psychoanalytic theory, 
the real is defined simultaneously as traumatic on the one hand, and as the condition 
of possibility for the subject, and thus of ethics as such, on the other. This estranging 
logic is elucidated, which leads to the identification of the Lacanian real as 
characterized by the dual function of ‘productive destruction’. The psychoanalytic 
experience allows me to pinpoint the precise point where ethics and the traumatic real 
come together: only where the analysand is confronted with the (traumatic) lack of 
guarantee behind the symbolic order, the subject is called forth to respond with a truly 
subjective act that reorganizes his or her desire and mode of functioning. 
 
The title of this chapter refers to Alenka Zupančič’s (2000) book, which situates and typifies 
the ethics particular to psychoanalysis, as developed by Lacan mainly in Seminar VII (1959-
60). In what follows, this paradoxical notion of an ‘ethics of the Real’ will be scrutinized, 
whereby the primary focus on trauma is momentarily abandoned. Nevertheless, the ultimate 




Chapter 4, I argued that the practices associated with the PTSD-construct dovetail with the 
assumptions underpinning today’s prevailing ethical stance, encapsulated in the human rights 
doctrine. A brief discussion of Badiou’s critique of this type of ethics laid bare the problems 
associated with it, despite its merits: the emphasis on vulnerability reduces those affected to 
the position of victims and strips them bare of their agency. In turn, this risks producing a 
general attitude of ‘nihilistic resignation’ that obstructs the envisioning of alternatives, and 
thus serves to consolidate the status quo. The framework of PTSD was thereby shown to be 
interwoven with this particular ethical position – in contrast with the popular outlook that 
considers it a merely technical, value-free construct. Given the problems associated with both 
PTSD and this type of ethics, a search for alternatives is warranted.  
The central claim of this book is that the concept of the real is at the heart of the intersections 
between trauma, ethics and politics. In what follows, the goal is to chart the manner in which 
the real is related specifically to the field of ethics. As established in the previous chapter, the 
real is the central Lacanian concept to think trauma. It thus comes as a surprise that this same 
concept is propounded to be the driving force behind a specific type of ethics associated with 
psychoanalysis. How are we to understand this claim? How can something that is ‘inherently 
traumatic’ be, at the same time, the very foundation of ethics? Importantly, what does this 
imply for our understanding of trauma and the manner in which we deal with it? What place 
do ethics take in the manner in which we address trauma? These preliminary questions orient 
the following sections. Our point of entry will be a description of the so-called ethics of the 
real. In secondary literature, the works of Zupančič (2000), Marc De Kesel (2002) and Calum 
Neill (2011) constitute its most notable articulations, which we will use as a springboard for 
what follows. Zupančič’s work will be the primary point of reference for this chapter, as her 
line of reasoning renders vivid in a very clear and direct way the point where the real 
intersects with ethics. The discussion of the real within ethics necessitates a terminological 
distinction between morality on the one hand, and ethics on the other. As Neill (2011) 
remarks, morality is concerned with concrete and sturdy notions of what constitutes right or 
wrong. Most often, this translates in a set of particular edicts or prescriptions which are 
consolidated in tradition. Ethics will be revealed to be what lies beyond these particular 






Kant’s ethics of desire 
According to Zupančič (2000), Lacan’s elaboration of the ethics of psychoanalysis takes as its 
point of departure the Kantian break with ‘traditional ethics’. This break is twofold. First, 
Kant acknowledged that the moral imperative is not concerned with the possibility of 
fulfilling certain obligations: morality is inherently a demand for the impossible. As such, he 
discovered the dimension of desire, as something that endlessly circles around an impossible 
real, to be central to ethics (Zupančič, 2000, p. 3). Second, Kant rejected the view that ethics 
concerns itself with the ‘distribution of the good’: it is not about wanting the good for others 
as one conceives it for oneself. Both Kant and Lacan rally against utilitarian and standard 
Christian ethics that try to ground ethics in some calculus of pleasures or gains. As such, their 
position is in turn very much out of sync with the dominant moral outlooks of our times, 
which remain strongly influenced by Jeremy Bentham’s and John Stuart Mill’s forms of 
utilitarianism. The latter is the paradigmatic example of a consequentialist ethical theory, 
wherein the moral worth of an action is judged by its resultant outcome: the best course of 
action is the one that maximizes a positive effect in terms of utility. For instance: ‘the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number’ as the measure of right and wrong. By contrast, Kant 
attempted to ground his ethics in the adherence to a rational principle merely for the sake of 
duty, which is why it is often considered an example of deontological ethics. Zupančič (2000) 
argues that Lacan started off from Kant’s analysis of the logics of desire in ethics, in order to 
take an additional step into the realm of the drive as central to ethics. In this endeavor, 
however, Kant remained the most important philosophical reference point for Lacan, and a 
large portion of this chapter will therefore be devoted to some of the former’s main ideas.  
The opening question to be addressed is the following: how is desire related to ethics? The 
traditional answer is that human desires are excessive: they constitute a dangerous, disruptive 
force that must be kept in check through the formation of and adherence to a moral code, so 
that our behavior is kept free of all excess. The unbridled living out of desires is deemed 
problematic because it interferes with the rights, preferences and happiness of others. 
Therefore, ethics appears to be involved with a gradual turning away from one’s egotistical 
inclinations towards more and more sociable goals. Kant will turn this idea upside down: 
ethics will not keep our conduct free of excess, but it is, in itself, excessive by nature. As I 




The Categorical Imperative 
Kant (1785) famously developed the idea of the ‘categorical imperative’ as the single moral 
obligation. Categorical imperatives are principles that are intrinsically valid; they are good in 
and of themselves and must be obeyed by everyone in each and every situation, regardless of 
the personal interests or desires involved. From the categorical imperative, all other moral 
obligations are subsequently generated. Importantly, this principal purportedly allows us to 
judge or test the ethical character of a specific action. The best-known formulation of the 
categorical imperative reads as follows: ‘Act only in accordance with that maxim through 
which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law’ (Kant, 1785, p. 31). Thus, 
when I am faced with a difficult choice, I should make explicit the maxim that supports a 
specific course of action, after which I should rationally investigate whether or not a world in 
which everyone acts in this same manner is feasible (that is, the universality criterion). If 
contradictions or irrationalities arise in this imaginary world, then the principle is not valid 
and should not be acted upon. In this manner, Kant attempted to found ethics as a principle of 
reason, so that it no longer required to be grounded on an external guarantor such as God or 
Nature. Rationality, for Kant, is the principle of humanity.  
 Importantly, the categorical imperative is ‘an end in itself’: it is not a means to some other 
need, desire or purpose. This is a crucial point. Kant holds that it is not enough for an action 
to be in accord with duty or with the law to qualify as ethical, for what counts is the 
motivation behind this action: what drives the choice for it? Such a compelling force is called 
a Triebfeder, a ‘drive’ or an ‘incentive’, a general term that encompasses everything from the 
most basic needs to the most elevated ideas (Kant, 1788, p. xlviii). Kant (1797, p. 51) insists, 
in a move that seems peculiar at first, that our actions are pathological when we are under the 
sway of such incentives. It follows that in our ordinary lives, our normal, everyday actions are 
always more or less pathological, propelled as they are by a series of drives or incentives that 
have nothing to do with the categorical imperative as such. It is worth stressing that the 
pathological equally encompasses common incentives such as pleasure or happiness (of the 
self and of others), as these exert a robust influence on the human will that differs from the 
mere ‘duty’ to adhere to the categorical imperative. It is not that the motivational force or 
appropriateness of such feelings is negated, but rather that when duty is concerned, they 
should not be allowed to determine the choice of action. For Kant, the only valid ethical 





law’ (Kant, 1797, p. 46). So, in this reading, if we are to determine whether an act is ethical or 
not, we simply have to ask ourselves the question which in fact determines our will: duty or 
some other, pathological influence (Zupančič, 2000). In contrast with the utilitarian ethical 
position, right or wrong is here not decided by the outcome of an action, but by the motives of 
the person who carries them out. When the personal appraisal of the consequences becomes 
the driving force of one’s comportment, this constitutes a pathological motive according to 
Kant, and hence does not amount to ‘the ethical’ as such. 
A brief pop culture illustration can make this more clear. In the American television series of 
Spartacus, we witness the arrival of the main character as a slave in a ludus, where he will be 
trained to become a gladiator. After he passes the test to determine that he is worthy, he 
swears the sacramentum of the gladiator brotherhood and becomes part of the group. Due to 
his racial background as a Thracian and his haughty and cocky attitude, Spartacus quickly 
develops a feud with the undefeated Gallic champion of the region, Crixus, a fellow resident 
at the same ludus. The hatred between both men rises as Spartacus becomes so skilled in 
combat and successful in the games that he is soon crowned the new champion of Capua, 
during a time when Crixus is out of action, recovering from his battle wounds. One night, 
Spartacus is caught by surprise in the seclusion of the ludus as an assassin sneaks up behind 
him and attempts to strangle him. By pure coincidence, Crixus walks in upon the scene. 
Within the framework of regulated battle, in training or during the games, Crixus had many 
times attempted to kill Spartacus himself – wanting nothing more than to be done with the 
obnoxious Thracian that took over his hard-earned position and status within the ludus, to the 
point even that Crixus is to be sold to a less prestigious lanista. At this juncture, Crixus has 
several options and is compelled to make a choice. He can just leave the scene and let 
Spartacus die, without anybody ever knowing he was there and could have intervened. For 
Kant, this would be a pathological option. Contrastingly, there are several scenarios where he 
could act in accordance with duty by intervening and saving Spartacus, without however 
reaching the level of the ethical because he is driven by selfish motivations. For example, he 
might believe that by saving Spartacus he might regain some of the lost respect and status he 
enjoyed before, thus potentially preventing the transaction to offload him to a lesser House; or 
he might want to save Spartacus from the assassin, only so that he himself can kill him in the 
arena in due time and get his personal revenge. Although his course of action would then be 




is not the sole motive. The third possibility is that Crixus simply recognizes his duty and 
saves his ‘brother’ – for no other reason than because it is his duty to do so. This would, 
incidentally, not imply that he thereby relinquishes any of his personal feelings towards the 
person of Spartacus. That Crixus in fact made a Kantian ethical choice in this fictive sequence 
is suggested by the dialogue that follows his rescuing intervention. The baffled Spartacus’ 
question as to why Crixus ‘would save a man whom he hates’, is answered as such: ‘I did not 
save Spartacus. I saved a brother who shares the mark’. After which Crixus turns away in 
disgust – once again strengthened in his conviction that Spartacus does not understand what it 
means to be a gladiator, and is not worthy of being a member of the brotherhood, nor of his 
popularity with the crowds. However, these personal opinions and motives did not play a part 
in Crixus’ decision to act, which was exclusively given in by duty (Woods, 2010).  
The essential Kantian stipulation that morality is a matter of motivation refers to the 
distinction between the legality and the morality or ethical character of an action: ‘The mere 
conformity or nonconformity of an action with law, irrespective of the incentive to it, is called 
its legality (lawfulness); but that conformity in which the Idea of duty arising from law is also 
the incentive of the action is called its morality’ (Kant, 1797, p. 46). The legality of an action 
does not concern itself with motivations: all that matters is whether or not the action is 
conform with law. The ethical dimension of an action thus lies beyond this correspondence 
between action and law: in relation to legality, ‘the ethical always presents a surplus or 
excess’ (Zupančič, 2000, p. 12). But what is the nature of this excess? As we have seen, it has 
something to do with the driving force behind an action: the will should be determined solely 
by ‘the form of the moral law’. Kantian ethics demands not only that action is conform with 
duty, but also that ‘this conformity be the only “content” or “motive” of that action’ 
(Zupančič, 2000, p. 14). To recapitulate and schematize this, consider the following theses, 
put forward by  Zupančič (2000, p. 16): 
 In conformity with duty (the legal) 
 In conformity with duty and only because of duty (the ethical)  
 
These phrases highlight that the ethical for Kant asserts itself as a supplement. This 
supplement appears to be a ‘pure waste’, in that it does not serve any purpose: in the end, the 
comportment of the subject remains the same, as do the consequences of the actions, despite 





some sort of wasteful excess that isn’t good for anything but, nevertheless, makes all the 
difference (ethical or not).  
 
Demand the Impossible 
We can now start to see why Kant demands the impossible in his conception of ethics: how 
can we ever be sure that we are not (unconsciously) driven by a pathological motive in our 
actions, even when those actions appear to be in line with the categorical imperative? With 
reference to the example from Spartacus: how can we ever be sure that Crixus was not 
(unconsciously) driven by some (disavowed) egotistical inclination (for example, to regain his 
prestige)? How can we disregard our self-interest, or the well-being of those that we cherish 
and love? A second and related problem that arises is Kant’s attempt to distinguish a proper 
ethical drive. As we have seen, all empirical ‘contents’ of the will, its ‘matter’, are regarded as 
pathological. Kant’s ethical alternative is that ‘form’ comes to occupy the position formerly 
occupied by matter, that form itself has to function as a drive: ‘form itself must be 
appropriated as a material surplus, in order for it to be capable of determining the will. […] 
the form of the moral law has itself to become “material”, in order for it to function as a 
motive force of action’ (Zupančič, 2000, p. 15). How, then, can something which in itself is 
not pathological, because it has nothing to do with the pleasure principle as the usual mode of 
subjective causation, come to be the drive of a subject’s actions? How can the pure form of 
duty, in other words, assume the place and function formerly occupied by pathological 
elements? As Zupančič remarks, if the latter would operate as a motive for the subject, we 
would no longer have to worry about the first problem concerning the almost impossible task 
of the ‘purification of the will’ (2000, p. 16).  
At this point, the parallel with Lacan’s conceptualization of the object a can be drawn. Object 
a is the ephemeral object that ‘drives’ desire forward. Its status is ambiguous: although it is 
called an object, it is not an object that we encounter in real life. This is why it is called the 
object-cause of desire: because it can never be given as such, it insists and forms the continual 
basis that supports desire’s endless search for ‘something else’ (Lacan, 1962-63). Lacan states 
that the ordinary objects that we engage with are related to the dimension of ‘demand’. 
However, after demands have been met, something inevitably stays behind, which is precisely 




rock and a lack’; something that is propounded to ‘exist’, although it can never be reached 
and thus continues to be lacking (Shepherdson, 2008). In other words: it is the positivization 
of a negativity, just as Kant’s real Triebfeder, the ethical motive of ‘the form of moral law’, is 
the positivization of the absence of every other Triebfeder (Zupančič, 2000). The only ‘true’ 
object-drive of the will is nothing but this empty form. The absence of content thus, in both 
cases, begins to function as a positive, material incentive. 
The emphasis on motivation in Kantian ethics opens onto the problems of desire and freedom. 
We have seen that the ethical is concerned not only with what it is that we want when we act 
in a certain way, but also with the way that we want it. However, this assertion leads us to 
another difficult question: are we free to desire what we want? 
 
The Dispossession of our Intimacy 
When dealing with ethics, the question of the subject inevitably takes centre stage. More 
specifically, we must busy ourselves with the difficult notion of freedom: when, if ever, are 
we truly acting as free agents? This is a crucial question in contemporary intellectual life. Are 
we the authors or even the owners of the thoughts and impulses that arise in our minds? Is the 
fact that ‘there is thinking’ going on in our heads the effect of some kind of (human) agency? 
Phenomenological enquiries argue that this is not the case: thoughts pop up when ‘they’ want 
to pop up, and not when ‘I’ expect them to do so (Feyaerts & Vanheule, 2015). Such 
observations led Lacan (for example, 1964, p. 35-6)  to question Descartes’ contention of the 
cogito: the fact that ‘there is thinking’ does not justify the claim that it is ‘I’ who am doing the 
thinking. It would be more accurate to say that ‘it thinks’ in my place. The I, then, is not the 
root of thoughts, but rather a position taken in response to thoughts (Neill, 2011, p. 27).  
As discussed, it is pivotal to Kantian ethics to define what it is that drives us in our 
comportments. Why did we choose this or that course of action? Although we cannot be sure 
that we have included all relevant factors, we often act as if it is possible to establish a valid 
account of causes and motives for a specific behavior, a sufficient schema that enables us to 
understand why we acted the way we did. The influencing factors can then be divided into 
external circumstances that limit our options and push us in certain directions on one hand, 





on the other. The problem, however, is that the existence and impact of internal factors not 
necessarily implies ‘freedom’ in a straightforward fashion. Is this not the ground-shaking 
discovery of psychoanalysis, that what arises in the field of consciousness does not come ‘out 
of the blue’, but  must necessarily be thought in relation to ‘something beyond’ consciousness 
that determines its appearance? If there is some sort of psychical determination behind our 
conscious mental phenomena, then the latter cannot be regarded as ‘free’ in any meaningful 
sense. These issues are as urgent and relevant today as ever, and they are debated extensively 
and passionately in the contemporary sciences of life (see Dennett, 2003 for a discussion).  
For Kant (1785, 1797), human beings as part of nature are subject to the laws of causality. He 
views most of our deepest convictions and inclinations as pathological. As discussed, we only 
act free if we are not driven by these (unconsciously) determined impulses. To claim that you 
are free because you ‘do what you want’ misses the point entirely: namely, that you are not 
free in what it is you want. Is what we want, for instance, not curbed by the pleasure principle 
– perverting the dynamics of need satisfaction in service of survival (De Kesel, 2002)? In the 
final analysis, the human will is arguably always more or less under the spell of some 
(pathological) representation like pleasure or happiness. In other words, we cannot find the 
basis for our freedom in our psychology, because our inner world is, against commonsense 
intuition, just as affected by causal chains beyond our control as the outer world. Saying that a 
subject acted in a free manner because his behavior was ‘internally motivated’, in other 
words, caused by ‘representations, desires, aspirations and inclinations’ (Zupančič, 2000, p. 
24), does not enable us to find freedom in any sense, for the simple reason that these internal 
factors are themselves subject to a strict form of (psychical) determination. Psychological 
causality points to a being ‘under necessitating conditions of past time which are no longer in 
his power when he acts’ (Kant, 1788, p. 122). 
Take for example the dynamics in a case of drug addiction. Imagine a man who might wish to 
end the diabolical spiral of substance abuse when going to bed in the early hours, after yet 
another night of excess. When this conviction arises in him, it is absolutely true: he is fully 
convinced that he cannot go on like that. He might even call up his family and declare his 
good intentions, only to find himself, a couple of hours later, in a state of wanting to resume 
the habit and use again. This does not contradict his previous exclamations; what he wants for 
himself simply changes along the rhythm of something ‘foreign’ inside him – whether we 




conditioned responses that activate craving, and so on. Addiction shows in an extreme way 
that we are not ‘free’ to choose what it is that we want – something ‘fickle’ inside us chooses 
for us. Alternatively, take the case of a man, described by Bruce Fink (2003), who enters 
analysis with the complaint that he cannot stop masturbating to a homo-erotic and fetishistic 
fantasy which, in his everyday life, is completely alien to him. This man does not ‘choose’ to 
‘enjoy’ this particular fantasy, as this enjoyment estranges him and makes him suffer. It rather 
appears that the fantasy chose him. To put it somewhat prosaic: a speaking being is a poem 
rather than a poet (Soler, 2014), someone who is written rather than the author of his 
thoughts. Although these examples are taken out of the field of psychopathology, it should not 
be overlooked that the same applies to thoughts and feelings which are deemed normal or 
adequate: they too arise on their own, following a logic or a determination to which we have 
no direct access.  
Kantian ethics, then, upholds that one must first of all face this dispossession of one’s ‘own’ 
intimacy. We must acknowledge that we are not ‘Master in our own house’, to paraphrase 
Freud’s famous dictum (1917a, p. 143). Although this insight has now been generally 
accepted on a theoretical level, it continues to stir up uncomfortable feelings. At the level of 
our everyday interactions, the idea that we are ‘in control’ of ourselves, along with everything 
that this implies, proves very hard to abandon – even for those who conclude from these 
observations that ‘free will’ (and thus the very idea of personal responsibility and the 
possibility of ethics) is only an illusion (Dennett, 2003). The latter appear to have no other 
choice than to ‘go along with the crowd’, as they continue to act, against their better 
judgment, as if free choice was real.   
 
The Ethical Subject 
Nevertheless, this is only half of Kant’s story: he does not give in to defeatism or nihilism as 
he maintains the possibility of subjective freedom, and thus, of ethics (Zupančič, 2000). Kant 
argues that the feeling of ‘guilt’ that arises when one has made a mistake, even if this mistake 
is caused unintentionally by oversight or ignorance, points to the awareness that one could 
have done otherwise (Žižek, 1998). The feeling of guilt indicates that something inside the 
person ‘accuses’ him or her for the committed action, signaling that he or she was in 





necessity that influenced him or her. The discussed guilt here has a very precise signification: 
it concerns the fact that ‘we can feel guilty even for something we knew to be “beyond our 
control”’, when we are carried along by ‘the stream of natural necessity’ (Zupančič, 2000, p. 
26). In this sense, that we feel guilty is more indicative than what we feel guilty of. Zupančič 
argues that this guilt is mirrored in the fact that analysands sometimes feel guilty not only for 
the content of their unconscious desires, but ‘because of the very frame which sustains this 
kind of “psychological causality”. It is as if they felt responsible for the very institution of the 
“psychological causality” which, once in place, they cannot but submit to, to be “carried 
along” by.’ (Ibid., p. 26, emphasis added) 
This is a difficult yet essential point. Freedom is purportedly located precisely in this split 
between ‘I couldn’t have done anything else’ and ‘nevertheless, I am guilty’ (Zupančič, 2000, 
p. 27). Here we meet with the paradox of Kantian ethics: only at the point where I become 
aware of the fact that I am carried along by the streams of necessity, can I become aware of 
my freedom. Thus: on the one hand, Kant incessantly reminds us of the fact that we are not 
free, even in our most intimate psychological being. On the other, he maintains that we are 
nevertheless responsible for all of our actions. In sum, with Zupančič’s appropriation of 
Freud’s (1923) maximxx: ‘Man is not only much more unfree than he believes, but also much 
freer than he knows’ (2000, p. 39). Where man believes himself to be an autonomous ego, at 
the level of psychological causality, he must find that all of his ‘spontaneous’ actions and 
undertakings are linked to the law of natural causality. Zupančič (2000, p. 28) calls this the 
‘postulate of de-psychologizing’ or the ‘postulate of determinism’. Instead of being free in the 
intimacy of our conscious minds, we find that we are determined by the Other as a causal 
order beyond our control. But at the very point that we admit to this foreign determination, we 
are confronted with a ‘crack’ in the Other, with the Other’s lack – and it is precisely there that 
we can find the autonomy and freedom of the subject. The task is to discover where the 
subject plays an active part in causal necessity. 
To be brief: the subject can only experience him- or herself as a divided subject to the degree 
that he or she has gone through the experience of being ‘caused’ by a structure that pre-exists 
and transcends him or her. Through this experience, one can discover oneself to be something 
impossible, something which denies the most fundamental aspect of human existence. That is: 
an entity lacking freedom and autonomy, a mere object on which circumstance operates. 




some kind of left-over element, which can serve as the basis for the ethical subject to appear. 
From this reading, it follows that the ethical subject needs to be teased out, needs to be 
brought into existence along a certain path. It must be ‘made to appear’, as it is normally 
occluded from sight. In the end, the subject must come to recognize the part that he or she 
plays in what appear to be the laws of natural necessity. Whenever we are ‘driven’ along by 
some kind of Triebfeder, whether it is pathological or not, we must always presuppose a 
subjective ‘act’ that instituted it as a sufficient cause (that is, instituted it into the maxim that 
guides the subject’s action). This is what the elusive idea of ‘being responsible for the very 
institution of the “psychological causality” that cannot be resisted’ is about. Even when we 
act in line with a principle of ‘self-preservation’, we cannot simply uphold that this is a 
genetically ‘caused’ comportment. Kant holds that it entails a subjective decision that gives 
this principle the authority to dictate our actions. To illustrate this, picture a man who explains 
the fact that he incessantly cheats on his wife by referring to his evolutionally developed, 
hard-wired male programming, which incites him to spread his genetic material as widely as 
possible: can we honestly say that this man is irresistibly driven by his genetic build-up? 
Obviously, at many instances we are not aware of which specific maxim determines our 
choices. This maxim is often left implicit, but it is nevertheless not impossible to recover it 
through reflection.  
In other words, there is no ‘cause of the cause’: ‘it may well be that you were dragged along 
by the torrent of (natural) necessity; but in the final analysis it was you that made this cause 
the cause’ (Zupančič, 2000, p. 34). It is only because the cause of the cause (the Other of the 
Other) is lacking, that the subject is called upon to take upon itself the responsibility for this 
missing guarantee, this lack of necessity. This does not mean that a person consciously 
‘chooses’ the maxims that guide his or her actions. For example, Jacques-Alain Miller (1995) 
discusses a case of a man for whom the psychoanalysis revealed that his object choices were 
always determined by a singular trait: he was attracted to women who somehow represented 
death. Sometimes he liked a woman because of her pale skin, another because she was ‘the 
corpse of the party’ (the one who stood unmoved while everyone else was dancing and having 
a good time), and so on (Miller, 1995, p. 238). The analysis of this man revealed that 
somehow his object choice was determined by an unknown maxim that made a ‘death trait’ 
function as a drive. When confronted with a woman marked by this peculiar trait, this man 





located in historical time, nor has it ever been experienced as such. It is an ‘unconscious 
decision’, which obviously raises the question whether or not the ‘conscious I’ is responsible 
for it.  
To complicate things further, there is a strange temporal dynamics involved with this ‘act’ of 
the subject that institutes the cause as cause. This type of act is propounded to be the act of the 
subject, while at the same time this act is the ‘condition of possibility’ for the subject’s 
arrival: the subject is said only to arise as an effect of this act. This is reminiscent of Freud’s 
thesis of the Neurosenwahl: the specific dynamics of an unconscious structure are 
consolidated at a mythical point in time where a ‘subjective response’ to castration 
supposedly occurs (Freud, 1913a). Freud maintained that the difference between neurosis, 
psychosis and perversion flows precisely from the kind of response given with regard to the 
threat of castration (respectively repression, forclusion and disavowal). Here, also, the 
neurotic/psychotic/perverse subject only comes into being as the effect of this choice, while 
we must necessarily consider it as something chosen by this very same subject. That this 
counterintuitive temporality is not a trivial or merely academic matter, is evidenced in the fact 
that without this postulate, psychotherapy as a praxis becomes impossible (Verhaeghe, 2001, 
pp. 50-1; Reisner, 2003).  
The emergence of the (ethical) subject is thus only possible because the Other is lacking or 
incomplete. Whereas our intimate phenomenological experience gives us the impression that 
we are free agents, making our own choices on the basis of internal data, we find that this 
conscious inner life is strongly determined by a causal order beyond our control – and thus 
cannot serve in a straightforward manner as the basis for our freedom. However, there is a gap 
at the heart of the symbolic system that sustains us as thinking and speaking beings of 
language: the element that guarantees this order is missing. For Lacan (for example, 1964), 
the experience of this lack constitutes a traumatic encounter with the real, which is the 
condition of possibility for the emergence of the subject. The subject, in this confrontation, is 
required to act, to somehow respond to the abyss that opened up. Simultaneously, the subject 
is declared to be nothing but the precipitation of this very act. In conclusion, we find that the 
real dimension at work in ethics is to be located precisely at the point where something is 
lacking in the chains of symbolical determination, which requires the supplementation of the 





Passage to Lacan: Kant avec Sade 
Although Lacan (1963) applauds the acknowledgment of the place of desire and the subject in 
ethics, he identifies a series of interrelated problems associated with Kantian ethics, which he 
discusses by scandalously juxtaposing Kant with his unexpected ‘other’: the infamous 
Marquis de Sade (Lacan, 1963). This pairing appears absurd at first: what could possibly be 
the relation of Kant’s stringent ethical attitude with Sade’s seditious project of unlimited 
pleasurable violence? Is there, more broadly, Žižek (1998) asks, a line to be drawn from 
Kant’s formalist ethics, in its insistence on the autonomy of Reason, to the atrocities of the 
20th century wherein killing became a ‘neutral business’xxi? Lacan puts these difficult 
questions on the table to tease out what he considers certain unacknowledged aspects of 
Kantian ethics, from its disavowed premises to its ultimate consequences. His point of entry 
links up with the famous Kantian example of the gallows, discussed in the Critique of 
Practical Reason (1788, p. 44):  
Suppose someone alleges that his lustful inclination is quite irresistible to him when he 
encounters the favored object and the opportunity. [Ask him] whether, if in front of the 
house where he finds this opportunity a gallows were erected on which he would be 
strung up immediately after gratifying his lust, he would not then conquer his 
inclination. One does not have to guess long what he would reply. 
Lacan (1964, p. 659) counters this reasoning by referring to the clinic of psychoanalysis, 
where it is not unusual to meet with a subject who can only (sexually) ‘enjoy’ when violating 
some kind of prohibition, and who is thus constantly faced with the possibility of being 
(metaphorically) ‘hanged’. Here, gratifying sexual passion ‘involves the suspension of even 
the most “egotistic” interests’ (Žižek, 1998, p. 14). In a sense, the subject is driven by 
something destructive beyond his control: we cannot simply say that he acts to maximize his 
own enjoyment or well-being. It is rather exactly the opposite: he is driven by an 
unconditional command to seek a gratification which is located beyond the pleasure principle, 
which does not serve the person’s ego in any way. We are dealing here with what Lacan 
called jouissance: a force that can make us act against our own well-being and ‘pathological 
interests’. Because this jouissance is a form of suffering, the whole situation changes its 
character, and the meaning of the moral law itself is completely altered (Zupančič, 2000, p. 





desire, which is oriented towards a strange type of object that is nothing but the positivization 
of a negativity (see above), can we then call this an ‘ethical act’ in the Kantian sense? Is this 
subject’s ‘passion’ ethical, taking into account that for Kant nothing but the moral law can 
induce us to put aside our pathological interests and accept our own death? For Lacan, the 
answer is a definite yes: jouissance is not opposed to the law, but is itself the very kernel of 
the lawxxii. Furthermore, he claims that this dimension of ‘ethical passion’, which he first 
discovered in Sade, is inherent to the Kantian theoretical edifice as such, and not just some 
coincidental manifestation or unjustified appropriation (Žižek, 1998).  
The root of the problem, Lacan argues, is that Kant fails to take into account the ‘subject of 
enunciation’ of the moral law – the one who utters the statement (Lacan, 1959-60, p. 64, p. 
82). For Kant, this issue seems meaningless, because the categorical imperative is seen as an 
‘impersonal command’ which comes ‘from nowhere’. Sade, then, makes explicit this function 
of the moral law’s ‘enunciator’.  According to Žižek (1998), it is precisely because the 
function of enunciator is taken up by a sadistic executioner/torturer in this oeuvre, that the 
content of the categorical imperative, the maxim to be followed, radically switches from 
Kant’s respect for the other as an end-in-itself towards Sade’s reduction of the other as a 
means for exploitation. The crux of the matter is that the categorical imperative must always 
be posited by someone who is called upon to act in a specific situation. As such, the problem 
of enunciation is intertwined with the movement between the particular and the universal. 
Is the truth of Kantian ethics, then, and the point of Lacan’s juxtaposition of Kant with Sade, 
that Kant’s ‘impersonal’ Law is nothing but the edict of a maleficent superego that 
sadistically enjoys the subject’s impotence to meet the required standards? Should the 
enunciator of the categorical imperative be identified with this sadistic superego? Or is this 
not what Lacan is after? The point that he seeks to make with the ‘with’ is not so much that 
Kantian ethics ultimately and necessarily digresses in some Sadean nightmare orchestrated by 
the superego. On the contrary: Lacan aims to show the dangers of not following through with 
Kantian ethics stringently enough. What Lacan (1963) recognizes in Sade is the perverse 
attitude of assuming the position of object-instrument of the Other’s desire. Crucially, this 
move only becomes possible because Sade does not take full responsibility for what he 





Kantian ethics notoriously leave open the content of what is right and wrong, of what needs to 
be done at the level of concrete action. This is often identified as its greatest weakness, but it 
also makes up its greatest strength. The categorical imperative functions as an open structure: 
it does not directly tell me what my duty is, it merely tells me that I should accomplish my 
duty. However, to be useful in particular situations, it must be filled with some kind of 
empirical content, which, because of the nature of the ethical principle itself, is then elevated 
to the form of universal necessity: ‘Act only in accordance with that maxim through which 
you can at the same time will that it become a universal law’…  This means that, ultimately,  
it is not possible to derive the concrete norms I have to follow in my specific situation 
from the moral Law itself - which means that the subject himself has to assume the 
responsibility of ‘translating’ the abstract injunction of the moral Law into a series of 
concrete obligations. (Žižek, 1998, p. 21) 
In this movement, by inventing its universal or necessary dimension, a particular or 
contingent object is elevated by the subject to the ‘dignity of the Thing’, which is Lacan’s 
definition of sublimation (Lacan, 1959-1960, p. 112).  
As discussed, Kant holds that we cannot shy away from our duty by hiding behind the image 
of our fellow-man. For example: ‘telling the truth’ is a perfect duty according to Kant, which 
means that it holds true in each and every circumstance. This is so because lying would 
contradict the reliability of language as such, which is deemed unacceptable as it undermines 
the principle of rationality itself (Zupančič, 2000). From this, it notoriously follows that when 
a professed murderer informs you of his plans to kill your wife, and asks you to tell him 
where she is, according to the categorical imperative you are obliged to answer truthfully (in 
this Kantian example, for the sake of the argument, not giving an answer is excluded, so that 
the choice is limited to lying or telling the truth). The categorical imperative here once again 
shows its ‘inhuman’ face, as it holds that moral actions cannot be judged by the expected 
consequences but simply pertain to duty. Examples like these show that one of the main 
reasons why we continue to act ‘pathologically’ is because of our estimation of the 
consequences that our actions will hold for other people. If we do not act in a strictly ethical 
way, it is because in the end we meet with the final ‘obstacle’ of the good of our fellow-
manxxiii. We thus find ourselves once again confronted with a paradox: can it ever be my duty 
to relinquish my duty? Are there circumstances where I have no choice but to concede on my 





If we follow through on Kant’s line of thought, it is always faulty to uphold that there was no 
other choice, that through the force of circumstance I could not have acted otherwise. We are 
always guilty when we give way on our duty, even if we believe ourselves justified in doing 
so.  
Lacan, in his reference to Sade, alerts us that the reverse should also be accounted for: we 
cannot  hide behind our duty, and use duty as an excuse for our actions. The latter is the basic 
stance of perversion: ‘I am sorry to do this to you, I am only doing this because the Other 
demands it of me, it is beyond my control, it breaks my heart to do this but I must’, and so on. 
The perverse subject presents himself as the instrument of the Other, as the one who ensures 
the Other’s enjoyment, thereby disavowing the surplus of enjoyment that he himself derives 
from carrying out his ‘sacral’ task. In this perverse logic, it is the Other who enunciates the 
law and makes the subject his instrument. The only answer to such a perverse stance, as 
Zupančič (2000, p. 59) points out, is to ask:  ‘where is it written that this is your duty?’ 
Remember that Kant’s ethics uphold that duty is only that which the subject makes his duty. 
Thus: we cannot hide behind an a priori constituted ‘truth’ or unbreakable Law that stipulates 
what we are to do no matter what the situation is. Here we arrive at the source of the problem, 
which lies in the idea that the categorical imperative is a test that unambiguously tells us what 
our duty is, and thus provide us with  an ‘objective’ guarantee. 
When Kant holds that to tell the truth is a perfect duty, this seems to imply that this principle 
has been ‘tested’ through the machinery of the categorical imperative, so that it henceforth 
can function as some kind of ‘commandment’ to be followed by everyone in each situation. It 
is precisely the proclamation of this sort of universal commandment that allows for the 
perverse subjective position: ‘I could not do otherwise than follow my unconditional duty, I 
was but the instrument of a Will that surpasses my own’. Lacan’s point is that this contention 
is precisely not Kantian enough (thereby implicating that Kant himself shied away from 
following his own line of thought to its radical endpoint). The ethical can never be 
consolidated in a series of everlasting commandments (morality), because such a list could 
never account for the role of the subject in the constitution of the universal or the law (ethics), 
that is, the subject’s act of enunciation. This is what Neill (2011) has in mind when he 
discusses the ‘impossibility of ethical examples’. In his seminar on ethics, Lacan (1959-60, 
pp. 243-87) discusses the case of Antigone at length, close-reading Sophocles’ ancient Greek 




Antigone’s insistence to bury her brother to the paradigm of the ethical act – as she appears 
unmoved regarding the consequences that this insistence will bring upon herself. Because this 
particular brother was killed in an insurgency against the city of Thebes, the new king Creon 
declared that he was to be treated as a traitor and his body left to rot outside the city walls. 
Antigone determined this to be unjust and adamantly pursued plans to bury her brother 
herself, thereby only appealing to the ‘laws of the Gods’ to justify her actions. As a result, 
Creon ordered for her to be buried alive. Despite her knowledge of the fatal and horrific 
consequences that she would face, Antigone persisted in her conviction – in defiance of the 
cruel and stubborn king. Is Antigone’s example to be admired and followed or not? Lewis 
Kirshner (2012, p. 14) sharply remarks that instead of being an admirable model, Antigone 
seems ‘closer to a fanatic, someone who conceivably needs an analysis’, given the fact that 
her desire seems fixated or frozen in an absolute certainty that borders on delusion. 
Nevertheless, it is alluring to read this play as an ‘ethical example’ to be followed by others. 
And indeed, a case can be made that Antigone’s act exhibits many of the traits of a truly 
subjective, ethical act: for instance the fact that it is desire made manifest, that she appeals to 
something ‘beyond signification’ that is of the order of the Real to explain herself, that she 
does not ‘cede on her desire’, that her act alters the contours of what is deemed possible, and 
so on. Žižek (for example 1991b, 2000, 2002)  finds this reading seductive; he recognizes in 
Antigone the transgressive gesture that marks a ‘true’ act in his view.  
Neill, however, takes things in another direction, as he convincingly argues that the space of 
ethics cannot be reduced to being simply ‘contra the law’; if this were true, then it would be 
strictly determined by the law or the system. The ethical is something beyond the law or 
system, beyond the couplet of good and evil. Whether the subject acts in conformity with the 
law, or against it, the essential point remains the same: both require the subject’s assumption 
of, and as, the cause or justification of that action. Even when we act in accordance with the 
law, we must take upon ourselves the decision to subscribe to the existent practice or norm. 
The ethical entails the assumption of cause by the subject, without appealing to some sort of 
(Other) foundation for his or her action. The ethical is the point at which the subject assumes 
upon itself the impossible place that would guarantee the law. Now, if the ethical consists in 
this moment of assumption of the cause of one’s existence as a subject, then it follows that the 
very idea of an ‘ethical example’ is nonsensical. To confer upon Antigone the status of an 





‘Thou shalt transgress the symbolic’. Whenever an example to be followed is formulated, it is 
recuperated to a law. As such, it loses precisely that which made it ethical in the first place: 
the moment of declaration or enunciation that necessarily accompanies it. Lacan’s discussion 
of Antigone thus does not aim at providing the reader with a moral code to be followed. The 
significant ethical dimension of the play lies rather in Antigone’s beauty: in all of her 
splendor, Antigone evokes a series of emotions in the spectator, stirring up his or her desire 
(De Kesel, 2002). She does not provide us with an example to be followed, but rather 
discloses the tragic shape of human desire. Antigone shows that desire eventually leads to the 
place beyond the good, that desire’s ultimate goal is not compatible with the self-preservation 
of the desiring subject (Lacan, 1959-60, pp. 270-87) . She shows that the death drive, or 
jouissance, is operative in our desire for the good and, thus, in ethics (De Kesel, 2005). As 
such, her aesthetic quality is of ethical value: it allows the audience to experience the limit of 
the real, without being completely sucked into it to the point of disappearance. The ethical 
dimension of beauty consists in the fact that it demands a (subjective) response from this 
other. 
 
From voluntarism to jouissance 
So far, we have discussed the manners in which Lacan critically approached Kant’s ethical 
project. Kant’s neglect of the difference between the subject of enunciation and the subject of 
the enunciated (the symbolic identity the subject assumes through his statement) was thereby 
identified as the source of a range of problems. It is precisely at this point that Lacan will 
depart from Kantian ethics, to give it a twist that takes it beyond the level of desire and into 
the dimension of the real. In relation to this, we have seen the danger that resides in the view 
of the categorical imperative as a guaranteeing test that tells us once and for all what our duty 
is. Such a view implies that the ‘universal’ is already given, and must merely be translated 
into the concrete situation of the here and now. The opposite appears to be the case: it is only 
through the ethical moment that the universal is posited as such. The paramount concept that 
will allow us to think how the escape from the real is possible, once its abyss has opened up, 
is the Lacanian elaboration of the ethical or subjective act (see Chapter 8). 
Kant also discussed the notion of the act, but concluded that an act of ‘radical good’ or 




inseparable link between the ability of performing an ethical act and the purity of the will of 
the person involved (Zupančič, 2000). Hence, he concluded that this type of act is out of reach 
for human beings, as its condition of possibility is a ‘holy will’. The latter can only be 
imagined as the mythical endpoint of an endless, asymptotic pursuit to achieve ethical 
perfection and freedom, which necessitated Kant to postulate the ‘immortality of the soul’ 
(Zupančič, 2000, p. 75). By contrast, Lacan posited that the ethical act is not beyond the 
possibilities of the human being. Ethical acts do occur. Contra Kant, however, he maintained 
that this occurrence is not the result of the divine or diabolical will of the subject. If someone 
acts in an ethical manner, it is not because he or she is an angelic creature: such a 
romanticizing reading derives from a voluntaristic understanding of what takes place in the 
act. Lacan placed jouissance at the heart of ethics, and jouissance is not a matter of the will. 
In fact, Kant’s soldering of the ethical act to the (holy) will of the subject, the requirement of 
a subject ‘equal to the act’, implies once again the effacement of the distinction between the 
level of the enunciation and the level of the statement discussed earlier. Subsequently, this 
effacement is excluded as impossible: it can, as such, never be reached in ordinary human 
existence. Lacan will argue that, to the contrary, the ethical act does not abolish this split, but 
rather discloses it, makes it present. He stresses the fact that the subject is alienated in its 
‘own’ act (1967-68), that the subject is ‘not “the hero” of his act’ (Zupančič, 2000, p. 101). 
Put differently, we might say that the subject is ‘realized’ or ‘objectified’ in the act. As such, 
the Kantian requirement of a holy or diabolical will as the condition of possibility for 
accomplishing an ethical act is no longer pertinent. Lacan breaks with Kant’s view that the 
coincidence of the will with the Law is the condition of an ethical act.  
In the following chapters, the notion of the Lacanian act will be discussed in greater detail. 
Just like the real, it will be an important concept to tie together the registers of trauma, ethics 
and politics. For now, it suffices to acknowledge the logical point where it becomes a 
possibility and the liaison function that it performs. I will discuss these by summarizing the 







Lacan showed that the possibility of both the subject and the ethical is related to the fact that 
the symbolic system is found lacking. The element that guarantees this system, the so-called 
‘Other of the Other’, does not exist. There is, in other words, an element missing from the 
symbolic structure, which is the precondition for it to function (Miller, 2012a). From this, it 
can be deduced that the real is an effect of the symbolic, something that only comes into being 
in relation to representation (cf. Chapter 5). The symbolic, here, is structured in a way that 
produces some kind of excess, some surplus or remainder. The real itself has a paradoxical 
double nature: it is a void (something lacking) which is subsequently transubstantiated into an 
object that materializes this negativity (Lacan’s concept of objet a). The dimension of the real, 
then, in which both subjectivity and ethics are lodged, is to be situated in the fact that the law 
is an-archical or without grounds (arche). It is the failure of this system to found itself that 
makes the ethical possible. Only in the encounter with the lack of the Other can the subject 
experience itself as subject (Neill, 2011). When Zupančič identifies Lacanian ethics as an 
‘ethics of the Real’, she thus refers to ‘an attempt to rethink ethics by recognizing and 
acknowledging the dimension of the Real (in the Lacanian sense of the term ) as it is already 
operative in ethics’ (2000, p. 4), and not to an ethics that elevates the real to the status of a 
psychoanalytically defined ‘good’ to be pursued (De Kesel, 2005).  
Psychoanalytic theory holds that the confrontation with this gap is traumatic: it engenders 
what Freud called a ‘traumatic anxiety’ that threatens to destroy the subject (see above). The 
symbolic-imaginary system, which ‘houses’ the subject of the signifier, is per definition 
incapable of providing the means for confronting this lack. In the midst of this chaos, then, an 
act or a decision is required to supplement the deficiency of the symbolic. Through the act of 
the subject, the missing ‘cause of the cause’ is installed. This response is the potential 
emergence of the ethical. The gist of Lacan’s argument here is subtle and must not be missed: 
a true act is only possible at the moment when the strict determination by the chains of 
symbolical necessity is broken. As discussed, we are looking for the point where the subject 
can be considered to be ‘free’, the point where his or her own causation becomes a 
possibility. This will be addressed in more detail when we critically investigate the concept of 




The ethical moment is intrinsically related to the breach in the symbolic or the law. This 
implies that it cannot exist simply in isolation or complete independence of the law. 
Symmetrically, Neill (2011, p. 225) continuously stresses the necessity of re-inscribing the act 
in the symbolic: ‘in order for the subject to have understood to have experienced the act or to 
have experienced itself as acting this would necessitate the act’s (re)inscription in the 
symbolic’. Therefore, the ethical is not a stable ‘realm’ in which we can dwell, it is not 
something that we can take up once and for all. Just as the unconscious and the subject, the 
ethical is characterized by its pulsating nature. As discussed in relation to the impossibility of 
ethical examples, it is something that must be taken up time and again. The ethical act passes 
back and forth between the limit of the symbolic, at which the real awaits, and the point of 
reinsciption in a field of representation that is fundamentally altered by its intervention. For 
this reason, it can serve as a transitory concept which, with regard to trauma, allows us to 
think what is involved in breaking away from the deadlocks of the real. In this manner, the 
ethical is emphatically put at the forefront of what is at stake in trauma. One of the main 
problems associated with PTSD is precisely that it approaches trauma as a technical problem, 
which is to say what, exactly, if not that the dimension of the ethical has been purportedly 
extracted from it? Lacan’s psychoanalytical elaboration of trauma precisely enables us to put 













The Lacanian Real in Politics 
 
Abstract: This chapter deals with the centrality of Lacan’s concept of the real in the 
movements of politics and societal transformations. An engagement with the works of 
philosophers such as Stavrakakis, Žižek and Laclau allows me to demonstrate that a 
disruptive encounter with the real is the driving force behind socio-political processes 
of symbolization. As such, the concept of rupture is connected with sociopolitical 
innovation. However, the traumatic impact of such large-scale, societal ruptures has 
been left unaddressed within these socio-political theories. The tension between 
psychiatric and socio-political concerns in the face of the contingent dislocations of 
the real are rendered tangible. The juxtaposition of Lacanian trauma theory and 
philosophical contributions on rupture-predicated societal change allows me to 
identify of the ‘moment of the political’ in trauma recovery. 
 
In the spirit of the previous chapter, I will now turn towards the place of the Lacanian 
category of the real in the field of politics. The link with trauma will become evident much 
sooner in this chapter, specifically when I discuss the formative role of shared fantasies in 
social groups – and the deteriorating effects that follow the traversal of such foundational 
structures. In recent years, several authors have argued that it is precisely in such moments of 
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(traumatic) rupture that the political surfaces, as something distinct from and constitutive of 
politics as we know it (for example, Eisenstein & McGowan, 2012; Johnston, 2009; Laclau, 
1990; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Stavrakakis, 1999).  
The primary goal of this chapter is to introduce the reader to the general rationale behind the 
claim that the Lacanian real is operative at the heart of politics. Luckily, a growing number of 
academic contributions have explored this difficult terrain over the past three decades, 
following Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s pioneering 1985 study Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy, in which the significance of Lacanian theory for political analysis was first 
argued. Slavoj Žižek (1989) subsequently signalled the importance of this study to a broader 
audience in his first book written in English, The Sublime Object of Ideology, and spent a lot 
of time and effort to further elaborate this emerging field of investigation. For our immediate 
purposes, Yannis Stavrakakis’ 1999 book Lacan and the Political offers an excellent 
introduction to the juxtaposition of political theory and Lacanian psychoanalysis. 
When Lacan’s work is discussed directly with regard to politics, this is usually limited to his 
interventions at the level of the psychoanalytical institution. Admittedly, Lacan’s stance à 
propos the psychoanalytical establishment of his time on the one hand, and his position with 
regard to his own legacy on the other, are amongst the most telling of the scant pieces of 
information at our disposal to reconstruct his personal political views and engagements – 
supplemented by a few explicit and skeptical remarks made to an audience of students in the 
feverish context of May ’68. Although such historical and biographical fragments may indeed 
tell us something about Lacan’s private political convictions, such as his distrust of utopian 
fantasies, this is not what primarily concerns us here. The relevance of Lacan’s work for 
political theory does not derive from his biography. The goal of this chapter is rather to 
elucidate what Lacanian theory, and more precisely, the category of the real, implies for the 
manner in which we think politics. Much like with ethics, it will appear that the real is already 
at work in politics, and the primary task is to clearly delineate its unacknowledged place and 
function, for example in the impasses arising in this field. Indeed, the Real will once again 
reveal itself to be a Janus-faced concept, equally stumbling block and propeller for the 
movements that effect social change.  
This line of thought could be summarized with an appropriation of Zupančič’s preliminary 
definition of the ‘ethics of the real’, discussed in the previous chapter: ‘is it possible to 





acknowledging the dimension of the real as it is already operative in politics’? Note that 
putting things in this manner circumvents a common problem associated with bringing 
together psychoanalysis (or psychology, for that manner) and the political: the reduction of 
the level of the social to an analysis at the level of the individual. ‘Psychological 
reductionism’, that is, understanding sociopolitical problems through recourse to an 
underlying psychological essence, is generally to be avoided or at least handled with great 
care and caution. Psychoanalysis is surely not a stranger to such reductionist exercises, in 
which society as a whole is treated as a patient, characterized by a collective unconscious and 
prone to all sorts of ‘psychopathological’ reactions (Stavrakakis, 1999, p. 1). Such approaches 
are often appealing and fascinating, and they have a long and illustrious history in 
psychoanalysis – arguably set off by Freud himself, given that several of his (later) writings 
can be seen as attempts to bridge the gap between models of the individual psyche and 
cultural and political phenomena (Freud, 1921, 1927, 1930, 1939). To Freud, academic 
disciplines such as sociology are ultimately reducible to forms of ‘applied psychology’, as 
they deal with ‘the behavior of people in society’ (Freud, 1973, p. 216). Lacan, by contrast, 
was much more reticent in his judgment and radically diverges from Freud in his approach to 
the social or ‘external’ level, as will become clear in what follows. It is worth pointing out 
that the reverse operation should also be handled with care, that is, treating the individual as a 
mere effect of forces operating on a societal level, for instance when violent and destructive 
behavior (for instance, the radicalization of Muslim youth in Western society) is 
comprehended as the result of low economic status or failed integration policies. Such forms 
of ‘sociological reductionism’, despite their merits, can lead to an unintentional dismissal of 
the individual responsibility involved in such phenomena.   
Although it is wise to refrain from directly explaining social phenomena through psychology 
and vice versa, the very fact that it is so seductive alerts us to a problem that will keep us 
occupied in what follows: how are the levels of the individual and the collective, of the 
psychological and the social, related to each other? This is not a straightforward question, and 
part of Lacan’s innovative potential derives from the fact that he turns this relation inside out 
and upside down, to the point that the dichotomy between internal and external is difficult to 
maintain. The primary Lacanian conceptual novelties that enable this alternative approach are 
tied up with a particular understanding of both the ‘barred subject’ and the ‘barred Other’, 
which we already touched upon in the previous chapters.  
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The idea of a Lacan-inspired ‘politics of the real’ becomes all the more relevant when 
juxtaposed with the problematic of trauma. If the real, as the central Lacanian category to 
think the traumatic, is operative in politics, we might wonder how this impacts our 
understanding of (collective) trauma and the manners in which we address it. More precisely: 
does the acknowledgment of the real as a register at the intersection of trauma and the 
political allow us to address the political difficulties associated with the PTSD approach to 
trauma, discussed in Chapter 3? In what follows, the necessary preliminary work will be 
carried out for opening up new avenues for trauma interventions that incorporate the political 
dimension and the focus on material recovery in their design. The strategy for accomplishing 
this will be to focus on the consequences of Lacan’s conception of the real for a number of 
key concepts in Lacanian political analysis: respectively the subject, the ‘objective’ level of 
social reality, fantasy and ideology. This ultimately amounts to the proposed distinction 
between politics on the one hand (the space of sedimented practices and institutions such as 
citizenship, elections, political parties, and so on) and the political on the other (the 
constitutive moment in which the definition of politics itself and the organization of social 
reality takes place) (Laclau, 1990; Stavrakakis, 1999, 2007). The instant of the political will 
be argued to be a particular modality of an encounter with the real, which in turn allows us to 
rethink the political aspects of trauma. 
 
Lacan’s Sociopolitical Subject 
Most contemporary projects that approach the collective or sociopolitical level (what we 
could call the ‘external level’) from a Lacanian angle take as their point of departure Lacan’s 
notion of the subject. As discussed, the latter offers a unique outlook on the inter-implications 
between the individual and the social because it does not equate the subject with the 
individual or the conscious ego. The central thesis is that the subject is essentially barred or 
split: in contrast with the traditional notion of an essentialist, ‘psychological’ subject that is 
transparent and representable to itself, Lacan emphasizes the gap that exists between 
subjectivity and the conscious ego. The subject, for Lacan, is an empty locus that comes into 
being only through the logic of the signifier. Moreover, identity formation is itself the result 
of an interplay between two distinct operations, alienation and separation: the identification 





The political significance of the theory of the barred subject is the following: every attempt to 
constitute an identity is dependent on the identification with and/or separation from ‘socially 
available discursive constructions’ (Stavrakakis, 1999, p. 36),  such as ideologies, patterns of 
consumption, social roles, gender roles, and so on. Hence, the subject becomes the place 
where the so-called ‘politics of identification’ take place. Instead of a (psychological) essence 
marking the individual psyche, Lacan (1957b) posits an irreducible and constitutive lack at 
the heart of human subjectivity, which can only be filled by sociopolitical objects of 
identification. It is precisely with this move that Lacan manages to avoid an ‘essentialist 
reductionism of the social to the individual level’ (Stavrakakis, 1999, p. 37). Importantly, this 
Lacanian subject is contextually and historically conditioned, given its dependence on the 
socially available discourses that shape it.  
The caveat is that the level of social discourse or language is not up to the task of filling the 
gap that marks the subject: just like the subject, the level of the symbolic is marked by an 
irreducible lack. This is what Lacan revealed as the ‘big secret of psychoanalysis’: the big 
Other, the symbolic order, is itself structurally lacking, incomplete or ‘barred’ (Lacan, 1958-
59). It is only a collection of stories and roles without an ultimate, definitive design or plot. 
The symbolic is structured around a traumatic kernel, a central lack. Something is missing 
from its structure, that is, the element that would guarantee its consistency. The lack in the 
subject is thereby doubled by the lack in the Other. This will be explored in more detail in 
what follows. 
 
The Missing Other of the Other: The Split Object 
Language and social discourse have priority over the subject: the latter only comes into being 
by grace of the alienating images and signifiers that are socially available. Likewise, social 
realities, according to Lacan, are not simply or immediately ‘given’, but rather the product of 
social construction: the symbolic creates realities as that which is named by language and can 
be talked about (Fink, 1995, p. 25). Reality is always constructed at the collective level of 
meaning and discourse. Stavrakakis points out that social constructionism, as a theory of 
knowledge, is based on the recognition of this social relativity of knowledge and its 
associated reality (1999, p. 11). What distinguishes Lacan’s theory from other theories of 
social constructionism is the place he preserves for the category of the real: there will always 
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be a remainder, something that cannot be expressed in language or (re)constructed, something 
that escapes the symbolic order and ex-sists (for example, Lacan, 1972-73, p. 22, 1975-76, p. 
36). As discussed in the previous chapters, this lacking element functions as the cause of the 
system. From a Lacanian perspective, the symbolic and fantasmatic dimensions of our social 
reality do not cover the whole extent of human experience. Lacan’s Other is thus not 
conceived as a closed circuit or totality: it is essentially ‘barred’.  
 
The Outside of Constructionism 
Stavrakakis (1999) argues that in this way, Lacan circumvents a paradox produced by the idea 
that ‘there is nothing outside social construction’ (p. 66). If the latter position is defended, 
then a certain essentialism takes root, as ‘on the one hand it [social constructionism] reduces 
everything to the level of construction and, on the other hand, it occupies a meta-linguistic or 
essentialist position outside construction’ to make this claim (Ibid.). The problematic touched 
upon here is a version of the ‘non-existence of meta-language’, or the fact that ‘the Other of 
the Other does not exist’ (Lacan, 1957-58). In order to make the claim that, for example, 
everything is reducible to symbolic-imaginary construction, one needs to speak from a 
position that is not reducible to construction – a position denied by the constructionist 
argument itself.  
The only way out of this impasse is the acknowledgment of something external to 
constructionism or symbolic reality. Lacan’s concept of the real attempts to define such an 
externality, without however returning to a new form of essentialism: his real is not a solid 
base ‘on which the superstructure of reality constructions is erected’ (Stavrakakis, 1999, p. 
66). By contrast, it is defined as the impossible to represent and to avoid. The 
acknowledgment and conceptualization of such a paradoxical exteriority is not only necessary 
to avoid essentialism, but also to provide an account of the cause that governs the production 
of new social constructions.  
This real cause is manifested whenever a problem or crisis dislocates the field of 
representation, when something unforeseen ‘destroys a well-ordered social world and 
dislocates our certainties, representing a crisis in which we experience the limits of our 
meaning structures’ (Stavrakakis, 1999, p. 67). These dislocations are constitutive in the sense 





constructionism only makes sense if both the vulnerability of the social order and the 
importance of a moment of negativity are recognized (Laclau, 1990). The encounter with 
lack, in the rupture of a given social world, stimulates a desire to suture it, to fill it with new 
social constructions, which is why such dislocations are considered productive in their 
destructiveness – a claim that obviously raises somewhat of a paradox. That the Other is 
barred means that every possible social reality is always at risk of being traversed, that is, of 
meeting with that part of the real which escapes its boundaries and dislocates its form of 
structuring. For Stavrakakis and others, it is in the moment of disruption that ‘the political’ 
surfaces and resurfaces time and again. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, it is precisely the lacking nature of the symbolic that 
allows for the emergence of the subject. One way to deal with this lack, at the level of 
identity, is through a series of identification acts that attempt to ‘fill’ it, to cover it up. The 
fact that a stable identity can never be reached keeps the flame of desire burning: the failure of 
identification is precisely what supports desire as such. If a ‘final’ identity were procured, this 
would be the end of desire as the motor force behind the continuous activity of the subject.  
By analogy with the impossibility to construct a stable identity at the individual level, we 
could say, with Laclau (1990), that society as such is an ‘impossibility’. It can never achieve a 
‘final’ and stable signification. Once more, we meet with the real in its negative aspect: 
whenever we construe meaning through language or representation, there persists a remainder 
that cannot be articulated or captured. This kernel of negativity that shines through and 
internally disrupts the symbolic register is, at the same time, the engine that drives the process 
of symbolization forward. Dislocation, and the lack it creates in our representations of reality, 
stimulates new attempts to construct novel representations. Lacan’s concept of the real thus 
reveals that ‘understanding social reality is not equivalent to understanding what society is, 
but what prevents it from being’(Laclau, 1990, p. 44). The stumbling block of the real 
generates an endless series of new attempts to construct this impossible object. Therefore, 
‘this play between possibility and impossibility, construction and dislocation, is structurally 
equivalent to the play between identification and its failure which marks the subjective level’ 
(Stavrakakis, 1999, p. 68-9). 
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The Promise of Jouissance 
The other side of this story, which has been largely neglected so far, concerns jouissance. The 
cyclical process of identification/construction and its failure is driven by a desire to achieve a 
state of fullness. It is the entrance into the field of language and social reality, that is, our 
constitution as subjects marked by lack (through an act of submission to the law of the 
symbolic), which retroactively gives rise to the myth of a presymbolic, purportedly ‘full’ 
jouissance able to remediate this lack. The primary agent of castration is thus language itself, 
and not some sort of contingent, personalized other: ‘The organism’s passage through and 
into language is castration, introducing the idea of loss and absence into the world’ (Leader, 
1996, p. 148, emphasis added). It is our advent as speaking beings which creates a loss that is 
‘at the center of civilization and culture’ (Fink, 1995, p. 100): the lack of jouissance allows 
for the emergence of desire sustained by fantasy, the motor force behind cultural 
development.  
A small word of caution is warranted here. Accounts like these are always at risk of 
unintentionally reinforcing some kind of utopian liberation fantasy, as if they form an 
argument to cast off the repressive mores that stand in the way of true, unlimited enjoyment. 
They seem to signal that lack can be circumvented, as it is tied up with the limitations 
imposed by the ‘paternal function’ (that is, the imposition of symbolic law). This is, however, 
far from what Lacan had in mind (1959-60, p. 184). He claims that total jouissance, as such, 
is impossible for the speaking being: if it were ever reached, the subject would be annihilated. 
The trick is that through the intervention of the paternal function, something inherently 
impossible is prohibited in a seemingly redundant fashion (Lacan, 1959-60, p. 176). 
Nevertheless, this prohibition creates the illusion that the impossible could be attained, were it 
not for the obstacles and barriers imposed from outside (Verhaeghe, 2009). The Law makes 
us believe that what is impossible really exists and is merely forbidden. As such, it supports 
fantasy and desire. Desire is tantamount to the law: as the latter prohibits ‘the maternal 
object’, the emblem for a forbidden jouissance imagined to be ‘total’ in the classical Oedipal 
account, it simultaneously installs her as something desirable. This entails somewhat of a 
ruse: although the desirability of the maternal object is an effect of the imposition of the law, 
her constitution as the ‘taboo object’ is organized in such a way that she appears as always-
already desirable, prior to and independent of the law, as some sort of ‘natural’ love object. 





so-called ‘lost’ object of fantasy, which would enable a total enjoyment, never existed as 
such: it is only ever posited retroactively. Lack comes first and gives rise to the idea of 
fullness, and not vice versa (Stavrakakis, 1999, p. 43). Or: the so-called ‘lost’ object concerns 
a past that was never actually present (LaCapra, 1999), it signals a structural  absence 
defensively interpreted as lost. 
The necessary act of exclusion to enter the field of social reality installs the fiction of total 
enjoyment. It is the promise of this jouissance that stimulates desire. However, when we 
pursue this desire in reality, we are always confronted sooner or later with the sad realization 
that ‘this is not it’, leading to the continuous displacement from object to object (Lacan, 1958, 
p. 580). It is the structural failure to retrieve the always-already lost (and thus structurally 
absent) object that keeps desire going. 
The promise of a ‘return to a state of fullness’ not only plays a crucial role at the level of the 
individual. Jouissance, desire and fantasy are determining factors at the level of the collective 
as well.  For instance, the political significance of the promise of jouissance lies in the 
observation that the success of political movements is often tied up with their ability to 
manipulate a kind of collective ‘symptomatic enjoyment’. One way to accomplish this is by 
painting a convincing picture of the lost paradise, combined with the assertion that it is within 
reach. Populist parties promise the final termination of the antagonisms and problems that 
haunt society and the return to a state of harmony and tradition. The proposed program for 
achieving this typically involves the eradication of something identified as standing in the 
way of the coveted harmony, some sort of scapegoat equivalent to the symptom in 
psychoanalysis: the Jew, capital, immigrants, and so on (for example, Žižek, 2014). Ideology 
taps into the enjoyment tied up with the fantasy of total harmony. It does so by disavowing 
the structural nature of the real (that is, castration) and proposing a ‘final solution’ for social 
antagonisms. In contrast with such an imaginary stance, which involves the confluence of the 
categories of ‘loss’ and ‘absence’, as Dominick LaCapra (1999) pointed out, a symbolic 
subject position recognizes the inevitability of lack and the impossibility to construct any 
definitive answers. The latter position is marked by an acceptance of symbolical castration, of 
the impossibility of total jouissance, of ever retrieving the putative lost object. This means 
that every critique of a political or ideological system must go beyond a purely deconstructive 
level: ‘it requires a mapping of the fantasies supporting this system and an encircling of its 
symptomatic function’ (Stavrakakis, 2007, p. 81). In other words: understanding the 
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movements of politics and ideology requires that we take into account the jouissance 
involved, that we work out how jouissance and certain privileged representations are related. 
The idea that social reality is itself structurally lacking finds its pendant in the pivotal role 
ascribed to fantasy in psychoanalytic theory. Only through fantasy can a more or less stable 
and coherent reality system be established. Indeed, for Lacan, as we have seen, fantasy is not 
in opposition to reality (in contrast with the common usage of the term). Fantasy, by contrast, 
is the necessary supplement that makes reality cohere: ‘It is because reality is articulated at 
the symbolic level and the symbolic is lacking, that reality can only acquire a certain 
coherence and become desirable as an object of identification, by resorting to fantasy.’ 
(Stavrakakis, 1999, p. 46) Fantasy remediates for the mark of castration or real lack in the 
symbolic by positivizing it. As such, it gives the social world consistency and appeal. 
However, this fantasmatic form of dealing with the Other’s lack is not infallible: it can be 
overthrown by events that are incommensurable with fantasy’s meaning-generating, defensive 
framework. The pertinence of such moments of rupture is double. First, it has been argued 
that events of this type are traumatic. Second, it is precisely this moment of rupture that 
allows us to circumscribe the foundational moment of the political. In what follows, I will 
situate the role of fantasy in the construction of social reality. Subsequently, I turn to a 
discussion of rupture in its traumatic and political dimension. 
 
Fantasy and Social Reality 
The previous sections dealt with the crucial Lacanian idea that the lack at the level of the 
subject is doubled by the lack in the Other. Consequently, the human condition is 
characterized by a quest for a lost and impossible enjoyment not affected by lack. Lacan 
elaborated the notion of fantasy to describe a scenario in which an encounter with this longed-
for jouissance is staged. Fantasy thus fulfills an essentially defensive role: it attempts to make 
bearable the doubled lack effected by castration (Lacan, 1964-65). Stavrakakis (1999) 
emphasizes that this is not to say that fantasy actually succeeds in ‘filling up’ the Other’s lack, 
for this is structurally impossible. It is rather that fantasy disavows this impossibility by 
presenting us with its object ‘as a metaphor of our lacking fullness’; it offers us the mirage of 
a mythical object that could administer a ‘full enjoyment’. Objet petit a, as Lacan called it, the 





positivization of symbolic lack, which (falsely) promises an enjoyment beyond castration and 
thereby creates the illusory consistency of the world.  
Nevertheless, even in fantasy the encounter with the object is always staged as a future 
possibility. We never actually succeed in retrieving it. The fantasy’s promise always remains 
just that: a whisper of a never-actualized possibility that sustains desire. As Stavrakakis 
(2007) puts it eloquently: fantasy offers the ‘presence of an absence’ (the mirage of a mythical 
object that is ‘out there’ somewhere) to mask the ‘absence of a presence’ (the non-existence 
of total jouissance) (p. 78). What constantly emerges from this exposition is that when 
harmony is not present, it has to be introduced through a fantasmatic social construction in 
order for reality to cohere. As argued in Chapter 5, this need for harmony and continuity 
purportedly derives from the fact that the ego is itself constituted through identification with a 
unified image, whereby the underlying experience of fragmentation and discontinuity is 
misrecognized (Lacan, 1949). This foundational move installs an overall ‘tendency toward 
misrecognition’ and a ‘generalized search for unity in the world, which actually distorts the 
experience of reality’ (Vanheule, 2011b, p. 2). Other explanations point to ‘something in 
human nature that puts a bonus on order, routine, repetitiveness, continuity, standardization, 
predictability’ (Sztompka, 2000, p. 457, emphasis added), because these conditions 
purportedly satisfy a ‘craving for existential security’ (Ibid.). Lacanian theory offers an 
explanation as to why this existential security is always at peril.  
Although fantasy is commonly understood as something highly individualistic, in the sense of 
an eminently private and intimate affair kept hidden from others, a few scholars have drawn 
attention to the collective aspects of fantasy as well (for example, Ernest Bormann (1985), 
Jacqueline Rose (1996), Todd McGowan (2007) and Slavoj Žižek (2008)). They claim that 
our social world is underpinned by shared fantasies crucial for understanding ‘the functioning 
of sociopolitical life[,] as the phantasy structure shapes the narratives of communities’ 
(Andreescu, 2013, p. 211). In turn, these narratives reinforce the associated fantasy as they 
make up ‘the context of the socialization of the members of the community’ (Ibid.). Fantasy is 
said to create a shared sense of identity, community and common consciousness. As such, it 
plays an important part in our self-definition. Rather than being confined to the intimacy of 
one’s psychology, then, fantasies are claimed to be present on a higher-order, communal level 
as well. On both levels (the individual and the societal), however, their role remains the same: 
they make bearable the lack in the Other while sustaining and orienting desire. Andreescu 
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(2013) argues that a political system only functions to the degree that it channels and captures 
human desire, usually by making reference to a utopian and lost state of harmony and unity.  
 
The Tissues of Social Life 
In this section, I will link the described collective fantasies to the notion of social trauma, 
conceived as the rupture of the ‘tissues of social life’ (Andreescu, 2013). This requires a small 
detour to situate notions such as social, cultural or collective trauma. As is well known, the 
etymology of the word trauma goes back to the Greek word for wound. The term did not 
appear in medical literature until the 17th century, to denote an externally caused bodily 
wound with tissue damage, that is, a physical wound that involves the penetration of the skin 
barrier. The idea of psychological trauma is essentially the result of the metaphorical 
application of the concept trauma to the domain of the psyche. Freud (1920) already 
suggested the existence of a stimulus barrier or protective shield that prevents our minds from 
becoming overloaded with sensorial input and keeps noxious stimuli out. The efficiency of 
our psychological functioning depends on this protective shield: it would be unbearable to 
experience the endless multitude of sensations that continuously impinge on us from both the 
external and internal worlds. These stimuli need to be filtered out and reduced to manageable 
proportions. Recall Freud’s definition of  trauma in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920, p. 
29): ‘any excitations from outside which are powerful enough to break through the protective 
shield. [...] The concept of trauma necessarily implies a connection of this kind with a breach 
in an otherwise efficacious barrier against stimuli’. Freud (1917b) believed that an event is 
traumatic when it overloads the psychic system with vast amounts of excitation, to the point 
where normal processing becomes impossible and the protective barrier is pierced. Although 
this Freudian definition is nearly 100 years old, it is not far removed from the dominant 
contemporary understanding of trauma, given its physiological undertones. Psychological 
trauma theories analogously pose the existence of defensive, meaning-generating barriers and 
define trauma as the sudden destruction of these structures (Brewin & Holmes, 2003). 
In recent years, notions such as social trauma,  collective trauma, community trauma and 
cultural trauma have become increasingly well-known and popular (for example, Alexander, 
Eyerman, Giesen, Smelser, & Sztompka, 2004; Erikson, 1995; Eyerman, 2003). Ostensibly, 





new metaphor: that the ‘tissues of social life’ can be damaged in much the same way as the 
tissues of the mind and body. This implies that the tissues of social life ordinarily perform a 
defensive barrier function, just like our skin or Freud’s proposed neurological blocking 
mechanisms: they shield the members of its community from a confrontation with something 
that threatens the community’s integrity. Stef Craps and Gert Buelens (2008) note that there 
are basically two fundamentally different perspectives on this type of trauma. Whereas some 
see it as a straightforward extension of psychological trauma to the collective level (as, for 
example, in the work of Dominick LaCapra, Kai Erikson and Linda Hutcheon), others view it 
as a social construction pure and simple – far removed from any sort of relation to the 
individual psyche (see, for example, the work of Ron Eyerman, Jeffrey Alexander and Neil 
Smelser).  
From a Lacanian perspective, what needs to be kept at bay is the lack in the Other. As 
discussed above, this notion emphasizes that there is no external guarantee to ground a 
specific symbolic order. Consequently, every social structure necessarily comes into being 
through a groundless, subjective act that must be ‘forgotten’ in order for the structure to 
function. For Lacan, being itself is split, and the coherence and continuity of both identity and 
reality require a misrecognition of this ontological lack through the development of a 
fantasmatic framework. Furthermore, a fantasy is only convincing if, once it has been put into 
place, we can forget that it is a fantasy. Social trauma is defined, then, as a rupture in the 
protective fantasies that ordinarily ‘glue’ a community together, so to speak, and that conceal 
the contingent nature of this community’s particular sociopolitical organization (Andreescu, 
2013, p. 215). From a Lacanian perspective, the tissues of social life are composed of such 
constitutive collective fantasies and their associated, shared narratives. One small example: 
the Western organization of family life is concomitant with shared fantasies and narratives 
regarding what a(n ideal) father, a mother, a daughter, a brother and so on should be. More 
broadly, the tissues of social life can be equated with the notion of culture. Indeed, 
sociologists have been at the forefront of describing the dynamics of large-scale societal 
ruptures through the concept of cultural trauma (for example, Alexander, Eyerman, Giesen, 
Smelser, & Sztompka, 2004).   
Social or cultural trauma is considered to derive from forms of radical social change marked 
by a characteristic temporal quality, substance and scope, origin and mental frame (Sztompka, 
2000). Examples are revolution, collapse of the market, radical economic reforms such as 
170      CHAPTER 7 
 
 
nationalization or privatization, forced migration, genocide, terrorism, assassination of a 
political or spiritual leader, the opening of secret archives that reveal a horrid truth about the 
past, revisionist interpretations of national traditions, and collapse of an empire or a lost war 
(Sztompka, 2000, p. 452). Note that such events, which have the potential to cause cultural 
trauma, do not automatically or necessarily actualize this potential. The societal effects of 
these events depend on the manners in which they are perceived and experienced. 
Nevertheless, all of these major upheavals share the defining potential to perform a rupture 
within the pre-existent social order. Whether or not a break with the previous order is 
traumatic depends ‘on the relative degree of such a break or displacement, as compared with 
the preceding measure of order, or as compared with the expectations concerning the 
continuation of order’ (Ibid., p. 457). In addition, it is worth pointing out that more local 
events such as incest, parental neglect and (sexual) abuse equally take place against the 
background of a collectively shared framework dislocated by such events. 
At first glance, the idea of social trauma has the potential to circumvent many of the problems 
associated with the hegemonic biomedical approach to trauma, discussed in Part II: 
individualization and psychologization of suffering, decontextualization and depoliticization 
in treatment approaches, culminating in an emphasis on immaterial rather than material 
recovery. First, social trauma focuses primarily on the collective instead of the individual 
level. Second, it does not assume that the impact of an event can be deduced on the basis of a 
series of a priori parameters, but takes the social, cultural and political context into account to 
develop a case-by-case understanding of the problems to be addressed. Lastly, it investigates 
the ways the damaged ‘tissues of social life’ can be restored, rather than taking the individual 
psyche as the locus of intervention. It accomplishes this by acknowledging the survivors as 
political agents and thinking interventions on the level of the Other (the field of the symbolic), 
for example in the focus on forms of remembrance and commemoration.   
Despite the appeal of this approach, it opens up a whole new array of difficulties. 
Specifically: how is this social tissue and its traumatic wounding to be imagined? If we follow 
Lacan’s basic tenets, we should try to understand them in a strictly materialist fashion, that is, 
insisting that there is nothing alien to matter. The idea of a ‘social tissue’ risks drawing us 
back to conceptions of some sort of extra-physical, immaterial dimension of transcendent 
being (for example, the notorious idea of some sort of Jungian collective unconscious, or a 





approach these matters scientifically. Another, related question that we must ask ourselves is 
whether or not the breach on the communal level is related to the individual (traumatic) 
experiences of those who make up the community, and if so, how? In other words: is the 
emphasis on the social tissues of life anything more than the shift from a psychiatric 
perspective to a sociological one, which is arguably the direction taken by scholars such as 
Eyerman? Or can we find a way to articulate both levels with each other? 
 
The Fabric of Fantasy 
Shared fantasies are materialized in the calibrated ways in which the members of a 
community address desire, in their common views of and interactions with the world, in their 
social practices, in the positions they take towards social authority, and so on. In short, they 
are materialized in what we commonly call ‘our way of life’, the way we organize our feasts, 
our rituals, our initiation ceremonies and so on. In these routines and practices, the unique 
way in which a community organizes its enjoyment becomes visible.  
Given that the social order is not natural in any sense, but rather something provisional, it 
must be produced and reproduced on a day-to-day basis. The tissues of social life are only the 
performative effect of the subject’s activity. Jenny Edkins, in her book Trauma and the 
Memory of Politics (2003), argues that both the subject and the social order in which the 
subject finds a place are perpetually constituted retroactively: neither exists as a fixed entity in 
the present moment. Instead, both are always in the process of formation:  
The person is formed, not through a process of interaction with the social order (since 
that would mean thinking of the social order as already there), but by imagining or 
supposing that the social order exists. This supposing by the individual is what brings 
the social into being. [...] But supposing that the social exists does not only produce 
the social order, it also, simultaneously, brings the individual into existence too. (p. 
13) 
This dovetails with Žižek’s emphasis on the ‘virtual’ character of the big Other, in that it only 
exists insofar as subjects act as if it exists:  
[The big Other’s] status is similar to that of an ideological cause like Communism or 
Nation: it is the substance of the individuals who recognize themselves in it, the 
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ground of their whole existence, the point of reference that provides the ultimate 
horizon of meaning, something for which these individuals are ready to give their 
lives, yet the only thing that really exists are these individuals and their activity, so this 
substance is actual only in so far as individuals believe in it and act accordingly. 
(2006, p. 10) 
By grounding fantasy in a series of activities, rituals, and so on, these authors provide it with a 
material basis: fantasy is not located simply in the minds of people, nor is it to be found in a 
transcendental realm of being. Fantasy is materialized in our social activity, in the artifacts 
that we produce, in the ways that we organize space, in the routines that we establish, and so 
on. These activities and objects co-exist with fantasy structures that invest them with 
meaning. It is clear, then, that major social changes, which interrupt daily routines and destroy 
the ‘material body’ of a society, have an impact on the social and cultural body as well (that 
is, the fantasies sedimented in the interrupted practices and destroyed spaces). Andreescu 
(2013) describes that social or community trauma occurs, more generally speaking,  
when an old social order, together with the fantasy that supports it, suddenly loses 
validity while a new one is  not yet established. This is a moment of an encounter with 
the emptiness at the core of and the inconsistency characterizing any social 
organization. The encounter exposes a community to the extent to which what was 
considered ‘matter of fact’, ‘natural’, or ‘personal’ is strictly a social construction. For 
instance, aspects that were thought to be deeply personal, such as one’s desire, 
phantasies, identity, and social network, are exposed as intimately linked to and 
shaped by a law, which, at the moment of radical social change, is rendered flawed 
and arbitrary. (p. 212)  
She continues: ‘In this sense, cherished life goals could be exposed as part of an oppressive 
“common sense”. In a radical social change one realizes to what extent his/her dreams and 
desires were shaped by and belonged to the order which is crumbling.’ (2013, p. 212) Radical 
social changes have the potential to expose how the core of our intimacy (our values, desires, 
identities and so on) is determined by a symbolic order that exceeds us. Where we believe 
ourselves to be free (in what we want, for example), we suddenly realize the degree to which 
we are dependent on the Other. This is reminiscent of the dynamics described in the previous 
chapter: recall that the moment of the ethical depends precisely on the recognition of this 





our dependency on the Other is compounded by the simultaneous exposition of the arbitrary 
character of this Other, of its unfounded and incomplete status. Combined, this impacts the 
‘individual’s sense of ontological security offered by the position one occupies within the 
symbolic order’ (Andreescu, 2013, p. 212), which is ordinarily achieved by routinizing social 
relationships (Mitzen, 2006).  
The invalidation of core fantasies by major social changes disrupts the (local) universe of 
meaning (Eisenstein & McGowan, 2012), because the central anchoring points around which 
meaning used to coalesce are invalidated. This will be discussed in the next section. 
 
Anchoring Points 
Lacan denoted the privileged elements in a discourse, around which meaning is constructed, 
with the term master signifiers (see Lacan, 1969-70 for an elaboration of his discourse 
theory). In his theory of signification, meaning endlessly shifts as signifiers are concatenated 
in a chain (Lacan, 1957-58, 1960). However, at points in which the discourse is punctuated, 
the meaning of each element of the chain is temporarily fixed and retroactively established. 
The term point de capiton denotes the retroactive movement by which specific signifiers are 
given a prominent role in a discourse (Lacan, 1960, p. 681), in that they become the points 
from which the meaning of whole chains of signifiers is established: ‘Everything radiates out 
from and is organized around this signifier […] It’s the point of convergence that enables 
everything that happens in this discourse to be situated retroactively and retrospectively.’ 
(Lacan, 1955-56, p. 268). One of the goals of Lacanian psychoanalysis is exactly to enable the 
analysand to recover the unknown master signifiers or anchoring points that organize the 
whole constellation of bizarre symptoms and incomprehensible suffering that troubled the 
subject. The most famous and often revisited elaboration of how a neurosis is structured 
around a nodal signifier is Freud’s (1909) case study of the Rat Man, in which the signifier 
‘rat’ continuously returns in the series of compulsive thoughts and worries that trouble this 
analysand (Heiraten, Raten, Spielratte, Rattenmamsell, and so on). Frédéric Declercq (2000) 
recounts the case of a man whose entire life story revolves around the signifiers ‘playing by 
myself’. As he told the analyst: ‘at home, I got very little attention from my parents. I always 
had to play by myself in my room.’ (p. 25, my translation) This resurfaces, for instance, in this 
analysand’s insistence on the subjective importance of playing all kinds of instruments. 
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However, he is surprised to find that he loves playing music in a band or orchestra, but really 
hates to rehearse ‘by himself’. More generally, he can only enjoy leisurely activities when 
they are shared with others. Although he loves motorcycles, for instance, he refuses to take up 
this activity ‘because it is something one enjoys by oneself’ (p. 25, my translation). The 
analysis reveals that a whole series of apparently separate threads converge in and are 
organized around such master signifiers.  
In the same way, each political or social discourse requires a (partial) fixation of meaning 
around certain ‘nodal points’, as Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p. 112) call them, without which 
these discourses would disintegrate into nonsense and chaos. Although there would be no 
meaning without such privileged signifiers, the existence of a point de capiton never produces 
an eternally stable meaning, but merely a relative and temporary fixation. Nevertheless, the 
latest fixation is often experienced as the mythical, final one. Stavrakakis (1999, p. 61) 
underlines that whereas the function of the point de capiton is ‘necessary (or universal) in 
structural terms, its particular content (the signified produced by its signifying predominance) 
is not a matter of mirroring a pre-existing objective reality but of hegemonic struggle’.  
In a traumatic rupture, these anchoring signifiers suddenly lose their validity. The entire 
framework that made sense of the world is dislocated, which leads to ‘the suspension or 
invalidation of institutions, norms, principles, rules, plans, and identities’ (Andreescu, 2013, 
p. 213). The individual’s sense of ontological security, offered by the position one occupies 
within the symbolic order, is thereby threatened. Our existence as individuals depends on 
experiencing ourselves as a whole and continuous person in time, which leads to a sense of 
agency. Symbolic identity grants the individual a sense of self, as a citizen of a state, for 
example, as a member of a religious community, a member of a family, and so on. It is by 
embodying this symbolic identity that the institution and social order is reproduced, while a 
sense of security for the individual is gained. In this sense, we start to see how the disruption 
of the social order as a whole, for instance in times of war or state-organized terror, is 
intertwined with the potentially traumatic loss of identity and security, both at the individual 
and the collective level. Major upheavals dislocate the routines of daily life, in often dramatic 
ways. Patterns of acting and thinking are changed, whilst old values are questioned. A 
disturbance of the social order involves a betrayal of trust: the powers that we relied on to 
protect us from harm prove to be unreliable. This is evidenced at the level of the community 





danger’ (Edkins, 2003, p. 4). Such events cause the social authority of the Other to collapse. 
In sum, there is an intimate bond between personhood and community. 
 
Productive Destruction? 
A topic of debate within both philosophy (for example, Andreescu, 2013; Eisenstein & 
McGowan, 2012; Stavrakakis, 2007) and psychological literature on ‘post-traumatic growth’ 
and resilience (for instance, Ayalon, 2005; Christopher, 2004; Joseph & Linley, 2006; Linley 
& Joseph, 2004; Vellacott, 2007; Reissman, Schreiber, Schultz, & Ursano, 2009), is whether 
or not (traumatic) ruptures should be viewed as something more than exclusively destructive. 
Although the encounter with rupture necessarily constitutes something disruptive and 
negative, something that shakes the foundations of both the subject and its reality, a number 
of Lacan-inspired philosophers have argued that it also has a productive quality (among them 
Badiou; Johnston; Laclau; Mouffe; Stavrakakis; Žižek) . Rupture is seen as opening up a 
possibility of social and political creation and re-articulation. In fact, the ‘moment of the 
political’ is argued to be dependent on such a confrontation with the negativity of the real. 
Does trauma have a ‘productive’ dimension? Proponents of theories of ‘post-traumatic 
growth’, a research domain in itself, certainly seem to think so (Christopher, 2004; Joseph & 
Linley, 2006). Trauma, in these psychological models, is thought to derive from a tension-
generating incongruence between the ‘trauma information’ and the ‘existing models of the 
world’. Recovery then requires the alleviation of this antinomy, which, if the ‘existing models 
of the world’ are accommodated to fit the ‘new trauma-related information’, purportedly leads 
to mental schemata that are viewed as more realistic, effective, functional or adaptive 
compared to the pre-trauma schemata.  
However, in a recent essay on the responses to the Paris Charlie Hebdo killings (for The 
London Review of Books), Slavoj Žižek (2015) calls for the abandonment ‘of the idea that 
there is something emancipatory in extreme experiences, that they enable us to open our eyes 
to the ultimate truth of a situation’. He refers to a memorable passage in the memoir Still 
Alive: A Holocaust Girlhood Remembered, in which Ruth Klüger (2003) describes a dispute 
with an advanced PhD candidate in Germany. Klüger’s interlocutor recounts that he once met 
with a survivor of Auschwitz, who, to his surprise and dismay, cursed the Arabs and held 
them all in contempt. The PhD candidate could not understand how someone who came from 
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Auschwitz could talk like that. Klüger vigorously responded by asking: ‘What did he expect? 
Auschwitz was no instructional institution... You learned nothing there, and least of all 
humanity and tolerance. Absolutely nothing good came out of the concentration camps.’ 
(Klüger, 2003, p. 65) 
In line with Žižek’s analysis, I think it is safe to assume that horrific experiences do not 
necessarily lead to ‘personal growth’, catharsis, or the development of humanitarian values. 
The fallacy in theories of post-traumatic growth, in my analysis, is the silent assumption that 
the traumatic event provides ‘corrective information’ to the pre-existent models of the world. 
This assumption suggests that ‘growth’ is a matter of drawing the right lessons from the 
trauma. By definition, however, trauma communicates no discursive information whatsoever. 
The traumatic event resists recuperation into any type of pre-existent meaning or knowledge. 
It does not open up a window that provides a more realistic or adaptive outlook on the self 
and the world. The reverse is true: trauma shatters the fantasmatic window through which we 
ordinarily perceive reality and ourselves. When this frame is shattered, nothing can be 
perceived. Trauma should not be romanticized with claims that survivors have a direct route 
to some sort of privileged, intimate knowledge or truth that is not accessible nor 
communicable to others. 
Pace Žižek, however, and in line with an emergent field of research (for example, Andreescu, 
2013; Badiou, 2009; Eisenstein & McGowan, 2012; Johnston, 2009; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985), 
I argue that the confrontation with the lack in the Other can be productive. The invalidation of 
the previous order, along with the fantasies that sustain it, opens up a zone of indetermination 
– if only for a brief interregnum. Recall that according to Lacan (1964), real cause as tuche is 
present only where the ordinary currents of determination (the automaton) are disrupted. It is 
the dislocation of established representations that stimulates the creative formation of new 
sociopolitical constructions. In this zone of indetermination, a subjective, ethical act is 
possible and even demanded, in that there is no option ‘not to respond’. It is here that the 
political as such takes form. Different acts with different consequences are possible at this 
point. However, there is no way of calculating what the right course of action is, nor what a 
given course of action will lead to. This is so because calculation necessarily relies on the pre-
given, which was rendered invalid by the emergence of the traumatic event (see above). A 
successful act is arguably one that changes the coordinates of what was deemed possible, one 





becomes possible. This would be an act that differs from any attempt to quickly install a new 
form of concealment, which would be a reactive attempt to return to the status quo ante. If 
what appears in trauma is by definition unintelligible and formless, in the sense that it cannot 
be perceived in terms of the interpretative framework that preceded it, then recovery from 
trauma requires a form of subjective activity that goes beyond a focus on intrapsychic 
mentalization or verbalization, one that creates a new situation or world that permits a belated 
access to the event. As I will argue in the next chapter, this is a process that cannot take place 
entirely intrapsychologically. It necessitates operations in the sociopolitical reality itself. 
The main difference between this view and the one defended in post-traumatic growth rests in 
the sustained emphasis on indeterminacy. It is precisely the acknowledgment of the 
insufficiency of all forms of previous knowledge, and all that this entails, that opens up a gap 
in which the ethical and political can appear. Let us now move on to the definition of the 
political in relation to the real. 
 
Encountering the Real: The Moment of the Political 
Throughout this chapter, the real has been defined in its negativity, as the limit of 
signification. Our social construction of reality acquires a degree of ontological consistency 
only in reliance on a specific fantasy frame. A dislocation of this frame occurs when 
signification breaks down in an encounter with the real. In such a moment, the illusion that 
closes the gap between the real and the symbolic loses validity. It is the disruption of a 
discursive field, in a moment of negativity, that stimulates this field’s movements. Social 
constructionism is structurally dependent on something beyond its field that causes its 
dynamic: the moment of dislocation or rupture is considered the condition of possibility for 
social and political creation (Laclau, 1990). At the same time, however, these dislocations are 
‘traumatic in the sense that “they threaten identities”’ (Stavrakakis, 2007, p. 75): they impact 
the social and subjective identities that depend on the pre-existent symbolic order.  
The moment of the political is thus intrinsically connected to rupture, crisis or dislocation. It 
is manifested in the tension between a given sociopolitical reality and an unrepresentable real 
that dislocates the former. The political arises as a possibility in the face of the failure of a 
former identity or social construction to fence off the lack at the core of our being. The 
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emergence of this lack, in a moment of crisis, precipitates a desire to rearticulate the 
dislocated structure: ‘stimulating, in other words, human creativity, becoming the condition of 
possibility for human freedom’ (Stavrakakis, 2007, p. 54). Social reality, as a sedimentation 
of meaning, ‘exists in an irreducible dialectic with the moment(s) of its own dislocation’ 
(Stavrakakis, 1999, p. 67). Take as a starting point of this dialectic the temporary status quo of 
a (political) reality, always-already affected by antagonisms and zones of uncertainty intrinsic 
to this particular discursive structure. This more or less stable and seemingly unified system is 
always at risk of being traversed by something ‘internally excluded’. Such an internally 
excluded event falls beyond the field of meaning established by the parameters of the pre-
existent symbolical framework. As such, it dislocates the symbolic-imaginary reality and 
creates a lack in the discursive order, which in turn stimulates the need to ‘suture’ this lack 
anew. The political, as a concept, designates the transition from the confrontation with 
negativity and lack in a moment of rupture to the positivization of this real through a 
subjective act. In the moment of the political, the subject assumes upon itself the 
responsibility to formulate an answer to the senselessness of the real.  
We find ourselves here at the heart of the whole problematic of trauma: how can something 
that is ‘no-thing’, something that is impossible from the standpoint prior to its occurrence, 
something formless, ungraspable and ephemeral, in short, a void – how can a void be 
positivized or otherwise worked through? How can the un-symbolizable be symbolized?  
There are many different ways of responding to the confrontation with the real. Trauma can 
be viewed as an inability to formulate an adequate response to the real, for whatever reason, 
with the result that one remains ‘within the rupture […] without the security of a place in the 
world’ (Andreescu, 2013, p. 213). In this light, the completion tendency (or Freud’s death 
drive) discussed in Chapter 3 becomes a repeatedly failed attempt to return to the status quo 
ante. However, these attempts structurally fail: the resistance against this assimilation is 
purely formal. Trauma is what necessitates a reconfiguration of the subject in its relation to 
the Other.  
The default answer to a confrontation with the lack in the Other is arguably a call to return to 
some sort of completion or closure, often at any price (see Edkins, 2003, p. 14). This requires 
that we ‘gentrify’ or depoliticize the political by ‘forgetting’ the ‘constituted, provisional and 
historically contingent nature of every social order, of every ontology’ (Ibid.). This position 





From a psychoanalytical standpoint, this entails the attempt to return to an imaginary, 
fantasmatic subject-position to attenuate the traumatic impact of the confrontation with the 
real. When the previous defensive fantasy formation has become untenable, it is sometimes 
possible to arrive at a new form of fantasmatic closure, and this undoubtedly has pacifying 
and thus therapeutic effects. The price to be paid, however, is the eclipse of the grounding and 
productive moment of the political itself. Ergo, the question has been posed whether or not 
alternative kinds of responses to the real are possible. Is it possible to resist the attempt to 
gentrify and depoliticize the moment of the political? Can we move from an attempt at 
fantasmatic closure and an imaginary subject-position towards lack to a symbolic subject-
position that acknowledges and assumes (in the sense of the French word assomption) the 
unfound nature of every social order? Can we, in other words, accept the traumatic lack at the 
basis of our subjectivity? Can we somehow accept the non-existence of the Other of the 
Other? This is indeed the gamble of Lacanian psychoanalysis, as we will see in the next 
chapter. Lacanian psychoanalysis aims at a confrontation with the real, precisely because it is 
only at this point that the subject is called forth to respond with an ethical act. However, the 
outcome of this process can never be forced or predicted. Nevertheless, the idea is that 
Lacanian psychoanalysis can help in the assumption of symbolic castration: the process by 
which the lack in the Other is acknowledged and kept open. This entails a separation from the 
Other – rather than to take refuge in a new alienation. Likewise, academic work on the 
politics of memory in the wake of large-scale traumatic events sometimes make the case that a 
re-inscription in linear narratives should be resisted in favor of, for example, strategies of 
‘encircling the trauma’ (Edkins, 2003, p. 15). This dovetails with Žižek’s work on ‘traversing 
the fantasy’, in which he transposes Lacan’s musings on the possible endpoint of a 
psychoanalytic cure to the level of the collective (for example, see Žižek, 1989).  
 
A Moral Conundrum 
Wulf Kansteiner and Harald Weilnböck (2008, p. 230) draw attention to the apparent 
incongruity between the clinical psychiatric trauma approach on one hand, which attempts to 
deal with the suffering of the traumatized through a form of narration, and the deconstructive, 
cultural trauma approach on the other, which is less interested in ‘curing’ those who suffer, 
but rather uses trauma as a concept that provides ‘unprecedented insight into the human 
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condition’. Whereas psychiatric literature on trauma emphasizes the need to ‘close off’ the 
gap opened by the traumatic events, cultural trauma appears to advocate keeping this gap 
open, because of the social and political opportunities and the epistemic power ascribed to 
this (traumatic) gap. Both discourses thus appear to move in opposite directions. Empirical 
psychiatric research suggests that personal healing depends on closure, whereas cultural 
trauma theory suggests that the possibility of social change hinges on a resistance to the 
mechanisms of closure and forgetting (Edkins, 2003). Is personal healing antithetical to 
political change? And if so, what should be given priority? Should we invest our resources in 
attempts to aid the traumatized by attending to their psychological wounds, knowing full well 
that this risks depoliticization, as discussed in the opening chapters of this book? Can we 
honestly argue that a direct focus on the suffering should be ignored in favor of interventions 
on a higher-order, collective level? Or should we attempt to combine both, in the sense of 
psycho-social trauma interventions? The moral conundrum observed by juxtaposing cultural 
trauma theory with trauma psychiatry is that the very survival of the trauma victim appears to 
depend on a swift reparation of his or her trust in human systems of signification, which 
contradicts the value of perceiving and remembering the relativity of these systems and the 
possibility of the political.  
Kansteiner and Weilnböck (2008, p. 230) observe that the ‘aestheticization and valorization of 
trauma’ appears ruthless and cynical in this light. Proponents of cultural trauma theory are 
often (explicitly) uninterested in the therapeutic process as such. Their interest lies elsewhere, 
namely in that trauma is viewed as a privileged moment connected to truth: whereas human 
beings normally apprehend their life-world through always deforming representations, the 
breakdown of our cultural systems of signification is seen as a rare and valuable moment of 
authenticity in which we can perceive reality ‘directly’. As such, trauma has an air of 
revelation about it: it shows us the limits of human culture. Sadly, it is impossible to 
‘understand’ the truth revealed, let alone to represent or communicate it. Every return to the 
symbolical is understood as a form of ‘betrayal’ of the real kernel and truth of trauma, a mis-
representation more than anything else. Linear narrative is approached with an attitude of 
suspicion, primarily because of its ideological function and its association with state power 
(Edkins, 2003). Taken together, this paints the picture of a false dilemma between a 
comforting and healing, imaginary ‘lie’ and the sustenance of a painful and discomforting, yet 





between the psychiatric and the cultural approach to trauma appears to be predicated on a 
different ethical stance, related to a specific conception of truth. Kansteiner and Weilnböck go 
so far as to suggest that the abstract theories of trauma in the study of culture and history 
serve to distance oneself from the horror of trauma as it is encountered empirically, with real 
people and real events.  
Psychoanalytic theory is often appropriated to inform and support deconstructive theories of 
trauma, in which narrative is seen as a tool of repression and misinformation rather than as 
enlightening and therapeutic. This appears odd, to say the least: is psychoanalysis not, after 
all, a praxis of speech, an attempt to ‘treat the real by the symbolic’ (Lacan, 1964, p. 6)? 
Although the real is indeed linked to truth in Lacanian psychoanalysis, it is not the 
‘undistorted’ truth of an unspeakable and unrepresentable ‘presymbolic real’, as argued in 
Chapter 3. Neither is it to be found in the void of some sort of ‘postsymbolic real’, conceived 
as the negative moment wherein the limits of signification are encountered. Truth involves 
precisely the repeated movement between the lack encountered in trauma and the acts 
produced in response to this lack. There can be no truth, no responsibility and no ethics 
without making the transition to the symbolic after the confrontation with the real. As Neill 
(2011, p. 218) puts it: ‘In order for an act to involve the responsibility which would render it 
ethical, this moment of inscription in meaning must be retroactively read into and assumed in 
the very decision to act’. In other words: truth cannot be found in an attempt to remain in the 
nothingness of the void. It requires an act in response to the void, which must be re-inscribed 
in a symbolic field whose organizing principle is changed by this very act. As will become 
clear, this particular Lacanian answer to the debate laid out by Kansteiner and Weilnböck 
enables us to exit the false dilemma between the therapeutic considerations of psychiatry and 
the deconstructive, political goals of cultural trauma theory.  
 
Dealing with Lack 
To conclude this chapter, I will briefly discuss an article by Florentina Andreescu (2013) in 
which she proposes four ways to deal with traumatic social change in its relation to fantasy 
formations: restoring a narrative thread, giving the enemy the face of one’s lover, 
emancipation possibilities and death as structure of fantasy invalidation.  
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As described above, the usual way to deal with trauma involves an attempt to include the 
traumatic events in a narrative. This applies to both the individual and the collective level. 
The person or community attempts to deal with the gap that has been revealed by ‘writing it 
over’, by disciplining it in a linear, chronological account. Andreescu gives the example of 
how a commercial clip featuring Clint Eastwood, broadcasted during the halftime of the 2012 
Super Bowl (American football) game, attempted to give meaning to the severe and surprising 
breakdown of the allegedly secure and stable American capitalist system by use of an 
American football metaphor: 
It’s halftime. Both teams are in their locker room discussing what they can do to win 
this game in the second half. It’s halftime in America, too. People are out of work and 
they’re hurting. And they’re all wondering what they’re going to do to make a 
comeback. And we’re all scared, because this isn’t a game. (Chrysler, 2012 in 
Andreescu, 2013, p. 217) 
Andreescu argues that the clip covers over and disciplines the apparent inconsistencies within 
the symbolic, capitalist order. The metaphor suggests that the cause of the traumatic rupture 
within economic reality is the nation’s lagging behind in the competition with a non-specified 
other (Ibid., p. 217). This other purportedly intends to take away the enjoyment and security 
of the American nation: it is an antagonistic other that requires the people to come together 
and collectively respond to its threat. As such, the narrative of the clip can help to build a 
strong basis for community, albeit a community marked by sharp binary oppositions. The first 
strategy thus consists of suturing the ruptured or dislocated space. As discussed above, some 
authors believe that every form of narrativization implies giving up ‘the special truth accessed 
through the encounter with the Real’ (Andreescu, 2013, p. 217). The integration of the 
traumatic memory into other memories can be seen as a way of forgetting the traumatic 
episode, rather than remembering it. The moral issue raised by Kansteiner and Weilnböck 
(2008) is whether or not tales of heroism and sacrifice should be rejected out of hand, even if 
those affected by the crisis would like to embrace such stories and rebuild their confidence 
and belief in the ‘fictitious’ social order and its linear time.  
A second way to deal with collectively experienced traumatic rupture is to refrain from 
narratives that offer clear explanations and solutions and to remain ambiguous about these 
issues. Andreescu recognizes this strategy in certain Bosnian works of fiction dealing with the 





culprit, these films problematize the aberrant logic that assigns people to one side or the other 
of a conflict. The enemy is shown to be a human being of flesh and blood, rather than a 
malevolent, inhumane other. Trauma and conflict are depicted as formative of communities, 
bringing people closer to each other. In a similar vein, Andreescu heralds Ismel Prcic’s novel 
Shards as a work that testifies to the estranging temporality of trauma, refusing a return to the 
chronological time of ordinary narrative, associated with ideology and the state. In this second 
approach, then, ‘dealing with trauma  […] entails refraining from covering over the traumatic 
wound or disciplining it with linear narratives, but, instead, it encourages marking its 
presence, lingering over, and encircling it again and again’ (Andreescu, 2013, p. 219). The 
idea is that we must remain ‘open’ to the impossible character of the traumatic past, to 
acknowledge it and to ‘allow it’ to return and disrupt linear narratives. In this way, we can 
attempt to access a knowledge ‘not available in narrative memory’ (Ibid., p. 220). 
A third way of dealing with traumatic social events is to embrace the invalidation of old 
identities, desires, dreams and so on. The awareness that the social order is ultimately 
unfounded and that the big Other does not necessarily hold all the answers can be viewed in a 
Lacanian light as the aforementioned ‘traversal of the fantasy’ (la traversée du fantasme). 
Because of the discussed central importance of fantasy, which regulates our enjoyment and 
relation to the Other, Lacan conceived the possibility that this foundational framework is 
reconfigured at the end of the analysis. This reconfiguration requires a distinct type of 
subjective activity, which Lacan theorized with his concept of the act. A successful subjective 
act has the power to change the entire organizing principle of the pre-existent world, as it 
introduces something formerly unthinkable. The valence and significance of all the terms by 
which we used to understand the situation is thereby affected: ‘it transforms what counts as 
significant in the framing of a situation’ (Ibid. p. 220). This is the line of thought that I will 
pursue in the next chapter, as it offers the possibility to tie traumatic rupture to ‘emancipation 
possibilities’ and sociopolitical innovation, the eclipse of which the construct of PTSD has 
been repeatedly critiqued for.  
The final outcome discussed by Andreescu involves a total eradication of the very ‘structure 
of phantasy, pattern of thought, or matrix at the base of narratives produced in a social space’ 
(2013, p. 221). As it is this matrix that creates and sustains the subject, the destruction of this 
matrix equals nothing less than the death of the subject. An example of such a ruthless 
traumatic destruction concerns the Native American community. The program of ethnic 
184      CHAPTER 7 
 
 
cleansing, involving massacres, genocide, pandemics, forced relocation and so on, carried out 
over multiple decades, has created severe problems for the Native American community to 
continue ‘life in the Symbolic’. There is no way back: the destruction of the sociocultural life-
world was so complete that it amounts to ‘symbolic death’: the total erasure of one’s identity. 
This is reminiscent of Zygmunt Bauman (1989) and Orlando Patterson’s (1985) work on the 
concept of ‘social death’ in relation to the Holocaust and slavery respectively.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, the rupture caused by radical social events was connected to the moment of 
the political. Although the dislocation of the collective fantasies that underpin sociopolitical 
reality is potentially traumatizing, in that it affects the kernel of our identity, many scholars 
have argued that it has a productive side as well. Controversial as it may sound, new 
communities and bonds can be forged in the fires of trauma. The moment in which the big 
Other is shown to be lacking opens up a zone in which social and political experimentation 
becomes possible and desirable. Nevertheless, there is a delicate debate surrounding these 
theories. The insistence on a sustained ‘openness’ to trauma appears to neglect the therapeutic 
effects of interventions that re-install the validity and reliability of the symbolic order.  
In the next chapter, I intend to show how Lacan’s concept of the act enables us to grasp how 
clinical, therapeutic work is not incompatible with political agency and novelty. Every 
Lacanian psychoanalysis inevitably leads to a confrontation with the lack in the Other. 
Perhaps this orientation is what distinguishes it from psychotherapeutic approaches. 
Surprisingly, the treatment is explicitly organized to guide the subject to the traumatic point 
where signification breaks down. This betrays a unique ethical position: only at the point 
where the crack in the Other appears, is change possible. Only then is subjectivization 
necessitated and can the relation to the Other be redrawn. In the face of lack, a specific form 













Trauma, Act and Event 
 
Abstract: In this chapter, the Lacanian and Žižekian conceptualizations of ‘the act’ 
are combined with Badiou’s theory of the event to develop a contextual and politically 
enabling understanding of trauma. The interweaving of trauma, event and act allows 
me to show the ways in which individual recovery can be connected to large-scale 
societal changes. Furthermore, the use of Badiou’s theory of the faithful subject 
clarifies that the acknowledgment of the dimension of the act in trauma recovery 
necessitates the adoption of a well-defined, positive form of ethics. The elaboration of 
this framework opens up new avenues to think through the process of trauma recovery 
in an innovative and productive fashion.  
 
The previous chapters introduced Lacan’s concept of the real and related it to the fields of 
trauma, ethics and politics respectively. In Chapter 5, it became clear that the real cannot 
simply be equated with the external referent of our representations in the sense of the Kantian 
das Ding. Although the real by definition resists recuperation in the symbolic, it should not be 
conceived as a natural realm of being before it is contaminated and disrupted by the 
intervention of the signifier. Rather, the real is a strange sort of surplus created by our advent 




signifying chains building up the plane of social reality. In Chapter 6, I drew primarily from 
Zupančič’s work to argue that Lacan grounded his specific conception of ethics in this lack. 
The fact that ‘there is no Other of the Other’ (Lacan, 1957-58) (that is, no external guarantee 
to ground the specific maxim that motivates our actions) necessitates the supplementation of 
some sort of ‘act’ that compensates for this lack. In what first appears as a paradoxical claim, 
the subject is considered the after-effect of this ethical act. Subjectivity and ethics are thus 
intimately connected with the limits of the symbolic-imaginary order; it is where this order 
‘lacks’ something that the subject is called into being in a moment of terror. Finally, in 
Chapter 7, I introduced the idea that the mechanisms of trauma, first described  at the level of 
the individual psyche, equally function on a higher-order, collective level. Cultural trauma 
theory, as a prime advocate of this idea, is not so much concerned with the clinical-
psychotherapeutic dimension of trauma: it does not aim at directly alleviating the suffering of 
populations affected by shared, horrible experiences. When the idea of trauma is applied to 
higher-order levels of analysis, it rather functions as a lens through which the human 
existential condition and historical movements can be perceived and analyzed. The upshot of 
such an approach is that it links the moments of severe disruption of the normal state of things 
(for instance in potentially traumatic situations of radical social change) with ‘creative’ or 
‘productive’ destruction (Eisenstein & McGowan, 2012): it is only when an existent 
framework is dislocated that the contingency and insufficiency of this frame is perceived. 
Moreover, the confrontation with the lack in the Other instills the desire to suture it once 
again, which requires the creative invention of new sociopolitical representations and 
structures. In this way, collective trauma models provide an alternative outlook that 
potentially remediates the depoliticizing effects associated with the dominant biomedical 
trauma approach. However, this focus on the productive and thus ‘positive’ potential of 
traumatic ruptures is seen by others as morally and practically untenable, as it seems to 
‘celebrate’ the most destructive of experiences as opportunities to break free from the 
representational constraints of our ‘Cartesian prison’; a rare moment to get out of our own 
heads and to gain direct access to a truth beyond representation. As such, the suffering 
involved is apparently downplayed or placed on a second level with regard to the value of the 
‘truths’ encountered in trauma.  
Is there a way to think how psychotherapeutic change can be compatible with political 





exciting ideas in philosophical and sociological theories on ‘evental’ change, that is, change 
through some kind of rupture with ‘what is’, so that the political dimension of trauma 
recovery can be accounted for? What stands in the way of appropriating these theories to 
remediate the shortcomings of the PTSD approach to trauma? In this chapter, I will argue that 
Lacan’s notion of the act plays a pivotal role as a mediating concept between real lack and 
symbolic-imaginary reality. Because of its particular characteristics, this concept throws a 
different light on the problems discussed throughout this dissertation. The chapter starts off 
with an introduction to the act as described by Lacan. Next, I will follow Žižek’s elaboration 
and systematization of this rather underdeveloped Lacanian notion. We will find that Žižek 
himself, finally, turns to Alain Badiou’s theory of the event to think through the consequences 
of the act. These three authors will provide me with the conceptual resources needed to spell 
out the subtleties of what is involved in traumatic recovery, and how this relates to both ethics 
and politics.  
 
The Origins of the Act 
The act is one of the key terms resurfacing through the entirety of Lacan’s teachings. Adrian 
Johnston (2009) observes that it functions as a nodal signifier in Lacanian discourse. 
However, its consistent reiteration in an array of theoretical and clinical contexts ‘risks 
concealing an unstable, less than fully consistent set of shifting significations assigned to it’ 
(Johnston, 2009, p. 144). In this section, I will provide a brief overview of the different usages 
of the term throughout Lacan’s work and discuss its primary characteristics. 
The first manner in which the act appears, as early as Lacan’s first seminar in 1953-54, is via 
the notion of ‘full speech’ (p. 50). In the context of an analysis, Lacan contends that the 
analysand’s discourse continuously shifts between empty speech (parole vide), a type of 
‘chatter’ which remains within the imaginary realm of everyday signification, and full speech 
(parole pleine), which reflects the symbolic dimension of language ripe with surprising 
aspects of meaning (sens). Full speech is marked by the occurrence of important, Hegelian-
style, performative ‘speech acts’ whereby the act of saying (the enunciation) corresponds with 
what is spoken (the enunciated) (Lacan, 1953-54). Importantly, such acts transform the 
subjectivity of the speaker: he or she becomes what he or she says in the very act of saying it. 




structurally impossible given ‘desire’s incompatibility with speech’ (Lacan, 1961b, p. 535), 
he or she inaugurates out of nowhere a new dimension of subjectivity (Johnston, 2009, p. 
144). 
During the following early seminars, Lacan often equated the act with what is known as 
‘acting-out’ in a clinical context. Acting-out denotes a transferential reaction of the analysand 
in which an unconscious message-to-be-deciphered is ‘played out’ in real life (in the sense of 
being staged) in what constitutes a call for interpretation (Lacan, 1962-63). The acting-out is a 
subjectively inaccessible solicitation of a response by the analyst, who is the addressee of this 
message. It is transferential in that it often surfaces in the wake of something missed by the 
analyst: what the analyst’s interpretation missed in the words of the analysand presents itself 
anew and on a different plane (that is, in actions), in an attempt to be ‘heard’ after all. Acting-
out is thus primarily demonstrative, oriented toward the Other (Lacan, 1962-63, p. 145). 
Moreover, the significance of this type of act is determined by the pre-existing context in 
which it takes place. As such, acting-out does not break with the symbolic-imaginary 
framework already in place. It stages ‘a fantasy-like scenario transpiring within the already-
there presence of socio-symbolic mediums of meaning’ (Johnston, 2009, p. 146). 
From the fourteenth seminar onwards, Lacan started to explicitly distinguish acting-out from 
the act proper, although this evolution was anticipated in the previous seminars (Johnston, 
2009). I will attempt to characterize Lacan’s notion of the act through a series of interrelated 
defining traits. First, unlike acting-out, the act is not the manifest expression of an underlying, 
already-established subjective intention or state. Whereas acting-out expresses a previously 
present form of subjectivity, which failed to be picked up in  
spoken discourse, the act should be viewed as something that precipitates subjectivity rather 
than being its product. More precisely, the subject, for Lacan, is defined by its desire, and it is 
only in the wake of an act that desire comes into existence. In this manner, a true act 
‘transforms’ the subject, in that the subject that arises from the act cannot be identified with 
the subjective forms prior to its occurrence. In line with the description of the performative 
speech act, the more general notion of the act entails that the actor is transformed at the level 
of his or her subjective structure and/or desire.   
Second, the act is inherently linked to the register of the symbolic, albeit in a double-edged 





signifying structure. However, it does so by forcing a radical shift of the symbolic prior to its 
occurrence. The act positively performs what was previously considered to be ‘impossible’; it 
presents or demonstrates something uncanny that disrupts and destabilizes the existent 
signifying structure. Because it undermines the pre-existent socio-symbolic Other, it always 
has a ‘transgressive’ dimension to it. To clarify this point, Lacan distinguishes the act from 
mere ‘action’, which is always readily inscribable in the pre-established framework, in the 
normal run of things. The act’s disruption signals its real aspect: although it is tied up with the 
inauguration of a new symbolic order, the act necessarily passes through a moment of (real) 
negativity with regard to the prior socio-symbolic reality. The transformation of the symbolic 
can therefore be said to rest upon a transitory suspension of the organizing principles of extant 
configurations of reality: the act performs a destabilizing break with this previous structure. 
Nevertheless, it also has a productive, symbolic side to it, as it introduces a previously 
unthinkable element into the symbolic field that, if properly worked out, will modify the 
organizing principle of a given reality and thereby generate a new signifying structure. This 
relates to the first defining trait discussed above: it is this shift in the symbolic that effectuates 
the mutation of the subject. In the changed symbolic structure, a new desire can be inscribed, 
if only ever after the (f)act (Johnston, 2009). 
Third, the act takes place precisely at the point where one is confronted with the real, more 
precisely, the aspect of the real captured in the idea of the missing Other of the Other (Lacan, 
1957-58, pp. 474-5,  1967-68). It transpires in complete solitude: there is no Other to 
guarantee its being appropriate, correct, just, successful, and so on. The act always involves a 
gamble, a risk, precisely because it cannot found itself on extant systems of knowledge or 
justification. Viewed from the standpoint of the pre-existent situation, the act appears as 
nonsensical  at the time of its occurrence – because its sense cannot be grasped within the 
limits of the situation’s signifying capacities. Furthermore, Lacan (1966-67,  p. 67) contends 
that the act is opaque to the one who carries it out as well. The act is not the result of calm, 
dispassionate deliberation; it is not a decision made consciously after the pros and cons have 
been carefully weighed. This means that the act can only be ‘subjectivized’ after the fact. 
Only then is it possible to, in a retroactive movement, reflect on and take responsibility for 
what transpired. Surprisingly, however, in Lacan’s account, the act is often if not always 
accompanied by an ‘effect of disavowal’ in its wake, an inability on the part of the newly 




we will see, it is on this point that both Žižek and Badiou, in their attempts to systematize and 
elaborate the underdeveloped notion of the act, differ from Lacan, in the sense that both 
philosophers emphasize the subjective figures that arise in response to the act, along with the 
sustained forms of activity accompanying them. This activity following in the wake of the act, 
however, depends on the acknowledgment and denomination of the evanescent break with 
what was (as opposed to its disavowal).  
The act has been primarily worked out as it functions in the context of psychoanalysis, that is, 
as the act of the analyst (Lacan, 1967-68). The latter is considered of prime importance to 
momentarily and repeatedly break up the analysand’s interpretative fantasmatic framework, 
along with the grip of the debilitating jouissance tied up with it. In other words, the act of the 
psychoanalyst suspends the frame that produces satisfactory meaning-effects during the 
process of free association, in order to separate the analysand from the enjoyment inherent to 
signification as such (joui-sens) (Lacan, 1990, p. 16). Such interventions serve to disrupt the 
satisfaction obtained in the psychoanalytic experience itself, which is deemed necessary to 
avoid the pitfall of ‘endless analysis’ (Verhaeghe & Declercq, 2002). In this move, however, 
the analyst simultaneously dissolves the very structure that supports his or her position as a 
transferential object, as a sujet-supposé-savoir. The act of the analyst thus effaces the actor, 
who is said to be reduced to nothing more than a ‘waste product’ (déchet) of this processxxvi. 
Because the act dissolves the symbolic-imaginary coordinates that ordinarily serve to anchor 
one’s identity in relation to the Other, it disrupts the ordinary modes of subjectivity and makes 
something new possible.  
Note that the act, in this manner, bears an uncanny formal resemblance to the traumatic event 
itself, in that both undermine or ‘traverse’ the fantasy that ordinarily covers over the lack in 
the Other. The most apparent differences between both, however, are that the degree of 
rupture associated with the psychoanalytic act is arguably of a lesser intensity; and that the act 
breaks with the pre-existent reality in a more controlled manner compared to the ‘wild’ 
traversal by a traumatic episode. Lacanian analysis proceeds through a repeated confrontation 
with minimal, piecemeal shocks that cumulatively violate the fantasy rather than being 
concluded by one majestic, sublime act of the analyst. In this regard, Soler (2014) draws 
attention to the fact that the unconscious ‘speaks but it does not conclude’ (p. 71); the end is 
not merely decided by the discovery of a ‘final signifier’ or a final truth. The analysis is at its 





after truth’ (Soler, 2014, p. 71). With reference to Sándor Ferenczi, we could say that the 
analysis must ‘die of exhaustion’; it must run out of gas (Ferraro & Garella, 2009). These 
ideas suggest that the traversal of the analysand’s fantasy is not merely situated at the level of 
meaning and signification, but, importantly, affects the modes of jouissance of the subject. 
The repeated confrontation with the non-existence of the Other, stimulated by the analyst’s 
acts, serves to soften the grip of a particular mode of fantasmatic enjoyment. 
Nevertheless, the question remains how the ‘exhaustion of the analysand libido’ affects the 
manners in which the unconscious functions. These are very difficult questions concerning 
the finality of the psychoanalytic experience. Is there some sort of qualitative transformation 
of the subject at the end? And if so, how does this come about? Lacan continuously struggled 
with these questions and formulated a series of tentative answers throughout his teachings. At 
different stages of his trajectory, he identified the finality of the psychoanalysis with 
traversing the fantasy; the deflation of the object a; a new ‘throw of the dice’ that inaugurates 
a new form of enjoyment; identification with the symptom; the formation of a sinthome as a 
new way of knotting the registers of the real, the imaginary and the symbolic; the ‘desire of 
the analyst’ as the product of a fully terminated analysis; and so on. Nevertheless, we can see 
that in all of these rather elusive solutions,  Lacan attempted to formulate a qualitative break 
with what went before, a sort of subjective transformation that differs from a mere 
modification within the coordinates of one’s functioning prior to analysis. ‘Exhaustion’ can 
therefore not be the entire story of the analysis’ finality, unless this petering out of so-called 
analysand libido is viewed as having far-reaching effects on the manners in which the person 
functions and orients him- or herself in real life. The quantitative logic of ‘running out of 
analysand libido’ must somehow be linked to a qualitatively different mode of functioning, to 
the precipitation of a new form of subjective structuring. 
The act of the analyst takes centre stage in recent technical writings on Lacanian 
psychoanalysisxxvii. It is theorized to be ‘supported by the desire of the analyst’, the idea being 
that it is only by grace of the psychoanalyst’s own passage through the psychoanalytic 
experience (and thus, by grace of the desire that was formed during this process) that he or 
she is able to perform this act when confronted with the anxiety-inspiring non-existence of the 
Other – an unavoidable encounter in the course of any full-fledged analysis (Lacan, 1967-68). 
A clinician who has not followed through with his or her own analysis until the very end is 




attempt to flee from the traumatic real permeating the analysand’s discourse. The analyst’s 
own analysis purportedly produces his or her capacity to endure this confrontation, to restrain 
from any attempt to cover it up – so that it falls to the analysand to respond to it. In my 
reading, however, this notion of the ‘desire of the analyst’ as a support of the act is rather 
problematic, as it circumscribes the act as reflective of or supported by an already-established, 
underlying subjectivity/desire. This obviously contradicts the Lacanian claim that the act is 
productive of subjectivity/desire rather than its effect. The gist of the argument nevertheless 
stands: it is the analyst’s task to endure and even stimulate the surfacing of the analysand’s 
real, albeit in manageable doses, when the analysand is ‘ready’ for this confrontation, so that 
the analysand is required to respond to the opened-up nonsensical abyss. The rationale is that 
the analysand must be brought to face this lack of guarantee, the absence of the Other of the 
Other, because this is the point where he or she is called forth as a subject and where a 
transformative act becomes possible. 
One more remark should be made at this point: the analyst’s act is incalculable and 
unforeseeable for both parties. It should not be viewed as some sort of masterful, strategic 
gesture that pinpoints and exploits the fragile anchoring points of an analysand’s discourse. 
Even for the analyst, his or her act is opaque and unpredictable (Žižek, 1999, p. 376). In this 
way, what constitutes an act is dependent on the manners in which it resonates with the other, 
in the effects that it brings about. What constitutes an act for one person and in one specific 
context, can be an empty gesture for another; it is only subsequent developments that allow us 
to make this verdict.   
Why is the clinical practice of Lacanian psychoanalysis increasingly oriented around these 
traumatic separations from the Other, if not because it views our attachment to the Other, our 
alienation in its signifiers, and the paradoxical enjoyment tied up with this attachment, as the 
root of our sufferings? Moreover, is the implicit message of this stance not that it is only 
through a confrontation with this unveiled lack that a ‘new throw of the dice’ becomes 
possible for the analysand?  The suspension of the Other, the confrontation with real lack, 
compels a subjective response from the latter. The act of the psychoanalyst, and the separation 
it entails, produces a moment of anxiety in which a new desire can take form, one that no 
longer suspends itself from the untenable fantasmatic framework that gave meaning and 
direction to the analysand’s life up to then. Note, however, that this potential outcome (a 





to this suspension appears to be an attempt to reinstate the big Other, a recourse to a former 
guarantee. This reactionary move is reflected in the movements of transference: once the 
traumatic gap appears, for instance through a nonsensical element that suddenly surfaces and 
disrupts the flow of associations, this will summon anew the associative work that produces 
meaning by revealing the fantasy. The lack encountered stimulates an expectation, a mirage of 
truth. Verhaeghe and Declercq (2002) work out that the subject’s choice, in confrontation 
with real lack, consists of either persisting in a belief in the symptom and the Other, or in an 
identification with the real kernel of the symptom. To believe in the symptom is to believe in 
the existence of a final signifier that reveals the ultimate signification and sense of the 
estranging element. In other words, this type of subjective response holds on to the idea that 
the Other is guaranteed ,that it is not marked by lack, that it can be made to cohere. The idea 
of an identification with the (real kernel of the) symptom is an attempt to formulate a mode of 
subjective functioning that departs from the adherence to the (lack of the) Other, which comes 
down to the inauguration of a new subject which ‘tries to come and go with the Real of the 
jouissance dictated by its own drive, without falling back in the previous trap of stuffing it full 
of signification’ (Verhaeghe & Declercq, 2002, p. 70). Whereas belief in the symptom signals 
a recourse to an imaginary subject-position, identification with the symptom refers to a 
symbolic subject-position that accepts the non-existence of the Otherxxviii.  
This is why analysis often takes so long: it is only through the repetition of this transferential 
and jouissance-saturated circuit that a paradoxical attachment – to the Other, to the fantasy 
and the jouissance it produces – can be abandoned – or not. If the outcome were decided in 
advance, we would be dealing with a psychotherapeutic technique that forces its ‘object’, the 
point at which it impacts, in a predictable direction. In psychoanalysis, by contrast, the analyst 
merely attempts to confront the analysand with the point where he or she is faced with an 
impossible choice. The fact that things can go either way at this point testifies to the ethical 
dimension involved: the lack of guarantee signals the distinction between therapeutics as a 
technico-medical enterprise and psychoanalysis defined (quite counterintuitively to a 
contemporary eye) as an ‘ethical’ practice.  
If the end of analysis involves a transformation of the subject and indeed, the precipitation of 
a new desire, then this can only be the result of an act-in-response, this time of the analysand 
him- or herself. The elaboration of the ‘act of the analyst’ thus minimally shows that one 




the Other, is such that it entails an ‘ethical injunction’; one cannot but react to it. However, 
there is no determinate, predictable outcome of the analyst’s act, in the sense that no-one can 
surmise the effects it will have on the analysand. As argued, different sorts of responses are 
possible in confrontation with the abyss of the real. The analyst’s act does not enforce a 
particular type of response, then, but it does involve a ‘forced choice’, in the sense that one is 
obliged to react. The subtlety of psychoanalysis as a praxis thus comes to the fore; it cannot 
force anyone to make a specific choice, yet it attempts to create the condition of possibility to 
make such a transition. To further complicate matters, recall that the ‘choice’ discussed here 
is rather paradoxical, in the sense that it concerns an ‘unconscious choice’ that can only be 
retroactively subjectivizedxxix. The analysand, as a conscious ego, cannot make this ‘choice’; 
it is not a matter of voluntaristic activity. In the confrontation with the real, it is the 
unconscious that responds – which is why Lacan considered the status of the unconscious 
ethical (1964, p. 34). The problematic touched upon here is reminiscent of a point of 
contention in Badiou’s philosophical system, as we will see: the question if the reliance on the 
occurrence of an event, which cannot be forced and therefore needs to be awaited, does not 
lead to a form of quietism or passive withdrawal (see below). 
Let me conclude by summarizing this argument. The analyst’s act guides the analysand to an 
encounter with the real by short-circuiting the fantasy. I contend that one possible reaction to 
this encounter consists of a transformative act, one that introduces a new element into the 
symbolic order, something previously considered impossible. Because this element from then 
on testifies to the fact that the impossible did happen, it has the power to radically alter the 
organizing principle of the associated reality. This second instance of the act, which transpires 
in a state of terror or anxiety, enables one to ‘exit’ the void of the real which was momentarily 
opened up by the analyst’s intervention, without returning however to the forms of 
subjectivity that preceded it. In other words, I claim that Lacanian psychoanalysis is 
structured in such a way as to make this confrontation with real lack possible, because this 
encounter is regarded as the condition of possibility for a radical, restructuring, ethical act on 
the side of the analysand him- or herself. Analysis, simply put, aims at subjectivization: it 
calls forth/produces the subject in a traumatic encounter with the lack of the Other, a subject 
considered the after-effect of a certain type of act. The didactical separation of the act into two 
distinct moments made here (one of disruption, one of conclusion) must not be taken too 





hand. Recall, for instance, Antigone’s act, discussed in Chapter 6, which breaks with the 
Other while simultaneously making explicit and affirming an alternative ethical choice. 
Antigone actively performs the impossible, she makes the impossible appear in full intensity, 
in its actuality, in the here and now. The break with the pre-existent can thus be achieved by 
presenting something formerly impossible, by adding something to the former situation – and 
not merely by subtracting something from it. The psychoanalytic act is a Janus-faced concept 
characterized by a real, negative side of disruption, and a productive, positive side directed at 
transformation of the symbolic.  
 
Clinical Illustration 
Chiriaco (2012) describes the case of Nina, who, since she was eight years old, had suffered 
incestuous assaults from a maternal uncle who resided in her parental home when she was a 
child. This uncle, the beloved younger brother of her mother, frequently took Nina in his 
room, locked the door, undressed and touched her. The abuse continued until she was twelve 
years old and she finally dared to say ‘no’ to him. Before this moment, she remained silent; 
out of fear, but most of all because the words to think or say what happened did not exist. It 
concerned the unthinkable, the unrepresentable of which she knew that it was forbidden and 
which left her feeling ugly, dirty, ashamed, disgusted and terrified. Although she had already 
recounted this history to another therapist, this disturbing past was revived when she became 
a mother herself, in her late thirties. 
I will not go into all the details of Nina’s case, nor will I discuss the entire course of the 
psychoanalysis itself. What I wish to illustrate here, is the manner in which Nina’s 
unconscious responded to this traumatic real through the formation of a fantasy that covered 
over its enigma, a subjective response that made it possible to ascribe a certain meaning to it. 
This reparative fantasy is not something of which Nina was aware; it was only by recounting 
the vicissitudes of her love life and professional endeavors that she was able to (re)construct it 
in the safety of the consultation room. Nina’s love life always took the same form: she 
became the mistress (la maîtresse) of married men, a position she acknowledged to enjoy. 
The element of risk, the hide and seek, the sneaking around: it entailed a passion that she 
liked. This organization of her love life, which repeated itself throughout the years, abruptly 




child: Florent. It troubles Nina that his name is reminiscent of her abusive uncle’s, Laurent. 
Whereas Nina used to be the mistress, her marriage with Florent placed her in the position of 
the cheated wife. Not that Florent was hooked to another woman; his true partner was the 
bottle. What he desired and enjoyed was alcohol, before anything else. 
In the analysis, Nina often wondered how she made it out of her incestuous childhood so well 
– in the sense that she was able to have a satisfactory sexual life and had always functioned 
professionally. She reconstructed that when she finally said no to the uncle, this procured a 
transition: the Other could no longer make use of her without her consent. She remembered 
that after another traumatic episode at school, where she was harassed by a group of boys who 
isolated her in the restroom and took off her clothes, thereby delivering her once again to the 
Other’s jouissance without defence, she was plunged in shame and silence. But then, she 
realized something: ‘It was like I found it normal that boys are like that, normal that I attract 
them. I was a prey.’ (Chiriaco, 2012, p. 34, my translation) This utterance, produced in the 
analysis, captured in a retroactive movement the fantasy that organized her love life up to 
then. It is a fantasmatic construction that enveloped the senseless, traumatic events to which 
she was submitted; a minimal theory, an attempt to infuse some sense in the senseless. She 
was the one who attracted men. With this minimal yet paramount shift: in her ‘no’ to the 
uncle, she became the master (maîtresse) of this fate: she accepted being the prey of men, but 
only insofar as she got to decide herself whether or not she would allow herself to be caught. 
This game between the prey and the hunter became pleasurable: she loved to seduce and be 
seduced. Thus, to paraphrase Chiriaco (2012, p. 35, my translation): ‘even if the sexual abuses 
oriented her existence, they did not hinder her from having a satisfying sexual life’. It was the 
formula of her fantasy that enabled Nina a way out of an eternal fixation in the position of the 
object of the Other. This fantasy coated the traumatic real with a symbolic-imaginary layer, so 
to speak. Yet it was only by grace of the sustained activity of ‘working-through’ the material 
produced during free association, that she succeeded in formulating it consciously, and 
recuperate and subjectivize its truth.  
One negative consequence of this fantasy, which helped her to be active, lively and feisty, 
was that it radically separated love from sexuality. Nina never felt lovable. Despite the 
pleasurable, fantasmatic masquerade that made her desirable, she was convinced that below 
the mask there was nothing to be loved. She attracted and trapped men through sex, yet she 





was tinged by a stain that she could not get rid of, no matter how hard she tried. She 
immediately associated this with her uncle’s transgressions, but, in a second time, equally 
with her own reaction towards him: why could she not say no? Why did she submit for so 
long? She had prematurely taken some of the responsibility for what had happened to her as a 
child (Chiriaco, 2012, p. 37). This distances her from the position of a victim mere and 
simple, yet it opens onto something real that takes her beyond the defensive, fantasmatic 
framework that fascinated and helped her, but for which she had paid a price. The fantasy was 
a screen to defend against the real that lingered beyond. When she became aware of this 
fantasy, the dream further destabilized it. 
Nina’s ‘act’, in this case, is first and foremost what constituted the fantasy. It concerns the 
subjective response to the experience of being passively delivered to the Other’s enjoyment. It 
consists of an interpretative twist that suddenly, apparently out of nowhere, enabled the 
elaboration of a framework through which Nina could orient herself vis-à-vis the traumatic 
real. Note that this act, which is often called subjective, that is, the act of the subject, is in fact 
something that occurs in an a-subjective nowhere. The subject is the effect of the act; it is 
only in the subsequent meanders of the desire inaugurated by the act that the subject can 
retroactively recognize herself in it. The fantasy, which remained largely unconscious until 
Nina was able to capture it in a minimal phrase during the analysis, oriented Nina’s 
professional, romantic and sexual life. She was able to derive a form of enjoyment from it, yet 
this came at a price. Moreover, this particular fantasmatic answer, despite its undeniable 
merits, seized to contain the traumatic real at a significant point in her life (when she became 
a mother). Something opaque and disruptive suddenly resurfaced and prompted Nina to seek 
out help. Secondly, the dream produced during the course of the analysis confronted Nina 
once again with what waited beyond this fantasmatic frame; it pointed towards a real element 
that could no longer be contained within this fantasy. This confrontation with the real 
stimulated a new act, which enabled her to break with her previous subjective position and re-
orient her life.   
This clinical vignette shows that every psychoanalysis entails a double movement: in the 
process of free association, links between apparently disparate elements suddenly appear, 
which causes meaning and sense to arise where there formerly was none. This ultimately 
amounts to the reconstruction of what Lacan (1957-58) called a ‘fundamental fantasy’, a 




desire and organizes enjoyment. The fantasy draws out certain subjective positions along 
which one can circulate. But analysis does not stop here, in the meaning and satisfaction 
provided by the fantasy. In the process of uncovering the fantasy, its limits are laid bare as 
well. The analysis is oriented around that which lies beyond the fantasy: it targets a 
confrontation with the real. Although there is no description of an ‘act of the analyst’ in this 
small vignette, the reported dream serves a similar function: it distorts the fantasy, it lays bare 
its weak spots and reveals it for what it is. Psychoanalysis is oriented towards a renewed 
confrontation with the traumatic real that awaits beyond the fantasy – because it is only in this 
confrontation that a new, singular solution to this real can be produced, one that breaks with 
the impasses of the former fantasmatic solution. Equally, this means that psychoanalysis 
requires the analysand to relinquish the jouissance that derives from this fantasy. The 
confrontation with the real allowed Nina to break with the identification of being ‘the Other 
woman’. A series of decisions followed in the wake of this decision. She left her ‘unfaithful’ 
husband in a refusal to be the cheated wife, thereby abandoning the subjective position she 
consistently occupied in the past. She discovered that she loved to study, and decided to seek 
a companion to share this new life with.  
Far removed from the context of psychoanalysis pure and simple, it was Žižek who identified 
the political possibilities of Lacan’s conceptualization of the act – given its role in breaking 
with a pre-existent representational reality and the inauguration of a new symbolic order. 
 
Žižek’s Political Act 
The appropriation of a concept developed in the specific context of psychoanalysis as a tool 
for political theory is illustrative of Slavoj Žižek’s often debated style, marked by a 
continuous and apparently careless ‘shifting of gears’ between two levels of analysis. 
However, as argued above, Lacan’s theory undermines the intuitive distinction between 
individual and collective levels of human existence, which is probably why Žižek considers it 
justified to make such transitions without risking the reduction of one level to the other or 
making certain ‘category errors’xxx.  
The political value of the act lies in its capacity to rewrite the very rules governing what is 





operates within the symbolic: it produces effects in this structure precisely because it 
transgresses its rules. As such, and in line with what was said about traumatic ruptures, the act 
destabilizes the big Other by revealing its flaws, inconsistencies and vulnerabilities. The 
interruption of the predictable cycles that govern a particular reality forces a transformation 
upon the regulated systems (Johnston, 2009, p. 110). In addition to this moment of negativity, 
however, the act also introduces something new into reality – something of which the status is 
not entirely clear but will need to be worked out.  
Žižek’s act roughly preserves the traits defined by Lacan. He agrees that the subject is, as 
such, ‘not included’ in the act. That is to say, the act does not arise out of a preconfigured 
subjectivity, but rather out of an asubjective nowhere. The subject only engages with its ‘own’ 
act in a retroactive movement. Put differently, the subject is not the active performer or ‘hero’ 
of the act, but rather an after-effect of this event (Zupančič, 2000). In addition, even for the 
one who carries it out, the act is never predictable or anticipatable. Johnston (2009) argues 
that this is so because the parameters of the framework of a given symbolic order, which are 
normally used to anticipate and define events, are shattered if and when an act happens. Or, to 
put it differently, it is impossible to decide, in the here and now, whether an action will turn 
out to qualify as a ‘genuine act’ in retrospect. It is subsequent history that makes this verdict, 
as we will see in what follows. That the subject is not ‘the hero’ of the act raises a number of 
difficult questions. If it is not the conscious subject who carries out this gesture, then who or 
what does? And can we, as self-conscious, volitional actors, influence the occurrence of such 
an act? Can ‘we’ do anything at all? Or is the message rather that we have to ‘wait’ for the 
act, given that it transpires ‘in the mode of an anonymous “it happens”, rather than as the 
outcome of intentionally guided forms of practice’ (Johnston, 2009, p. 111)? Does the idea 
that the act is formative of subjectivity, then, not lead to a form of ‘quietism’, that is, the 
attitude of waiting for something benign to happen and taking no action because of this 
promise? As we will see, a similar concern has been voiced with regard to Badiou’s theory of 
the event and the particular conception of subjectivity that derives from it. Recall the similar 
paradox encountered in the context of psychoanalysis: the act/event cannot be forced to 
happen. Nevertheless, psychoanalysis works towards the possibility of this moment, and its 
particular strategies to achieve this might be instructive for political theory as well. 
Another often-debated aspect of Žižek’s elaboration of the act concerns the manners in which 




a given socio-symbolic reality should not be viewed as a homogeneous, stable, harmonious 
system, only disrupted in exceptional circumstances by strictly external intrusions (for 
instance, Žižek, 1989, 1993, 1999). Žižek repeatedly stresses that such moments of crisis, 
which seem to be brought on by contingent, external factors, are moments in which the 
internal incoherence of the entire system comes to light.  Žižek views the social order as 
always-already ripe with conflicts, antagonisms and tensions. It is itself heterogeneous and 
inconsistent: society, as such, does not exist. In other words: crises immanently arise out of 
the ‘ordinary’ being of society; they are the immanent effect of the internal logics of the 
structure. It is the function of collective fantasies or ideology to hide these points of fragility, 
or to recast them as contingent, externally caused glitches. Recall the metaphor of Einstein’s 
special and general theory of relativity: the symbolic space (or society) is not ‘curved’ or 
fractured because of the contingent, external intrusion of ‘real’ elements (matter). The idea 
that a smooth, ‘uncurved’ symbolic space is within reach, if the intruder/obstacle could be 
eliminated, is what ideology or fantasy would have you believe. Žižek (2006) claims that the 
causality should be reversed: ‘real’ fractures only appear because the ‘space’ of the symbolic 
is always-already curved. The primary function of ideology is precisely to treat an identified 
dysfunction as an external intrusion and not as the necessary result of the system’s 
functioning.  
Žižek’s reading of the act emphasizes the moment of negativity that tears away the imaginary 
cover of ideology to reveal the Other’s lack of foundation and its insufficiency. He thereby 
acknowledges that it is always against the background of a given socio-symbolic context, 
marked by its internally determined zones of fragility, that an act intervenes. Just as the real 
cannot be conceived in itself, but only in relation to a symbolic-imaginary system that 
determines the points where it can potentially emerge, so what constitutes an act is equally 
dependent on the context in which it takes place. This in turn implies that ‘the same gesture 
can be an Act or a ridiculous, empty posture, depending on the context’ (Žižek, 2002, p. 152). 
Think, for instance, of the climactic scene in Stanley Kubrick’s epic drama film Spartacus, 
when the slaves, asked by Crassus to identify and give up their leader, each stand up to 
proclaim ‘I am Spartacus’, and then compare this to the rather pathetic #jesuisCharlie after 
the 2015 Charlie Hebdo killings in Paris. However, that a concrete act is always situated in a 
specific context is not to say that it is completely determined by this context. If the latter were 





Given that the act ‘retroactively changes the very co-ordinates into which it intervenes’ 
(Ibid.), there can be no such guarantee; the act involves a radical risk. Žižek claims that it is 
precisely this dimension of risk, the chance that the act will ‘radically misfire’ (Žižek, 2002, 
p. 153), which is unbearable to many in the contemporary West. An act without risk, 
however, is an ‘Act without the Act’ (Ibid.); it is nothing more than an empty gesture. Are all 
the self-declared Charlies genuinely prepared to side with the cartoonists if a terrorist were to 
ask them who it was that drew Mohamed? The act cannot be taken up in the contemporary 
logic of preserving only the positive while expelling the negative, for instance when we drink 
coffee without caffeine, soft drinks without sugar, beer without alcohol, and so on.  
Although Žižek acknowledges the importance of the preceding symbolic context with regard 
to the act, he is less clear about what follows the act’s momentary suspension of this order. 
Neill (2011) argues that Žižek considers the act’s intervention as something ‘absolute’, in the 
sense that he leaves no room for the subsequent, necessary re-inscription of the act in the 
Symbolic (its positive side). For Žižek, any such re-inscription misses the radical nature of the 
act. Neill, however, contends that this insistence on a complete and indefinite suspension of 
the big Other brings Žižek’s act closer to Lacan’s concept of the passage à l’acte, which 
entails the dissolution of the subject and thereby the impossibility of the ethical (Lacan, 1962-
63, pp. 135-53). If each and every re-inscription in the symbolic ‘betrays’ the act, then suicide 
is indeed the only act that always succeeds (Lacan, 1990, p. 66-7). In contrast with this line of 
argument, the ethical import of the act is only realized if a moment of inscription into a 
permutated field of meaning is retroactively read into and assumed in the very decision to act. 
Johnston (2009) argues that Žižek’s hesitation to accept a moment of re-inscription in the 
symbolic is linked to the idea that an act not only reconfigures the field of the symbolic while 
maintaining its terms, but that it involves a transformation of the very contours of the 
symbolic itself. In other words, the act is not simply the performative modification of reality 
or the symbolic, but rather an intervention in the very structuration of reality itself. The 
transfigurations of the act cannot be reduced to a re-shuffling of the elements that were 
already in place, in the sense that new elements occupy different positions within the same 
‘playing field’. Such an intervention leaves the ‘transcendental regime’ of the symbolic space 
intact. The act, as it were, changes the rules of the game itself. The difficulty encountered here 
is associated with the idea that only a (real) negativity can disrupt sociopolitical reality. As we 




instance, the (symbolic) name of the event) can equally cause a dislocation of the preceding 
framework – in the same movement in which it generates a new reality. 
Johnston (2009) maintains that as Žižek attempted to elaborate the Lacanian act, the 
limitations of this never fully systematized notion became apparent. In order to specify the 
strange relation of the act with the symbolic, Žižek turned to Badiou’s theory of the event to 
further clarify his position. Badiou’s event is in many aspects strikingly akin to Lacan’s act, 
which even prompted Žižek to identify Badiou as ‘the theorist of the Act’ (Johnston, 2009, p. 
143). For the purposes of discussing trauma recovery in its political and ethical dimension, 
Badiou’s notion of the event has the advantage of being embedded in a systematized 
philosophical system. In what follows, I will discuss a few of Badiou’s key ideas, which 
resonate with the Lacanian insights discussed throughout this book. Just like the real in its 
relation to the symbolic Other, Badiou attempts to think the dynamic between a given state of 
things (a situation or a world) and the emergence of something incommensurable with this 
prior state which he calls the event. In this way, the Badiouian detour offers a way to 
recapitulate what we have discussed from a different anglexxxi. The added bonus, however, is 
that it simultaneously offers a more comprehensive framework to theorize the process of the 
act – so that we can put this concept to use in concrete contexts. 
 
Badiou’s Theory of the Event 
French philosopher Alain Badiou occupies a somewhat peculiar position relative to his 
contemporaries because his work draws upon both analytical and continental philosophical 
traditions. His first major book, Being and Event, was only translated into English seventeen 
years after its original French publication (2005, pp. xi-xiv). The title of this work readily 
marks a dichotomy that is of interest in the context of our discussion of trauma and the act: 
ontology or the science of ‘being-qua-being’ versus the event – which is seen as a rupture in 
being, as that which is ‘not-being-qua-being’ (Badiou, 2005, p. 173). It is through this 
opposition between being (or ‘world’) and event, grounded in a newly developed ontology 
based on Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, that Badiou attempts to address the two major 
questions that drive his philosophical project. Firstly, how is it possible that radical change 
immanently arises out of specific ‘situations’,  rather than ‘being procured from some 





reconcile the notion of a subject with (post-structuralist and constructivist) ontology (Badiou, 
2003a; 2009a)? In the end, his philosophical project, which scrutinizes the tension between 
formalization/structure and disruption/novelty, is an attempt to elaborate a theory of change 
that allows for the development of an ethic. As we will see, Badiou argues that it is only 
through the gap between being and event that subjectivity (and concomitantly, ethics) 
becomes a possibility for human beings.  
I will first introduce the dichotomous terms ‘world’ and ‘event’. The manner in which Badiou 
describes this antinomy is highly reminiscent of the aforementioned rupture between a pre-
existent meaning-generating symbolic-imaginary system and an irreducible, uncanny 
traumatic episode. In order to grasp the manner in which Badiou theorizes these concepts, it is 
necessary to underline the distinction between ontology on the one hand, as the science of 
being-qua-being or absolute being ‘in itself’, and the order of presentation on the other, as the 
‘ontic’ in a Heideggerian sense, which is concerned with specific ‘beings’. Badiou holds that 
pure being is ‘inconsistent multiplicity’, whilst presentation (the ontic) requires that 
multiplicity is made consistent (Badiou, 2005, p. 25). Presentation or appearance, then, is 
always the result of a count or an operation, some kind of organizing activity. Importantly, 
there are infinite ways of counting the inconsistent multiple, and this under-determination 
gives rise to an inexhaustible multitude of worlds, each of which is co-existent with a specific 
‘transcendental’ (the name for such an organizing principle). This is why Badiou declares that 
‘ontology is mathematics’, and why he is so interested in set theory: because it is about ways 
of counting. For Badiou, set theory delineates the very laws of being itself, meaning the laws 
that pertain to the formation and organization of any group or any multiple – in total 
indifference to what it is that is being ordered. Ontology, then, is the study of the features 
shared by any order of presentation whatsoever, ‘which amounts to the same thing as saying 
that it studies the conversion of what there is of pure being into something consistent and 
structured’ (Pluth, 2010, p. 37). However, as ontology studies the laws of composition of all 
organized multiples, it can never become a study of any singular situation.  
In Logics of Worlds, Badiou (2009a) expands the reach of his philosophy by formalizing the 
way that being-qua-being (and its supplements: event, subject and truth) appears or exists 
within a specific world or situation. While existence is usually thought of as an ontological 
category, Badiou claims, in line with Lacan (1973-74xxxii), that it is rather a category of 




of thought, it is possible for some things to ‘exist more’ or ‘less’ in a world than others, 
depending on their place in the world's transcendental. Furthermore, existence is always 
localized: to exist is to appear in some ‘there’, with respect to other appearances. The 
transcendental measures the ‘degrees of identity or difference among a multiple and itself, or 
between a being-there and other beings’ (Badiou, 2009a, p. 102). Each world or situation is 
thus characterized by a particular ‘transcendental structure’ that indexes or organizes the 
interrelations between its various elements (as such, a world's transcendental should not be 
considered something separate from its world). 
In sum, the most crucial feature of a situation or world is the fact that it is a system of 
organization, a way of counting and structuring the pure multiple. As Ed Pluth (2010, p. 75) 
remarks in this regard:  
for any world, no matter how inhuman, the same principles of organization (the same 
‘logics’) adhere: there is a transcendental for that world, there are minimal and 
maximal degrees of appearing in it, there are relations of dependence, synthesis, and 
so on that can all be formalized.   
More concretely, world is the name for a general status quo ante characterized by an 
equilibrium. It refers not only to that which actually surrounds us, but equally to the ensemble 
of possibilities that are determined in it (what can and cannot appear). Importantly, worlds are 
characterized by their own internal tensions: within a world, not everything is clear and 
consonant. Furthermore, each world has its own authorized ways of managing dissent and 
domesticating the unknown.  
The view that any given world or situation is characterized by a series of immanently 
generated tensions and antagonisms fits nicely with Žižek’s description of fantasmatically 
construed (sociopolitical) realities. In Lacanian theory, the symbolic-imaginary constitution of 
reality in relation to the Other appears to have a function similar to Badiou’s transcendental 
regime, namely, rendering a confusing chaos consistent. However, as Pluth (2010) reminds 
us, set theory is  
ultimately indifferent to the way in which human beings perceive and carve up the 
world conceptually or linguistically. It allows being qua being to be carved up in all 
sorts of different ways that have nothing to do with what we perceive and how we 





Against this more or less consistent background which is called a world or a situation, 
Badiou’s notion of the event designates the sudden, unexpected and incomprehensible 
appearance of something that has no place in it. As Johnston (2009, p. 10) puts it, the event is 
‘a happening that isn't authorized either by the mathematical-ontological order of “being qua 
being” (l'être en tant qu'être) or by the logical system of transcendental structures regulating 
the play of appearances within circumstances in a given world’. Formally, this description 
comes very close to the manner in which trauma itself is defined. The main difference, 
however, is Badiou’s emphasis on the positivity of the evanescent event. The event always 
has a positive valence for Badiou, because it is considered the immanent appearance of an 
eternal ‘truth’, granting those who become its subjects the possibility of becoming ‘immortal’ 
in the sense described in Chapter 4. Trauma, on the other hand, is associated with death and 
finitude, with the destruction of subjectivity. 
Whereas Badiou (2005) first defined an event by focusing on its intrinsic properties, in Logics 
and Event he came to characterize it through the status of its effects in a world: event is the 
name for something that has the potential to dramatically change the world within which it 
surfaces. More specifically, Badiou (2009a) stipulates that the changes procured by an event 
(through the activity of a subject) include modifying the very manner in which appearances in 
that world are ordered: ‘evental changes redistribute the assignation of degrees of existence in 
a world, thereby creating another world through installing a different transcendental regime’ 
(Johnston, 2009, p. 24). An event is the sudden appearance, with maximal intensity, of a 
previously inexistent element of a given world. Therefore, it reveals the radical contingency 
of any way of ordering the multiple and has the potential to change all the other appearances 
and degrees of existence. In other words, the event announces the possibility for a new world 
to arise. This clearly dovetails with the Žižekian and Lacanian descriptions of the act, 
although it puts more stress on the positivity of the rupture (in the sense that the break derives 
from the impossible, evanescent appearance-in-disappearance of an unfathomable 
‘something’, an excessive supplement to the pre-evental world).  
There are many ways to make the related concepts of world and event more tangible. For 
example, what constitutes an event can be conceptually distinguished from the more general 
notion of a fact (Pachoud, 2005). If the world is understood as a general transcendental 
regime that constitutes what is and what is not possible (that is, what can and what cannot 




framework. They can be intelligibly located within the analyzable, foreseeable cause-and-
effect chains unfolding themselves within the confines of a specified system. By contrast, the 
event cannot be understood on the basis of that which is already in place: it is the intrusion of 
a seemingly uncaused X that resists re-inscription back into these same chains. In short, the 
distinction between an event and a fact can be made through reference to the consequences 
(that is, the degree of change) that it has for the world in which it takes place. In the same 
vein, a modification contrasts with an event because it only affects the appearances of its 
world, not its transcendental regime. Recall, in this regard, Lacan’s distinction between acts 
and actions, which exhibits a similar logic.  
In conclusion, Badiou’s philosophy of change offers a very detailed and powerful account of 
how to think the dynamics of rupture – explicitly situated on the macroscopic level between 
world and event rather than limited to the micro-level of the individual. The event is described 
as the unforeseen breakthrough of what was previously judged to be ‘impossible’, that is, a  
transgression of the transcendental regime of the pre-existing world. Badiou’s event shares 
this characteristic with both trauma and the act. These concepts are all marked by a certain 
excess with regard to the world in which they appear. After the discussion of the theoretical 
building blocks provided by Badiou’s philosophy, I will propose a manner in which they can 
nevertheless be conceptually distinguished from each other.  
 
There Is No Such Thing as ‘Trauma Information’ 
What typifies a traumatic reaction, and what is re-asserted by Badiou’s theory of the event, is 
that the traumatic event cannot be entirely grasped from within the interpretative background 
that is present at the moment of its occurrence. Badiou’s event can only be comprehended 
retroactively, because any understanding of it can only take place on the basis of a new 
horizon of possibilities that is generated by the eventxxxiii. In exactly the same way, a trauma is 
antonymous with the symbolic-imaginary framework that preceded it. The consequences of 
this antagonism can hardly be overstated: a traumatic episode ultimately destroys the 
symbolic-imaginary identity of the affected person, which is sometimes argued to amount to 
the death or erasure of the subject itself (Žižek, 2008).  
The sharp line drawn between world and event in Badiou’s theory allows us to revisit the 





through the lens offered by Badiou, it becomes clear that cognitive theories of post-traumatic 
growth, which describe trauma recovery as a process of assimilation of or adaptation to the 
purported ‘new trauma-related information’, presuppose as a given what can only be the result 
of an as-of-yet unspecified process. The information that a trauma supposedly delivers is 
basically unknowable from within the pre-existent world in which it emerges. Framed in this 
manner, the question becomes how ‘something that is nothing’ from the standpoint of the pre-
evental situation can have such profound effects on the world in which it surfaces.  
As I have already hinted, Badiou’s philosophy stipulates that ‘reading’ the event requires the 
advent of a ‘new world’ that is somehow instigated by this event. Likewise, I claim that 
recovery from trauma requires the production of a new interpretative background from which 
the trauma can be dealt with. However, I have not yet addressed the question where this new 
world, which is of capital importance for recovery, comes from. I will approach this issue 
through Badiou’s elaboration of the ‘subjectivization of the event’. The bulk of the rest of this 
chapter will be devoted to this theory, thus preparing the way for understanding the act 
involved in traumatic recovery.  
 
The Subject and the New Present 
Badiou’s Logics of Worlds (2009a) formalizes the ways in which the subject appears in a 
world. I will primarily focus on the structure of the ‘faithful subject’xxxiv, as this particular 
subject-form is said to produce, through its sustained efforts, the new present that allows 
belated access to the meaning of the event (that is, its ‘truth’). According to Badiou, at the 
origin of each subject’s appearance lies, as a necessary precondition, an event. In fact, the 
formal theory of the subject is a theory of ‘subjectivization’: it deals with the advent of a 
subjectivity that is grounded in the situation it is part of. Badiou’s subject is thus not a 
universal feature of structure as such, but a rarity, something which arises only in exceptional 
conditions when a Truth-Event disrupts the ordinary run of things (Žižek, 2012, p. 621).  
As explained above, the event is what appears only in its disappearance; it has no reality or 
sense within the world as it stands; it is elusive and cannot be the object of factual knowledge, 
evidence or proof. In terms of Badiou’s philosophy: whether or not an event belongs to a 




have any consequences (and for something new to come about), a response from within the 
original situation or world is required in the form of an ‘intervention’, a term that denotes the 
declaration that an event does belong to its situation (Badiou, 2005, p. 202).  
Subjectivization starts with a decision: yes, I acknowledge that an event has taken place, and I 
name it ε. The name of the event is called its trace (often denoted ε), and it is only through 
this act of naming that the event, which is inherently ephemeral, subsists in time as a mark for 
the subject. However, and this is a subtle yet essential twist, according to Badiou, the subject 
is not so much the one who chooses and names, as that which emerges as a result of the act of 
naming – which recalls Lacan’s (1967-68) description of the subject in the ethical act. In sum, 
it is through the ‘intervention’ that something of the event itself ends up being presented in 
the situation or world: ‘the act of nomination of the event is what constitutes it’ for the 
situation (Badiou, 2005, p. 203). By being named, an event attains some degree of efficacy, 
some minimal presence in a situation. The name becomes the stand-in for the event, and it is 
only thanks to this subsisting mark that the evanescent event can ever have any consequences 
on the multiples of the situation. As such, the notion of intervention attempts to construct a 
bridge between the non-being of an event and a situation or world as an order of presentation 
(Pluth, 2010). Importantly, this is centered around the emergence of a new signifier, the trace. 
I would propose that the positive, productive side of the Lacanian act should be located 
precisely at the level of this interface. In this sense, it should not be equated with the 
Badiouian event per se, but rather with the ‘intervention’ that generates a trace.  
Furthermore, the nature and status of this evental name must be highlighted: both an event 
and its signifiers are indiscernible and undecidable from within the here and now of the yet-
to-be-modified world. As far as the established knowledge-regime is concerned, the name of 
an event is nothing more than a gibberish ‘empty signifier’ without referent. Badiou argues 
that the name will only be assigned a referent or a signification in the future anterior, when 
the new world has been fully actualized. Subjectivization thus involves a counterintuitive, 
paradoxal temporality: the names of an event amount to additions to the pre-evental situation, 
and their correctness can only be judged from the perspective of the new world inaugurated 
by this event and produced through the prolonged efforts of the faithful subject.  
To cut a very complex and multi-faceted account of the process of subjectivization short: after 
this instant of subjectivization (which refers to the flash of the intervention, or, as I propose, 





relation with other multiples in the situation, ‘forcing’ its presence in the situation. This could 
be called a ‘subject-process’, which refers to the continuation, within a structure, of the 
disruption that began with the subjectivization. I propose that this prolonged subjective 
activity provides a new outlook on the difficult yet essential Freudian concept of ‘working-
through’ (Durcharbeiten) (Freud, 1913b). The faithful subject engages itself in a fidelity or 
truth procedure: it scrutinizes the multiples of the situation from the standpoint of its evental 
supplement, considering which ones are affected by the event and which ones are not 
(Badiou, 2009a, pp. 50-4). Fidelity, in Badiou’s philosophy, requires the performance of ‘a 
series of decisions about the elements of the situation in question, asking whether each one is 
modified by the event or not’ (Pluth, 2010, p. 97). Through this process, a ‘truth’ is gradually 
exposed, which groups together all the terms of the situation which are positively connected 
to the event. This, in turn, results in the establishment of a new present: a new world governed 
by a different transcendental regime that changes the degrees of visibility (or existence) of its 
elements. As such, things that were previously unthinkable and de jure inexistent suddenly 
become represented in the (new) situation. Note that the event does not bring about a new 
world on its own; it is essential that this requires a series of acts (decisions which cannot rely 
on established knowledge to authorize themselves) in a singular situation. When translated to 
the context of trauma, then, recovery is not the result of the direct verbalization of the 
undigested experience, but rather of the creation of a new (social) context that allows for it to 
be read. This requires both the flash of an intervention/act and the sustained activity of 
working-through or forcing new bits of knowledge. 
 
Forging a Trace: From the Event to the Act 
The articulation of the event with this specific notion of a subject shows that the motif of the 
abrupt cut is necessarily extended with the long-term endeavor to ‘force’ one’s circumstances 
to respond to the breaks in the default order of things. Importantly, this is not an enterprise 
that takes place entirely intrapsychically. Badiou’s theory stipulates that this new present is 
produced through a series of subjective acts that concern the other – a form of activity which 
he attempts to capture in the ‘matheme of the faithful subject’. In this modality of the subject, 
the  trace of the event motivates and dictates the choices and actions one makes. Essentially, 




the expansion of the present and exposing, fragment by fragment, a truth (Badiou, 2009a, pp. 
50-4).  
But does this, then, not commit the same mistake that was identified in theories of ‘post-
traumatic growth’? If recovery from trauma requires the installation of a new world that only 
comes about through a series of subjective acts under the auspices of the evental trace, then 
how can one know how to act, considering that the trace is both a declaration that an event 
has taken place and the initial attempt to name it? As we have seen, from the standpoint of the 
pre-evental world, the name of the event is ‘non-sensical’ as it does not have any referent in 
that situation. Furthermore, even if the trace could be accurately formulated and 
comprehended at that particular time, there persists an unbridgeable gap between the event’s 
name, as a guiding principle, and its application in real-life decisions involving either yes or 
no. Suffice to say that promoting the activity of the faithful subject in order to generate a new 
present leads to a renewed paradox concerning the temporality at work in recovery: the trace 
of the event, just as the ‘new trauma-related information’, is necessarily posited at a moment 
in chronological time where it cannot yet be surmised – due to the lacking interpretative 
framework that this requires at that particular moment. The act (of naming the event, for 
example) always seems to ‘run ahead’ of what will retrospectively have been in light of the 
context that is created as its consequence, a feature that is called ‘anticipatory certitude’ (Pluth 
& Hoens, 2004, p. 185). Thus, although the ‘principle derived from the trace’ is said to drive 
and motivate the faithful subject, there is essentially no way to directly access the content of 
this principle anymore than the aforementioned ‘new trauma-related information’.   
One possible solution to this problem is acknowledging that the trace of the event, as the 
result of the intervention (as per Badiou) or the act (as per Lacan), is not an objective 
reflection of the ‘true’ nature of the event, but rather something that is coined, in the sense of 
a linguistic invention of an expression that is used for the first time. Indeed, Badiou (2003b, p. 
114) acknowledges that there is always, in every truth procedure, a poetic moment because 
we always have to find a new name for the event. Translating this into a more familiar, 
psychological frame of reference, we could say that, from a Lacanian point of view, the 
speaking being, to get a preliminary hold on the event, forces a signifier on what has 
happened. This signifier comes to simultaneously point to and obscure the (traumatic) event. 
It is a signifier that is stamped on the experience, deforming it in a sense and unavoidably 





left-over of the vanished event is sometimes referred to as its symptom or mark (Roffe, 2006, 
p. 335). A trace is thus forged that comes to designate the event and stand in for it. Note that 
this obligatory passage of the event through the signifier is a forgery: in order for the truth of 
the experience to be accessed, it must be hit with a signifier that will inevitably miss it to a 
certain degree. There is no guarantor of truth in this attempt, just as there is no unmediated 
access to the traumatic truth as such. The forging of the trace is a subjective act par 
excellence: it produces something new ex nihilo. Furthermore, it bears repeating that this sort 
of subjective act is not that of a deliberate, conscious subject. At the moment of the act, the 
subject is, as Alenka Zupančič (2000, p. 104) observes, ‘“objectified” in this act: the subject 
passes over to the side of the object. […] In an act, there is no “divided subject”: there is the 
“it” (the Lacanian ça) and the subjective figure that arises from it’. Another way of saying this 
is that there is no subject or ‘hero’ of the act (at the time of its occurrence): it is only after the 
act that someone can find the subjective position from which to look back at and assume 
responsibility for it. Nina’s example, described above, comes to mind. 
The subjective act cannot ground itself on anything that is already in place in the symbolic 
order at the particular time of its occurrence. The trace, which appears to be the guiding 
principle that commands the acts and decisions of the faithful subject, should therefore not be 
taken as an assured, fail-safe compass that guarantees the desired outcome, for it is itself 
already essentially a product of the subject’s activity.  
 
The Anticipated Certainty of the Subjective Act 
So far, we have elaborated on three essential features of the act, which are interrelated. First, 
the act brings something new into the world. Second, it is characterized by a logical 
temporality that is distinct from normal, chronological time. And third, the act appears to arise 
ex nihilo, without the possibility for it to ground itself in the knowledge that preceded it. To 
further our comprehension of this concept, we will now return to the Žižekian reading of 
Lacan’s subjective or ethical act. The act comes very close to the Badiouian concept of 
forcing, as ‘anticipatory certitude’ is the hallmark of both (Pluth & Hoens, 2004, p. 185). 
However, for my purposes, the return to Lacan’s conceptualization is preferable at this point, 
as it readily emphasizes the importance of this type of act in the context of the clinical 




In the previous section, I argued that the trace driving the subjective act is a creation rather 
than an objective reflection of the traumatic event. However, despite this apparently arbitrary 
and ex nihilo character, the subject does succeed in arriving at what can only be called a truth. 
With reference to Žižek (1991c), we could argue that truth arises from misrecognition. Žižek 
alludes to the fact that truth, because of its epistemological and ontological status, can never 
be approached directly but always requires some sort of detour through which it is created. 
For example, in order to produce the knowledge that we desire about the meaning of our 
symptoms, the process of psychoanalysis requires the (illusory) supposition by the analysand 
that this knowledge already exists – more precisely, it is thought to exist in the transferential 
person of the analyst (which is why Lacan (1964, p. 225, 232, and so on) introduces the 
concept of sujet-supposé-savoir, the subject-supposed-to-know, to redefine the notion of 
transference). This misrecognition forms the impetus for the analysand to speak, and by doing 
so, he or she discovers that in the end the analyst was a figure of his or her imagination and 
obviously does not possess the truth concerning his or her very being. But also, through this 
process of dissolving the transference, he or she stumbles upon the meaning and 
unacknowledged gratification of his or her symptoms – almost by accident or as a side-effect, 
as it were. The latter is thus only obtained through the founding misconception that this 
knowledge already existed in the analyst. As such, this knowledge is projected into a point in 
the future, from where it appears to return as the analysis produces the signifying frame that 
gives the symptoms a proper symbolic place and meaning: ‘Transference is then an illusion, 
but the point is that we cannot bypass it and reach directly for the truth. The truth itself is 
constituted through the illusion proper to the transference.’ (Žižek, 1991c, p. 189) The analyst 
is thus someone who sustains the analysand’s misrecognition and who even goes so far as to 
deceive him or her on this point. But ultimately, through this ‘swindle’ (escroquerie), the 
analyst keeps his or her word as the analytic process produces a morsel of the desired truth 
about the meaning of the symptoms. It is the symbolic elaboration in the analysis which 
decides retroactively what the symptoms will have been. Hence, there is a strange temporality 
at work in this instantiation of the truth: the subjective mistake, error or misrecognition 
‘arrives paradoxically before the truth in relation to which we are designating it as “error”, 
because this “truth” itself becomes true only through – or, to use a Hegelian term, by 





The same thing can be said of the subjective acts that we are discussing. The temporal 
paradox that is at work in the recovery from trauma consists of this one thing: that one has to 
decide on what it is that has happened, at a time when the knowledge to do so is absolutely 
lacking. It is this feature that makes recovery from trauma an ethical matter, in the sense 
discussed in Chapter 6. Moreover, Lacanian psychoanalytic theory and Badiou’s philosophy 
alike hold that the subject only appears in the midst of this very lack (Neill, 2011, p. 193). 
Recovery from trauma, then, essentially involves a decision as to what has happened. And, in 
line with Žižek, this decision cannot but be erroneous (more precisely, from the standpoint of 
the pre-evental world its proclamation is nonsensical). However, only through this 
(mis)recognition of what has happened, and by remaining faithful to it, can the subject finally 
arrive at the truth and implications of the trauma. Thus, the first attempts to deal with the 
trauma are necessarily premature in that they always seem to come too early. Nevertheless, 
the appropriate moment cannot arise but through a series of premature or failed attempts. In 
this way, the aforementioned quietism, of which the theory of the act/event is sometimes 
accused, is countered: one is obliged to perform a series of actions of which only time will tell 
if one of them amounts to an act proper. There can be no act without activity. 
These claims add an important dimension to the hackneyed notions of verbalization and 
mentalization in trauma recovery. Verbalizing the trauma, in my reading, is a subjective act of 
creation that is essentially without grounds, rather than the development of an understanding 
that correctly matches the ‘objective reality’ of what has happened. It is precisely this 
dimension of the act – and, along with it, its political implications, as we will see – that is 
obscured when the ‘new trauma-related information’ is taken as a given rather than as 
necessarily constituted. At the moment of the subjective act itself, there is no guarantee of its 
truthfulness. The act involves a wager and can never be the result of mere calculation, as the 
latter relies solely on the pre-given that was rendered futile by the confrontation with the real.  
At this juncture, Badiou’s reliance on mathematics proves particularly useful. The concept of 
forcing (akin to the process of the Lacanian act), which Badiou deploys to describe the 
activity of the faithful subject, actually refers to a technique in set theory invented by 
mathematician Paul Cohen. Basically, it addresses how the undecidable can be decided upon 
after all, and Cohen's accomplishment was to show that such a decision can be legitimate. We 
have seen that the names used in a truth procedure are ‘additions’ to the pre-existent situation, 




undecidable in one situation may be veridical (or demonstrably false) in a new one. Forcing 
authorizes and legitimates claims about indiscernible multiples – not proving or verifying 
them, but giving them a status that is better described as suspended than as undecidable 
(Pluth, 2010). The faithful subject engaged in the labor of forcing thus operates as if the 
present situation were already completely reworked from the standpoint of the evental truth. 
Whereas both the event and its signifiers are indiscernible in the here and now, they become 
verifiable (and, perhaps, veridical) in the light of the knowledge-regime of the new world. In 
Badiou’s (2003c, p. 65) own words:  
I call the anticipatory hypothesis of the generic being of a truth, a forcing. A forcing is 
the powerful fiction of a completed truth. Starting with such a fiction, I can force new 
bits of knowledge, without even verifying this knowledge.  
Thus, although the ex nihilo character of the act might raise suspicions about the nature of 
what it produces (for example, its arbitrary and/or constructionist character), forcing actually 
makes it possible to arrive at a ‘truth’ that is separated from the specificities of the people 
involved in its production. 
The forcing of new bits of knowledge invests the whole ‘pre-trauma world’ with new 
meaning, as it becomes enmeshed in the textures of the new present. On a more psychological 
level, the faithful subject’s acts are associated with the development of new subjective 
projects and goals, a new orientation of the person’s biographical narrative. This is why 
Lacanian theory speaks of the post-traumatic subject as a subject which survives its own death 
(see Žižek, 2008): the desire that oriented the biographical narrative up to the moment of the 
trauma, as that which forms the core of the person’s identity, is abolished – only to be reborn 
through the act. However, the desire that emerges out of the detritus of the trauma and 
through the act is not the same as the one before; it is a new desire, constituting a new subject 
and drawing out radically different aims and trajectories.  
Again, this new orientation of desire is not something of which the effects are restricted to the 
psyche of the traumatized person; it is primarily directed outwards, where it addresses the 
other. Establishing a new present that allows for a subjective appropriation of the trauma is 
not limited to, for example, intrapsychically developing new schemata. Although an act is 
primarily an act for the subject, it is always something that, due to its transgressive nature, 





The act differs from an ‘action’ in that it radically transforms its bearer (agent). After 
an act, I am ‘not the same as before’. In the act, the subject is annihilated and 
subsequently reborn (or not); the act involves a kind of temporary eclipse of the 
subject. The act is therefore always a ‘crime’, a ‘transgression’ – of the limits of the 
symbolic community to which I belong.  
We have to approach this designation of the act as a ‘transgression’ or a ‘crime’ with great 
care. What is meant by this is that the act has a formal structure to it that is foreign to the 
register constituted by the good/bad dichotomy, but nevertheless it may be perceived as ‘evil’ 
or ‘bad’ because it always represents a certain ‘overstepping’ of the limits of the given 
symbolic order (or community) in which it takes place. As the act introduces a new present, it 
brings a change in ‘what is’, and this always implies that the other cannot but react to the 
novelty that is introduced. This feature opens the door for a re-introduction of the political in 
trauma recovery. 
As Laclau, Stavrakakis, Žižek and others have remarked, the ‘new’ in politics is always 
related to the emergence of a new signifier, ‘a new ideal which comes to occupy the place of 
the organizing principle of a discursive field and of associated subjective identities’ 
(Stavrakakis, 2007, p. 59). This idea links up with the above description of the act as similar 
to Badiou’s ‘intervention’. With the emergence of a new master signifier, ‘the socio-symbolic 
field is not only displaced, [but] its very structuring principle changes’ (Žižek 1999, p. 262). 
Note that such a rearticulation of symbolic-imaginary reality is argued to rely upon ‘the 
contingent dislocation of a pre-existing discursive order, through a certain resurfacing of the 
traumatic real which shows the limits of the social’ (Stavrakakis, 2007, p. 59). The dislocation 
is the ‘source’ of the intervention. The new signifier responds to a gap that suddenly opens up 
and produces anxiety. As described in Chapter 7, a traumatic rupture invalidates the nodal 
points that ordinarily structure the elements of a given sociopolitical reality into a meaningful 
system. When a new master signifier surfaces, this changes the meaning of those prior 
anchoring points. The political dimension  of an act can thus manifest itself in language itself 
– with the caveat that language, in Lacanian theory, is a material substance. Interventions in 
the signifier thus directly affect the actual, material units of ideology. Every radical 
reconfiguration of these elements can therefore be viewed as a direct attack upon the 





Disentanglement : Trauma, Event, and the Act 
Throughout this work, figures of rupture and discontinuity have taken center stage. Trauma is 
thought to derive from the violent and unexpected confrontation with ‘something’ that cannot 
be represented. In other words, what transpired in the traumatic event resists recuperation in 
the former structuration of the subject’s psychical economy. In a variety of psychological 
theories on trauma, the incommensurability of the traumatic episode with prior meaning-
making frameworks is identified as generative of the typical traumatic symptomatology 
(Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Lacan theorized the traumatic confrontation with the formless, 
unfathomable ‘beyond’ of representation with the concept of the real. Theories of cultural 
trauma and other forms of large-scale rupture locate the incommensurability on a trans-
individual level rather than a psychological one. 
As discussed, the formal characteristics of Badiou’s notion of the event vis-à-vis the pre-
existing world are highly reminiscent of the described dichotomy between a traumatic episode 
and the preceding symbolic-imaginary system. Trauma, the event, the act: all of these 
concepts are ultimately defined by their capacity to exceed the pre-given. They all share a 
moment of negativity, of disruption of the pre-established structure, of suspension of the 
Other. However, whereas the event and the act are explicitly linked to the production of a new 
symbolic structure, in part through this fleeting moment of dislocation, this is not the case 
with trauma in any clear way. The main distinction between trauma on the one hand, and the 
event/act on the other, lies in their respective valence: whereas Badiou’s event is heralded as 
the harbinger of positive change (via the local manifestation of an eternal truth), trauma is 
defined by destructiveness and negativity. Whereas Badiou’s event (and equally, Lacan’s act) 
produces a subject, trauma denotes the subject’s dissolution or destruction. Or even: Badiou’s 
event opens possibilities, while trauma closes them off (Di Nicola, 2012a). In this light, the 
delicate discussion concerning the ‘productive dimension’ of trauma can be rephrased as 
follows: can we legitimately conceive of trauma as an event in the Badiouian sense? Badiou 
himself is clear on this matter: he firmly rejects any such linkage on the basis of the discussed 
difference in valence (negativity/death versus positivity/life). From a clinical perspective, we 
could add that trauma is not ‘productive’ in any straightforward way. One of its defining 
characteristics is precisely its uncanny resistance to the passing of chronological time: there is 





case: trauma is the impossibility to close off or conclude the past, which is why it returns to 
haunt the present.  
The fertility of juxtaposing trauma with the theory of the event/act lies in the latter’s 
specification of how the unrepresentable/impossible finds its way into a symbolic order that is 
altered by this transition. The disruption of the Other, whether it is in the guise of a traumatic 
episode, a situation of radical social change, a Badiouian event or a psychoanalytical act – all 
of which are instances of the real, in the sense that they are manifested at the precise points of 
inconsistency of the reality/world at stake – requires the ‘flash of an intervention’ as well as 
the subsequent, arduous subject-process, if this disruption is to have a lasting impact on the 
(sociopolitical) reality at stake. Theories of the act and the event highlight this moment of 
creative invention that is necessitated yet often overlooked in trauma recovery. Moreover, 
these theories make tangible the counterintuitive temporality inherent to this process, related 
to the ‘anticipatory certitude’ and the concept of ‘forcing’ discussed above. Lastly, they 
clarify both the  ethical and the political dimension of the subjectivization of rupture.  
The act affirms the break with the pre-existent and introduces something new that can only be 
judged if the prior situation is reworked from the standpoint of this evental supplement. The 
necessity of creating a new present for coming to grips with the ephemeral event provides a 
powerful outlook when applied to traumatic pathology and recovery. The ethical act of 
naming (the intervention) and the subsequent subjectivization process target the Other: just as 
the analyst’s act requires a response from the analysand, so the act in the face of the traumatic 
real is an injunction for the other/Other to take up a position. This is the act’s political force: it 
is directed outward, towards the creation of a new ‘transcendental regime’ and thus a new 
present or world, rewriting the rules of what is possible and what is not. The invention of a 
new signifier around which a new field of meaning coalesces is a prime example of the 
moment of the political, in the sense discussed in Chapter 7.  
To conclude this chapter, I will discuss a few examples to render these many points more 
vivid. First, I will turn to Ron Eyerman’s discussion of the cultural trauma of slavery, and 
show how his expose relates to the central notion of the act. The idea is that Eyerman 
describes the lengthy political process situated at the level of different and incommensurable 
symbolic formations, rather than traumatic rupture per se. In this way, a brief discussion of 
Eyerman’s cultural trauma theory allows me to further disambiguate the notions discussed 




fabric by the 1970s feminist movement, as recounted by Judith Herman in Trauma and 
Recovery: The Aftermath of Violence – from Domestic Abuse to Political Terror (1997). The 
Lacanian framework allows us to think through the process and dynamics of societal change 
in its relation to individual healing. This example makes clear that even those traumatic 
experiences that take place in the intimacy of one’s private family life should be read against 
the background of an overarching sociopolitical system. In my reading, it is by grace of the 
subjective acts and the permutations this causes in the field of the Other that the traumas of 
these women can be worked through. 
The Cultural Trauma of Slavery 
In Cultural Trauma. Slavery and the Formation of African American Identity, Ron Eyerman 
(2003) meticulously works out how what he calls the ‘cultural trauma of slavery’ was at the 
base of an emergent collective identity, through an equally emergent collective memory (p. 
1). Slavery, first and foremost, evidently affected those who directly experienced it in horrible 
ways. But secondly, Eyerman argues, it became ‘traumatic in retrospect’ (p. 1) for a large 
collective of people who did not experience it firsthand. His intriguing and controversial 
thesis is that the individual experiences of the slaves became a cultural trauma only when they 
were taken up in a collective memory that pervaded the entirety of American society and 
formed a rupture with the ways in which members of this society viewed themselves and their 
history. According to Eyerman, cultural trauma thus always necessitates the establishment 
and acceptance of the ‘traumatic meaning’ of what happened. He thereby emphasizes the 
lengthy process by which a series of traumatic experiences is mediated and represented over 
time. If a traumatic episode in history, which affected a particular sub-group of a given 
society, is to have an impact on the entirety of this society, in the sense described in Chapter 
7, this means first of all that it must be transmitted or dispersed ‘within the discourse of 
people talking about the past’ (p. 6):  
while this reconstructed common and collective past may have its origins in direct 
experience, its recollection is mediated through narratives that are modified with the 
passage of time, filtered through cultural artifacts and other materializations, which 





Cultural trauma, in Eyerman’s reading, requires representation and mediation: only through 
the dissemination of the ‘traumatic meaning’ across the different societal strata can the gap in 
the Other become visible for all, disrupting the manners in which a certain collective fantasy 
normally covers over the antagonisms this society harbors within itself. Modern technologies 
have made the dispersal of such narratives much faster and more efficient. However, if 
representation and mediation are required to constitute a cultural trauma, this always involves 
‘selective construction and representation, since what is seen [for instance on television or in 
newspapers] is the result of the actions and decisions of professionals as to what is significant 
and how it should be presented’ (p. 3). As such, Eyerman holds, ‘national or cultural trauma 
always engages a “meaning struggle”, a grappling with an event that involves identifying the 
“nature of the pain, the nature of the victim and the attribution of responsibility”’ (p. 3). 
Obviously, this process is highly political. 
In this view, memory is not stored inside the heads of individuals, but accumulated in 
discourse as the outcome of people’s interactions. This means that the past is collectively 
shaped, although not necessarily collectively experienced. Moreover, the past is materialized, 
for instance in spatial organization, artefacts and so on. There are, nevertheless, limitations to 
‘memory construction’ as a social process, constraints imposed by recorded history. Although 
the past cannot be literally constructed, it can be selectively exploited. The construction of 
collective memory renders parts of the world visible and others invisible by imposing a 
structuring, meaning-generating ‘frame’ on it. Hence, it is a form of power. Who has access to 
the means of representation, which are ‘essential for public commemoration and the framing 
of collective memory’ (p. 12)?  Who defines what is seen and what is heard? The moment of 
the political is often marked by a declaration by which something previously unthinkable and 
invisible is suddenly presented, something with the power to instigate a protracted political 
process. In this way, Eyerman’s cultural trauma theory offers a way to imagine how, in the 
case of slavery, the personal was made political.  
I agree with Kansteiner and Weilnböck’s (2008) critique that Eyerman, in his analysis, makes 
a conceptual error when he argues that cultural trauma is ‘produced and reproduced’ through 
media representations that cause ‘a dramatic loss of identity and meaning, a tear in the social 
fabric’ of a relatively coherent group (Eyerman, 2003, p. 2). Eyerman’s idea is that 
representations of an unacknowledged past in films, TV shows, novels and so on are 




because it violates one or more of its fundamental cultural presuppositions, to refer to Neil 
Smelser’s definition of cultural trauma (Alexander et al., 2004). What we are dealing with in 
these destabilizing representations is not trauma strictly speaking; it involves a rupture caused 
by the discursive and thus symbolic presentation of something previously invisible or 
disavowed. In other words: the ‘cultural trauma’ Eyers describes is the dislocating effect of a 
novel representation of reality being in an antagonistic relation with the dominant, generally 
accepted one. It concerns a struggle between two competing and inassimilable symbolical 
systems. The narratives that represent the trauma of slavery are disruptive in the sense that 
they traverse the fantasy – along with the enjoyment that it supplies – that ordinarily gives 
meaning and sense to the nation’s history; they require a retroactive reappraisal of this 
history. What we have here is a political struggle for memory and for truth, played out at the 
level of the symbolic. Although this clearly involves rupture, I would refrain from calling it 
traumatic in that it does not entail a confrontation with the postsymbolic real that suddenly 
makes its presence felt in the symbolic. Rather, it is a destabilization based on a series of 
ethical and political acts that draw something of a real that was once suffered, by those who 
actually lived through slavery, in the symbolic. The rupture caused by the (symbolic) products 
of this act, nevertheless, repeats the initial break on a different level. As discussed, the act 
shares a formal structure with trauma: it confirms the traumatic break by introducing 
something new, something that cannot be assimilated within the pre-existent framework. 
However, it differs from trauma per se in that it succeeds in making the jump from one level 
to the other, whereas trauma is characterized by destruction without salvation. Only through 
the act is it possible to create a new symbolic context that allows for a retroactive 
understanding of the traumatic episode and its consequences. This ‘jump’ is incalculable and 
uncertain. It only acquires a form of objectivization or validation in the symbolic processes 
that follow it.  
Hence, I propose that the moment of the political (and the act) itself is located before the 
entire social, cultural and political interplay described in so much detail by Eyerman. Trauma 
is not the clash between two competing discursive formations. Such a reading reduces the 
dimension of the traumatic real to a form of incongruent information. As I have established, 
such an understanding skips an important step, namely, the paramount move in which 
something real, in the Lacanian sense of the term, is drawn into the symbolic through an 





that in a sense repeats the initial fracture: what it introduces breaks with what was while it 
simultaneously opens a path to introduce a new symbolical structure. 
In Eyerman’s account, this dimension of the act is rendered superfluous. Furthermore, 
Kansteiner and Weilnböck’s point that TV shows and other representations of traumatic 
episodes are not merely destructive, but sometimes even formative of group identities in ways 
that helped social minorities to gain public recognition for past suffering is apt and underlines 
that representation of trauma is not simply a reproduction of trauma. These cultural 
representations are indeed, sometimes, ways to exit the traumatic impasse as they play a role 
in the reconstitution of, for instance, African-American (in the TV show Roots) and Jewish-
American (in Holocaust) identity. This is exactly the point: beyond the disruptive break 
caused by these representations, their positive potential lies exactly in their symbolic-
imaginary productivity, in that they introduce something that can be faithfully worked out and 
amount to a ‘new present’ as Badiou calls it. 
For Kansteiner and Weilnböck, because of the positive potential of such cultural 
representations, they should not be viewed as ‘traumatic’, not even in a metaphorical cultural 
sense. I agree that the ruptures caused by these representations are not simply to be equated 
with ‘trauma’, although they share the structure of rupture. I view their rupture as the 
consequence of an act in which something formerly unthinkable is given form. As discussed 
above, this transition to the symbolic entails a risk, a jump from one level to the other, and its 
truth value or objectivity is never guaranteed but only uncovered through the historical 
developments that follow in its wake.  
Does the emphasis on cultural forms of representation of trauma, and the reverberations of 
these productions in the fabric of society, conveniently make us ‘lose track of the victims and 
their physicality and mental vulnerability’ (Kansteiner & Weilnböck, 2008, p. 234)? I would 
argue that, minimally, theories of cultural trauma offer detailed accounts of how social, 
political and cultural change can be predicated upon the manners in which trauma is 
collectively remembered. Eyerman’s case study of slavery, for instance, attempts to 
reconstruct, decade by decade (and generation by generation), how the trauma of a large yet 
disempowered minority group slowly found its way into mainstream collective memory, in 
what constitutes a political process that founded a group identity to support its aggregated 
demands. Although this discourse provides insights in how the traumatic experience of some 




from an engagement with the suffering and psychological recovery of those affected. This 
criticism targets the purported belief that political change requires an ethically untenable 
fidelity to the truth of trauma, which in turn is underpinned by the idea that trauma offers a 
privileged outlook on a truth beyond representation. Although in my reading trauma indeed 
has some sort of revelatory effect, in the sense that it invalidates a meaning-giving fantasy 
framework, this is not a ‘truth’ strictly speaking. It is not an ‘insight’ or an ‘idea’ that can be 
put to work. It is only through a subjective act that truth comes into play, in a prolonged 
process marked by a paradoxical temporality. This process flows from a decision, but we have 
seen that it should not be viewed as something instantaneous. The break of the act must be 
repeated at several instants, when the emerging subject is confronted with ‘points’, moments 
in which the confusing chaos of endless multiplicity is filtered through the ‘two’; that the 
complexity of a situation is reduced to the choice between a yes and a no (Badiou, 2009a, p. 
50-2).  
 
The Act of Speaking Out 
The speak outs of the 1970s women’s liberation movement can be considered subjective acts 
in the sense described above. First of all, they undoubtedly brought something new into the 
world, that is, something that was obviously already happening but was unrecognized up to 
that point. As Herman (1997, p. 28) writes:  
The real conditions of women’s lives were hidden in the sphere of the personal, in 
private life. [...] Women did not have a name for the tyranny of private life. [...] Betty 
Friedan called the woman question the ‘problem without a name’. 
As such, this problem could be called an ‘inexistent’ from the standpoint of that world’s 
transcendental. The acts of speaking out by the women’s movement opened up a new time, in 
which public discussion of the common atrocities of sexual and domestic abuse had suddenly 
been made possible. Prior to these acts, speaking about these things was unthinkable and even 
impossible. It fell beyond the ensemble of possibilities that were determined in that particular 
world. Thus, the act of speaking out brought with it a new present, not only through the 
revelation of a part of the world that was formerly cloaked or ‘inexistent’, but also by 





The speaking out literally changed the bond with the Other and ultimately the organization of 
this Other: that of which it was forbidden to speak now became that which should be spoken. 
What was previously invisible and inexistent suddenly appeared with maximal intensity. This 
constitutes an event that undermined the traditional, patriarchic organization of family life and 
the violent suppression of women. In this example, we recognize a pre-trauma world, where 
such a thing as domestic violence is hardly thinkable even as it occurs, simply because it is 
not represented in the world’s knowledge-regime and there exists no name for it. This world 
consists of a series of patriarchal narratives, nodal points and fantasies that hide the 
impossibility to provide definitive answers to the questions regarding sexual identity and the 
sexual relationship, and that attempt to give form to these impossible real aspects of life. 
Within this system, women are confined to a very strict place, alienated in a discourse that 
reduces them to a limited role in a purportedly harmonic and ‘natural’ family constellation. 
Patriarchal society is ripe with theories that justify this social organization by stressing the 
inferiority of women in general. These phallocentric theories produce and affirm fantasies that 
suture the lack of foundation of this organization of social life.  
However, victims of sexual or domestic abuse are subjected to a series of experiences that 
open up a daunting abyss in which comprehension falls short. This violent string of 
experiences constitutes an uncanny something that exceeds and overthrows the symbolical 
framework that is in place at the moment of its occurrence. Thus, although the abuse takes 
place in the private life of individual families, it is not without a relation to the sociopolitical 
discourse that functions on the macro-level of their community. The traumatic experiences 
insist on the beyond of this framework, on its lack, its inadequacy. This is heightened by the 
fact that in the field of the symbolic Other there is no signifier to be found that designates this 
thing that they are subjected to. On the contrary, when looking for an answer, these women 
only found a prohibition to speak of these things. What they experience was simply denied or 
recuperated in the dominant phallocentric framework (for example in a discourse on 
congenial obligations and so on). We have here, then, the world and the traumatic event that 
traverses it.  
Haunted by these symptoms of a thing that does not exist, what are these women to do? As 
we have seen, if the truth of the event is to be procured, if a way out of the traumatic impasse 
is to be discovered, this requires the generation of a trace that holds onto and stands in for the 




answered affirmatively and proceeded to fight it – first of all by calling it into existence, by 
dragging it out of the shadows through what they called ‘consciousness-raising’ (Herman, 
1997, pp. 28-9). The technique of consciousness-raising took place in intimate and 
confidential groups of women where speaking the truth was imperative, and it was here that a 
trace was forged through what we can recognize as a genuine ethical act. As discussed above, 
the forging of a trace is a subjective act that runs ahead of the certainty that should have 
authorized it. This naming of what was formerly unthinkable is an act that is faithful to the 
traumatic event, because it would rather sacrifice the old world than deny the reality of this 
thing that has yet to become what it will have been.  
Once the trace was formed, a growing group of militant women could organize themselves 
around its truth. This group is the (collective) subject of that truth, it is the effect of the act of 
naming (the intervention). What actions should they take to safeguard and develop this fragile 
new present that is incommensurable with the old world – if this was indeed their decision? 
Activist women chose to organize a first speak out on rape in 1971, which approximately 300 
people attended at St Clement’s Episcopal Church in New York (Matthews, 1994). Women 
would come to a speak out specifically to share their own experiences with an audience and to 
raise their voices, to literally speak out against sexual violence. It must be stressed that at the 
time of their act, there was no way of telling what the outcome might be. Although the 
feminists’ speaking out may resemble the strategies utilized by other political pressure groups 
(for instance those applied in the campaign to end the Vietnam war), this did not by any 
means guarantee that their emerging truth would be acknowledged. The decision to speak out 
involved a wager, a point of radical uncertainty that could not be settled by mere calculation. 
It was an act that could not authorize itself on anything but the desire of the subject in 
question. 
From the perspective of the pre-trauma world in which it had absolutely no place, the act of 
speaking out came too soon, before the ‘objective conditions’ for such a thing were in place. 
From society’s point of view, there was a good reason why these unspeakable and 
unthinkable things were kept secret: bringing them into the light of day could destabilize the 
existent social order (which, eventually, it did). Consequently, this act was considered ‘evil’ 
or ‘bad’ by 1970s society: it was transgressive in that it broke the unspoken rules of social 
interaction and threatened to disrupt the social edifice. Here we see the act’s transgressive, 





a question that cannot be ignored. How will other women who live through similar 
experiences react? Will they speak out or remain silent? How does society as a whole 
respond? Are the testimonies of these women to be taken seriously, or rather discredited and 
downplayed? The act always has an interpersonal dimension that is tantamount to the 
elaboration of the new present. It is, in part, through the changes brought about in the social 
field and the different perspective that this offers that one can come to grips with the 
traumatic event. Moreover, the reactions of others play an essential role in completing the 
process of the act: only through them does the anticipatory certitude receive some sort of 
‘inter-subjective verification process’, desubjectivizing the initial principle of the trace and 
providing objective evidence for it. The act essentially precedes the certainty that should have 
led up to the act (Pluth & Hoens, 2004, p. 189). It is the development of a new present that 
constitutes the context necessary to assess the traumatic experience and recover from it.  
This example serves to illustrate the concepts that I have introduced, and to demonstrate how 
the subjective acts of one or a few persons trying to deal with their trauma can introduce a 
new present that impacts society as a whole. The truth that is uncovered by the faithful 
subject’s activity can be picked up by others, who also become a subject of this truth – 
working either towards its production, its denial or its occultation. The example of the 1970s 
women’s movement magnifies one aspect of the transgressive nature of the act: that it allows 
for the gathering of a group of people around its trace, who work together to produce its 
consequences. The activity of this composite subject can produce huge sociopolitical 
upheavals that constitute a new world on a macro-level. The example, then, shows how 
recovery from trauma is not necessarily an exclusively intrapsychic process, but can have far-
stretching societal ramifications. It is the restructuration of the Other that allows for coming to 
terms with the traumatic past. 
Finally, we could add an epilogue to this reading of the feminist speak outs. The nature of 
‘speaking the unspeakable’ has significantly evolved over the past 30 years – arguably 
through the prolonged efforts of subjects faithful to a range of emancipatory political truths. 
Whereas events such as speak outs can be deemed radical and transgressive for 1970s society, 
contemporary Western culture typically condones and even promotes such disclosures (Rothe, 
2011). Indeed, it has been argued that we live in a culture of ‘emotional display’ (Pupavac, 
2004, p. 492; Seltzer, 1997). Speaking out has thus become part and parcel of the structure of 




practices. In short, what used to be an act, in the context of 1970s society, might have become 
a mere action in the contemporary world (which has changed precisely because of the former 
acts) (see also Gibbs, 2014 and Kilby, 2007 for similar arguments) . Additionally, when it 
becomes (prescriptive) shared knowledge, Herman’s emphasis on the necessity to supplement 
private healing with the public duty to break the conspiracy of silence can lead to new ethical 
questions: the call to bear witness can, for instance, place a heavy burden on the shoulders of 
counselors and their patients alike (McKinney, 2007).  
Such is the fate of each and every truth: it brings about a new world, which amounts to saying 
that it somehow passes from the dimension of truth, with its relations to ethics and 
subjectivity, to the domain of knowledge. Hence, caution is called for when we apply 
accepted humanitarian formats and established ‘know-how’ to process, at both an individual 
and a community level, a diversity of experiences of ruptures.  
 
Closing Thoughts 
In this chapter, I worked out an outlook on trauma that draws from Lacanian theory and 
philosophical writings on rupture and societal change. This framework makes clear that 
recovery from trauma and sociopolitical action can go hand in hand. Whereas the biomedical 
framework of trauma was criticized for being individualizing, decontextualizing and, 
ultimately, depoliticizing, I do not believe that the solution to this problem is simply to 
forsake a focus on psychological suffering and to trade in a psychiatric level of analysis and 
intervention for a sociological one. My aim has been to destabilize this dichotomy more than 
anything else, primarily by means of the particular Lacanian conception of the subject and the 
Other which allow for a confluence between the level of the individual and the level of the 
collective. 
The decontextualizing operation of PTSD and the biomedical framework is countered by the 
idea that each community is characterized by its own symbolic-imaginary reality – which is 
given consistency by a series of singular fantasies, narratives and nodal points. What applies 
in one culture is not necessarily the case in another. If trauma is minimally defined as a 
rupture with what was, as the confrontation with an excess that resists recuperation in the pre-





clear that what is ‘traumatic’ in one culture/for one person is not necessarily so for another. It 
is impossible to predict beforehand what will constitute a traumatic event, least of all on the 
basis of a knowledge that has been developed outside of the contexts in which it is applied. 
Another strength of this framework is that it allows to ‘expand our understanding of trauma 
from sudden, unexpected catastrophic events that happen to people in socially dominant 
positions to encompass ongoing, everyday forms of violence and oppression affecting 
subordinate groups’ (Craps, 2010, p. 54) – that is, ‘insidious trauma’. The notion of insidious 
trauma was developed by Maria Root and taken up more recently by Laura Brown, to denote 
‘the traumatogenic effects of oppression that are not necessarily overtly violent or threatening 
to bodily well-being at the given moment but that do violence to the soul and spirit’ (Brown, 
1995, p. 107). Buelens and Craps (2008, p. 3) identify Frantz Fanon’s account of 
encountering racial fear in a white child a classic example of insidious trauma due to 
systematic oppression and discrimination. The continual exposure to ‘everyday, repetitive, 
interpersonal events’ (Brown, 1995, p. 108), for instance in the context of racism, can 
dislocate the dominant societal discourse in the same sense as a one-shot, major catastrophe 
does. In this way, trauma theory, which has been developed from the perspective of dominant 
groups in society, can become more sensitive to the needs of disenfranchised groups.  
The individualizing and psychologizing trend in the PTSD-framework has been argued to be 
ill-suited for the understanding and treatment of collectively undergone disruptive events, 
such as colonial traumas involving ‘dispossession, forced migration, diaspora, slavery, 
segregation, racism, political violence, and genocide’  (Craps & Buelens, 2008, p. 3). To 
recognize and address the specificity of these experiences requires the transition from a focus 
on the individual to the larger social entities. Only then can the focus on immaterial recovery 
be widened to take into account material recovery. If coming to grips with the trauma requires 
a questioning and modification of the sociopolitical context that gave rise to the suffered 
violations, then the effects of trauma interventions must go beyond individual, psychological 
healing – the ‘salvation of the soul’, as Frantz Fanon called it. In the context of colonial 
oppression and racism, Fanon argued that the ‘black man’s chronically neurotic state of mind 
cannot be alleviated as long as the socioeconomic structure that brought it on remains 
unchanged’ (Craps & Buelens, 2008, p. 4). In Fanon’s own words: ‘There will be an authentic 
disalienation only to the degree to which things, in the most materialistic meaning of the 




It is my hope that the proposed Lacan-inspired framework aids in making a step towards 
trauma interventions that enable social change rather than obfuscating it. As I have argued, 
this requires a different ethical position, which leaves behind a focus on the visible symptoms 
of evil in favor of a position which I have characterized through Badiou’s fidelity procedure. 
Although speaking out and interventions into the materiality of language do have an 
important role to play in the approach of trauma, I agree that large-scale, collective traumas 
cannot simply be alleviated ‘by inviting victims to share their individual testimony’ – as is 
often the case with Truth Commissions, for instance. As Shane Graham (2008) argues, in the 
context of South Africa,  the collective, spatial, and material repercussions of the apartheid era 
in South Africa must be addressed if healing is to take place. It is the material context itself 
that needs to be reworked, as it is here that the oppressive, trauma-generating societal 
discourse was inscribed. Nevertheless, the specificities of the theory of the act make clear that 















General Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Part I of this doctoral dissertation focused on the etiology of trauma. A discussion of the 
Freudian concept of Nachträglichkeit showed that delayed traumatic reactions and traumatic 
reactions following a non-Criterion A event are sometimes related. In these cases, the 
traumatic impact of an apparently trivial event derives from an association with an earlier 
event which, however, remained without psychopathological consequences for a long time. 
Traumatic pathology here develops as the result of the belated formation of a traumatic 
memory of the older event, of the belated ‘realization’ of a peculiar traumatic meaning that 
cannot be supported by the subject. Whereas Freud initially tied these delayed traumatic 
reactions to the precocious sexual experience, my analysis shows that the mechanism of 
Nachträglichkeit functions beyond the mythical point of the structuring of the subject in the 
Oedipal phase. This study argues that it is impossible to predict traumatic pathology on the 
basis of a set of a priori event characteristics. The resultant psychological reaction is always 
dependent on the specific combination between a stressor and a person. The mechanism of 
Nachträglichkeit thus presents one manner in which personal background and interpretation, 
and the characteristics of a situation interact to determine the effects of an encounter. 
Moreover, it shows that the (traumatic) impact of a situation is not given once and for all; the 
signification-value of an event can be modified as new elements are brought into articulation 




In many psychological theories, traumatic pathology is defined as the result of the dislocation 
of a meaning-giving framework, a confrontation with the limits of meaning. The question 
then becomes how and where meaning is generated. Whereas cognitive psychological theories 
emphasize the intrapsychic construction of meaning, other theories underscore the importance 
of context in the production of meaning. In any case, the shibboleth of trauma appears to be 
the impossibility to return to the status quo ante: each and every attempt to integrate the 
traumatic event in the pre-traumatic psychological economy/meaning-generating context 
ultimately fails. As a result, the traumatic event insists. From this, I inferred the definition of 
trauma as that which requires a ‘restructuration of the subject’ – which, obviously, raises the 
question as to how this should be further understood. In Part III of this dissertation, I 
developed a Lacan-inspired framework to show that the restructuring of the subject should not 
be comprehended as a merely intrapsychic enterprise. It requires the reworking of (the 
relation of the subject to) the Other.  
The study in Chapter 2 articulated a number of empirical findings on trauma with a relatively 
unfamiliar psychoanalytical concept. From this study, a number of testable hypotheses can be 
developed for further research. In accordance with an emerging line of research conducted at 
the Department of Psychoanalysis and Clinical Consulting, case material can be analyzed to 
see how an event that triggered a series of psychological complaints is tied to other factors in 
that person’s psychological functioning, as well as to other elements in his or her history. In 
other words, the study in Chapter 2 suggests the need to invest in case construction in 
empirical therapy research and in the diagnostic and therapeutic clinical process itself. It is the 
chain of signifiers, the narrative material that is produced during the analysis, that constitutes 
the context or background against which the singular logic of someone’s problems can be 
grasped.  
The analysis in Part II of this dissertation shows the necessity to go beyond the biomedical 
perspective of trauma and to develop trauma models  that incorporate the subject, the context 
and the political dimension of trauma. Although a number of recent academic contributions 
clearly move in this direction, it proves difficult to translate these ideas in concrete 
interventions that can be applied in situ.  
In the third and final part of this dissertation, I provided a framework to conceptualize the 
relations between trauma, ethics and politics. The impetus for this elaboration derived from 





develop an understanding of trauma that acknowledges the importance of context; that 
transcends a unilateral focus on the individual; and that incorporates the political dimension 
of trauma. As described in the closing thoughts of Chapter 8, the proposed Lacan and Badiou-
inspired model offers an alternative understanding of trauma recovery which, I believe, helps 
to address these issues.  
The concept of the act takes center stage in the final part of this dissertation. It is my 
contention that this under-theorized notion differentiates psychoanalysis per se from 
psychotherapy as such. It follows that the elaboration of this concept, carried out in Chapter 8, 
has relevance beyond the context of trauma studies. Therapy research in general could benefit 
greatly from the idea that the analytical/therapeutic process is discontinuous, and 
characterized by radical ruptures that separate the subject from the security entailed in the 
alienation in the Other. The subject can only renounce the paradoxical jouissance delivered by 
this alienation if his or her relationship to the Other is restructured through a transformative 
act. This implies that therapy should not be conceived as a gradual, linear or incremental 
process. On the contrary, as psychoanalysis shows, this experience is an arduous and painful 
one, as it aims at the confrontation with the point where meaning breaks down. Amidst the 
fear that accompanies the confrontation with the lack of the Other, and in complete solitude, 
the subject is given a chance to ‘throw the dice’ once again.  
This line of thought clearly goes against the increasingly popular ideas that the patient knows 
what he or she needs, and that the feelings that immediately arise in the analysand, in 
response to the analyst’s interventions, constitute a reliable compass to direct the cure. The 
discontinuous character of the changes procured by the process of a psychoanalysis can be 
tested longitudinally, for example by collecting empirical data over the entire range of therapy 
sessions. Narrative material (obtained by verbatim transcription of audio-taped therapy 
sessions) can be placed alongside (quantitative) measures of evolutions in symptom levels and 
more objective markers (such as cortisol levels). It would be interesting to investigate whether 
or not a deterioration at the level of symptoms could be observed when a confrontation with 
the real is at hand. In the same vein, it could be registered in what ways analysands respond to 
this confrontation, and how this affects the further course of the analysis.    
This conceptual study offers  an impulse to reorient the debates surrounding psychological 
trauma. It offers concrete avenues to incorporate the subject, context and political dimension 




it is also clear that they also require further elaboration and dialogue with others in the fields 
of trauma research and trauma interventions to test their utility. The task that lies ahead is to 
translate the insights of this study into testable hypotheses on the one hand, and practical 












Trauma voorbij het biomedische paradigma. Denksporen 
voor een subjectgerichte en contextuele traumabenadering.  
 
Psychisch trauma werd de afgelopen drie decennia intensief bestudeerd vanuit heel diverse 
academische disciplines, die we kunnen onderbrengen in een klinische en een culturele 
onderzoekstraditie. Deze tradities worden gekenmerkt door radicaal verschillende 
kennistheoretische aannames, waarden, overtuigingen en doelstellingen, en zijn bijgevolg 
moeilijk te integreren. De academische dialoog tussen beide tradities komt bovendien slechts 
moeizaam op gang.  
 
Probleemstelling 
Onderliggende studie erkent de pertinentie voor de klinische praktijk van een aantal kritieken 
die voornamelijk in het culturele traumaonderzoek weerklank vonden, en die enkele 
specifieke pijnpunten van het dominante, biomedische traumamodel (gekend onder de noemer 
van de Post-Traumatische Stress Stoornis (PTSS)) blootleggen. 
Ten eerste zijn er vraagtekens te plaatsen bij het etiologische mechanisme dat het PTSS-
model van trauma onderstut. De bestaansreden van deze diagnose is het idee dat deze vorm 
van psychopathologie veroorzaakt wordt door blootstelling aan een specifiek soort 
stressor/gebeurtenis. De stoornis wordt geacht op een onmiddellijke, quasiautomatische of 
mechanische wijze voort te vloeien uit de confrontatie met een dergelijke stressor. Deze 
aanname, die het hart uitmaakt van de PTSS-diagnose, is echter moeilijk te weerhouden in het 
licht van een aantal empirische bevindingen. Onderzoek toonde aan dat trauma niet verklaard 
kan worden vanuit de uitzonderlijke aard en extreme kenmerken van de gebeurtenis op zich. 
Vooreerst bleken dergelijke gebeurtenissen zich veel frequenter voor te doen dan initieel 
gedacht, zelfs in Westerse maatschappijen. Daarenboven ontwikkelt slechts een minderheid 




pathologie. Onderzoek heeft dus aangetoond dat andere factoren in rekening moeten worden 
gebracht om het ontstaan van traumatische pathologie te doorgronden. Een traumatische 
reactie zou te maken hebben met de specificiteit van de ontmoeting tussen een singulier 
subject en een particuliere gebeurtenis.  
Een tweede punt van kritiek betreft het onvermogen van het PTSS-model om de rol van 
contextuele factoren in zowel het ontstaan als de behandeling van trauma in rekening te 
brengen. Een tweede kernidee aan de basis van PTSS is dat een diverse reeks gebeurtenissen 
conceptueel aan elkaar gelijkgeschakeld kan worden, omdat al deze gebeurtenissen 
verondersteld worden dezelfde symptomen te veroorzaken volgens hetzelfde 
pathofysiologische mechanisme. Deze conceptuele annulering van de eigenheid van diverse 
etiologische gebeurtenissen kan leiden tot een veronachtzaming van de manieren waarop de 
sociale, culturele, politieke of economische context een rol speelt in zowel het ontstaan als de 
verdere ontwikkeling en het mogelijke herstel van trauma.  
Ten derde werd de focus op het individu in Westerse psychotherapeutische interventies 
bekritiseerd, omdat deze niet aangepast is aan de problemen die ontstaan na collectieve 
trauma’s als politiek geweld, grootschalige natuurrampen, enzovoorts. Tevens valt de focus 
op het psychisch functioneren van het individu moeilijk te rijmen met interventies die de 
sociale oorzaken van diverse vormen van psychisch lijden trachten te wijzigen. In het 
verlengde van een aantal andere onderzoekers verdedigen we de stelling dat traumatische 
pathologie zich niet in een sociaal vacuüm voordoet, en dat herstel van trauma een 
verandering in de relatie van het individu tot de Ander (een Lacaniaans concept dat zowel de 
anderen aanduidt als de socio-symbolische orde waarin we zijn opgenomen) vereist.  
Ten vierde behelzen de genoemde decontextualiserende en individualiserende effecten van 
het PTSS-model een politieke dimensie: PTSS richt de aandacht op immaterieel herstel (een 
verandering in het psychisch functioneren van het individu), waardoor materieel herstel (in de 
zin van de modificatie van een traumagenererende context) onderbelicht blijft. 
Traumapsychiatrie dreigt daardoor een depolitiserend instrument te worden, in dienst van het 







Wanneer we deze punten van kritiek samennemen, dan suggereren deze de noodzaak 
1. om het bestaande etiologische model voor traumatische pathologie uit te breiden of te 
modificeren, zodanig dat de subjectieve dimensies van trauma kunnen 
geconceptualiseerd en geïncorporeerd worden; 
2. om de invloed van cultuur en context in ons begrip van en omgang met trauma te 
erkennen en een plaats te geven; 
3. om de gelimiteerde focus op het individu te verlaten; 
4. om de politieke dimensie van trauma te erkennen en op te nemen in trauma-
interventies. 
Om dit te verwezenlijken is conceptueel onderzoek rond trauma noodzakelijk. De 
onderzoeksvragen van dit doctoraat, aansluitend bij de geschetste tekortkomingen van het 
PTSS-model van trauma, zijn dan ook de volgende:  
1. Wat zijn de tekortkomingen van een etiologisch model dat het subject uitsluit, en op 
welke manier kunnen we het subject reïntroduceren in ons denken over trauma?  
2. Op welke manier kunnen we de rol van context in etiologie en herstel van trauma 
erkennen? 
3. Is het mogelijk om herstel van trauma te denken op een manier die de exclusieve 
focus op het individu overstijgt? 
4. Daarbij aansluitend: hoe kunnen we de politieke dimensie van trauma verrekenen in 
onze omgang met trauma?  
 
Methode 
Aan de hand van een literatuurstudie ga ik nader in op deze vragen. Ten eerste besteed ik de 
nodige aandacht aan het uitwerken van de genoemde punten van kritiek. Ik maak daarbij 
gebruik van uiteenlopende bronnen, waaronder de meest recente empirische bevindingen met 
betrekking tot psychisch trauma. Aangezien deze bevindingen soms lijnrecht ingaan tegen de 
assumpties die aan de basis liggen van PTSS, en dus de validiteit van dit model ernstig ter 




gezien de centrale plaats van het PTSS-model in bijvoorbeeld humanitaire hulpverlening, 
(forensische) psychiatrie en rechtszaken. Verder maak ik gebruik van filosofische analyses 
om de grondslagen van het PTSS-construct aanschouwelijk te maken, en van historische 
studies rond de ontwikkeling van traumaonderzoek om de huidige impasses in een ruimere 
context te plaatsen.  
Ten tweede tracht ik de geschetste problemen door te denken vanuit een alternatief 
referentiepunt, met de bedoeling er een nieuw licht op te werpen. De Freudiaanse en 
Lacaniaanse psychoanalyse staan daarin centraal. Historisch gezien heeft de psychoanalyse 
een belangrijke rol gespeeld in de manier waarop traumatische fenomenen worden begrepen. 
Dat ze vandaag op de achtergrond is geraakt in het denken rond trauma, heeft mijns inziens te 
maken met een bepaalde ethische stellingname die haar typeert en die moeilijk te verzoenen is 
met de positie die inherent is aan het biomedische PTSS-model. Kort samengevat stelt de 
psychoanalyse dat het subject en de Ander steeds een rol spelen in de ontwikkeling en het 
herstel van trauma. Het is precies deze dimensie van het subject die buitengesloten wordt in 
het biomedische model, wat verweven is met de voornoemde problemen. De Lacaniaanse 
psychoanalyse, en meer bepaald het concept van het reële, vormt een centraal referentiepunt 
doorheen dit doctoraatsproefschrift. De unieke Lacaniaanse conceptie van zowel het subject 
als de Ander staat ons toe om de dichotomieën tussen intern/extern en individu/collectief te 
overstijgen. Tot slot zal ook de filosofische theorie van Alain Badiou, die op bepaalde punten 
nauw verwant is met het werk van Lacan, een waardevol instrument blijken om een aantal 
problemen binnen het huidige traumamodel te identificeren en te remediëren. De keuze voor 




In Deel I van het doctoraatsproefschrift wordt ingegaan op de eerste onderzoeksvraag. 
Hoofdstuk 1 biedt een korte historische bespreking van de evoluties in de theorievorming 






In Hoofdstuk 2 wordt eerst scherpgesteld op de beperkingen van het PTSS-model inzake 
etiologie scherpgesteld door middel van een lezing van de empirische evidentie ter zake. 
Daarbij komen de problemen met het Criterium A van de diagnose aan bod, alsook de 
moeilijkheid om een verklaring te bieden voor uitgestelde traumatische reacties (delayed-
onset PTSD). Vervolgens wordt, aan de hand van het Freudiaanse concept Nachträglichkeit 
en de psychoanalytische opvatting van logische tijd, verduidelijkt op welke manier de impact 
van een gebeurtenis op een individu steeds subjectief gemedieerd is. Een grondige bespreking 
van het mechanisme van Nachträglichkeit brengt aldus een onderbelichte dimensie van 
traumatische etiologie in kaart.  
In Deel II van dit doctoraatsonderzoek worden de overige kritieken op PTSS 
(decontextualisering, individualisering en depolitisering) gekaderd binnen het biomedische 
ziektemodel dat de psychiatrische diagnostiek richting geeft sedert de uitgave van de derde 
editie van het gezaghebbende psychiatrische handboek Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM) in 1980.  
In Hoofdstuk 3 worden, aan de hand van een filosofische analyse, de kernassumpties die aan 
de basis liggen van het biomedische ziektemodel geëxpliciteerd en in verband gebracht met 
PTSS. Tevens wordt aangetoond hoe deze assumpties doorwerken in concrete trauma-
interventies, en aanleiding geven tot de focus op het individu en veronachtzaming van 
contextuele en culturele factoren. Tot slot bespreek ik de niet-onderkende politieke dimensie 
van PTSS-interventies. 
In Hoofdstuk 4 worden de in Hoofdstuk 3 besproken kritieken op PTSS in verband gebracht 
met een ruimere, ethische crisis in het Westen. Via het werk van Badiou toon ik de parallellen 
aan tussen de kritieken op PTSS enerzijds, en de door Badiou geïdentificeerde problemen met 
de ethiek van mensenrechten anderzijds. Op basis hiervan formuleer ik de hypothese dat er 
een welgedefinieerde ethische positie aan de basis ligt van de problemen met PTSS – één die 
niet aldus benoemd en erkend wordt vanuit het dominante traumavertoog, maar die via het 
werk van Badiou kan worden geëxpliciteerd als zijnde defensief en negatief. Daaruit volgt dat 
we, om een antwoord te kunnen bieden op onderzoeksvragen 2 tot en met 4, de relaties tussen 
trauma, ethiek en politiek kritisch moeten bevragen en adequaat conceptualiseren. Dit vormt 




In Deel III werk ik een conceptueel kader uit om de relaties tussen trauma, ethiek en politiek 
in kaart te brengen. De centrale hypothese van waaruit ik vertrek is dat Lacans concept van 
het reële zich op het snijpunt van deze drie velden bevindt. Een grondige analyse van dit 
concept biedt aldus een ander perspectief op de problemen die in Deel II werden uitgewerkt. 
Eerst wordt het reële besproken zoals het zich voordoet in elk van deze velden afzonderlijk. 
Daarna betrek ik deze drie velden, elk in hun relatie tot het reële, op elkaar.  
In Hoofdstuk 5 introduceer ik een aantal Lacaniaanse sleutelconcepten die van pas zullen 
komen in wat volgt. Ik identificeer en bespreek vervolgens uitgebreid de twee voornaamste 
opvattingen van het reële die Lacan door zijn onderwijs heen ontwikkelde: een 
presymbolische en een postsymbolische variant. Vervolgens sta ik stil bij de 
psychoanalytische traumaopvatting die verbonden is met beide concepties van het reële.  
In Hoofdstuk 6 onderzoek ik de paradoxale notie van een ‘ethiek van het reële’. Reeds op dit 
punt zien we een intrigerend verband oplichten: het Lacaniaanse reële wordt enerzijds gezien 
als de mogelijkheidsvoorwaarde van het subject en van ethiek als dusdanig, terwijl het 
anderzijds wordt gedefinieerd als inherent ‘traumatisch’. In dit hoofdstuk werk ik deze tegen-
intuïtieve logica uit. Daarbij zal duidelijk worden dat herstel van trauma een ‘ethische act’ 
veronderstelt, en dus niet louter een medico-technische kwestie is.   
In Hoofdstuk 7 bespreek ik het concept van het reële in relatie tot politiek. Daarbij sluit ik aan 
bij een aantal filosofen en traumaonderzoekers die in de verstoringen van het reële de 
drijvende kracht zien achter innovaties in het socio-symbolische veld. Ruptuur in het 
symbolische wordt in deze theorieën gelieerd aan politieke innovatie. Echter, de traumatische 
impact van dergelijke breuken in het maatschappelijke veld, en het persoonlijke leed dat deze 
veroorzaken, kreeg tot op heden weinig aandacht binnen deze socio-politieke theorieën. Dat 
brengt ons tot een ogenschijnlijke tegenstelling en een moreel dilemma: waar politieke 
theorieën het reële zien als de mogelijkheidsvoorwaarde voor verandering, en bijgevolg 
pleiten voor het zo lang mogelijk openhouden van de kloof van het reële, is het klinisch-
therapeutisch devies om dit traumatiserende reële zo snel mogelijk af te sluiten en zo het 
psychische lijden te verlichten.  
In Hoofdstuk 8, ten slotte, breng ik de velden van trauma, ethiek en politiek samen via het 
concept van het reële. Ik toon aan dat psychologisch-cognitieve traumatheorieën een logische 





aan ‘de nieuwe traumagerelateerde informatie’. Hier wordt een essentiële stap overgeslagen, 
in de zin dat deze theorieën datgene wat door het subject geconstrueerd moet worden (de 
betekenis van het trauma) als gegeven aannemen. Ik beargumenteer dat de Lacaniaanse notie 
van de act aangewend kan worden om dit niet-onderkende doch cruciale aspect in de 
behandeling van trauma te conceptualiseren. Bovendien is het precies deze gemaskeerde 
dimensie van de act die een alternatieve ethische positie vereist en een pad opent naar 
collectieve actie en sociale verandering. Op deze manier kan tevens een uitweg geboden 
worden voor het morele dilemma dat in Hoofdstuk 7 werd opgeworpen. 
 
Resultaten per Hoofdstuk 
Uit de historische analyse van Hoofdstuk 1 blijkt dat evoluties in het denken rond trauma 
steeds gelieerd zijn aan ontwikkelingen in het morele klimaat van de maatschappijen waarin 
het vraagstuk van trauma zich aandient. Operationeel uitgedrukt: het dominante vertoog van 
die maatschappij. Voor de aanvaarding van bepaalde ideeën is het van het grootste belang of 
de mensen die zich aanbieden met traumatische symptomatologie gezien worden als 
simulanten, als passieve slachtoffers of als geprivilegieerde getuigen van een zijde van het 
leven die normaal aan het zicht onttrokken is. Omgekeerd hebben de theoretische denkkaders 
rond trauma een impact op de manier waarop deze mensen worden gepercipieerd.  
Daarnaast zien we dat politieke, sociale en economische gegevenheden steeds een rol spelen 
in het denken rond psychisch trauma. Deze gegevenheden genereren een context waarin 
sommige ideeën beter gedijen en aan populariteit winnen – ten koste van alternatieve 
mogelijkheden. Ons huidig begrip van traumatische pathologie, geconsolideerd in het 
construct van PTSS, valt niet zomaar eenduidig af te lezen uit deze fenomenen. Verschillende 
verklaringsmodellen zijn mogelijk, en de keuze tussen alternatieven gebeurt niet steeds op 
basis van wetenschappelijke argumenten. In de context van de spoorwegongevallen en 
Railway Spine speelden economische motieven een rol in de aanvaarding en populariteit van 
bepaalde ‘psychologische’ modellen ten koste van andere. Ten tijde van Wereldoorlog I en 
Shell Shock betrof het een politieke/militaire noodzaak die zich daarin liet gevoelen. De 
definiëring van PTSS werd in grote mate beïnvloed door de wensen van militante 




beweging, die niet alleen het eigen lijden erkend wilden krijgen maar ook eisten dat de 
externe gebeurtenis werd aangeduid als de oorzaak van hun psychische problemen. 
Tot slot leert deze historische analyse dat psychisch trauma zich slechts zeer moeilijk laat 
vastpinnen in een academisch weten. Als trauma dubbel bestudeerd moet worden, dan kunnen 
we niet anders dan vaststellen dat er op dit moment een vrij grote consensus bestaat tussen het 
dominante traumamodel aan de ene kant en de maatschappelijke perceptie van deze 
fenomenen aan de andere. De komst van PTSS stelde een einde aan een reeds lang woekerend 
en hevig debat aangaande de vraag naar het respectievelijke aandeel van interne en externe 
factoren in het ontstaan van traumatische pathologie: de externe gebeurtenis werd voortaan 
gezien als de determinerende factor. Het PTSS-model voelt juist en vanzelfsprekend aan. Net 
daarom roept het verbazing op als wetenschappelijke studies de grondslagen ervan 
ondergraven (zie Rosen & Lilienfeld, 2008), of als blijkt dat de toepassing ervan paradoxale 
effecten produceert (Summerfield, 1999; Watters, 2010). Bewustzijn van de geschiedenis van 
traumastudies maakt het makkelijker om de vanzelfsprekendheid en neutraliteit van het 
huidige, biomedische traumabegrip ter discussie te stellen.  
De bespreking van de empirische evidentie rond traumatische etiologie in Hoofdstuk 2 doet 
ernstige twijfel rijzen over de adequaatheid van Criterium A van de PTSS-diagnose. Dit 
criterium werd ingevoerd om een onderscheid te maken tussen problemen die ontstaan na 
confrontatie met een ‘minder zware’ stressor of life event, en die dus te maken zouden hebben 
met een specifieke, individuele kwetsbaarheid voor dergelijke gebeurtenis (te diagnosticeren 
als Aanpassingsstoornis volgens de richtlijnen van de DSM), en problemen die ontstaan na 
confrontatie met een ‘traumatische stressor’, en dus voortvloeien uit de aard van deze 
gebeurtenis zelf (PTSS). Het symptomaal beeld is voor beide stoornissen identiek, maar er 
wordt een ander onderliggend pathologisch mechanisme verondersteld voor beide diagnoses. 
Deze veronderstelling laat zich echter niet empirisch bevestigen.  
Studies tonen aan dat het quasi onmogelijk is om te voorspellen welk soort gebeurtenis 
traumatiserend zal zijn (in de zin van het produceren van het traumatische symptoombeeld), 
op basis van een lijst vooraf bepaalde, ‘objectieve’ karakteristieken van de gebeurtenis – wat 
de zin van een Criterium A ernstig ter discussie stelt. Een traumatische reactie blijkt 
daarentegen afhankelijk van de ontmoeting tussen een singulier subject en een bepaalde 
gebeurtenis. De uitdaging is om te conceptualiseren hoe subjectieve dimensies een rol spelen 





stigmatisering, beschuldiging en verwerping van de traumapatiënt). Een analyse van het 
veronderstelde etiologische mechanisme achter PTSS toont verder aan dat uitgestelde 
traumatische reacties bijzonder moeilijk te verklaren zijn binnen dit model.  
Beide kwesties kunnen anders benaderd worden door uit te gaan van logische tijd in het 
ontstaan van traumatische problemen in plaats van vast te houden aan een chronologische 
(diachrone) tijdsopvatting. Een bespreking van het mechanisme van Nachträglichkeit, aan de 
hand van een Freudiaans klinisch vignet over de behandeling van Emma Eckstein, leert dat 
uitgestelde traumatische reacties het gevolg zijn van een verlate realisatie van de traumatische 
betekenis van wat ooit gebeurd is. Het betreft hier dus een trauma dat geconstitueerd wordt 
door twee momenten in plaats van één. Waar de ervaring van die eerste gebeurtenis niet 
resulteert in traumatische pathologie (en dus niet automatisch ‘traumatiserend’ werkt), blijkt 
de herinnering aan die gebeurtenis op een logisch verwant moment wel traumatiserend te 
worden. Het vernieuwende aan deze studie is dat ze duidelijk maakt dat de subjectief 
toegankelijke herinnering aan de eerdere ervaring slechts gevormd wordt en traumatiserend 
werkt in het licht van de huidige psychische architectuur, die slechts werd opgebouwd na het 
feitelijke voorval. Het is dus slechts in het licht van de actuele psychische opmaak dat de 
herinnering aan een vroegere gebeurtenis traumatiserend wordt, waar ze dat voorheen niet 
was. Dat betekent dat een gebeurtenis niet ‘inherent’ traumatiserend is, op basis van bepaalde 
objectieve karakteristieken (intensiteit, geweld, seksualiteit), maar dat het traumatiserende 
precies schuilt in de manier waarop een gebeurtenis de actuele psychische economie van het 
subject in kwestie raakt, in de manier waarop ze resoneert met de rest van het psychische 
materiaal. Tevens toont dit aan dat het initiële ontbreken van betekenis op zichzelf geen 
aanleiding geeft tot trauma; het is pas wanneer de betekenis van het initiële voorval achteraf 
wordt gerealiseerd, en niet kan worden geassumeerd, dat de problemen ontstaan.  
In Hoofdstuk 3 beargumenteer ik dat het de vooronderstelde universele validiteit van de 
PTSS-diagnose is die een bepaalde (depolitiserende) hantering van deze kennis mogelijk 
maakt. De assumpties van universaliteit, objectiviteit en neutraliteit zijn verweven met het 
biomedisch ziektemodel, dat psychische stoornissen beschouwt als natural kinds: ziekte-
entiteiten die in ongewijzigde vorm doorheen de geschiedenis en over culturele grenzen heen 
een ontologische kern hebben. De primaire data van psychiatrisch onderzoek (symptomen en 
medische tekens) worden beschouwd als onafhankelijk van de theorie of de methode waarmee 




wetenschappelijke vereisten die binnen dit biomedisch model gesteld worden om een 
syndroom te infereren, beschikt het niettemin over een wetenschappelijk aura. De claim dat 
PTSS een realiteit vat die universeel, objectief en neutraal is, functioneert als justificatie voor 
de manieren waarop dit psychiatrisch traumamodel in de praktijk wordt ingezet.  
Mijn analyse leert echter dat PTSS stoelt op een aantal nauwelijks onderkende kernassumpties 
die niet universeel gedeeld zijn (de focus op het individu, de veronderstelling van een 
universeel menselijk subject, cognitieve theorie van informatieverwerking, betekenis die 
intra-individueel wordt geconstitueerd, enz.). Een historisch perspectief toont de culturele 
bepaaldheid van deze diagnose verder aan (zie ook Hoofdstuk 1). In combinatie met het 
gebrek aan empirische evidentie om deze categorie te valideren, suggereert dit dat de 
psychiatrische kennis rond PTSS niet gezien kan worden als universeel, neutraal of objectief: 
ook PTSS is een culturele constructie, en dit heeft gevolgen voor de interventies die op deze 
kennis zijn gebaseerd. 
Psychologische spoedinterventies komen vaak neer op ‘het toedienen van psychologie’: de 
lokale populatie wordt onderwezen in psychologische theorieën. De hulpbehoevenden moeten 
de dubbele positie innemen van tegelijk subject en object van de psychologie te zijn: ze 
worden geacht de blik van de academische psychologie over te nemen om hun eigen 
innerlijke leefwereld te onderzoeken in termen die aangereikt worden door de 
hulpverstrekkers. Deze aliënatie in de betekenaars van de Ander schrijft de gepaste emoties en 
reacties voor op normaliserende en normatieve wijze. Bovendien zet het de hulpbehoevenden 
vast in de passieve positie van ‘de student’. Dit mondt uit in een sterk gepolitiseerde 
humanitaire hulp, die het terrein ter plaatse depolitiseert. Het is precies de claim dat PTSS een 
universele realiteit beschrijft (en zich dus ‘voorbij ideologie’ bevindt) die toelaat om dit 
model dwingend op te leggen. De politieke dimensie van PTSS bestaat er dus in dat 
problemen die hun oorsprong hebben in een bepaalde sociale, politieke of economische 
context worden geherdefinieerd en gelokaliseerd binnen een biomedisch discours. Terwijl een 
medische interventieroute wordt geopend, worden alternatieve vormen van interventie 
afgesloten. Aldus wordt een bepaald economisch, sociaal of politiek status quo in de hand 
gewerkt. De focus op het individu, die verweven is met de dominantie van een cognitief 
psychologisch perspectief in het onderzoek naar traumatische fenomenen, zorgt er verder voor 






Een korte bespreking van Alain Badious kritiek op de ethiek van mensenrechten in Hoofdstuk 
4 legt een aantal parallellen bloot met de problemen rond PTSS die in Hoofdstuk 3 werden 
uitgediept. In beide gevallen wordt ervan uitgegaan dat de mens in staat is om a priori de 
manifestaties van het kwade/trauma te herkennen, onafhankelijk van de sociale, culturele, 
economische of politieke context in kwestie. In beide gevallen leidt de focus op gemakkelijk 
te herkennen manifestaties van het kwade/trauma tot interventies die gericht zijn op de in het 
oog springende oppervlaktefenomenen die ermee gepaard gaan, zonder een analyse te maken 
van de context en specificiteit van het probleem. Er wordt met andere woorden op symptomen 
gewerkt, en niet op oorzaken. In beide vertogen wordt tot slot een universeel psychologisch 
subject verondersteld dat gedefinieerd wordt in zijn of haar kwetsbaarheid: dit subject wordt 
gezien als aangeboren, a-contextueel, geïsoleerd en fragiel. Dit zorgt opnieuw voor een 
gebrek aan aandacht voor contextuele factoren in de determinering van subjectiviteit. Tot slot 
reduceren beide vertogen de ander tot het statuut van ‘slachtoffer’.  
Op deze manier vormt zich de hypothese dat het PTSS-model sterk verweven is met de 
ethische uitgangspositie van het mensenrechtenvertoog. De alomtegenwoordigheid van het 
mensenrechtendiscours en van PTSS signaleert mogelijks de conditie van de Westerse mens 
die zich, met het heengaan van de klassieke vormen van autoriteit en de teloorgang van de 
collectieve, grote verhalen, in een ‘post-traditioneel vacuüm van betekenis’ bevindt. Als 
trauma een ‘crisis van betekenis’ is, dan kan deze stoornis gezien worden als de prototypische 
existentiële conditie van Westerse, post-traditionele maatschappijen. De spectaculaire opmars 
en alomtegenwoordigheid van het traumadiscours gedurende de afgelopen drie decennia kan 
dan gezien worden als een effect van de Westerse blik, die de eigen problemen overal om zich 
heen ontwaart – eerder dan dat deze het gevolg is van wetenschappelijke vooruitgang op het 
vlak van de theoretische kennis rond trauma. De analyse in dit hoofdstuk toont de 
verwevenheid tussen trauma, ethiek en politiek, en suggereert de nood om de relaties tussen 
deze velden te conceptualiseren. 
In Hoofdstuk 5 leert een lezing van Lacans gepubliceerde teksten en seminaries dat er twee 
belangrijke opvattingen zijn van het concept van het reële. Het presymbolische reële wordt 
gezien als een domein van onmiddellijke ervaring, de brute sensoriële ervaring die nooit het 
bewustzijn bereikt zonder gefilterd te worden door symbolische representatie via het 
geheugen, het ego of diverse neurologische banen die onze zintuiglijke ervaring mediëren en 




gestructureerd door het symbolische en imaginaire register, die het (mis)representeren. 
Bijvoorbeeld: in zijn theorie over het spiegelstadium stelt Lacan dat identificatie met een 
geünificeerd lichaamsbeeld de chaotische diversiteit van het reële lichaam overdekt in de 
vroegkinderlijke ontwikkeling, en dat deze (mis)kenning het prille proto-ego constitueert. 
Trauma wordt binnen de theorie van het presymbolische reële begrepen als het gevolg van 
een confrontatie met dat stuk van het reële dat niet kan worden gesymboliseerd, dat stuk dat is 
achtergebleven en nooit de overgang naar het symbolico-imaginaire heeft gemaakt.   
De presymbolische opvatting van het reële houdt vast aan een chronologisch perspectief. 
Echter, het idee van het reële als een domein van het bestaan voor de komst van de betekenaar 
of de taal kan nooit meer zijn dan een achteraf-constructie, gezien we als spreekwezens altijd-
reeds in de taal gegrepen zijn. Bovendien mist een definitie van het reële als traumatisch-in-
zichzelf het punt dat iets enkel en alleen traumatisch kan zijn in relatie tot iets anders: trauma 
kan alleen gedacht worden als een breuk met een pre-existerend representationeel systeem. 
Het poststymbolische reële is dan ook beter geschikt om traumatische fenomenen te 
begrijpen. Deze opvatting van het reële keert het intuïtieve, traditionele begrip van trauma op 
zijn kop: het idee is niet langer dat het symbolische ‘verstoord’ wordt door de aanwezigheid 
van een verstorend, traumatisch, reëel element, maar dat het traumatiserende reële zelf een 
manifestatie is van de reeds aanwezige ‘verstoring’ die uitgaat van het symbolisch systeem 
zelf. Het reële is iets dat ontstaat als een soort exces ten gevolge van het proces van 
symbolisering; het pre-existeert het symbolische dus niet. De drie registers (imaginair, 
symbolisch en reëel) moeten eerder als gelijkoorspronkelijk worden begrepen. Echter, 
subjectief kan het reële slechts ervaren worden als een ‘leegte’ in de betekenaarsketting die 
het pulserende verschijnen van het subject onderstut. Mijn studie leert dat de determinering 
van het symbolische gericht is op een confrontatie met het reële exces dat het produceert, 
maar dat deze ontmoeting keer op keer een ‘gemiste ontmoeting’ is. Het reële functioneert als 
oorzaak van de betekenaarsketting. 
In Hoofdstuk 6 traceer ik een ander aspect van het reële, dat door Lacan aangeduid wordt als 
‘het niet-bestaan van de Ander van de Ander’ of de ‘gebarreerde Ander’. Daarmee doelt hij 
op het feit dat er in het symbolische systeem structureel een element ontbreekt, met name dat 
element dat het zou kunnen funderen. Echter, het is slechts in confrontatie met deze kloof (het 
tekort in de Ander) dat het subject in leven geroepen wordt, op een punt waar de 





tekort in de Ander, is met andere woorden de mogelijkheidsvoorwaarde voor het verschijnen 
van het subject en dus voor ethiek als dusdanig. Het is via de ethische act dat het subject de 
plaats inneemt van de ontbrekende Ander van de Ander. Daarmee bedoelt Lacan dat wanneer 
het subject bijvoorbeeld gedreven wordt door een onweerstaanbare ‘externe’ invloed, het nog 
steeds het subject is dat deze externe drijfveer als maxime voor zijn of haar gedrag 
geïnstalleerd heeft. De Lacaniaanse psychoanalyse stelt, met andere woorden, dat het subject 
verantwoordelijk is voor het onbewuste dat hem of haar in een bepaalde richting stuwt.   
In dit hoofdstuk worden voorts de Kantiaanse wortels van de psychoanalytische ethiek 
verduidelijkt. Om als ethisch gekwalificeerd te kunnen worden, moet een daad volgens Kant 
niet alleen in overeenstemming zijn met de plicht; de plicht moet daarnaast het enige motief 
zijn voor de daad. Die laatste vereiste is een soort ‘nutteloos’ surplus, dat nergens voor dient 
(in de zin dat de uitkomst van de daad identiek blijft) maar voor Kant niettemin alle verschil 
maakt (ethisch of niet). Voor Kant is de categorische imperatief het rationele principe dat kan 
functioneren als een moreel kompas, zonder nog langer te steunen op een garanderende Ander 
(God, de natuur, enz.). Het principe van de categorische imperatief veronderstelt dat het 
particuliere (in de zin van een bepaalde actie in de concreetheid van een specifieke situatie) 
wordt verheven tot het universele (cf. ‘handel slechts in overeenstemming met een maxime 
waarvan je tegelijkertijd kan willen dat het een algemene wet wordt’). Kant stelt dat de mens 
pas vrij kan zijn als hij zich losmaakt van zijn eigen determineringen (gaande van de meest 
basale driften, over diepmenselijke emoties, tot de meest verheven idealen die iemands acties 
bepalen). Hij stelt daarbij noch de adequaatheid van dergelijke drijfveren noch de 
motivationele kracht ervan ter discussie; zijn visie is simpelweg dat deze geen rol mogen 
spelen in de keuze voor een bepaalde actie opdat die als ‘ethisch’ zou kunnen worden 
gekwalificeerd.  
Lacan sluit aan bij deze principes maar bekritiseert Kant op twee punten. Ten eerste stelt hij 
dat Kant het subject van het uitspreken (sujet de l’énonciation) van een bepaald maxime uit 
het oog verliest. Ten tweede stelt Lacan dat ethische daden niet onmogelijk zijn voor de mens, 
en dat ze – ondanks de kloof tussen de onzuivere wil van het subject en de ethische daad zelf 
– wel degelijk voorkomen. Kants imperatief lijkt afgeroepen te worden vanuit een ‘asubjectief 
nergens’. Een gevolg daarvan is dat dit principe opgevat kan worden als een soort 
lakmoesproef die het ethisch gehalte van een bepaalde handeling voor eens en voor altijd 




ethiek is altijd gebonden aan een concrete situatie en aan een bepaald subject. Het is dus niet 
zo dat het universele vertaald moet worden om het te kunnen toepassen in concrete situaties; 
het universele wordt slechts als dusdanig geponeerd via de ethische act van het subject. Het 
probleem met het idee van universele plichten, die ‘reeds getest’ zijn aan de hand van de 
categorische imperatief, is dat ze gerecupereerd worden tot het niveau van een wet. Aldus 
verliezen ze precies de ethische dimensie, met name de act die aan de wet voorafgaat en deze 
fundeert. Via Sade toont Lacan dat het precies het zich verschuilen achter een geconstitueerde 
wet is dat het perverse genot mogelijk maakt: de pervert loochent het eigen genot en 
presenteert zich als het instrument van het genot van de Ander, als de trouwe dienaar van de 
Wet. Dus: waar Kant aantoonde dat een mens zich niet kan verschuilen achter het welzijn van 
de Ander (of het zelf) om zijn plicht te verzaken, toont Lacan dat het omgekeerde evenzeer 
niet opgaat. Een mens kan zich niet verschuilen achter ‘zijn plicht’ om de eigen daden te 
verantwoorden. Ethiek kan, met andere woorden, nooit gerecupereerd worden in een serie 
voorschriften die door iedereen in elke situatie moeten worden gevolgd (moraal).  
De inzet van deze studie over ethiek is de volgende: Lacan maakt duidelijk dat het subject, in 
de confrontatie met de zinloosheid van het reële en het niet-bestaan van de Ander van de 
Ander, gedwongen wordt om te reageren met een ethische act. Paradoxaal genoeg stelt hij 
voorts dat het subject een effect is van deze act. Wanneer we dit betrekken op trauma, waar 
het subject eveneens wordt geïnterpelleerd door een zinloos reële, dan volgt daaruit dat het 
‘herstel’ van trauma een ethische dimensie omvat. Meer bepaald: het is mijn stelling dat het 
subject op de inbreuk van het reële moet antwoorden met een dergelijke ethische act – voorbij 
een focus op een medico-technische verbalisering of symbolisering (zie Deel II). De 
kenmerken van deze act worden uitgewerkt in Hoofdstuk 8.  
In Hoofdstuk 7 knoop ik aan bij het werk van een aantal filosofen en politicologen die het 
concept van het reële inzetten om maatschappelijke (politieke, culturele, economische) 
evoluties te begrijpen. Het idee is dat de realiteit een socio-symbolische en fantasmatisch 
onderstutte constructie is. Deze sociale constructie heeft de functie om een bepaald 
ondraaglijk reële te verhullen en om het verlangen en het genot te kanaliseren. Het reële wordt 
hier geconceptualiseerd als een surplus dat in deze socio-symbolische articulatie wordt 
gegenereerd, en dat het potentieel heeft om deze specifieke articulatie van de realiteit te 
ontwrichten. Het reële toont zich van tijd tot tijd wanneer de realiteit wordt gedestabiliseerd 





een einde aan een welgeordende sociale wereld en ondergraaft de zekerheden waarop deze 
gestoeld is. Het installeert een crisis waarbinnen we de limieten van onze betekenisverlenende 
structuren ervaren (Stavrakakis, 1999, p. 67). Verschillende auteurs situeren in deze reële 
dislocaties de oorzaak van maatschappelijke veranderingsprocessen: de ontmoeting met het 
tekort in de Ander, met diens instabiliteit en arbitrariteit, stimuleren het verlangen om dit 
ondraaglijke reële opnieuw te overdekken met nieuwe representaties. Echter, klinisch gezien 
is het precies deze confrontatie met het reële (en het imploderen van de symbolico-imaginaire 
coördinaten die de identiteit van de betrokken personen fixeren) die traumatiserend werkt.  
Lacans specifieke conceptie van het subject en van de Ander toont hoe de destabilisering van 
de sociale orde verweven kan zijn met problemen op persoonlijk vlak. Onze identiteit en 
subjectiviteit bestaan niet in onafhankelijkheid van de Ander. Wanneer deze Ander wordt 
‘ontmaskerd’ en zijn autoriteit verliest (omdat bijvoorbeeld blijkt dat de staat, als ‘vaderlijke’ 
instantie die normaliter de wet garandeert en de eigen burgers beschermt, zelf de wetten 
overtreedt of haar burgers aanvalt), kan dit gevolgen hebben op persoonlijk of individueel 
vlak. Gezien ook de eigen identiteit, verlangens, fantasieën en sociale netwerken intiem 
verbonden zijn met en gevormd zijn door de Ander, die op een dergelijk moment van ruptuur 
wordt getoond in zijn tekort en arbitrariteit, zal de destabilisatie van dit overkoepelende 
symbolische systeem een impact hebben op de persoonlijke ervaring. De eigen intimiteit 
wordt dan gereveleerd als iets extiem: ze is gebouwd op en gevormd naar de wet van een 
Ander die tot voor de traumatische breuk als absoluut werd ervaren. Wanneer deze Ander 
wankelt, wankelt ook de ervaring van het zelf – wat kan leiden tot psychische problemen. 
Nog anders gesteld: sociale rupturen kunnen het gevoel van ‘ontologische veiligheid’, 
geschraagd door de positie die iemand heeft in het symbolische, ernstig verstoren.  
Politieke theorieën die het reële centraal stellen, beargumenteren dat grootschalige 
maatschappelijke verstoringen toelaten om ‘het moment van het politieke’ te identificeren. Dit 
‘politiek moment’ duidt de transitie aan van een confrontatie, in een moment van ruptuur, met 
negativiteit en het tekort naar de positivisering van dit reële via een subjectieve act. In het 
moment van het politieke neemt het subject de verantwoordelijkheid op zich om een 
antwoord te formuleren op de zinloosheid van het reële. Opnieuw mondt mijn analyse uit in 
de dimensie van de act, ditmaal als een scharnierconcept om politieke evoluties te begrijpen. 
De act is één van de mogelijke subjectieve antwoorden op de verstoringen van het reële – een 




het licht van dat reële. Deze dimensie van de act ontbreekt in huidige besprekingen van 
trauma. Het is mijn hypothese dat dit concept cruciaal is om processen van ruptuur, zowel 
binnen de kliniek als binnen de maatschappij, te begrijpen. 
In Hoofdstuk 8 wordt deze act geconceptualiseerd aan de hand van het werk van Lacan, Žižek 
en Badiou. Ik weerhoud daarbij volgende kenmerken van de act. De act is niet de manifeste 
uitdrukking van een reeds geconstitueerde, onderliggende subjectiviteit of verlangen. Het is 
slechts via een act dat een bepaald verlangen en een vorm van subjectiviteit ‘neerslaat’. Een 
act transformeert het subject, in de zin dat het subject na de act niet meer hetzelfde subject is 
van voor de act. Een act is tevens verweven met het symbolische en behelst niet enkel een 
reële zijde. De act inaugureert een nieuwe symbolische structuur in hetzelfde moment dat hij 
in de oude structuur een radicale verschuiving bewerkstelligt. De act presteert iets wat 
voorheen als ‘onmogelijk’ werd aanzien: hij presenteert of demonstreert iets unheimlichs dat 
de bestaande symbolische structuur verstoort en destabiliseert. De act overschrijdt, met andere 
woorden, steeds de limieten van een gegeven socio-symbolische realiteit. Het is mede de 
wijziging in het socio-symbolische veld die de mutatie van het subject bewerkstelligt. Ten 
derde vindt een act steeds plaats op het punt waar men op het reële botst. Waar de Ander 
getekend is door een tekort, waar de Ander niet (langer) gegarandeerd is, daar moet men in 
complete eenzaamheid, los van de Ander, een act stellen waarvan de uitkomst nooit 
gegarandeerd is. De act is steeds onzeker, omdat hij zich niet kan funderen op bestaande 
kennis. Ook voor de actor zelf is de act opaak en onvoorspelbaar; het is slechts mogelijk om 
er achteraf, in een retroactieve beweging, verantwoordelijkheid voor te nemen. De dimensie 
van de act veronderstelt een soort gok, in de zin dat op het moment van de act de uitkomst 
ervan ongekend is. Echter, de act wordt gekenmerkt door een anticiperende zekerheid: dankzij 
de veranderingen die de act teweegbrengt in het sociale veld ontstaat de mogelijkheid om de 
act te valideren. De act wordt verifieerbaar in het licht van het kennisregime van de nieuw-
geconstitueerde realiteit. 
Doorheen de analyse in Hoofdstuk 8 wordt aangetoond dat de act een rol speel in zowel de 
besloten context van een psychoanalyse als in de macrocontext van politieke veranderingen. 
De parallel met Badious theorie van ‘het evenement’ benadrukt dat een confrontatie met het 
reële (zoals het geval is bij trauma) niet gereduceerd kan worden tot een incompatibiliteit 
tussen twee symbolische formaties. Dat betekent onder meer dat de modificaties die vereist 





gezegd is het precies deze dimensie van de act die in de gebruikelijke (psychologische) 
traumatheorieën wordt veronachtzaamd. Badious filosofie maakt tevens duidelijk dat het 
evenement enkel retroactief kan worden gelezen, en dat deze lezing een modificatie van de 
sociale context veronderstelt. Wanneer we dit toepassen op de problematiek van trauma, dan 
betekent dit dat herstel niet slechts te maken heeft met de intrapsychische metabolisering van 
het traumatische incident, maar dat het een herwerking van de sociale context (en de relatie 
van het subject tot de Ander) vereist. Het is slechts door de constructie van een nieuwe sociale 
realiteit dat men grip kan krijgen op het reële dat de voorgaande sociale orde heeft doorkruist. 
Naar analogie met Badious theorie over de subjectivering van het evenement, besluit ik dat 
deze herwerking van de Ander een langdurig en volgehouden proces behelst: na de flits van 
de act kan er zich een subject vormen dat trouw is aan deze act, en dat deze act articuleert met 
de andere elementen van de voorafgaande situatie. Op deze manier wordt een nieuwe context 
stap voor stap gegenereerd.  
 
Discussie 
In Deel I van dit doctoraatsproefschrift wordt nader ingegaan op de etiologie van trauma. 
Daarbij wordt, aan de hand van een bespreking van het Freudiaanse concept Nachträglichkeit, 
aangetoond dat uitgestelde traumatische reacties en traumatische reacties na blootstelling aan 
een niet-Criterium A stressor in sommige gevallen gerelateerd zijn. De traumatische impact 
van een ogenschijnlijk triviale gebeurtenis is dan afkomstig van de associatie met een 
vroegere gebeurtenis, die zelf evenwel gedurende lange tijd zonder pathologische gevolgen is 
gebleven. Traumatische pathologie blijkt hier het gevolg te zijn van de ‘uitgestelde’ vorming 
van een traumatische herinnering aan de lang vervlogen gebeurtenis. Waar Freud trauma 
initieel verbond met de ‘premature seksuele ervaring’, blijkt uit mijn bespreking dat het 
mechanisme van Nachträglichkeit ook werkzaam is voorbij de structurering van het subject in 
de Oedipale fase. Deze studie maakt aanschouwelijk dat het onmogelijk is om traumatische 
pathologie te voorspellen op basis van een lijst a priori parameters; de psychische reactie is 
afhankelijk van de specifieke combinatie tussen een stressor en een persoon. Het besproken 
mechanisme toont één manier waarop persoonlijke achtergrond en de kenmerken van een 
situatie met elkaar interageren om de effecten van een gebeurtenis te determineren. Bovendien 




gegeven is; het is steeds mogelijk om de valentie van een gebeurtenis te wijzigen op basis van 
nieuwe elementen.  
Traumatische pathologie wordt in vele psychologische theorieën gedefinieerd als het gevolg 
van de ontwrichting van een betekenisverlenend kader. De vraag is op welke manier betekenis 
gegenereerd wordt. Waar cognitieve psychologische theorieën de nadruk leggen op de 
intrapsychische constructie van betekenis, verlenen andere denkkaders een centralere plaats 
aan de context om betekenis te produceren. Het eigene aan trauma lijkt er in ieder geval in te 
bestaan dat er geen weg terug is naar de status quo ante. De pogingen van het psychische 
systeem om het traumatische evenement te integreren in de pretraumatische psychische 
economie mislukken steeds, waardoor het zich blijft aandienen ter bewerking. Daaruit 
distilleerde ik de definitie dat herstel van trauma een ‘herstructurering van het subject’ vereist 
– wat uiteraard de vraag oproept hoe dit verder moet worden begrepen. In Deel III van dit 
doctoraat werkte ik een kader uit om aan te tonen dat de ‘herstructurering van het subject’ niet 
louter intrapsychisch dient opgevat te worden, maar dat dit tevens een herwerking van (de 
relatie van het subject tot) de Ander vraagt.  
In Hoofdstuk 2 breng ik een aantal empirische bevindingen uit het traumaonderzoek in 
articulatie met een weinig gekend stuk psychoanalytische theorie. Uit deze studie kunnen 
empirisch testbare hypotheses worden gegenereerd voor verder onderzoek. Zo werden reeds 
een aantal masterproefprojecten gestart waarbij aan de hand van casusmateriaal (verbatim 
getranscribeerde therapiesessies) werd nagegaan op welke manieren de gebeurtenis die de 
psychische klachten had ingeleid, samenhangt met andere factoren in iemands psychisch 
functioneren en elementen uit de levensgeschiedenis van de cliënt. De studie beschreven in 
Hoofdstuk 2 pleit met andere woorden voor de investering in casusconstructie, zowel binnen 
empirisch therapieonderzoek als binnen het diagnostische en het therapeutische klinische 
proces zelf. Het is de betekenaarsketting, het narratief materiaal dat in de analyse 
geproduceerd wordt, die de context vormt van waaruit de singuliere logica achter iemands 
psychische klachten kan worden begrepen.  
Het idee dat trauma niet rechtstreeks voortvloeit uit de kenmerken van de gebeurtenis op zich 
heeft bovendien verregaande implicaties voor de manier waarop humanitaire hulpverlening 
wordt opgevat. Het is precies het idee dat we de impact van een gebeurtenis op een individu 
kunnen voorspellen dat deze interventies onderstut. Op deze problematiek wordt nader 





huidige, dominante traumaopvatting is uitgegroeid tot een ‘gedeelde waarheid’ in het Westen, 
het niet lukt om deze waarheid ook empirisch te bevestigen. Een aantal problemen met PTSS 
worden gelinkt aan het biomedische ziektemodel dat sedert 1980 richting geeft aan de 
psychiatrische diagnostiek (de nadruk op het individu, de preoccupatie met ‘immaterieel 
herstel’, de moeilijkheden om context te verrekenen, een technische aanpak die de ethische 
dimensie van traumaherstel mist, en een depolitisering die een economisch of politiek status 
quo in de hand werkt). Bovendien wordt de hypothese ontwikkeld dat de 
alomtegenwoordigheid van trauma in onze maatschappij te maken kan hebben met een 
‘ethische crisis’ die ‘post-traditionele’ samenlevingen kenmerkt. Deze analyses tonen 
voornamelijk de noodzaak aan om het biomedische perspectief op trauma uit te breiden met 
modellen die het subject, de context, en de politieke dimensie van trauma includeren. Hoewel 
er in diverse academische disciplines aanzetten gegeven zijn om dergelijke modellen te 
ontwikkelen, is dit in de klinische en praktische realiteit veel minder het geval. Verder 
conceptueel werk is nodig om concrete interventies te ontwikkelen die in staat zijn om de 
geïdentificeerde problemen van het PTSS-model in situ het hoofd te bieden. 
Tot slot wordt in het derde deel van het doctoraatsproefschrift een aanzet gegeven om de 
relaties tussen trauma, ethiek en politiek te denken. De noodzaak daartoe vloeit voort uit de 
analyse in Deel II. Daarbij worden de initiële onderzoeksvragen evenwel in het achterhoofd 
gehouden: de traumabenadering moet toelaten om context in rekening te brengen; ze moet de 
focus op het individu overstijgen; ze moet de politieke dimensie van trauma onderkennen. De 
oplossing voor deze problemen is mijns inziens niet om een psychologische benadering in te 
ruilen voor een sociologische. Het doel is veeleer om deze dichotomie te destabiliseren. 
Daartoe steun ik op het Lacaniaanse begrippenkader, met speciale aandacht voor de concepten 
van het reële, het subject, de Ander, en de act.  
De decontextualisering die gepaard gaat met de PTSS-benadering van trauma wordt 
gecounterd door de veronderstelling dat elke samenleving gekenmerkt wordt door een eigen 
symbolico-imaginaire realiteit. Deze realiteit wordt consistent gemaakt via een serie 
singuliere fantasieën, narratieven en ‘knooppunten’ (nodal points of points de capiton). Wat 
dus geldig is in één cultuur, is dat niet noodzakelijk in een andere. Als trauma minimaal 
gedefinieerd wordt als een breuk met ‘wat is’, als de confrontatie met een exces dat weerstand 
biedt aan de recuperatie in het vooraf-bestaande, betekenisverlenende kader, en net daarom 




voor één cultuur of persoon dat niet per se is voor een andere. Het is onmogelijk te 
voorspellen wat traumatiserend is voor een ander, en dit geldt des te meer wanneer dit 
betracht wordt op basis van kennis die werd ontwikkeld in andere contexten dan degene waar 
ze wordt toegepast. 
Merk op dat de hier geschetste benadering tevens toelaat ons begrip van trauma te verruimen 
om ook ‘gradueel’ of ‘cumulatief’ trauma (insidious trauma) een plaats te geven. De laatste 
jaren hebben diverse onderzoekers de opvatting bekritiseerd dat trauma veroorzaakt wordt 
door plotse, onverwachte catastrofes – tegen een achtergrond van relatieve stabiliteit en 
welbevinden. Deze opvatting zou vooral gepast zijn om de trauma’s van mensen in sociaal 
dominante posities te denken. De notie van cumulatief trauma werd ontwikkeld door Maria 
Root en recenter opgepikt door Laura Brown, om de traumatogene effecten aan te duiden van 
‘vormen van verdrukking die niet noodzakelijk openlijk gewelddadig of bedreigend voor de 
fysieke integriteit zijn op een enkel, afgelijnd moment, maar die niettemin schade toebrengen 
aan de ziel’ (Brown, 1995, p. 107, eigen vertaling). De idee van cumulatief trauma zou beter 
geschikt zijn om belangrijke aspecten van de trauma’s van onderdrukte groepen te vatten. Het 
besproken model maakt het mogelijk om sensitiever te worden voor dergelijke noden, in de 
zin dat een breuk met het voorgaande symbolico-imaginaire kader niet gelokaliseerd hoeft te 
kunnen worden in één specifieke gebeurtenis.  
In Deel II wordt de noodzaak beargumenteerd om de huidige focus op het individu te 
verleggen naar grotere sociale entiteiten, en zo ook ‘materieel herstel’ op te nemen in 
traumatheorie. Een centraal idee in het kader dat werd uitgewerkt in Deel III is dat herstel van 
trauma een ondervraging en verandering van de sociopolitieke context die aanleiding gaf tot 
het ondergane onrecht vereist. Om dit idee in de praktijk om te zetten moeten we echter 
vertrekken van een andere ethiek, die zich niet langer blindstaart op de duidelijk zichtbare 
manifestaties van ‘het kwade’ en die ik heb getypeerd aan de hand van Badiou’s procedure 
van het ‘trouwe subject’ (sujet fidèle/faithful subject; procédure fidèle/fidelity procedure).  
De notie van de act staat centraal in het finale deel van deze dissertatie. Mijns inziens is het 
precies deze nog te weinig uitgewerkte notie die de psychoanalyse differentieert van 
psychotherapie als dusdanig. De relevantie van de uitwerking van de act in Hoofdstuk 8 
overschrijdt dan ook de context van het traumaonderzoek per se, gegeven de centrale plaats 
van dit concept binnen de klinische praktijk. Het is mijn overtuiging dat therapieonderzoek 





discontinu is, en gekenmerkt wordt door radicale breuken die het subject losmaken van de 
beveiliging die de aliënatie aan de Ander biedt. Het is slechts door de herstructurering van de 
relatie tot de Ander dat het subject zich kan losmaken van de paradoxale jouissance die deze 
aliënatie oplevert. Dat betekent dat therapie geen gradueel, incrementeel proces is, waarbij op 
een eenduidige manier reductie in de klachten en verbetering in het algemene welbevinden 
wordt bekomen. Een psychoanalyse verloopt moeizaam en pijnlijk, gezien er op de limieten 
van de betekenisverlening moet worden gebotst – om daar, te midden van de angst die 
gepaard gaat met de confrontatie met het tekort van de Ander, en in volstrekte eenzaamheid, 
de gelegenheid te krijgen om de ‘dobbelstenen opnieuw te werpen’.   
Een dergelijke visie gaat uiteraard in tegen het aan populariteit winnende idee dat de cliënt 
weet wat hij of zij wil en nodig heeft, en dat zijn of haar gevoel van welbehagen tijdens de 
gesprekken een betrouwbaar kompas vormt om de therapie op af te stemmen. Het discontinue 
karakter van evoluties binnen het psychoanalytische/therapeutische proces kan longitudinaal 
getest worden door data te verzamelen over de gehele loop van de therapiesessies. Daarbij 
kunnen inhoudelijke gegevens (uit de transcripties van de sessies) vergeleken worden met 
evoluties in symptoomniveaus en meer objectieve markers (zoals cortisol-niveaus). Dit kan, 
onder meer, duidelijk maken dat ‘verslechtering’ op symtomatisch vlak precies optreedt 
wanneer een confrontatie met het reële zich aandient.  
Deze conceptuele studie vormt een aanzet om het debat rond psychisch trauma te 
heroriënteren. Ze biedt concrete denksporen om het subject, de context en de politieke 
dimensie van trauma een plaats te geven. Deze ideeën zijn mijns inziens veelbelovend, maar 
vereisen nog verdere uitwerking en dialoog met het academische veld. Een belangrijke taak is 
om de geleverde inzichten om te zetten in testbare hypotheses enerzijds, en praktische 
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i For DSM-5, published in 2013, Criterion A has again received important revisions. It now 
reads as follows: ‘The person was exposed to: death, threatened death, actual or threatened 
serious injury, or actual or threatened sexual violence, as follows: (1 required) (a) Direct 
exposure, (b) witnessing, in person, (c) indirectly, by learning that a close relative or close 
friend was exposed to trauma. If the event involved actual or threatened death, it must have 
been violent or accidental, (d) repeated or extreme indirect exposure to aversive details of the 
event(s), usually in the course of professional duties (e.g., first responders, collecting body 
parts; professionals repeatedly exposed to details of child abuse). This does not include 
indirect non-professional exposure through electronic media, television, movies, or pictures.’ 
(National Center for PTSD, 2013) 
ii Other researchers have attempted to define trauma severity more objectively, for example by 
measuring the duration of the trauma and the number of incidences (Maercker et al., 2000). 
iii In the previous version of DSM (DSM-IV-TR), Criterion A1 was the component of the 
stressor criterion that described the range of events that justified the PTSD diagnosis. 
Criterion A2 described the subjective reaction of the person exposed that was a requirement 
for receiving the diagnosis. For DSM-5, Criterion A2 of the PTSD definition has been 
dropped. 
iv In German, the passage reads as follows: ‘Uberall findet sich, das eine Erinnerung verdrangt 
wird, die nur nachtraglich zum Trauma geworden ist‘ (Freud, 1895/1950, p. 435). 
v All the events subsequent to puberty to which an influence must be attributed upon the 
development of the hysterical neurosis and upon the formation of its symptoms are in fact 
only concurrent causes – “agents provocateurs” as Charcot used to say, although for him 
nervous heredity occupied the place which I claim for the precocious sexual experience’ 
(Freud, 1896/1975d, pp. 154–155). 
vi This is equivalent to the Lacanian notion of ‘la rencontre manquée’ (the missed encounter), 
which is a fundamental feature of the category of the Real. 
vii Adrian Johnston (2005) convincingly argues that a psychical element is a signifier to the 
extent that its value/meaning is determined by a network of differential relations between it 
and other elements. Thus, a visual memory trace can function ‘as an unconscious signifier 
insofar as its significance in a psychical economy depends on its interactive ties with other 




                                                                                                                                                                                                   
viii   Adrian Johnston (2013, p. 178) proposes this concept as he discusses how the speaking 
being as a subject is embedded in but not reducible to the human animal as an animal. 
ix Lacan called this type of determination the automaton-function of the unconscious, 
beautifully schematized in his ‘logic of the signifying chain’ (Lacan, 1954–1955, 
1957/2006c). 
x In Diagnosis and the DSM, Stijn Vanheule (2014) works out that an array of theoretical 
presuppositions drive this project, which renders its claims to “theoretical neutrality” 
untenable.  
xi This was changed into ‘Cultural Concepts of Distress’ in DSM-5, in an attempt to account 
for the fact that ‘all forms of distress are locally shaped, including the DSM disorders’ (APA, 
2013, p. 758). This claim, however, is difficult to reconcile with the general diagnostic 
approach of the DSM and the clinical interventions it inspires (Vanheule, 2014). 
xii In Badiou’s writings, ‘human rights’ and the more archaic phrase ‘rights of man’ are used 
interchangeably. Both are used to refer to humankind as a whole and thus encompass both 
sexes. 
xiii The work of Bruce Fink (1994; 1997), Danny Nobus (2000), Paul Verhaeghe (2001, 2008), 
Samuel Weber (2008) and Slavoj Žižek (1989, 2006) come to mind as excellent introductions 
into the meanders of Lacan’s work.  
xiv Incidentally, the same applies to the difficult notion of jouissance, which denotes some sort 
of paradoxical, corporeal mixture of enjoyment and pain. This Lacanian elaboration of 
Freud’s death drive is often comprehended as something that exists prior to and in 
independence of the signifier. However, in his later teachings, Lacan emphasized that 
jouissance must be conceived in its dependence on the materiality of language, which 
translated into concepts such as lalangue, the unary trait, and joui-sens. 
xv Bruce Fink draws attention to the fact that, insofar as we name and talk about it and weave 
it in a theoretical discourse, we obviously give some type of “existence” to that which only 
‘ex-sists’. 
xvi The identification with an image requires the presence of “proto-Symbolic, pre-Oedipal 
coordinates” that, for instance, locate an inside versus an outside (Eyers, 2012, p. 16). 
xvii A thorough discussion of these graphs can be found in Fink (1995, pp. 16-23, 179-182). 
xviii Although this is very reminiscent of the cognitive trauma theories mentioned in Chapter 3, 
the main difference is that meaning is not simply generated intrapsychically in the Lacanian 





                                                                                                                                                                                                   
xix This is a second pivotal point of divergence with cognitive trauma theories: recovery from 
trauma cannot come about on the basis of pre-existent knowledge, but requires the passage 
through the real of an act. 
xx ‘[T]he normal man is not only far more immoral than he believes but also far more moral 
than he knows” (Freud, 1923, p. 52). 
xxi This is reminiscent of Zygmunt Bauman’s thesis, worked out in Modernity and the 
Holocaust (1989), that the Holocaust is connected to the project  of modernity because of its 
reliance on procedural rationality, the division of labor, taxonomic organization of species, 
and the tendency to view rule-following as morally good.  
xxii  See Lacan, 1959-60, pp. 167-240 for a discussion of the complex and paradoxical 
relationship between jouissance and the law. 
xxiii From this, it follows that a ‘successful’ ethical act always has consequences for the Other, 
which will be of prime importance when we return to the general thesis of this study, for 
instance when we discuss the intersection of ethics with politics. 
xxiv Shepherdson uses the example of gold to make the strange status of the taboo object clear: 
our (symbolical) monetary system is said to rest on a ‘gold standard’ that materially 
guarantees or supports the system. Gold can play this part only because it appears to have 
some sort of ‘natural value’. As a material, it stands outside the symbolic system itself and 
merely gives ‘value’ to the symbolic elements that circulate in it. The enigma is that gold’s 
special status as something with ‘natural value’ is an effect of this symbolic system itself: 
gold is a product or surplus-effect expelled from the symbolical interplay. Thus: gold comes 
into being via the system, yet in such a way that its origins are hidden, to appear as if it was 
‘always there’ and the system only emerged on its basis. As such, it functions as a (false) 
‘natural’ guarantee for the monetary system (Shepherdson, 2008, p. 21-25).  
xxv Specifically: Fuse (Žalica et al., 2003), Go West (Imamović&Puska, 2005), Grbavica: The 
Land of 
My Dreams (Žbanić, Karanović, Lučev, & Ćatić, 2006), and In the Name of the Son (Harun 
Mehmedinovic, 2007). 
xxvi  ‘Nous voyons maintenant cette place où elle est, parce qu’elle peut être occupée, mais 
qu’elle n’est occupée <qu’au temps> où ce sujet supposé savoir s’est réduit à ce terme, que 
celui qui l’a jusque-là garanti par son acte, à savoir le psychanalyste, lui, le psychanalyste 
l’est devenu, ce résidu, cet objet a. Celui qui, à la fin d’une analyse dite didactique relève, si je 




                                                                                                                                                                                                   
analyste est devenu dans l’accomplissement de cet acte, à savoir ce résidu, ce déchet, cette 
chose rejetée.’ (Lacan, 1967-68, lesson on January 10, 1968, p. 58) 
xxvii See, for instance, the post-Lacanian literature on ‘the passe’, or the seminars of Jacques-
Alain Miller (such as ‘De la Nature des Semblants’ of 1991-92). 
xxviii Although there is a tendency to elevate the symbolic type of response to a desirable ideal, 
it should be noted that so-called ‘imaginary’ strategies that succeed in pinning down the 
estranging real element quickly produce therapeutic, soothing effects. In my regard, Lacan’s 
‘knot theory’ moves away from this privileging of the symbolic in the direction of 
acknowledging the equivalence of the three registers. Similarly, the idea of the ‘sinthome’ 
emphasizes the singularity of a subjective solution in the face of the real, a particular form of 
knotting the registers together – without making any statement about the ways in which this is 
best accomplished (Lacan, 1975-76). It should be noted that even an ‘imaginary’ response to 
the real that suddenly manifested itself in a traumatic encounter necessitates a creative 
invention: trauma formally resists the return to prior modes of fantasmatic enjoyment. 
xxix Unconscious choice, just like unconscious thought, can be considered somewhat of an 
oxymoron – a philosophical matter that I will not pursue here.  
xxx Adrian Johnston (2009, pp. 85-91) describes the philosophical arguments that justify this 
strategy in more detail.  
xxxi Some paragraphs in the following sections have been taken from an article published in 
Theory & Psychology (December 2014, vol. 24(6), pp. 830-851, doi: 
10.1177/0959354314548616). This article was written in cooperation with Stijn Vanheule and 
Stef Craps, who both work at Ghent University. 
xxxii See lesson of January 15, 1974. 
xxxiii And, as we will see, this new interpretative horizon only comes into being through the 
disciplined and protracted activity of the faithful subject. 
xxxiv Badiou’s typology of the subject consists of the faithful subject, the reactive subject and 
the obscure subject. They are characterized by a differential relation with regard to the truth of 
the event. The faithful subject works towards its production, the reactive subject towards its 
denial, and the obscure subject towards its occultation (Badiou, 2009a, p. 50-67). 
 
